Berkeley's Idealism

[genkaus]

Your statement is logical, however, I find the implied definition of “reality” as physical reality problematic. Our nomenclature may be slightly different and I would prefer not to bicker about semantics. I consider myself a layman and may not be up to date with conventions common in academic circles. I also attempt to use everyday language to the greatest extent possible.

You are correct in inferring the implication, but that position would be untenable even without it.

Like you, I consider reality a given. My concerns revolve around the scope of various ways of talking/thinking about that reality. As I see it physics describes one aspect of reality (material interactions) and has provided powerful means of interacting with reality, i.e. stainless steel, the polio vaccine, transistors, etc. I understand metaphysics to include all other fundamental parts of reality that support the validity of physics and the integrity of the scientific method as it applies the parts of reality governed by physical laws.

There seems to be a certain equivocation between physics and physical laws here.

Physical reality (including the physical laws) would be at the very least, a fundamental part of reality. Physics - being the understanding of these fundamental parts - would necessarily rely on it for its validity.

Metaphysics is the understanding all fundamental parts of reality. If the reality is considered to only have a physical component - then there is no distinction between metaphysics and physics (other that a functional one). Thus, any fundamental distinction between physics and metaphysics requires the assumption of more parts to reality than physical ones.

However, this assumption does not automatically make any part of reality dependent on another - nor does it indicate which part of reality is independent of which. Your last statement indicated the assumption that it is the physical reality that is dependent on the other fundamental parts whereas, according to our current knowledge, it is only physical reality that can be taken as a given. However, this is a position you'd have to espouse in order to defend idealism.

I’m not comfortable with the way you formulated this statement. I’ve been experimenting with alternate forms, such as…
1. A fact is a true statement about a thing that will be true even when the thing goes unobserved.
2. “P” is a true statement about a thing “E”.
3. Thing “E” goes unobserved, therefore…
4. Statement “P” cannot be a fact.

Incorrect formulation. The correct one would be:

1. A fact is a true statement about a thing that will be true even when the thing goes unobserved.
2. “P” is a true statement about a thing “E”.
3. Thing “E” goes unobserved, therefore…
4. Statement “P” can be a fact (from 1).

[Neo-Scholastic]

Thus, any fundamental distinction between physics and metaphysics requires the assumption of more parts to reality than physical ones.

This may be a point of semantics more than real difference. Metaphysics would just be physics not yet developed. There must be only one reality and I've been calling the Totality. Maybe cosmos (kosmos) would be the more appropriate term. I've been calling physical reality the reality governed by physics to distinguish it from other forms of inquiry, like philosophy, mathematics, etc. Perhaps instead refering to "physical reality", I should refer to material reality, although I do not find that much of an improvement. (Suggestions?)

Plus I'm not convinced that everything reduces to physical processes as currently understood. I do not say that in order to defend theism. I still think there are serious problems in philosophy of mind that go beyond four fundamental forces and physical constants.

However, this assumption does not automatically make any part of reality dependent on another - nor does it indicate which part of reality is independent of which.

Would such a inter-dependency/coincidental be called nominalism in academic discourse?

Incorrect formulation. The correct one would be:
1. A fact is a true statement about a thing that will be true even when the thing goes unobserved.
2. “P” is a true statement about a thing “E”.
3. Thing “E” goes unobserved, therefore…
4. Statement “P” can be a fact (from 1).

You are correct. I misplace a negative. I'm still uncomfortable because this form uses the term "fact" for something that may never be observed. To me that's a bit of a problem. How then do you know if it is the true statement is really true? You could state a fact and not even know it to be true. To correct this problem, perhaps the following would be more accurate:

1. A fact is a statement about a thing that is observed to be true and which continues to be true even when the thing ceased to be observed.
2. "P" is a true statement about thing "E"
3. Thing "E" goes unobserved.
Therefore:
4. "P" cannot be a fact.

There is also a time element involved in the Premise 1 where it says "continues to be true". Because the fact can only be known be a true statement only during observation. A change could happen after the observation. Like if I say there is beer in the fridge but unbeknownst to me my "friend" drank it all.

This seems to strike at the heart of Idealism. Like you said, without facts there can be no proof. And without proof (in the form of observation) there can be no facts.

