Morality in Nature

[genkaus]

I've course I do. I'm not a determinist, or a physical monist. I believe in actual mind and actual free will.

And why do you think that determinists and physical monists don't believe in single entities or actual minds or actual free-will?

Except that it's neither free nor will.

Except that it is.

Yes, because determinism has wiggle-room, so that the murder itself isn't proof enough that it had to happen. So where does this wiggle-room come from? Space pixies?

Okay, so if you blow a CPU, and the computer doesn't function, you'd say, "Goddamned computer doesn't work" and throw out the whole thing, right? Because that's what punishing an individual is-- the entirety of the individual didn't cause a murder.

Except for the fact that the computer is not an agent so the concept of punishment does not apply here.

What matters isn't whether the self exists. What matters is whether it is a byproduct of deterministic processes. If it is, then the apparent agency of the self is irrelevant-- it is a single experience of multiple functions, none of which the self has control over.

The term "byproduct" implies that there is another primary product. Which is not my view.

The self is a product of deterministic processes. Period. The part that the self plays in that deterministic process is one of agency and control - which is why its existence and function are very much relevant.

[bennyboy]

I've course I do. I'm not a determinist, or a physical monist. I believe in actual mind and actual free will.

And why do you think that determinists and physical monists don't believe in single entities or actual minds or actual free-will?

Because nobody can be free of deterministic influences, which necessarily means they cannot have done other than they have done. If you cannot do other than you have done, you didn't have free will.

Yes, because determinism has wiggle-room, so that the murder itself isn't proof enough that it had to happen. So where does this wiggle-room come from? Space pixies?

Okay, so if you blow a CPU, and the computer doesn't function, you'd say, "Goddamned computer doesn't work" and throw out the whole thing, right? Because that's what punishing an individual is-- the entirety of the individual didn't cause a murder.

Except for the fact that the computer is not an agent so the concept of punishment does not apply here.

It's your analogy, not mine. But I think it accurately represents your view-- the brain is a machine which takes input, processes it, and outputs behaviors. Is this not your view?

What matters isn't whether the self exists. What matters is whether it is a byproduct of deterministic processes. If it is, then the apparent agency of the self is irrelevant-- it is a single experience of multiple functions, none of which the self has control over.

The term "byproduct" implies that there is another primary product. Which is not my view.

The self is a product of deterministic processes. Period. The part that the self plays in that deterministic process is one of agency and control - which is why its existence and function are very much relevant.

This is inaccurate. In your view, the self is one link in a causal chain starting with events external to a body, and ending with the body acting in some way on its environment. Saying it's an agent is like saying the transmission of a car is an agent in converting foot presses on the gas pedal into acceleration of the car. Calling part of that process "self" doesn't change the fact that it's simply a machine for translating controlling inputs to mechanical outputs.

[genkaus]

Because nobody can be free of deterministic influences, which necessarily means they cannot have done other than they have done. If you cannot do other than you have done, you didn't have free will.

That's your definition of free-will. Which I don't regard as actual free-will.

It's your analogy, not mine. But I think it accurately represents your view-- the brain is a machine which takes input, processes it, and outputs behaviors. Is this not your view?

Nope.

This is inaccurate. In your view, the self is one link in a causal chain starting with events external to a body, and ending with the body acting in some way on its environment. Saying it's an agent is like saying the transmission of a car is an agent in converting foot presses on the gas pedal into acceleration of the car. Calling part of that process "self" doesn't change the fact that it's simply a machine for translating controlling inputs to mechanical outputs.

Wrong. The two cases are not equivalent because of the existence of self-awareness and self-reflection functions. These functions are present in the person - which makes it an agent. It is absent in the car-transmission, which makes it a non-agent.

[bennyboy]

Wrong. The two cases are not equivalent because of the existence of self-awareness and self-reflection functions. These functions are present in the person - which makes it an agent. It is absent in the car-transmission, which makes it a non-agent.

Sure it does. Some cars have complex computers monitoring each wheel, revs, fuel consumption, etc. etc. Some of the more advanced ones even have some learning capability-- automatically adjusting the suspension suiting the driving styles of individual drivers, etc.

Would you say these cars have selves and free wills?

[genkaus]

Sure it does. Some cars have complex computers monitoring each wheel, revs, fuel consumption, etc. etc. Some of the more advanced ones even have some learning capability-- automatically adjusting the suspension suiting the driving styles of individual drivers, etc.

Would you say these cars have selves and free wills?

No, because there is still no self-awareness function. Once you figure out how to install those, then yes.

