Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[bennyboy]

You are the one trying to argue against this position by suggesting qualia to be a property of all matter or qualia existing without matter - so you are the one who has to provide evidence.

I'm not suggesting anything except that I don't know exactly what qualia are. I'm suggesting that I can't observe them, or even know them to exist, outside my own subjective experience. I'm suggesting that if qualia is only part of brain function, then brain function is physically sufficient to explain all behaviors, making it scientifically irrelevant whether someone actually has qualia or just seems to.

"Show me the evidence" fails as a response to agnosticism. The evidence that we are agnostic is that we are agnostic. If you think we are NOT agnostic about what qualia are and what causes them, then show me some, and show what made them. But you can't. And that's the point.

As for the alternatives you listed: those are the things you'd have to rule out to have a meaningful scientific experiment on the nature of qualia. If you want to show qualia are only a property of function, then you have to show that something lacking that function lacks qualia (which you can't) or that all qualia must be associated with that function (which you can't). You've defined and assumed, then asserted. What you haven't done is shown how you can prove your assertions represent the reality of what qualia are and how they are caused to exist.

Ironically, you've used the same process that I have to get started: "I know I have qualia, I know I have a brain, so what can I infer?" I've inferred that since others SEEM to be physically similar to me, and SEEM to act as though they have qualia, I should assume that they do, as this lets me get on with my meaningful life. You've formed the same process as a "scientific" hypothesis: "What evidence should I look for to establish qualia? I can only see behavior, so let's use that. Yep, that guy behaves as though he has qualia-- so there's evidence supporting my hypothesis."

The only difference is that I don't accept your evidence as proper evidence, or your hypothesis as scientifically meaningful. It introduces an unecessary property to a process (input/processing/output) which is already sufficient to explain behavior.

---

If I might thow a monkey wrench into the mix. With all the talk about zombies and what not, I think the issue falls back on the question of whether qualia have any reason to exist at all. This reminds me of this argument:

1. Knowledge depends on significant correspondence between awareness (qualitative phenomenal experience) and cognition (physical brain processes).

2. Natural selection explains the correspondence between awareness and cognition.

3. Evolutionary processes cannot select for features that do not affect behavior.

4. If awareness supervenes on cognition, then awareness is causally inert and cannot influence behavior.

5. Thus, natural selection cannot explain the correspondence between awareness and cognition.

6. And thus, knowledge does not depend on any significant correspondence between awareness and cognition.

Given that human consciousness is a result of evolutionary processes then you have two possibilities, neither of which square with materialism. First, if awareness is causally relevant and does affect behavior that means phenomenal properties influence physical processes from the top-down. That means phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to physical properties and the physical universe is not causally closed. On the other hand, if evolutionary processes can select features that do not affect behavior, then it displays teleological behavior that is inconsistent with an undirected naturalistic process.

Is this your own line of argument? It's very elegant.

I'm not sure about #3, though. Some important traits, like color, don't affect behavior but are naturally selected. Unless being eaten is a behavior!

[genkaus]

This reminds me of this argument:

1. Knowledge depends on significant correspondence between awareness (qualitative phenomenal experience) and cognition (physical brain processes).

2. Natural selection explains the correspondence between awareness and cognition.

3. Evolutionary processes cannot select for features that do not affect behavior.

4. If awareness supervenes on cognition, then awareness is causally inert and cannot influence behavior.

5. Thus, natural selection cannot explain the correspondence between awareness and cognition.

6. And thus, knowledge does not depend on any significant correspondence between awareness and cognition.

First error:
3. Evolutionary processes cannot select for features that do not affect behavior.

Evolutionary processes cannot select for features that do not affect survival - would be more appropriate. While behavior does affect survival, it is not the only factor that determines it.

Second error:

4. If awareness supervenes on cognition, then awareness is causally inert and cannot influence behavior.

Establishing awareness' supervenience over cognition is not sufficient to establish it as causally inert and non-influential on behavior.

Third error:

6. And thus, knowledge does not depend on any significant correspondence between awareness and cognition

Even if natural selection were unable to explain the correspondence between awareness and cognition, this conclusion would still be invalid.

Given that human consciousness is a result of evolutionary processes then you have two possibilities, neither of which square with materialism. First, if awareness is causally relevant and does affect behavior that means phenomenal properties influence physical processes from the top-down. That means phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to physical properties and the physical universe is not causally closed.