[genkaus]

This may be a point of semantics more than real difference. Metaphysics would just be physics not yet developed. There must be only one reality and I've been calling the Totality. Maybe cosmos (kosmos) would be the more appropriate term. I've been calling physical reality the reality governed by physics to distinguish it from other forms of inquiry, like philosophy, mathematics, etc. Perhaps instead refering to "physical reality", I should refer to material reality, although I do not find that much of an improvement. (Suggestions?)

Plus I'm not convinced that everything reduces to physical processes as currently understood. I do not say that in order to defend theism. I still think there are serious problems in philosophy of mind that go beyond four fundamental forces and physical constants.

There is a difference between being "reduced to" and "arising from".

Consider the forms of inquiry which could be considered independent of the material reality - philosophy, mathematics, logic etc. All these fields arise from the material reality as a result of the process of abstraction. For example, we can only perceive concrete examples of humanity, i.e. a single person here or there. But when we identify the defining qualities and aggregate them conceptually, we get the concept of a human being. And while this concept may have instantiated concretes, it cannot be said to be reduced to them.

It would be incorrect to say that these fields go "beyond" physical reality or to assert that they assert any effect over it, since they have developed from the material reality in the first place.

Would such a inter-dependency/coincidental be called nominalism in academic discourse?

Maybe. I don't know.

You are correct. I misplace a negative. I'm still uncomfortable because this form uses the term "fact" for something that may never be observed. To me that's a bit of a problem. How then do you know if it is the true statement is really true? You could state a fact and not even know it to be true.

Any statement of fact implies knowledge of truth. To state something as a fact, while claiming no knowledge of its truth is self-contradictory. Now, if a thing is never observed (directly or indirectly) then there can be no knowledge about it and therefore no factual statement about it either.

To correct this problem, perhaps the following would be more accurate:

1. A fact is a statement about a thing that is observed to be true and which continues to be true even when the thing ceased to be observed.
2. "P" is a true statement about thing "E"
3. Thing "E" goes unobserved.
Therefore:
4. "P" cannot be a fact.

There is also a time element involved in the Premise 1 where it says "continues to be true". Because the fact can only be known be a true statement only during observation. A change could happen after the observation. Like if I say there is beer in the fridge but unbeknownst to me my "friend" drank it all.

Certain ambiguity here.

The first premise is incorrect definition about a fact. A fact is simply a statement about a thing that is currently observed to be true. Any further continuation of its truth or any further observation are irrelevant.

For example, if I stated "George Bush is the president of America" - this would have been both a fact and the truth in 2004. But now the same statement is neither. Facts are not absolute and unchanging - they are contextual.

So, in the rest of your argument - P can be a fact upto the point that E has been observed and no change in E occurs. After that, P is no longer a fact.

This seems to strike at the heart of Idealism. Like you said, without facts there can be no proof. And without proof (in the form of observation) there can be no facts.

You are equivocating between scientific meaning of proof and general meaning. Scientifically, what is observed is a fact. It requires no further proof, it is self-evident. Where a theory is concerned, the facts that support it are equivalent of the proof.

In layman's terms, observation identifies facts. The difference here is just what is true and identification of that truth. While no statement can be made about truth without proper identification, it exists regardless.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I guess this is the point where my neo-Platonic thinking starts to kick in. We clearly have a much different understanding of the abstraction. I think like an artist in this regard.

To make an abstraction, an artist selects generalized features representative of a particular thing or class of objects. This process results in a visual or auditory prompt that calls to mind the object represented. For example the artist extracts the visible outline and color impressions of a person to make a portrait. The portrait, as a symbol, prompts the mind to form a mental image of the person they represent. The symbol is an abstraction.
The exact opposite of an abstraction is a form. A form is that from which particular physical examples are abstracted. Forms are not vague abstractions extracted from many examples. Instead the various particular embodiments (abstractions) are each cruder versions of fuller and more comprehensive ideal forms. In Panentheism (or at least the kind I advocate) creation simply means formally causing something to exist. Because distinct entities have no definitive demarcation that separates them physically, their perceived relationship to the properties and qualities of a form allow us to recognize when any given thing can be considered part of a class of objects.

