consciousness?

[Angrboda]

Now without mutual interaction, it doesn’t’ matter what felt experiences accompany the physical events.

The physicalist position is that "felt experiences" are physical events, and thus the mutual interaction is an accepted part of the explanation, leaving nothing extra to be accounted for.

Clearly, reality consists of both observable third-person facts and first-person qualitative experiences.

My objection here is usually greeted with a chorus of blank stares but I'll make it in spite of dim expectations for its reception. There is essentially zero evidence for the proposition that first-person qualitative experiences are a part of reality in the necessary sense. The only evidence we have for the facts of subjective experience are the claims of that subjectivity as to the veracity, nature, and content of its experience. Nowhere else in science is the existence of a "real" phenomenon so unilaterally accepted in the almost total absence of any actual empirical evidence.

Anyway, you may begin your interval of dumbfounded gaping at your leisure.

[Neo-Scholastic]

The physicalist position is that "felt experiences" are physical events, and thus the mutual interaction is an accepted part of the explanation, leaving nothing extra to be accounted for.

Mutual interaction between what? Your statement tacitly acknowledges that two different things are involved while at the same time asserting that they are the same thing.

The There is essentially zero evidence for the proposition that first-person qualitative experiences are a part of reality in the necessary sense.

Other than the direct, unmediated, and visceral feeling of being alive. I cannot imagine more compelling evidence.Now if you are saying that first-person experiences aren’t a necessary part of material reality, then I agree with you. In physical theories, feelings are not needed to explain behavior or the verbal reports of the subjects. You have to at least try to account for all the phenomena. That approach just pretends the phenomena doesn’t exist.

The only evidence we have for the facts of subjective experience are the claims of that subjectivity as to the veracity, nature, and content of its experience. Nowhere else in science is the existence of a "real" phenomenon so unilaterally accepted in the almost total absence of any actual empirical evidence.

What is empirical mean if not something known from experience? Putting “real” in quotes shows that the maker of the statement excludes any non-material thing from the definition of real. It’s just another way to beg the question.

The physical events of A could just as easily generate the subjective experience of …but no physical theory can exclude it.

No - not "just as easily". [/quote]Then please explain how a physical theory does exclude that possibility. If mental-properties are inert epiphenomena then it doesn’t matter what they are or whether they happen at all.

Moreover, if only physical processes are causal, then thinking, feeling and willing would have no significance and ‘you’ are just along for the ride…

This argument works only if you assume that 'you' are something other than the sum of those electro-chemical reactions. That would be an illusion not supported by evidence we have.[/quote]So if your consciousness self is an illusion, of what is it an illusion?

Changing the description does not alter whether or not the chain of events is composed of mental events versus purely physical ones.

No, it does not. What it does is explain how sensations are felt and how they interact with the causal chain.[/quote]You again ignore chains of mental association, such as: “The intense pain of stubbing made me angry at the table and I remembered the time I kicked a chair and resolved never to do that again, so I choose not to act out my anger.” That statement reports how the sensation of pain started a chain of thoughts linked by meaning and significance.

[Angrboda]

The physicalist position is that "felt experiences" are physical events, and thus the mutual interaction is an accepted part of the explanation, leaving nothing extra to be accounted for.

Mutual interaction between what? Your statement tacitly acknowledges that two different things are involved while at the same time asserting that they are the same thing.

Um, the two different things involved are different physical things undergoing different physical events. I honestly don't have a clue about what the last part of your statement means. I'll try to be patient in the face of what appears either intentional dishonesty or rank stupidity. Felt experiences are physical events in the brain just like other aspects of mind are physical events in the brain; there's no shortage of "things" to interact with each other. Other than that, the only sense I can make of it is that you are either asserting that the brain is one unified, atomistic thing, possessed of no parts, or you are asserting that consciousness is a unified, atomistic thing, for which we have no actual objective evidence that such is the case, but more on that below.

The There is essentially zero evidence for the proposition that first-person qualitative experiences are a part of reality in the necessary sense.