Unless the phenomenal process is a specific form of physical process in action. In which case, it is both causally relevant and reducible

On the other hand, if evolutionary processes can select features that do not affect behavior, then it displays teleological behavior that is inconsistent with an undirected naturalistic process.

Also incorrect. Like I said, behavior is not the only criteria by which survival is determined. So, evolutionary processes can select for features without necessarily affecting behavior.

To put it in perspective, consider this:
In terms of energy consumption, the brain is a very costly organ. Almost 20-25% of your basic metabolism goes to sustain your brain. Which does not seem surprising considering all the functions going up in there.

Imagine if your brain had to process every bit of "information" its way. Imagine if every aspect of every sensory input had to be evaluated and a response generated. With the sheer quantity involved, the energy toll would've been much higher. So, having a supervising process, one that evaluates the inputs and their evaluation, would be a definite advantage. It'd allow the whole system to prioritize tasks and focus on specific inputs thus drastically reduce the overall energy requirement. That is what awareness is - a system that monitors the mental activity itself. And this is the advantage it was selected for.


On a side note - good to see an intellectual argument from you. The quality of your posts had been declining of late.

[bennyboy]

That is what awareness is - a system that monitors the mental activity itself. And this is the advantage it was selected for.

Prove it.

[Neo-Scholastic]

First error: 3. Evolutionary processes cannot select for features that do not affect behavior. Evolutionary processes cannot select for features that do not affect survival - would be more appropriate. While behavior does affect survival, it is not the only factor that determines it.... In terms of energy consumption, the brain is a very costly organ....That is what awareness is - a system that monitors the mental activity itself. And this is the advantage it was selected for.

I will concede that survival is more appropriate. That substitution does not undermine the argument. How does improved energy efficiency give a physical system phenomenal qualities?

Second error: 4. If awareness supervenes on cognition, then awareness is causally inert and cannot influence behavior. Establishing awareness' supervenience over cognition is not sufficient to establish it as causally inert and non-influential on behavior....(later)... the phenomenal process is a specific form of physical process in action. In which case, it is both causally relevant and reducible

This premise addresses the problem of over-determination that plagues your philosophy of mind. If phenomenal properties are reducible to physical events then they are not causally relevant. You have just given a name to a large set of related events. If mental properties occur simultaneously with physical processes then qualia are just along for the ride doing nothing. They neither steer nor propel. If qualia actually do something it is over and above what the physical processes are doing just fine by themselves.

Third error:6. And thus, knowledge does not depend on any significant correspondence between awareness and cognition...Even if natural selection were unable to explain the correspondence between awareness and cognition, this conclusion would still be invalid.

By itself no. In the context of the argument it is valid. Evolutionary pressures do not explain how our capacity for rational knowledge came to be. As such there is no materialist explanation for why they should exist at all. The physical universe can do everything it already does without any subjective awareness of any kind.

[I and I]

Qualia shapes and influences physical actions of human beings and vice versa.
Qualia already implies a mutual influence of the physical on the mental.

Next

[bennyboy]

Qualia shapes and influences physical actions of human beings and vice versa.
Qualia already implies a mutual influence of the physical on the mental.

Next

Wow, you managed to be condescending AND completely disregard the OP and everything anyone said about it. Well done.

[I and I]

Qualia shapes and influences physical actions of human beings and vice versa.
Qualia already implies a mutual influence of the physical on the mental.

Next

Wow, you managed to be condescending AND completely disregard the OP and everything anyone said about it. Well done.

Condescending how?

[genkaus]

I'm not suggesting anything except that I don't know exactly what qualia are.

If that was all you were suggesting, then there would be no need for a discussion. But as the rest of your post shows, that is not all you are suggesting.

I'm suggesting that I can't observe them, or even know them to exist, outside my own subjective experience.

Can't know - as opposed to don't know. And as I've said before, consistent application of this agnosticism means you can't know whether the 9/11 is real.

I'm suggesting that if qualia is only part of brain function, then brain function is physically sufficient to explain all behaviors, making it scientifically irrelevant whether someone actually has qualia or just seems to.

Wrong. If qualia is a part of brain function, then knowing the differnce between someone who has qualia and someone who simply seems to is the same as knowing the difference between someone who has that particular function and someone who has some other function which resembles certain properties of having qualia. And that knowledge is scientifically relevant.

