I am an orthodox Christian, ask me a question!

[Purple Rabbit]

Jon Paul, first let me thank you for the oppotunity you offer to shed some light on the RC view.

Here's my question. In one of your postings you state that you believe in your god because you "don’t believe anything else is a possibility, without logical self-contradiction". This means logic is a prerequiite for your belief, which I think is a good thing to do. I reckon you are familiar with the Euthyphro dilemma that for me demonstrates the logical fallacy of the concept of absolute divine moral. In short 'Euthyphro' shows that it is a logical fallacy to accept divine moral as absolute moral. If there exists absolute moral it is not absolute because god says so, but it would be absolute independent of what god says about it and indeed of his existence. If absolute moral exists at all it is necessarily independent of god. If there is no absolute moral then it is a fallacy to claim divine origin for it. How do you cope with it?

Let's summarise Euthyphros dilemma: Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral, or is it moral because it is commanded by God?

The answer is that it's a false dilemma, in my conception of God. The moral precepts that Gods reveals to us are absolutely necessary because of Gods nature as an omnibenevolent being.

That god's moral is a moral that is absolutely necessary is not logical proof for the absoluteness of the moral, but only for the fact that you take on blind faith that moral allegedly provided by god is absolute moral. Please answer the question.

Since God is not contingent (dependent) upon anything else, it would be absurd to say his absolute nature is contingent upon anything else.

How do you know that god is not contingent upon anything else? Is it god's word you go by? That would be circularv reasoning. And as god can freely choose his moral tenets, we are delivered to the whims of god's free will. There is no guarantee that his moral is absolute it is inherently dependent upon god and it is genuinely arbitrary.

So therefore, the moral preceptives are not contingent upon God, or upon something outside of God, but absolutely necessary because of his absolute nature of omnibenevolence, necessity being the explicit antonym of contingency.

This is a contradiction. If only god provides the absolute moral preceptives they are de facto dependent upon god. If not only god provides these absolute moral preceptives they are independent upon god and we in fact do not need god to find absolute moral.

[Jon Paul]

How do you know that god is not contingent upon anything else? Is it god's word you go by? That would be circularv reasoning.

Because of my conception of God, which I have already explained in detail, which specifically logically necessitates him as noncontingent upon anything outside of himself, because that would be a contradiction of the logical precepts and metaphysics involved in the claim. Contrary to the causality of the universe, which in its very nature of impure actuality is constantly re-contingent upon an outside actuality for the actualisation of new potentialities that enter into the causal procession.

This is a contradiction. If only god provides the absolute moral preceptives they are de facto dependent upon god.

Only Gods noncontingent actuality can embody absolute morality, so they are not dependent upon any contingency, but sheerly a part of noncontingency.

if not only god provides these absolute moral preceptives they are independent upon god and we in fact do not need god to find absolute moral.

Only Gods noncontingent actuality can embody absolute morality, so no, they are not independent upon the noncontingency, since they themselves are a part of noncontingency. They are not merely dependent on noncontingency either, since they are a part of it.

[Edwardo Piet]

To have truth or evidence, first you need the presumption that truth even exists (in the metaphysical sense).

I would think, that to rationally believe there is absolute objective truth in the first place there has to be some indication - i.e. evidence - that there is objective truth. Would you not agree there?

[Jon Paul]

To have truth or evidence, first you need the presumption that truth even exists (in the metaphysical sense).

I would think, that to rationally believe there is absolute objective truth in the first place there has to be some indication - i.e. evidence - that there is objective truth. Would you not agree there?

But that has nothing to do with the epistemic structure of a worldview. A worldview does not need to be evidenced, for the epistemic structure of that worldview to be the epistemic structure of that worldview. That is simply an analytical fact which is agnostic with regards to truth and evidence. Worldviews are subjective, they are not themselves affirmative proof for or against that worldview. They are facts of peoples presuppositions, not objective facts. The worldview only needs to presupposed for the implicit epistemic structure to be the epistemic structure of that worldview. In other words, what evidence there is for the worldview has nothing to do with whether or not it is presuppossed. The only premise necessary for a worldview to be a worldview is that the worldview is presupposed, or taken to be true.

Whether there is evidence that there is an objective truth is a wholely other question which ignores the metaphysical precepts that are implicit in such a quest for evidence. Because there are some premises for whether or not there can be an objective truth, which objectively speaking, to be epistemologically correct, need to be assumed, for it to be even possible to believe that any evidence is possible which so establishes such an objective truth. The problem is that atheism simply does provide or grant the premises for this in its epistemic structure, and I have already given the reasons why. And so, no evidence can transcend the presuppositions which are already implicit in the epistemological presupposition an atheist worldview brings to the table, in the quest for objective truth. That means if an atheist claims an objective truth he simply is being incoherent with the epistemic structure of his own worldview, without knowing it. In other words, we have a self-contradiction.