Other than the direct, unmediated, and visceral feeling of being alive. I cannot imagine more compelling evidence.Now if you are saying that first-person experiences aren’t a necessary part of material reality, then I agree with you. In physical theories, feelings are not needed to explain behavior or the verbal reports of the subjects. You have to at least try to account for all the phenomena. That approach just pretends the phenomena doesn’t exist.

Phenomena have properties. And unless you have some rough idea of what those properties actually are, you're going to have considerable difficulty actually locating and demonstrating the thing. If "direct, unmediated, and visceral feeling" were evidence of what consciousness is, then we wouldn't be having this conversation, as the answer to the question of what consciousness is would have long ago been settled by introspection. Since it's clear that the "what" of consciousness is not readily known through introspection, the "that" of consciousness is unknown. I'm not denying the phenomenon, I'm simply denying that you have any evidence of the phenomena which is, to use the language of tv crime dramas, "not contaminated by the chain of evidence." I'm not suggesting there is no such thing as consciousness, I'm pointing out that the mind is an eminently impeachable witness as to its own nature, and lacking any other witnesses to its nature, you have no credible testimony to present.

(Unless, perhaps you're arguing that when I'm drunk, the other women in the bar all get super pretty, and that that's an actual objective fact that I can make inferences on the basis of. People on DMT declare themselves to have experienced the complete cessation of time and the evaporation of their distinctness from the universe as a whole. All that is proof of is that the mind of the person on DMT believes these things actually happened, not evidence that they actually happened. Or are we going to now have to admit the actual existence of all gods past and present based on what somebody's subjectivity believed? Belief is only evidence of belief; it isn't evidence of the things believed in. If the only "evidence" you have is what one person's mind believes about itself, that's no evidence that the contents of that belief are true. [As a consequence of evolution and shared brain phylogeny, many, many, people share the same or similar beliefs about the nature of their minds; these are, so-to-speak, the "default settings" of the machine. As in anything else, that a lot of people believe something is not in itself evidence of their belief's truth.] I'm not in any sense "denying the phenomena"; I'm denying the validity and reliability of your evidence for its nature and its existence in accordance with that description of its nature. (I normally consider a whole chain of what, why, and how as a pre-condition to knowing that, but given the subject, I think we should first focus on whether you have any independently verifiable knowledge of the "what" of consciousness. When you have that, and only then, will I likely consider any claims to knowing "that" to be even remotely well founded.)

The only evidence we have for the facts of subjective experience are the claims of that subjectivity as to the veracity, nature, and content of its experience. Nowhere else in science is the existence of a "real" phenomenon so unilaterally accepted in the almost total absence of any actual empirical evidence.

What is empirical mean if not something known from experience? Putting “real” in quotes shows that the maker of the statement excludes any non-material thing from the definition of real. It’s just another way to beg the question.

Empirical evidence (also empirical data, sense experience, empirical knowledge, or the a posteriori) is a source of knowledge acquired by means of observation or experimentation. Empirical evidence is information that justifies a belief in the truth or falsity of an empirical claim. In the empiricist view, one can only claim to have knowledge when one has a true belief based on empirical evidence. This stands in contrast to the rationalist view under which reason or reflection alone is considered to be evidence for the truth or falsity of some propositions. The senses are the primary source of empirical evidence. Although other sources of evidence, such as memory, and the testimony of others ultimately trace back to some sensory experience, they are considered to be secondary, or indirect.

Are you acquainted with someone who has sensory experience of the nature of consciousness? If so, I'd dearly love to speak with such a person. Whether they've simply seen consciousness or only heard a consciousness [can consciousness make sounds? Can it reflect or give off light?] doesn't particularly matter. Have you seen your own consciousness? It's not begging the question to demand that you produce the animal in question so that it may be inspected. Claiming it exists, and more specifically, that it exists as something with specific properties in the absence of being able to actually demonstrate that something actually has these properties, and then, expecting us to conclude it exists on the basis of that claim alone, well, I can't imagine a more petitio principii.

---

And I've exhausted myself in accomplishing what I have thus far accomplished. I apologize if there are any gaps or missing links in my response, but this girl is veggie.