"Show me the evidence" fails as a response to agnosticism. The evidence that we are agnostic is that we are agnostic. If you think we are NOT agnostic about what qualia are and what causes them, then show me some, and show what made them. But you can't. And that's the point.

We as in people like you or we as in humanity is general?

I have no problem accepting the fact that you are agnostic in regards to everything related to qualia. Don't take my pointing out your inconsistent application as your agnosticism as disbelief in your agnostic state. After all, all that is required for agnosticism is to remain ignorant of the evidence.

As for humanity in general, most of them don't claim to be agnostic. Different groups give different explanations regarding what qualia are and what causes them. One group in particular - made of scientists - is actually showing their work.

As for the alternatives you listed: those are the things you'd have to rule out to have a meaningful scientific experiment on the nature of qualia. If you want to show qualia are only a property of function, then you have to show that something lacking that function lacks qualia (which you can't) or that all qualia must be associated with that function (which you can't). You've defined and assumed, then asserted. What you haven't done is shown how you can prove your assertions represent the reality of what qualia are and how they are caused to exist.

Actually, you were the one who listed those alternatives - and in order for me to rule them out, they have to be ruled in first. Which means, for me to consider them, you have to establish them as valid and sensible possibilities. When discussing gravity, it is not up to me to disprove the hypothesis that it is caused by His Noodliness by pushing us down with his Noodly appendages, unless you prove it to be a sensible possibility in the first place.

In order to develop a meaningful scientific experiment into the nature of qualia, I first have to operationalize the definition - meaning identify a testable, concrete meaning behind the nebulous notion - come up with a hypothesis pursuant to it and set up the experimental parameters. Disproving all the hare-brained alternatives is not required.

Ironically, you've used the same process that I have to get started: "I know I have qualia, I know I have a brain, so what can I infer?" I've inferred that since others SEEM to be physically similar to me, and SEEM to act as though they have qualia, I should assume that they do, as this lets me get on with my meaningful life. You've formed the same process as a "scientific" hypothesis: "What evidence should I look for to establish qualia? I can only see behavior, so let's use that. Yep, that guy behaves as though he has qualia-- so there's evidence supporting my hypothesis."

You're ignoring the third fact that we also know - that my behavior is a result of qualia. I'm not using behavior as evidence because I can see it, I'm using it because I know it to be a consequence of qualia. That's the difference between your assumption and my knowledge.

The only difference is that I don't accept your evidence as proper evidence, or your hypothesis as scientifically meaningful. It introduces an unecessary property to a process (input/processing/output) which is already sufficient to explain behavior.

Given the definition of qualia as a specific process - there is no new or unnecessary property being introduced. It is already a part of the process.

---

That is what awareness is - a system that monitors the mental activity itself. And this is the advantage it was selected for.

Prove it.

Prove a tautology?

---

I will concede that survival is more appropriate. That substitution does not undermine the argument. How does improved energy efficiency give a physical system phenomenal qualities?

No - phenomenal qualities improve energy efficiency. That is why they are selected for. And that undermines your argument.

This premise addresses the problem of over-determination that plagues your philosophy of mind. If phenomenal properties are reducible to physical events then they are not causally relevant. You have just given a name to a large set of related events. If mental properties occur simultaneously with physical processes then qualia are just along for the ride doing nothing. They neither steer nor propel. If qualia actually do something it is over and above what the physical processes are doing just fine by themselves.

If qualia is a name given to large set of related events, then there is neither any over-determination nor causal irrelevance. Since qualia is reducible to physical events, it is not "along for the ride" - it is the ride.

By itself no. In the context of the argument it is valid. Evolutionary pressures do not explain how our capacity for rational knowledge came to be. As such there is no materialist explanation for why they should exist at all. The physical universe can do everything it already does without any subjective awareness of any kind.

Ignoring the fact that evolutionary pressures do explain how our capacity for rational knowledge came to be and that there is a good materialist explanation for why they exist - even if there wasn't such an explanation, your rejection would still be invalid.

There isn't any need for subjective awareness is not an argument against its existence.

[bennyboy]

Can't know - as opposed to don't know. And as I've said before, consistent application of this agnosticism means you can't know whether the 9/11 is real.

