Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[genkaus]

The difference would be that the zombie only processes information, while I both process and subjectively experience it.

Can you show this difference to be relevant?

More to the point - can you show that "subjectively experiencing" is qualitatively different than "processing information" rather than being a specific form of it? Or can you show the absence of "subjective experience" within a zombie?

The simplest observation of one's own experience shows that theres "I" the thinker/observer, and then ideas or physical objects which I think about or observe. The problem with both physical monism (with mind) or substance dualism (physical objects + mind) is that they BOTH fail to reconcile this subject/object duality.

The fundamental error of dualism - which is the same one you commit in the rest of the argument - is rooted in this proposition. That the 'simplest observation of one's own experience shows that there's an "I"' - it tells you nothing about that "I"'s metaphysical nature. You don't know whether that "I" is a fundamental entity or a composite one. You don't know what it is made of. You don't know anything about its nature other than that it observes.

Dualism makes the mistake of regarding it eliminatively and as a fundamental entity. It sees that "I" is not the body or the brain or thoughts or feelings etc - so it must be something separate from all that. And given that the existence of "I" is a brute fact, it must also be a fundamental and irreducible entity. These two suppositions result in the assumption of a secondary, non-physical, irreducible substance called "mind". But given that the assumptions are invalid, the conclusions regarding the nature of mind become invalid as well.

In substance dualism, my question is: how is it possible for mind and matter to interact? How, for example, does one move? What is the bridge? It seems to me there must be something which is partly matter and partly mind. If so, that duality is collapsed anyway, since there's now mind/matter, which is pretty much the monist's description of the brain.

Before asking that question, what you should be concerned about is "what is mind?". Without knowing what the bridge is being built between, talking about the bridge itself is pointless.

In the case of physical monism, the problem is that science takes as its target observable properties of matter. Brain function is observable, but the mind isn't. Mind is not an observable property of matter, nor is it a necessary explanation of how any material system behaves. It doesn't MATTER (snerk) whether a brain has a mind: the mechanism from eye, to brain, to behavior can be traced along physical structures without reference to qualia.

'Observable' is what sense? In science, we infer the existence of an entity from the effects it causes - so, in that way, mind is very much observable from the effect called behavior. And given that certain behaviors - such as learning - require the existence of a mind, it does become the necessary explanation for that particular behavior.

[bennyboy]

The difference would be that the zombie only processes information, while I both process and subjectively experience it.

Can you show this difference to be relevant?

More to the point - can you show that "subjectively experiencing" is qualitatively different than "processing information" rather than being a specific form of it? Or can you show the absence of "subjective experience" within a zombie?

Not at all. I can't show, or know, if there IS any difference. Given any physical structure or process, I cannot know for sure whether there is some kind of qualia "floating" around it.

If there's something special about the organic materials that is required for qualia, then a non-organic machine could never subjectively experience. If it's only the self-referential nature of the data being processed, as you've suggested in the past, then we might make something that really does experience, and doesn't just seem to.

But we could never know for sure that we had.

The fundamental error of dualism - which is the same one you commit in the rest of the argument - is rooted in this proposition. That the 'simplest observation of one's own experience shows that there's an "I"' - it tells you nothing about that "I"'s metaphysical nature. You don't know whether that "I" is a fundamental entity or a composite one. You don't know what it is made of. You don't know anything about its nature other than that it observes.

That's all correct.

Dualism makes the mistake of regarding it eliminatively and as a fundamental entity. It sees that "I" is not the body or the brain or thoughts or feelings etc - so it must be something separate from all that. And given that the existence of "I" is a brute fact, it must also be a fundamental and irreducible entity. These two suppositions result in the assumption of a secondary, non-physical, irreducible substance called "mind". But given that the assumptions are invalid, the conclusions regarding the nature of mind become invalid as well.

Given that ANY assumption is invalid, the conclusions based on it are invalid as well.

I don't think "I" is an assumption. I think it's a label for "whatever it is that thinks and observes." But I agree that assuming there's a self, unique to and separate somehow from the rest of the universe, is potentially a false assumption.

In substance dualism, my question is: how is it possible for mind and matter to interact? How, for example, does one move? What is the bridge? It seems to me there must be something which is partly matter and partly mind. If so, that duality is collapsed anyway, since there's now mind/matter, which is pretty much the monist's description of the brain.

Before asking that question, what you should be concerned about is "what is mind?". Without knowing what the bridge is being built between, talking about the bridge itself is pointless.

Super-accurate definitions aren't always necessary, in my opinion. If I say, "Mind is thinking and imagining 'n' sich," and others understand what I'm talking about, that's good enough. Whatever mind is and matter is, if they are unique substances which interact, we'd need some hypothesis about how such apparently unlike substances COULD interact. That's probably where the ideas of "will" and "soul" come in: there's a third-party which is neither mind nor matter but reconciles them. I'm not sure if that's the Catholic trinity, but it's A trinity.