[genkaus]

Then please explain how a physical theory does exclude that possibility.

By studying various aspects of that causal chain - where it comes from and where it goes.

If mental-properties are inert epiphenomena then it doesn’t matter what they are or whether they happen at all.

Even if mental properties were inert epiphenomena, they would still be significant as the very purpose of the study. Do you think that neuroscientists invest thousands of hours studying the brain simply to take a look at some complex and intricate wiring system without actually caring about what it does? Its the other way around. They are more concerned about what it does and how it does it. If mental-properties were irrelevant, then there would be no purpose or application for neuroscience.

So if your consciousness self is an illusion, of what is it an illusion?

Your conscious self is not an illusion - your idea that your conscious self is something distinct and separate from the electrochemical reactions taking place in your brain is an illusion. That is the illusion of your conscious self itself, i.e. that is your view of your conscious self that is not real.

You again ignore chains of mental association, such as: “The intense pain of stubbing made me angry at the table and I remembered the time I kicked a chair and resolved never to do that again, so I choose not to act out my anger.” That statement reports how the sensation of pain started a chain of thoughts linked by meaning and significance.

And the physical chain might go something like "The strong signal received by the pain center, led to a increase in activity in the aggression center as well as triggering the memory center to retrieve similar sense data, i.e memory of similar pain in similar circumstances and record of the results. This data, along with data from aggression center proceeded to decision making center where the comparative interaction resulted in a signal being sent back to the aggression center which led to decrease in activity there."

The different descriptions do not make either of them any less real - nor do they indicate that they are separate chains of causation. In fact, any series of events can be described in multiple ways depending upon what we choose to identify as an entity. I can describe the solar system as distinct planetary bodies circling the sun or I can describe them as a variety of molecules in motion around a central concentration of hydrogen and helium with a significant amount of them being coalesced together. Neither description indicated an illusion and both have meaning and significance depending upon the requirement.

[downbeatplumb]

Professor Plumb, you have only restated an argument already made, adding only that an authority shares your opinion. The tacit assumption of his concluding remarks is that no causal mechanism between brain-processes and mind-processes is required because one is the same as the other.

…neurochemical processes produce subjective experiences.

Meanwhile his next sentence injects a straw man into this debate:

…the hypothesis that consciousness creates matter (does not) hold equal standing (as physicalist theories do)

Mind creating matter has not been part of this discussion. No one denies the intimate connection between minds and brains.

The writer of the article was answering the statement that the mind creates the universe. I posted it because of the very clear way it links brain processes to the mind I apologise for not making myself clearer.

The authority you cited does not actually address the full relationship between mental events and brain events. He only looks for efficient causes and observes only third-party physical facts.

So you insist on shoehorning in the supernatural where non is required.

Empirical study of the brain takes for granted the formal relationships, logical relations, and assigned values (all immaterial) that allow us to feel, think about, and will to act upon what we observe.
In the example you provided, physical events produce both physical and mental effects. Following the initial physical cause you get both a second physical event and mental one. Now you have two potential causes, one mental and the other physical

"Mental processes" are just the manifestation of physical processes.

This means one of the following:

1. Mental properties are side-effects without causal import. This means the feeling of being alive, making choices, and contemplating ideas have no power. And because mental processes are inert they can have neither function nor use.

It means no such thing, mental processes have evolved the same way everything else and has the same importance as any other attribute. you are making baseless assertions based on your feelings where as I present facts backed by hard science.

2. A pre-existing harmony exists between mind-states and brain-states. This creates two parallel chains of causation that co-exist but do not interact.

The Mind is the brain functioning. like urine is the product of a functioning kidney.

But there is a third option that atheists refuse to consider and dismiss out-of-hand, because that is one that undermines their materialist worldview.

3. Causation, broadly defined, goes both ways. Mental causes inform physical effects, just as physical causes constrain mental effects.

Because this third option does not restrict causality to one direction, from physical cause to mental effect, it allows the possibility of interaction between two real and distinct realities, a materially substantial one and an immaterial formal one.