This does however open the door to Idealism which is a concept I find problematic for the reasons we’ve been discussing. And that is why I started the discussion. By reducing everything to operations of the mind, Idealism fails to address why physical relationships are even required. It seems to me, physicality somehow constrains mental activities. When some of the more strident members here talk about their belief that science will someday explain conscious experience, I find it more than a bit naïve. Such materialists are essentially claiming that conscious experience is produced by classical electro-chemical processes. That also is a self-refuting position, similar to Idealism. If conscious experience emerges from physical events, then some kind of proto-consciousness must be already present.

So I see a form-substance relationship extending throughout the totality. While they can be distinct aspects of reality, they can never be truly divided. Every substance has a form and every form has a substance. This is why I posit the existence of a pan-psychic medium, which I consider a primal substance, as something that embodies ideal form. This is both a top-down and bottom-up approach. While it is possible to view reality from either direction, top-down being Idealism and bottom-up being Materialism, I do not see how either can be complete without the other.

Of course none of this has as yet been confirmed experimentally, but we can at least see a possible interfacing mechanism between the part of reality governed by classical physics and the experiential part of reality. While I do not claim to understand the details of Penrose’s theories about sub-neural activity, what little I do know seems support this position.

[genkaus]

I guess this is the point where my neo-Platonic thinking starts to kick in. We clearly have a much different understanding of the abstraction. I think like an artist in this regard.

To make an abstraction, an artist selects generalized features representative of a particular thing or class of objects. This process results in a visual or auditory prompt that calls to mind the object represented. For example the artist extracts the visible outline and color impressions of a person to make a portrait. The portrait, as a symbol, prompts the mind to form a mental image of the person they represent. The symbol is an abstraction.
The exact opposite of an abstraction is a form. A form is that from which particular physical examples are abstracted. Forms are not vague abstractions extracted from many examples. Instead the various particular embodiments (abstractions) are each cruder versions of fuller and more comprehensive ideal forms.

I think it is when you started talking about forms that you either lost me or went off the tracks yourself.

There are physical concretes which we can perceive. We generalize certain features from those concretes to create abstractions - such as an artist generalizing the outline and color. So far, we are on the same page.

Then you go ahead an talk about forms of which those abstracts are cruder or incomplete embodiment. If a concrete is taken as an embodiment of an abstract, then the form would be an abstract's abstract. However, instead of understanding it as something derived and understood through the abstract (as abstracts were derived and understood through concretes), here you presuppose their existence and define abstracts according to them. That seems to me to be presupposing idealism.

In Panentheism (or at least the kind I advocate) creation simply means formally causing something to exist. Because distinct entities have no definitive demarcation that separates them physically, their perceived relationship to the properties and qualities of a form allow us to recognize when any given thing can be considered part of a class of objects.

Since perceptions are all what are required to create abstracts, perceived demarcation is quite enough to classify distinct objects

This does however open the door to Idealism which is a concept I find problematic for the reasons we’ve been discussing.

Actually, the door was opened the moment you talked about forms being the ideal and complete versions of abstracts.

And that is why I started the discussion. By reducing everything to operations of the mind, Idealism fails to address why physical relationships are even required. It seems to me, physicality somehow constrains mental activities. When some of the more strident members here talk about their belief that science will someday explain conscious experience, I find it more than a bit naïve. Such materialists are essentially claiming that conscious experience is produced by classical electro-chemical processes. That also is a self-refuting position, similar to Idealism. If conscious experience emerges from physical events, then some kind of proto-consciousness must be already present.

How do you come to that conclusion? You'd need to explain it a bit better on how it is self-refuting.

So I see a form-substance relationship extending throughout the totality. While they can be distinct aspects of reality, they can never be truly divided. Every substance has a form and every form has a substance. This is why I posit the existence of a pan-psychic medium, which I consider a primal substance, as something that embodies ideal form. This is both a top-down and bottom-up approach. While it is possible to view reality from either direction, top-down being Idealism and bottom-up being Materialism, I do not see how either can be complete without the other.

The critical difference between bottom-up and top-down approach is that the bottom-up approach is more or less self-evident. Our percepts are self-evident and the abstracts derived form them are therefore justifiable. The ideal form and any knowledge of it, however, is anything but. Further, every known abstract has its root in those percepts and nowhere any invocation of the ideal form is required to trace the its origin.