In the case of physical monism, the problem is that science takes as its target observable properties of matter. Brain function is observable, but the mind isn't. Mind is not an observable property of matter, nor is it a necessary explanation of how any material system behaves. It doesn't MATTER (snerk) whether a brain has a mind: the mechanism from eye, to brain, to behavior can be traced along physical structures without reference to qualia.

'Observable' is what sense? In science, we infer the existence of an entity from the effects it causes - so, in that way, mind is very much observable from the effect called behavior. And given that certain behaviors - such as learning - require the existence of a mind, it does become the necessary explanation for that particular behavior.

Is this an existential argument, or a semantic one? It's often hard to tell when we're in this territory. Are you defining mind as "that which observes and learns?" Because this clearly begs the question. However, in a dualist view, I can't find a very satisfying definition either: "That which experiences qualia" begs the question in a similar way.

[Neo-Scholastic]

…it is safe to say that the proposition that the mind is a productof the brain is a scientific fact…

Your bias shows. From a scientifically neutral position, the brain could just as easily mediate of facilitate mind. Saying that mind is a product of the brain comes from your philosophical interpretation of the data.

…I'm not a fan of the way the concept of 'emergence' is used, both by professionals and non-professionals, and imo, saying that consciousness is 'an emergent property of the brain' is little more than hand-waving the problem aside

I could not agree more.

…The key point is that dualism itself doesn't actually explain anything either; it's just kicking the can down the road. "A seperate substance is responsible for consciousness." "Well, how does that second substance give rise to consciousness?" "I dunno; it just does." … How does this other substance give rise to mind, qualia, and consciousness?)

This is not a fair criticism, though often repeated. You never ask what is it about matter that allows it to give rise to physical properties, do you?

[bennyboy]

This is not a fair criticism, though often repeated. You never ask what is it about matter that allows it to give rise to physical properties, do you?

I'm not sure this helps the dualist case. If the answer to that question is "Dunno, but we can see it's true. Guess it must be considered a brute fact," then matter becomes the magical property-mill, and you are left explaining why such a substance would be limited in the properties it produces-- specifically why not consciousnous?

I think it's because scientists DO have some understanding of how matter gives rise to many properties, and how unlike the property of consciousness is to any of the others, that gives it a special status. Specifically, all other properties are objectively observable, while mind is not.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I'm not sure this helps the dualist case. If the answer to that question is "Dunno, but we can see it's true. Guess it must be considered a brute fact," then matter becomes the magical property-mill, and you are left explaining why such a substance would be limited in the properties it produces-- specifically why not consciousnous?

I see your point. Such a property as consciousness cannot be described mechanically, a problem IMHO that is insurmountable. As such it could be fundamental to matter in the same way as gravity. But that is not the claim made by physical monists. Then again, I not sure even materialists have a very good grasp on what matter really is.

I think it's because scientists DO have some understanding of how matter gives rise to many properties, and how unlike the property of consciousness is to any of the others, that gives it a special status.

And those who study semiotics DO have an understanding of how meaning works, its signs, signifiers, tropes, etc. These things can be studied without reference to physical matter as matter. There is much work to be done in this area if it is to catch up with scientific knowledge.

But these scholars are not running around saying, "how can meaning give rise to physical properties?" or calling physicality an emergent property of experience. The pretense of sciencetism is that it can just assume someday maybe without having its ontological naturalism challenged.

In the meantime, because of this divide I believe that at the very least methodological dualism is justified in trying to resolve the mind-body problem.

[MindForgedManacle]

@bennyboy The observation of the necessity of their being an "I" tells you nothing of its nature, as Genkaus pointed out. Heck, Descartes pointed that out in his Meditations on First Philosophy:

"But I do not have a sufficient understanding of the nature of this 'I' that now necessarily exists."

[bennyboy]

@bennyboy The observation of the necessity of their being an "I" tells you nothing of its nature, as Genkaus pointed out.

Already covered:

The fundamental error of dualism - which is the same one you commit in the rest of the argument - is rooted in this proposition. That the 'simplest observation of one's own experience shows that there's an "I"' - it tells you nothing about that "I"'s metaphysical nature. You don't know whether that "I" is a fundamental entity or a composite one. You don't know what it is made of. You don't know anything about its nature other than that it observes.

That's all correct.

In fact, I'd go even farther: nothing you experience tells you about the ultimate nature underlying those experiences. That includes the true nature of both the subjective self and the objective "other" that you contemplate, and the ideas that occur to you. And yet somehow we've arrived at a skew: the experience of other is taken at face value "Of course there's a physical world. I can hit you in the face with it," but the experience of self is not: "Just because you experience the self as unique and different to other matter doesn't make it so."

[pocaracas]

Does a chimp have "experience of self"?
Does a dolphin?
does an elephant?
does a dog?
does a cat?
does a pigeon?
does a lizard?
does a clown fish?
does a fly?
Does a flea?
Does a dust mite?