Oh you do talk rot don't you.
You speak of of interaction with a realm for which there is no evidence.
You may as well say you have a telephone that can call Narnia.

[Neo-Scholastic]

For the sake of clarity, I am not using quote feature, but will try to address each of the relevant points raised by both of you, Gen and Apo. Before proceeding I thank Gen for your persistence and patience and Apo for your detailed response which I know takes great effort on your part. I agree with much of what you say, meaning both Gen and Apo. I do not consider your opinions wrong, per se, just inadequate. Or I accept the premises but not the interpretation of their conclusions. If that sentence doesn’t seem to make sense hopefully, my meaning will become clear as I write. You will both find some of my response familiar, but I will try not to repeat myself too much. Hopefully, after providing my view’s account of the problems more fully, you will not judge my comments ‘intentionally dishonest’ or displaying ‘rank stupidity’.

Apo, you object to the idea that first-person observations provide reliable knowledge about the mind and its relationship to the brain. I do not disagree with that assessment. However, your assessment does not distinguish between the contents of consciousness and our conception of it. You can be absolutely certain that you are in pain, but incorrectly believe that your pain is caused by a demon. Likewise, people who took DMT cannot deny that they experienced a radical alteration of consciousness, but they can be wrong about how their interpretation of its true nature. So when you asked if I knew anyone who had a sensory experience of the nature of consciousness, I must say no. But if you had asked me if I know anyone who experiences consciousness then yes. I do. I don’t question that I have that experience, but I do question its nature.

Has introspection lead to any knowledge about consciousness? Yes and no. Introspection has not provided any answers about the physical nature of consciousness. That does not mean that introspection has not provided some knowledge about conscious experience. We can understand which feelings are closely related. We can learn what ideas follow from given premises. We can know what types of thinking produce reliable conclusions. While we do not know the physical cause of these mental-properties we can understand the formal relationships among them.

Continuing that line of questioning, you ask if anyone can present material properties of mind. Of course not. The fact that mental properties have no discernable material properties is what makes them so puzzling. We can take felt experience as a given, without taking it as given that felt experiences are purely physical. Such a position ignores the issue and does not take the question seriously. The ‘animal in question’ is one that does not have the material properties you require to accept its existence, only formal ones. A lack of quantitative qualities does not prove a lack of qualitative ones.

This leads to the next objection: “…different descriptions do not make either of them any less real - nor do they indicate that they are separate chains of causation.” I agree with the first part of this statement, but not the second. You can present different descriptions of the apparently identical events precisely because you can make distinctions between mental-properties/processes/states and material-properties/processes/states. But I disagree with the second part of the statement, because we can recognize two types of causal relationships: efficient causes and formal ones. Efficient causes relate only to the material. Formal causes relate only to the mental.
I believe physical theories are inadequate because they ignore formal, mental properties, and the role they play in literally ‘informing’ material properties and constraining physical interactions.

Now the question for me is why I would associate formal causes with qualitative experience. Simply put qualitative, felt experiences are a very real phenomena and any complete theory of mind must account for them.
I find it very difficult to believe that the qualitative aspect of reality is something emergent. I choose to believe that it is fundamental to the structure of the universe. I persist in that opinion, not for theological reasons, but because I think that it an adequate mind-brain theory must account for all the phenomena. And since there is at least a possibility that consciousness is arises our of a qualitative aspect rather than a quantitative one, I will choose a theory that preserves the things we most value in life: our free will, values, purposes, and meaning.

I have some speculations about why mind and brain are so intimately linked and I would be happy to share those speculations with the understanding that these are just things I am pondering and not positions to which I am committed. I would otherwise continue, but I am afraid of beating a dead horse with my on-going conception of the relationship between forms and substances.

[genkaus]

Get back to the quote feature - this wall text makes it hard to read your arguments.

This leads to the next objection: “…different descriptions do not make either of them any less real - nor do they indicate that they are separate chains of causation.” I agree with the first part of this statement, but not the second. You can present different descriptions of the apparently identical events precisely because you can make distinctions between mental-properties/processes/states and material-properties/processes/states. But I disagree with the second part of the statement, because we can recognize two types of causal relationships: efficient causes and formal ones. Efficient causes relate only to the material. Formal causes relate only to the mental.