So, your options here are to view abstracts as derived from self-evident percepts - the epistemological consequence of this position being use of reason, or to view it as a crude version of an unknown ideal form - the epistemological consequence being faith.

However, there are consequences to holding beliefs in the ideal form, especially, when you consider it to hold primacy. In any conflict between the abstract derived from the percept and that viewed a crude version of ideal form, you'd necessarily subscribe for the latter - one for which there can be no justification. To hold that position rationally, you must first justify that it is possible to view reality that way - which would require knowledge of existence of the ideal form - which would require that you start from the bottom-up (the self-evident part) and show that there can be an ideal form.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Before continuing the conversation I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your willingness to participate in a truly philisophical discussion. Thank you.

So on to the issues at hand:

“Then you ...talk about forms of which those abstracts are a cruder or incomplete embodiment. If a concrete is taken as an embodiment of an abstract, then the form would be an abstract's abstract.” - genkaus

You restated that fairly well, but I meant more. A concrete, or real, thing has both formal and substantial attributes. Form and substance cannot be found independent of each other. Nevertheless we still talk about a thing’s form or a thing’s substance.

Here is what I’m asking you to do: Consider this process in light of the premise that “every form has a substance and every substance has a form.” This means, when we generalize features to create abstractions those abstractions are themselves realized as a concrete, or real, thing. The portrait is an abstraction of the person AND it is also a concrete object made of paint on canvas. The painting has both formal and substantive aspects. To extend this example, if I now make a drawing of the painting, then the drawing is an abstraction of formal features found in the concrete painting.

"Since perceptions are all what are required to create abstracts, perceived demarcation is quite enough to classify distinct objects” - genkaus

I doubt this very much but I cannot come up with the right words to express what I'm thinking. I'd like a raincheck on that one to make sure I don't set up some kind of straw man.

"You'd need to explain it a bit better on how it is self-refuting." - genkaus, refering to my dismissal of conscious experience being produced by classical electro-chemical processes.

Because classical physics operates according to deterministic principles that themselves have no experiencial component. In this scheme consciousness is an illusion produced by brain functions. The self-refuting part is that the illusion of a subjective experience is itself a subjective experience.

“The critical difference between bottom-up and top-down approach is that the bottom-up approach is more or less self-evident...Our percepts are self-evident and the abstracts derived from them are therefore justifiable. .” - genkaus

The role of the conscious observer is also self-evident. “Cognito Ergo Sum.” We must account for both the self-evident truth that we are self-aware experiencers of reality (without giving in to Idealism) and the equally self-evident truth that concrete things are made out of something (without settling for Materialism).
"To hold that position rationally, you must first justify that it is possible to view reality that way - which would require knowledge of existence of the ideal form."

To hold a position rationally does not require one to prove that it is so against all commers. All that is required is a reasonable hypothesis. The concept of ideal form only means that there is a ultimate and universal standard that informs our proximate truths just as the idea of primal matter only means that there is a universal and fundamental ground in which the various forms can manifest themselves. While such a position is not conclusive, I find it entirely reasonable.

[genkaus]

Before continuing the conversation I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your willingness to participate in a truly philisophical discussion. Thank you.

Likewise.

You restated that fairly well, but I meant more. A concrete, or real, thing has both formal and substantial attributes. Form and substance cannot be found independent of each other. Nevertheless we still talk about a thing’s form or a thing’s substance.

There seems to be certain ambiguity in the use of the word "form" - previously used as ideal form and now being used as equivalent of an abstract.

Getting to the argument - yes, a concrete has both formal and substantial attributes, but it is only the substantial that is inherent to it. The formal attributes are the consequence of perception ans abstraction of the given concrete. These two cannot be "found" independent of each other, because the very act of "finding" results in formal attribution.

Here is what I’m asking you to do: Consider this process in light of the premise that “every form has a substance and every substance has a form.” This means, when we generalize features to create abstractions those abstractions are themselves realized as a concrete, or real, thing. The portrait is an abstraction of the person AND it is also a concrete object made of paint on canvas. The painting has both formal and substantive aspects. To extend this example, if I now make a drawing of the painting, then the drawing is an abstraction of formal features found in the concrete painting.

