On Hell and Forgiveness

[polymath257]

So the doctrine is that there is a single version of 'greater' that applies to all virtues? How about bravery vs compassion? How about honesty vs respect?

Besides, the whole debate boils down to the existence of your fairy tale deity. In the absence of such a creature, the rest of this goes out the window.

And, again, the problem isn't the impossibility of maximal versions of each virtue (that is a separate issue). The question is the consistency between different virtues. The virtues may be possible, and even a greatest for each individual virtue, without having a single entity be maximal for *all* virtues.

And how do you know there isn't more than one 'maximum'? Again, such are quite possible and even reasonable. But you make no mention to dispense with that possibility.

There only has to be a greatest WITHIN the property for this to make sense. Your unconnected pairs do nothing to undermine the concept. 

Bravery: does not apply to God.
Compassion: the greatest amount of compassion possible
Honesty: the highest possible standard
Respect: does not apply to God. 

Each property has within itself the concept of what is greater. There is no external standard that has to be dreamed up. It is already there. There is no "maximal for *all* virtues." Just string the greatest possible attributes together--and then you have God.

OK, so you are picking and choosing virtues that can or cannot be used. How do you choose? Why do bravery and respect not apply to God? They *are* virtues, are they not?

And once again, even if each virtue you choose has a maximum, there is no reason to think they all have the *same* maximum. In fact, having a common maximum on unrelated orders is very, very rare.

So, again, why do you think that there is a *common* maximum for all these virtues?

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OK, let me say it more clearly: you have given no coherent definition of the term 'greater' for any individual virtue. This I don't see as a huge thing: it is probably possible to do so.

Then, you have failed to give a coherent way to merge the different types of 'greater'. This is a major problem: it is actually very seldom that two different orderings give a 'nice' merged ordering. There are two main ways to attempt this: known as the product order and the lexicographic order. Which you pick will determine the properties of any 'maximum'. But they give different results and there are multiple ways to do the lexi order: each with very different properties.

So, by waving your hands, you fail to note that you cannot get the properties you want from this argument unless you give details. Again, that makes your whole argument incoherent: you have to do the work to make it make sense.

Finally, even if you resolve the issues of how to merge different virtues into an overall ordering, you still need to proven the existence of a greatest. Most partial orders do NOT have a greatest at all (especially if they allow infinities). Often, there are two or more 'maximal' entities that cannot be compared at all. You want to claim a *unique* maximal entity for the merged order and allowing infinite progressions. That is very, very unlikely.

And, ultimately, your lack of understanding of basics means that you wave away serious difficulties and fail to comprehend fundamental problems with the argument. That, in addition, leads to incoherence: your confusion is such that the details cannot be understood.

I gave you a definition (from a dictionary, those things, that provide definitions for words).  I also notice, that you keep trying to talk about other things, than the topic at hand without any real specifics.  And I still don't think that you can equivocate on the term incoherance in this way, and have both your arguments be coherent.  You need to pick one.

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I think you are having issues, making a non-math problem into a math problem.  To a hammer... everything is a nail.

How am I equivocating on the term 'incoherence'? As far as I can see I have used it consistently and correctly.