What you are missing is that even if you identify two separate types of causation, the causal event being looked at remains the same. Since you brought up Aristotle's causal theory, take his own example. In making of a bronze statue, the formal causal chain would be described as the cast being made, the material being melted and poured into it. The efficient causal chain would be the artisan shaping the cast, choosing the material etc. However both descriptions pertain to the same event - they are not separate. Similarly, whether you view an item as a collection of atoms being held together or you analyze it as a single entity - say, a ball - you are talking about the same thing. Why wouldn't the same principle apply to the entity that is 'you'. Whether you study your consciousness as a series of electrical impulses flying around inside the brain or you view it as a single entity - you are still talking about you.

I believe physical theories are inadequate because they ignore formal, mental properties, and the role they play in literally ‘informing’ material properties and constraining physical interactions.

On the contrary, physical theories do have to account for the formal, mental properties. That is the other side of neuroscience - psychology and psychotherapy. The ideal theory would meet somewhere in the middle, but right now, we are starting from both ends.

[Neo-Scholastic]

That is the other side of neuroscience - psychology and psychotherapy. The ideal theory would meet somewhere in the middle, but right now, we are starting from both ends.

I do not disagree with this statement. Neuroscience deals with material properties and physical causes that are quantitative. Psychology deals with mental qualitative ones. Where I think we differ is that you want to reduce one set of properties to the other, in such a way that describing one is just another way of describing the other. They may be two sides of the same coin, but they have distinctly different properties. I question the assumption that a model of reality with only four forces and a handful of constants can meaningfully account for the appearance of mental properties.

As you said, an ideal theory would meet somewhere in the middle. I believe that middle ground includes something equally fundamental to the structure of the universe to account for qualia and all the mental properties built from them. That something need not be supernatural in the traditional sense, it would just extend our understanding to include all the basic features of the natural world.

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...whether you view an item as a collection of atoms being held together or you analyze it as a single entity - say, a ball - you are talking about the same thing.

Not from my perspective. A ball could be composed of any number of different substances. A collection of atoms can assume multiple shapes. Even if they happen to co-exist in a single entity they are still very different in a way that makes a difference.

[genkaus]

I do not disagree with this statement. Neuroscience deals with material properties and physical causes that are quantitative. Psychology deals with mental qualitative ones. Where I think we differ is that you want to reduce one set of properties to the other, in such a way that describing one is just another way of describing the other. They may be two sides of the same coin, but they have distinctly different properties. I question the assumption that a model of reality with only four forces and a handful of constants can meaningfully account for the appearance of mental properties.

As you said, an ideal theory would meet somewhere in the middle. I believe that middle ground includes something equally fundamental to the structure of the universe to account for qualia and all the mental properties built from them. That something need not be supernatural in the traditional sense, it would just extend our understanding to include all the basic features of the natural world.

Two mistakes here.

First, when I say the ideal theory would meet in the middle, I do not mean that it would have some aspects of both but be essentially separate from either. I mean that it would include both of them, i.e. both neuroscience and psychology would be two different applications of it. It wouldn't reduce one set of properties to the other, but each set of properties would be describable by using the the other set.

Second, and more importantly, is your assumption that 'qualia' is to be found somewhere in the fundamental structure of the universe. Consciousness is a holistic process - it requires a specific configuration of matter acting in a specific way with parts of it performing specific functions to exist. Even its simplest component - that of sensation - requires a complex structure where if a part is missing, it would not occur. You are going for the reductionist approach. You are trying to take a microscope to the parts and when you don't find consciousness below a certain level, you assume that there is fundamental and yet undetectable that is the cause, when all the evidence we have suggests otherwise. It is not that the cause consciousness itself is some fundamental force of universe that manifests itself only when a certain level of biological complexity is reached - it is that that complexity itself is the cause.

Not from my perspective. A ball could be composed of any number of different substances. A collection of atoms can assume multiple shapes. Even if they happen to co-exist in a single entity they are still very different in a way that makes a difference.