While you are correct in thinking that we do create abstractions by generalizing concretes, you are mistaken in that every abstraction would therefore have a concrete. That's because there is another way abstractions can be created - from preexisting abstractions. For example, from my perceptions I've got abstract concepts about my body, my arms etc. Similarly, from observing the birds, I've concepts about their wings. Now, within abstraction, I can imagine myself with wings, flying through the air, but this is an abstraction without any concrete counterpart.

Because classical physics operates according to deterministic principles that themselves have no experiencial component. In this scheme consciousness is an illusion produced by brain functions. The self-refuting part is that the illusion of a subjective experience is itself a subjective experience.

The error here is the assumption that since there is no experiential component to be found reductionally, there could be no experience holistically. The example I like to use here is that of a clock measuring the passage of time. While you cannot point to any component that is responsible for the measurement, the clock as a whole is capable of it. Arrangement of components in a particular way is capable of resulting in attributes that cannot be found in any of the components themselves. These are referred to as emergent properties.

The role of the conscious observer is also self-evident. “Cognito Ergo Sum.” We must account for both the self-evident truth that we are self-aware experiencers of reality (without giving in to Idealism) and the equally self-evident truth that concrete things are made out of something (without settling for Materialism).

Here we reach an irreconcilable difference. I do not consider consciousness or self-awareness to be self-evident for the following reasons.

1. If consciousness was self-evident, then every conscious being would be self-aware, i.e. aware of its own consciousness. That is not the case, since a majority of the animal kingdom is conscious, but not self-aware.

2. Even in humans, the external awareness comes before any awareness of oneself. Functions such as thought and memory are only possible to a self-aware being. The fact that we were conscious for a long time before we became capable of either, means there is a difference between consciousness and self-awareness, which would not be there if it were self-evident.

3. I do not agree with Cogito Ergo Sum, because it seems to me that it replaces the cause with the consequence. I'd say, Sum Ergo Cogito, i.e. I exist therefore I think. Alternatively, I'd formulate it as - I exist, therefore I think, therefore I know I exist.

I think that was the understanding that Descartes intended when he formulated the phrase. It is the knowledge of your existence that is the consequence of your thought - not your existence itself. Thus, your role of a conscious self-aware being is not self-evident, but contingent.

To hold a position rationally does not require one to prove that it is so against all commers. All that is required is a reasonable hypothesis. The concept of ideal form only means that there is a ultimate and universal standard that informs our proximate truths just as the idea of primal matter only means that there is a universal and fundamental ground in which the various forms can manifest themselves. While such a position is not conclusive, I find it entirely reasonable.

As you said, the hypothesis should be reasonable and as I said, for this hypothesis to be reasonable, you should show that the proposed ideal form could exist - not that it does, but that it is possible. Plain assumption of that possibility does not make the hypothesis reasonable. Just because you can conceive of such an ideal form, does not mean that the concrete of such could exist.

[Neo-Scholastic]

There seems to be certain ambiguity in the use of the word "form" - previously used as ideal form and now being used as equivalent of an abstract.

Yes, I’m aware of that. My intention is to bring our language and the terms we use closer to a mutual understanding of meaning. Where this occurs I will try to be clear about it.

Getting to the argument - yes, a concrete has both formal and substantial attributes, but it is only the substantial that is inherent to it. The formal attributes are the consequence of perception as abstraction of the given concrete. These two cannot be "found" independent of each other, because the very act of "finding" results in formal attribution.

In your writing you make a distinction between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’. For me this is a problem. It suggests that ‘concrete’ means an actual real thing as opposed to ‘abstract’ which means something that is only apparent and thus not ‘real’. Thus when I hear ‘concrete’ I think of a ‘thing’, something that exists. Whereas, you seem to use ‘concrete’ as synonymous with ‘substance’.

