(March 23, 2012 at 12:09 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: I think your position roughly aligns with the eliminative materialist/functionalist schools of thought
More functionalist than materialist.
For the time we come back to the discussion, I'd like to set aside some definitions, what we've agreed upon etc., so that we may not repeat the same arguments.
1. Metaphysics:
We both agree that reality is to be considered self-evident and the primary. We also agree that there seems to me more than just the physical aspect to reality. We have also identified two aspects of reality which can be considered to exist.
First, the physical - alternatively referred to as substantive or material. This reality exists independent of any consciousness. Everything that we can see, hear, touch, smell, taste, would be a part of this reality.
The second is (as I refer to it) conceptual. Alternatively referred to as formal, abstract or - without any religious connotations - spiritual. We both also seem to agree that ideas, thoughts, emotions, knowledge, beliefs etc. belong to this reality.
What we seem to disagree upon is their individual modes of existence and how they depend on each other. More on that later.
2. Attributes:
We agree on the existence of both substantive and formal attributes regarding an object. As per the distinction between substantive and formal aspects of reality, the substantive attributes are a part of physical reality and the formal ones of the conceptual one.
We also have pretty much the same idea on how the substantive properties are translated into formal ones. By perception, identification, generalization and then abstraction.
Finally, with regards to epistemology, since we both accept the existence of physical reality, we also accept the validity of evidence provided by it.
Here's where our disagreements start.
1. With regards to metaphysics - I hold the physical reality to be primary and the conceptual reality to be a product of it. I hold that consciousness has a specific identity - that it requires specific physical medium and structure to exist and I consider the conceptual reality to be a product of this consciousness. I consider the capacities of the consciousness - the ability to feel and think - to be emergent from this structure.
You disagree because you do not see them as emergent. So, you hold that consciousness (and therefore the conceptual reality) is present throughout in form of proto-conscious matter and consciousness only becomes apparent at complex level structures.
2. Consequent to your metaphysical position, you believe that all substantive properties would have a formal counterpart and vice-versa. I hold that while the conceptual reality is dependent upon the physical one for existence, its content (the abstracts) need not have one to one correlation in the physical counterpart. So, unless a consciousness has perceived the physical, it does not have an existence in the conceptual reality. And it is possible for the concepts to mix and merge so that they would no longer apply to the concrete they came from.
3. Regarding the identity of an abstract - I choose to identify the abstract by its content rather than its physical manifestation. For example, an idea exists in my brain - "chicken is good" - and it physically manifests itself as the electrochemical changes taking place within it. And suppose you think of the idea "chicken is good" as well. Now, the identity, i.e. both the substantive and formal attributes of the thought are completely different by the virtue of existing in different minds. But the content of the idea is the same. And therefore idea is the same as well. A simpler example would be - two copies of the same book exist, but the conceptual counterpart - the story - is the same.
4. Finally, I failed to address you point regarding emergent properties - that while these properties give the brain the ability to perform behavior of being alive, it does not provide with feeling of the same. I'd say that the ability to feel and think would be an emergent property of the same structure as well.