And you've consistently ignored my agreement with that statement, and my statement that these two cases of agnosticism are not equivalent.

Wrong. If qualia is a part of brain function, then knowing the differnce between someone who has qualia and someone who simply seems to is the same as knowing the difference between someone who has that particular function and someone who has some other function which resembles certain properties of having qualia. And that knowledge is scientifically relevant.

There's no way to establish if qualia is a part of brain function, except by your assumption-masked-as-hypothesis.

I have no problem accepting the fact that you are agnostic in regards to everything related to qualia. Don't take my pointing out your inconsistent application as your agnosticism as disbelief in your agnostic state. After all, all that is required for agnosticism is to remain ignorant of the evidence.

Theists do what you do. They say, "Look at the magnificent sunset. Only God could have done that." You say, "Look at the behavior. Only qualia could have done that." What neither of you have done is to establish that your "evidence" is attributable to, and only to, what you say it is.

Actually, you were the one who listed those alternatives - and in order for me to rule them out, they have to be ruled in first. Which means, for me to consider them, you have to establish them as valid and sensible possibilities. When discussing gravity, it is not up to me to disprove the hypothesis that it is caused by His Noodliness by pushing us down with his Noodly appendages, unless you prove it to be a sensible possibility in the first place.

That's a goofy parallel. I'm talking about systems which are integral to brain function, and how to identify which of those systems are necessary for qualia to really exist, and which are not. This is not making shit up just for giggles.

Why are they sensible possibilities? Because given qualia in the brain, one, some or all of those layers of functioning are required for qualia to exist. But we can only interface with functioning humans, specifically those who can communicate. We can't check a group of neurons, or atoms, for qualia. We can't check non-organic processing units for qualia.

Your solution is to define it away, "Qualia (according to me) is X, therefore wherever X is found, I've found evidence of qualia." Except you haven't demonstrated that qualia is X, and your "evidence" is therefore really only evidence that you are willing to beg the question.

Disproving all the hare-brained alternatives is not required.

If you want to say what qualia are, then you have to prove that's what they are. If you want to prove that a particular layer of function is sufficient to produce qualia, then you have to demonstrate that to be true.

You can call the alternatives to your arbitrarily-chosen level of function "hare-brained" if you want, but this does little to prove your positive assertions about the nature of qualia.

[genkaus]

And you've consistently ignored my agreement with that statement, and my statement that these two cases of agnosticism are not equivalent.

No. I've answered it by showing the equivalence.

There's no way to establish if qualia is a part of brain function, except by your assumption-masked-as-hypothesis.

Every description of qualia fits matches brain function - thus the hypothesis that qualia is brain function stands on solid ground.

Theists do what you do. They say, "Look at the magnificent sunset. Only God could have done that." You say, "Look at the behavior. Only qualia could have done that." What neither of you have done is to establish that your "evidence" is attributable to, and only to, what you say it is.

Except, unlike theists, I know of the existence of god and know of atleast one sunset for which he is directly responsible.

In other words, I know that qualia exists and I know that some of my behavior is caused by qualia. And that differentiates my proposition frm a theists.

That's a goofy parallel. I'm talking about systems which are integral to brain function, and how to identify which of those systems are necessary for qualia to really exist, and which are not. This is not making shit up just for giggles.

For you to talk about that, you first have to accept that bran systems are necessary to create qualia - which you haven't.

Why are they sensible possibilities? Because given qualia in the brain, one, some or all of those layers of functioning are required for qualia to exist. But we can only interface with functioning humans, specifically those who can communicate. We can't check a group of neurons, or atoms, for qualia. We can't check non-organic processing units for qualia.

Given the basic nature of qualia - that is, it is always associated with complex sensory events, positing its existence at neural or atomic level becomes nonsensical.

Your solution is to define it away, "Qualia (according to me) is X, therefore wherever X is found, I've found evidence of qualia." Except you haven't demonstrated that qualia is X, and your "evidence" is therefore really only evidence that you are willing to beg the question.

Except, I'm not the one doing the defining. And showing evidence for a tautology is never required.

Qualia is a property of experience, which requires existence of a mind. Which means positing existence of qualia at the level where mind doesn't exist is nonsensical and does not require disproving.

If you want to say what qualia are, then you have to prove that's what they are.

You mean proof as in definition - which has been available to you from the start.