[bennyboy]

Sure it does. Some cars have complex computers monitoring each wheel, revs, fuel consumption, etc. etc. Some of the more advanced ones even have some learning capability-- automatically adjusting the suspension suiting the driving styles of individual drivers, etc.

Would you say these cars have selves and free wills?

No, because there is still no self-awareness function. Once you figure out how to install those, then yes.

You'll have to define self-awareness, because the car is monitoring both its environment and itself, and modifying its behavior to meet specific goals. It is doing the FUNCTIONS that are ascribed to awareness, making it (presumably) a philosophical zombie by your definition of awareness.

So in what way is the car not showing awareness in its deterministic, complex interactions with the environment, when a human is?

[genkaus]

You'll have to define self-awareness, because the car is monitoring both its environment and itself, and modifying its behavior to meet specific goals. It is doing the FUNCTIONS that are ascribed to awareness, making it (presumably) a philosophical zombie by your definition of awareness.

So in what way is the car not showing awareness in its deterministic, complex interactions with the environment, when a human is?

It is not modifying the framework for behavioral modification.

Like I said in the other thread - self-awareness requires more than monitoring the environment and its own functions - it requires monitoring the process of monitoring. That's the function ascribed to awareness that the car does not display and the human does.

[bennyboy]

You'll have to define self-awareness, because the car is monitoring both its environment and itself, and modifying its behavior to meet specific goals. It is doing the FUNCTIONS that are ascribed to awareness, making it (presumably) a philosophical zombie by your definition of awareness.

So in what way is the car not showing awareness in its deterministic, complex interactions with the environment, when a human is?

It is not modifying the framework for behavioral modification.

Like I said in the other thread - self-awareness requires more than monitoring the environment and its own functions - it requires monitoring the process of monitoring. That's the function ascribed to awareness that the car does not display and the human does.

I see your redundancy and raise you two: maybe it's the ability to monitor the monitoring of the monitoring of the monitoring.

Okay, so let's take a community of people. Not only does each individual monitor his own process of monitoring: the entire group monitors the ability of each individual to monitor his own process of monitoring. By your terms, this is sufficient to label the community as a singular agent, and to state that it is self-aware.

This is morality meets Gaia. I didn't take you for such a hippie!

[genkaus]

I see your redundancy and raise you two: maybe it's the ability to monitor the monitoring of the monitoring of the monitoring.

That's required for higher level conceptualization processes.

Okay, so let's take a community of people. Not only does each individual monitor his own process of monitoring: the entire group monitors the ability of each individual to monitor his own process of monitoring. By your terms, this is sufficient to label the community as a singular agent, and to state that it is self-aware.

Nope.

Each individual monitoring his own monitoring is self-awareness. So, we already know at which level self-awareness occurs and any monitoring done is attributed to individual self-awareness.

When regarded as a singular entity, that is, one level above the individual level, the community doesn't behave like a self-aware being. The individuals are aware of each-other and they are aware that they live in a community, but the community as a whole is not aware of itself. Compare the concept of zeitgeist as an illustration of this phenomenon.

This is morality meets Gaia. I didn't take you for such a hippie!

Are you prejudiced against hippies?

[bennyboy]

I see your redundancy and raise you two: maybe it's the ability to monitor the monitoring of the monitoring of the monitoring.

That's required for higher level conceptualization processes.

Okay, so let's take a community of people. Not only does each individual monitor his own process of monitoring: the entire group monitors the ability of each individual to monitor his own process of monitoring. By your terms, this is sufficient to label the community as a singular agent, and to state that it is self-aware.

Nope.

Each individual monitoring his own monitoring is self-awareness. So, we already know at which level self-awareness occurs and any monitoring done is attributed to individual self-awareness.

When regarded as a singular entity, that is, one level above the individual level, the community doesn't behave like a self-aware being. The individuals are aware of each-other and they are aware that they live in a community, but the community as a whole is not aware of itself. Compare the concept of zeitgeist as an illustration of this phenomenon.

The community totally behaves like a self-aware being. It changes its mores, it responds to crises, it even develops new ways to monitor itself (clay tablets, newspapers, Facebook). And parts of the brain are very much aware of each other-- some parts of the brain specifically have the function of monitoring the function of other brain parts.

I think basically you're special pleading-- awareness is what you define it, but any other thing that meets your criteria is faced with new conditions and criteria.

This is morality meets Gaia. I didn't take you for such a hippie!

Are you prejudiced against hippies?

Absolutely. They don't shower enough, and they keep talking about things like watching the watcher or monitoring the monitor. And the cute ones sometimes go home with me, making my friends jealous, and then insist on sleeping head-to-toe. Not a fan.