But that specific ball consists of those specific collection of atoms in that form and those specific collection of atoms make up the ball. That collection of atoms in that shape is the ball - even if these are two different ways of looking at it.

[Angrboda]

Ignoring that you just essentially conceded every point I made, let me try to recap.


Allow me to propose an admittedly biased consolidation here.

Your claim: "Clearly, reality consists of both observable third-person facts and first-person qualitative experiences."

A) a priori reasoning cannot establish the nature of consciousness (thus this conversation; more below);

B) we have no actual empirical evidence of consciousness itself (even physicalists are lacking here, at present);

C) if it is non-material (my term was actually, had "properties"), there can be no empirical evidence of consciousness;

D) empirical evidence is our only source of a posteriori knowledge;

C1) Since a priori and a posteriori are the only means by which we can acquire knowledge of the nature of consciousness, and both are excluded, we cannot have knowledge of the nature of consciousness (at present, based on what we know);

C2) If [C] and no empirical evidence of consciousness is possible in principle, and [A] holds (not knowable a priori), then knowledge of the nature of consciousness is not possible even in principle;

C3) If we (currently) do not have knowledge of the nature of consciousness [A, B, & D], then the assertion that "Clearly, reality consists of ... first-person qualitative experiences" is clearly absurd, as it is inherently a claim about the nature of consciousness.


Feel free to correct my errors and elaborate where I have been insufficient.


In your previous posts there appears, to my impression anyway, an underlying assumption that I think needs to be made explicit and either confirmed with justification, or denied. That is the assumption that there are certain facts about conscious experience about which consciousness cannot be wrong. Given that this is a statement about consciousness, it seems prima facie evident that the justification for this assumption can't come from the impressions of subjective experience, as the circularity there is obvious, rendering the justification null and void. You seem to want to suggest that the nature of consciousness is not justifiable by external evidences, so it would appear you can't derive it from there. (And I'm noting that this in some ways parallels the above.) Descartes went down this road only to conclude cogito ergo sum, which itself is not even necessarily defensible (we'll skip that debate please); Descartes would be faced with the same dilemma that unless you demonstrate both that "I doubt" and I am incapable of being wrong about "I doubt", even that fails. (There are lengthy dissections in the literature; I'm not personally familiar with them. My chosen tack is to observe that there are possible worlds in which entailment doesn't hold [or at least, is unknowable], then entailment itself is contingent. As such, it's impossible to say on Descartes argument whether or not he exists in such a possible world, so it's impossible to assume the validity of the entailment cogito ergo sum. [Usually I frame this differently; this is a condensation].) Moreover it's not apparent whether the "I" that exists is "consciousness" or the being that is experiencing consciousness, as both are consistent with the conclusion (which leaves us back at the starting line with arguing whether the "I" is an aspect of a physical brain or an independent entity or plenum). (Sorry for the digression, I know you like to be thorough.)

So ultimately, even taking Descartes into account, there is no fact of consciousness about which that consciousness cannot be wrong. Descartes thought experiment, while certainly fascinating, cannot settle the matter of whether the consciousness that believes itself to exist in reality as part of a brain is any less correct than the consciousness that believes it exists as a fact independent of the brain. Therefore, Descartes cogito ergo sum cannot be used to demonstrate that, "Clearly, reality consists of both observable third-person facts and first-person qualitative experiences," in the sense that both exist as distinct parts of reality (instead of the one being subsumed by the other, via the physicalist explanation). So, Descartes doesn't abet your claim. And it's not altogether clear to me that you can demonstrate that there is any other fact of consciousness "about which consciousness itself cannot be mistaken." So you do not, to my view, have any reliable foundation for the claim that "first-person qualitative experiences" are a part of reality independent of being processes implemented in the brain. (And I realize in formulating this last sentence that I may have constructed a strawman. Feel free to let me know if that is the case.)

I know this became all fuzzy and rambling and ended up rather pear shaped. I apologize for that. I should probably just stop engaging such subjects until I'm feeling better. (or at least willing to do the necessary editorial work)


Anyway. Regards.