To my thinking the formal and the substantial are both attributes of the ‘concrete’ real thing. Confronted with a real thing, we perceive that it has a form and we also perceive that it has a substance. Form by itself does not make a thing real until fleshed out by substance. Likewise, substance by itself does not make a real thing unless it takes on a form. Even at the smallest scales of reality, we infer both s&f from the quark’s existence. I disagree with the physicist that said, “reality is just structured nothingness.” Out of nothing, nothing comes, etc.
Here I’m using the terms ‘form’ and ‘substance’ very loosely, because I see both as having relative meanings rather than absolute ones depending on scale (cosmic, everyday, microscopic, sub-atomic, etc.) Likewise, I use the terms ‘form’ and ‘abstract’ loosely as well for roughly the same reason.

…you are mistaken in that every abstraction would therefore have a concrete. That's because there is another way abstractions can be created - from preexisting abstractions. For example, from my perceptions I've got abstract concepts about my body, my arms etc. Similarly, from observing the birds, I've concepts about their wings. Now, within abstraction, I can imagine myself with wings, flying through the air, but this is an abstraction without any concrete counterpart.

Consistent with my terminology, a fantastic thought, is still a real thing, i.e. a thought. In objective reality, the thought manifests itself as a formal state in the brain’s substance. Researchers recognize this when they look at an MRI and observe the retrieval of a memory or other mental activity. The person getting the MRI has a much different view. For the person various experiences collected into the impression of their grandmother, for example. In my terminology, experiences correspond with the substance of a memory and the impression with the form of a memory. How I think these conjoin I’ll explain below.

…The example I like to use here is that of a clock … [the] arrangement of components in a particular way is capable of resulting in attributes that cannot be found in any of the components themselves. These are referred to as emergent properties.
In the clock example, the emergent property is a function. Functionalism explains the emergence of objective abilities of the brain once critical levels of order and complexity have been reached. As such, it only describes cascades of physical events, like translating electromagnetic waves into the brain states that prompt animals to react. Functionalism provides no mechanism whereby actual sensation can enter into or influence the causal chain of events. It’s a hollow victory. You get all the behaviors of being alive, but not any of its feeling.

[quote='genkaus' pid='259428' dateline='1332401734']Here we reach an irreconcilable difference. I do not consider consciousness or self-awareness to be self-evident…

Perhaps you are right about it being an irreconcilable difference. I think we’re both in good company. Respected thinkers come down on both sides of the issue. Or we might not be as far apart as would seem on first blush. Going back to our earlier posts, we came to agreement on what constitutes a fact.

Scientifically, what is observed is a fact. It requires no further proof, it is self-evident.…In layman's terms, observation identifies facts.

(emphasis mine)
In light of that agreement, I’d like to re-examine your comments about the self-evidence of self-awareness and consciousness.

It is the knowledge of your existence that is the consequence of your thought - not your existence itself. Thus, your role of a conscious self-aware being is not self-evident, but contingent.

Here I want to avoid the inherent vagueness of ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-awareness’. Each of us observes the contents of consciousness, our own subjective sensations and perceptions. Experiences themselves are facts, even if what the experiences represent are only fantasies, and are thus self-evident, not contingent.

… for this hypothesis to be reasonable, you should show that the proposed ideal form could exist - not that it does, but that it is possible.

Following up on a earlier promise: In my terminology, experiences correspond with the substance of a memory and the impression with the form of a memory. How I think these conjoin I’ll explain below.
I envision reality extending along a line from the infinite to the infinitesimal. On the infinite end of the line you have one Ideal Form, the complete form of the totality. As you move along the scale, away from the infinite toward the infinitesimal, you get various lesser forms made of compound substances. At the far end of the scale sits primal matter, the irreducible infinitesimal substance of the totality.
Since, in my view, functional descriptions of interactions at scales between the everyday and quantum level, do not support subjective experiences, I predict a finer scale of materiality that has fundamental proto-conscious properties. A pan-psychic substance such as this would conjoin with forms of subjective experience to become real things.
Now I’m ready to follow-up with the promised reply to your comment in an earlier post: "Since perceptions are all what are required to create abstracts, perceived demarcation is quite enough to classify distinct objects” – genkaus.