[genkaus]

Not at all. I can't show, or know, if there IS any difference. Given any physical structure or process, I cannot know for sure whether there is some kind of qualia "floating" around it.

If there's something special about the organic materials that is required for qualia, then a non-organic machine could never subjectively experience. If it's only the self-referential nature of the data being processed, as you've suggested in the past, then we might make something that really does experience, and doesn't just seem to.

But we could never know for sure that we had.

You are missing the point of the question - I'm not asking you to consider whether or not other entities are capable of subjective experiences (you've stated quite clearly that you cannot know that). I'm asking you to consider the nature of your own subjective experiences.

You take it as a brute fact that you are capable of subjective experiences.
You also accept the fact that your brain is capable of of processing information and that there are many, many forms of information processing going on in there.

I'm asking you to consider the hypothesis that "having subjective experiences" is one form of "information processing" going on in your brain. As evidence for this hypothesis, you have neuroscientific research suggesting that changes made in the information processing system changes the nature and quality of subjective experience.

The idea of a philosophical zombie rests on the premise that qualia/subjective experiences are not a form of information processing. That is the only way for the so-called zombie to have all the information processing capacities and still not be able to experience subjectivity. Therefore, in order to show any qualitative difference between you and a zombie, you need to show that having subjective experience is not a form of information processing - and the only way for you to do that is start with a dualistic assumption.

I don't think "I" is an assumption. I think it's a label for "whatever it is that thinks and observes." But I agree that assuming there's a self, unique to and separate somehow from the rest of the universe, is potentially a false assumption.

The assumption here is not an "I". Like I said, you can regard the existence of "I" as a self-evident, brute fact. The assumption here is about the nature of "I", i.e. what "I" is. In dualism, the assumption is that the nature of "I" is something different and independent of what you see in the rest of the universe.

Super-accurate definitions aren't always necessary, in my opinion. If I say, "Mind is thinking and imagining 'n' sich," and others understand what I'm talking about, that's good enough. Whatever mind is and matter is, if they are unique substances which interact, we'd need some hypothesis about how such apparently unlike substances COULD interact. That's probably where the ideas of "will" and "soul" come in: there's a third-party which is neither mind nor matter but reconciles them. I'm not sure if that's the Catholic trinity, but it's A trinity.

Generic definitions may suffice when when everyone superficially understands the subject matter - but when you intend to study it in depth, a more accurate description is called for. Otherwise, you end up making all sorts of unfounded assumptions - as you demonstrate here. You assume that mind and matter are "unique substances" without actually considering what they are. You pose a difficulty in interaction without understanding their nature. And based on that, you hypothesize a third party which may turn out to be completely unnecessary.

Is this an existential argument, or a semantic one? It's often hard to tell when we're in this territory. Are you defining mind as "that which observes and learns?" Because this clearly begs the question. However, in a dualist view, I can't find a very satisfying definition either: "That which experiences qualia" begs the question in a similar way.

Its an epistemological argument and I'm not defining mind.

You made a comment about mind not being an observable property of matter - the implication being that we cannot know whether or not a particular material entity has a mind or not. You epistemological assumption here is that the only way we can know that an entity exists is by direct observational access to it - such as, we can know our mind exists but not anyone else's. The problem with this position is that we infer the existence of something from the effects it causes and without direct observation all the time. Which is why, observation in science refers to both direct observation and the observation of effects. Thus, my question regarding "in what sense do you mean observation?".

---

You never ask what is it about matter that allows it to give rise to physical properties, do you?

Actually, we do ask that. The whole body of natural sciences is devoted to asking precisely that question. All those sciences do is study matter at different levels and ask "why does it do that?" or "how does it do that?".

---

Nothing you experience tells you about the ultimate nature underlying those experiences. That includes the true nature of both the subjective self and the objective "other" that you contemplate, and the ideas that occur to you. And yet somehow we've arrived at a skew: the experience of other is taken at face value "Of course there's a physical world. I can hit you in the face with it," but the experience of self is not: "Just because you experience the self as unique and different to other matter doesn't make it so."

That's not quite accurate. As you say, if the experience of the "other" is taken at face value, the conclusion is "Ofcourse there's a physical world. I can hit you in the face with it". In the same vein, taking the experience of "self" at face value, the conclusion would be "Ofcourse there is a self, who do you think feels the pain of being hit in the face?"

Whether or not that "self" is unique and qualitatively different than the "other" can only be established by questioning their underlying nature - something, as you've accepted, that cannot be established simply by taking it at face value.

[bennyboy]

Does a chimp have "experience of self"?
Does a dolphin?
does an elephant?
does a dog?
does a cat?
does a pigeon?
does a lizard?
does a clown fish?
does a fly?
Does a flea?
Does a dust mite?

I think so, but cannot know for sure.