This is an epistemological, analytical, rather than evidential paradox.

[Edwardo Piet]

There needs to be evidence for something objective do you not think though, in order to rationally believe in it? So do you think there needs to evidence for objective truth in order to rationally believe it exists, or not?

EvF

[Jon Paul]

There needs to be evidence for something objective do you not think though, in order to rationally believe in it?

That depends what you mean.

It's very problematic if you are saying we need "objective proof" that there is a such thing as "objective truth".

Because it begs the question that there can be objective truth foundations, by demanding "objective proof" that such can be.

It presupposes that there already is a such thing as objectivity.

Any notion of objective truth merely means something which is dogamtically held to be objective epistemic foundation for a belief. So you are saying you want objective epistemic foundations for the contention that there is a such thing as objective epistemic foundations. That is simply not possible. Any argument or proof has to presuppose that there can be objective epistemic foundations if it wants to pretend to provide objective epistemic foundations for the possibility of objective epistemic foundations!

It is implicit already in the quest for evidence. Meaning that the question is one of presuppositions, not of evidence.

So to answer: can there be proof or evidence for the existence of objective truth, I will reply that that depends entirely on what your presupposition is. Whether I believe it? I believe it cannot be coherently proven by agnostic means, because any search for such proof already has presuppositions which are not agnostic. It can only be proven by working from already-existing presuppositions, namely that there is such a thing as objective epistemic foundation, or objective truth.

[Edwardo Piet]

It's very problematic if you are saying we need "objective proof" that there is a such thing as "objective truth".

No, I'm saying there's evidence for reality, in science for example - the consensus. Objective in the sense of existence; and I am wondering where the evidence is for any objective 'truth' as in absolute truth - that we can absolutely know - and (if you wish to know) I also - more specifically - need evidence to believe there are any morals or values whatsoever that are objective.

EvF

[Jon Paul]

EvF, I am afraid that we are simply talking in two different directions. I had two parts of my foundations for transcendental monotheism: metaphysics built on empirical observations of reality, neccesitating Gods existence for the actuality of our reality, and, the epistemological necessity for transcendental monotheism.

Now, you are addressing the epistemological part, with an evidentialist approach. That is not going to work, because the epistemological part addresses the very nature of epistemic foundations, and thus the conditions necessary to say that anything can be taken as valid proof/evidence for an objective truth, or in other words, an objective epistemic foundation for a given contention. The only other option than to integrate this objectivity into your epistemic structure, is to claim that you will simply use subjective proof as a starting point, but then it is just that - subjective. Any other person can claim another subjective conclusion if there is no objective standard for objective epistemic foundations for logical truth to begin with. And then you have no way to say anything objectively about reality as an atheist, because no integral part of your epistemic structure transcends the abstractions of your own mind.

No, I'm saying there's evidence for reality in science for example - the consensus. Objective in the sense of existence;

What do you mean there is evidence for reality? Do you mean with "evidence", objective epistemic foundations for the belief that reality exists? If so, you are begging the question of an objective standard which transcends subjectivity, for epistemic foundations, and that is simply not consistent with a non-monotheistic epistemic structure, which provides no objective standard for logical truth, except abstractions of the brain chemistry, and then you are contradicting your own epistemic structure.

If you are not talking about objective epistemic foundations for the belief that reality exists, you are merely talking of subjective abstractions, which is not something which provides an objective epistemic foundation for the belief that reality exists - only subjective, in which case you cannot adscribe to it any truth that transcends your own mind. In either case, you are unable to propose anything objectively about reality as an atheist.

and I am wondering where the evidence is for any objective 'truth' as in absolute truth - that we can absolutely know

I've already shown you the error there lies in this question. You cannot provide objective epistemic foundations for the existence of objective epistemic foundations, without begging the question or presupposing it to exist. Either you commit the fallacy of begging the question, or you presuppose it to exist on grounds of proper basicality (that it is integral in your epistemic structure), but since that contradicts a non-monotheistic epistemic structure, you are then in fallacy again.

and (if you wish to know) I also - more specifically - need evidence to believe there are any morals or values whatsoever that are objective.

Read the first paragraph in this post if you want to understand why that question completely talks in another direction than what I meant with "objective epistemic foundations" for moral truth.

[LEDO]

What the fuck is "moral truth?" Is there "immoral truth."

[Jon Paul]

What the fuck is "moral truth?" Is there "immoral truth."

The expression 'moral truth' doesn't refer to morally judging a 'truth'. It refers to moral truths as such, that is, objective epistemic foundations for moral standards. Immorality is specifically a negation of 'morality' which follows from the judgement that something does not live up to given moral standard. It already presupposes moral truth.