At the everyday scale, we recognize real things composed of everyday substances, like wood, and everyday forms, like chairs. Everyday things are recognizes by comparing them real things at the microscopic scale. I use the analogy of weights and measures. An official set of ‘true’ weights and measures serves as the basis by which all other weights and measures. All other weights and measures are considered ‘true’ only so far as they accurately reflect the properties of their official versions. Correspondences between the formal state of the brain’s substance (the official standard) allows us to recognize things at the everyday scale (various examples of the official standard). I assume that parallel processing at neural scale is sufficient to provide a demarcation point when that point of demarcation occurs at the everyday scale.

So far so good, nothing another forum member would call “woo”.

The problem I see that needs a hypothesis is this. The brain continually adapts the connections between neurons into new shapes that encode a real official standard that expands or adjusts when we are presented with an outlying example, one not already reflected in the neural model of reality. For example, from childhood we learn to identify dogs after repeated exposure to various kinds of dogs. Once that neural model has been formed (by the process I’m trying to describe) the child compares new particulars against the model. Four legs and a tail, check. Floppy ears, check. Etc. How does the brain know to adjust the model or form new categories when confronted with an outlier like a three-legged dog? I’m saying that the brain compares its neutrally encoded model with an “official standard” that exists at a different scale than the everyday, relationships (forms) encoded in larger composite substances, like a community.

This is as far as I’ve gotten with this line of inquiry respecting demarcation points, etc. From here it’s uncharted territory to me.

[genkaus]

In your writing you make a distinction between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’. For me this is a problem. It suggests that ‘concrete’ means an actual real thing as opposed to ‘abstract’ which means something that is only apparent and thus not ‘real’. Thus when I hear ‘concrete’ I think of a ‘thing’, something that exists. Whereas, you seem to use ‘concrete’ as synonymous with ‘substance’.

I do make a distinction between an 'abstract' and a 'concrete', but it is not as you understood it. A concrete is a real thing, an abstract is the product of our mind which is the result of our perception of the real thing. At this point, you'd be the one equating physical reality with reality. A concrete exists in physical reality, an abstract in conceptual reality.

To my thinking the formal and the substantial are both attributes of the ‘concrete’ real thing. Confronted with a real thing, we perceive that it has a form and we also perceive that it has a substance. Form by itself does not make a thing real until fleshed out by substance. Likewise, substance by itself does not make a real thing unless it takes on a form. Even at the smallest scales of reality, we infer both s&f from the quark’s existence. I disagree with the physicist that said, “reality is just structured nothingness.” Out of nothing, nothing comes, etc.

A concrete does have formal attributes - but only when it is perceived. You cannot speak of any formal attributes of an object unless it is perceived. Substance, however, is enough to make an object real, even absent any perception.

To clarify, there are three consideration while talking about attributes of a concrete. Firstly, it exists - and it exists as a structured substance. This existence is independent of anyone's perception of it. At this level, there can be no formal (i.e. conceptual) attributes assigned to it. e.g. there is something inside the breadbox (or maybe there isn't). Now, if there is, then its existence and mode of existence does not depend upon us. However, it does not have any formal (as in conceptual or abstract, not structural) - attributes just yet.

Next is perception. This is the step where the formal attributes come in. With perception, we identify the structure and the substance and the formal properties come in. e.g. I open the box and see a lump of matter. I can see through it - formal attribute: transparency. It does not deform easily - formal attribute: solidity. Light splits within it: refractiveness. It scratches other surfaces : hardness. And so on. Substantially, the object had all these properties from the beginning, formally, it didn't.

Finally, I abstract out all these formal attributes from the concrete example in front of me and I put it under one header - "Diamond".

Consistent with my terminology, a fantastic thought, is still a real thing, i.e. a thought. In objective reality, the thought manifests itself as a formal state in the brain’s substance. Researchers recognize this when they look at an MRI and observe the retrieval of a memory or other mental activity. The person getting the MRI has a much different view. For the person various experiences collected into the impression of their grandmother, for example. In my terminology, experiences correspond with the substance of a memory and the impression with the form of a memory. How I think these conjoin I’ll explain below.

You are confusing between the form of the memory and the content of the memory. For example, the formal attributes of a book would be "leatherbound", "thick", "has pages". The content represents a completely different abstract - the story.

The point here would be - though a pure form ("a story" or a "memory") does exist, it cannot exist independently of some other concrete ("the book" or "brain").

Here I want to avoid the inherent vagueness of ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-awareness’. Each of us observes the contents of consciousness, our own subjective sensations and perceptions. Experiences themselves are facts, even if what the experiences represent are only fantasies, and are thus self-evident, not contingent.

The vagueness between consciousness and self-awareness is easily resolved. Consciousness is simply awareness of something - anything. Even a plant that senses changes in temperature can be considered conscious. Self-awareness is consciousness of consciousness.

Now, is the observation of consciousness, i.e. consciousness of consciousness, self-evident? We are aware of our experiences, thoughts and emotions - but is that awareness automatic? If it was automatic, then there is no reason as to why anything that is conscious would not be self-aware. Even if it was automatic among humans, then babies would be self-aware from birth. The sizable gap between being conscious and being self-aware suggests that self-awareness is a learned awareness and not automatic, though it seems to come automatically to us now.

Following up on a earlier promise: In my terminology, experiences correspond with the substance of a memory and the impression with the form of a memory. How I think these conjoin I’ll explain below.

Actually, memory - being a concrete itself - would have a substance and a form, independent of its content.

I envision reality extending along a line from the infinite to the infinitesimal. On the infinite end of the line you have one Ideal Form, the complete form of the totality. As you move along the scale, away from the infinite toward the infinitesimal, you get various lesser forms made of compound substances. At the far end of the scale sits primal matter, the irreducible infinitesimal substance of the totality.

Hold it for a sec. Here, you once again use the words "Ideal Form".

Given that you the usage of the word was changed previously, you need to re-clarify what it means here.

Since, in my view, functional descriptions of interactions at scales between the everyday and quantum level, do not support subjective experiences, I predict a finer scale of materiality that has fundamental proto-conscious properties. A pan-psychic substance such as this would conjoin with forms of subjective experience to become real things.

That would be unnecessary. While the complete explanation may not be present yet, the basics regarding consciousness and subjective experiences are understood and do not require invocation of an unknown materiality.

As I previously argued, the absence of property within the contents of the object does not negate the property itself.

The problem I see that needs a hypothesis is this. The brain continually adapts the connections between neurons into new shapes that encode a real official standard that expands or adjusts when we are presented with an outlying example, one not already reflected in the neural model of reality. For example, from childhood we learn to identify dogs after repeated exposure to various kinds of dogs. Once that neural model has been formed (by the process I’m trying to describe) the child compares new particulars against the model. Four legs and a tail, check. Floppy ears, check. Etc. How does the brain know to adjust the model or form new categories when confronted with an outlier like a three-legged dog? I’m saying that the brain compares its neutrally encoded model with an “official standard” that exists at a different scale than the everyday, relationships (forms) encoded in larger composite substances, like a community.

This is as far as I’ve gotten with this line of inquiry respecting demarcation points, etc. From here it’s uncharted territory to me.

As I see it, this would be where the process of abstraction comes in. While a lot of formal properties are available for the process of abstraction, only some of them are selected to formulate an abstract concept. Those properties become the defining properties for that abstract.

Consider this example. A child is exposed only to iPads as computers from the beginning. Unless taught about what are the defining characteristics of a computer are and simply told that "this is a computer", he'd formulate his own abstraction as to what a computer means. "Single physical body" - check, "touchscreen" - check and so on. This abstraction would only strengthen the more he's exposed to different types of iPads. So, when finally confronted with a desktop, he might not identify it as a "computer", since it has none of the defining features he selected.

However, if he's correctly informed that a computer means "something that computes", he can easily correct himself by identifying that "yes, iPad is still a computer since it does that and so is an abacus". This way, the correction of the standard is possible.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I think your position roughly aligns with the eliminative materialist/functionalist schools of thought, whereas I’m currently exploring the pan-psychic approach with a healthy dose of neo-Platonism thrown in the mix. As for me, I’ve exhausted the extent of my understanding on this topic and will continue learning, taking into account the points you’ve raised. These have made me aware of areas I need to flesh out and contemplate more. Since I do not try to convert or convince anyone, I’m glad you provided me the opportunity to converse about these issues. Hopefully, I’ll be able to pick-up this thread in the near future as my understanding matures. Till then, see you on other threads.