Panpsychism is not as crazy as it sounds.

[Heywood]

Sure, the relevant quantum systems interact, which is what "observation" means in the language game of quantum mechanics. If you're trying to press that any further you're equivocating on the word "observation".

The only further I would go would be to say the photon/table system isn't conscious but it is computational. Something is inputed, something is outputted and in the process something is changed. Consciousness is probably an emergent property of computations. The table/photon system isn't conscious but could be part of a larger more complex system that is conscious.

[Wyrd of Gawd]

Panpsychism is basically the idea that all matter in some sense conscious. That's not to say that all matter has a mind, as that is obviously only true of brains. It's also not to say that all matter is aware or perceptive, in the way that we experience awareness and perception through visual experience and our brain processes. But consider the idea that all matter, ranging from particles to brains, have an experiential component, call it protophenomenal or protoexperiential or even protoconscniousness. It SOUNDS like a very absurd idea at first but this is why I don't think it should.

Even a materialist, as I presently consider myself to be, must account for the strange fact that the Cosmos IS in some sense Mind, that is through beings such as ourselves and of course throughout a grading spectrum on the evolutionary tree of life. At some point in evolution it seems that "consciousness," the ability to feel, entered the picture. Now as I see it, there are few different reasonable hypotheses to draw from this:

1) There is a fundamental law in Nature, like physical laws, that determines an experiential component, extrinsic to matter, to arise only when a certain kind of informational threshold is met, transmitted by and through a particular arrangement of functioning machines, such as neurons. Call it a psychophysical law. This law would dictate that when precise conditions are met, say it a biochemical structure (AI proponents might deny this requirement) organized in a specific way, arranged to interact with other biochemical structures, that is the overall mapping of a network of smaller systems (think brains), then consciousness emerges, ranging in quality depending on the preceding factors. For some, consciousness might be a very weak experience in comparison to ours, lacking in the richness and of course the analysis. At any rate, it seems like consciousness on this must be viewed as an emergent property which suggests a deeper underlying law on par with those of gravity and motion. That is to say, information, how certain particles interact (on the cellular level), has both a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect. This is still monism and along the lines of some atheistic thinkers, such as Spinoza, who believed matter and mind were the same underlying "stuff" expressed in two different ways.

2. The other option I think is fascinating and not entirely implausible is that all matter has an instinsic experiential component, a degree of consciousness. Now that seems hard to believe but only if you imagine consciousness for a thermometer or an atom to be something like your consciousness. It wouldn't be. Those things likely don't feel anything that we would relate as feeling but in some sense, even the most faintest you can imagine, a feeling component exists within them. Perhaps it is only felt by a subject when other conditions are met at a higher level, perhaps a biochemical and/or informational organization one.

At any rate, I find subjectivity vs. objectivity one of the most amazing aspects of the Cosmos. There must be a materialist account for this and I'm beginning to find the common functionalist view misguided. Consciousness is not merely function, and if it is, what effect does it have on the physical that underlying "unconscious" (at least to us) neural processes cannot accomplish without any experiential aspect to it? Epiphenomenalism seems to run into a Darwinian problem. If consciousness is basically useless, perhaps a "byproduct" of other functions, why did/does evolution select for it? These are all questions I'm sure you have discussed countless times before but have you considered panpsychism?

I read about a guy who believed similar stuff to the extent that he didn't want to offend dirt. That explains why he never took a bath in over 60 years. He thought that the dirt on his hide would get upset if he ever washed it off.

[Chas]

Yes, actually it is.

It is pretty bat shit.

---

Is my table conscious?

In a certain sense your table is observant. A photon that hits it will it in a particular place. For that to happen an "observation" has to be made to collapse the wave function.

You have this pretty much backwards, or inside out.

"Collapse of the wave function" simple means going from probabilistic to known. There is no physical event, no thing that collapses.

It is the knowledge of a conscious observer that changes. There is no evidence the the table is a conscious observer.

[Mudhammam]

Consciousness is probably an emergent property of computations.

By what law or principle does that happen? At what level of computation does matter "mysteriously" gain a subjective quality that "feels" pain? It's easy to call something bat shit crazy when you just insert magic into the equation, which is what materialists essentially seem to be doing by saying that a cell is nothing but a cell but add enough of them together and now you have the experience of being a bunch of cells that together can think and tell his or her "self" stories about his or her "self"! Where does the quality of experience--consciousness, feeling--enter the picture according to presently known laws and what evolutionary advantage does it offer that mere computations don't?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Careful Pickup. As an atheist I found the case for panpsychism compelling... it's a gateway philosophy. Next thing you know you'll turn Swedenborgian.

[Mudhammam]

Careful Pickup. As an atheist I found the case for panpsychism compelling... it's a gateway philosophy. Next thing you know you'll turn Swedenborgian.

Lol what's a Swedenborgian?

[Whateverist]

Good on you regardless Pickup for not wanting to rush to nothing-but conclusions. The worst sort of theists decide on the destination before they've ever begun to explore. I think the same is true for atheists.

[Mudhammam]

Good on you regardless Pickup for not wanting to rush to nothing-but conclusions. The worst sort of theists decide on the destination before they've ever begun to explore. I think the same is true for atheists.

Agreed. Even so I see no room for theism in my speculations though.

---

I think materialists and physicalists need to broaden their ideas about what matter either instrinsically or extrinsically is.

[Alex K]

Putting aside my difficulties in defining consciousness in the first place, I found the panpsychism thing compelling for a while. An observational fact which led me to discard the idea again is how easily we lose consciousness. For it to be present, the brain has to function very well, and minor disturbances such as interference from chemicals or electricity lets us lose it. This to me points to consciousness as an emergent phenomenon of feedback circuits i.e. your first category. If consciousness were somehow a deep property of the matter I am made of, I would not expect it to kick the bucket only because there's some C2H5OH around.

If this is not an argument against panpsychism in your sense, I'd be gratetful if you explained where I go wrong.

[Mudhammam]

Putting aside my difficulties in defining consciousness in the first place, I found the panpsychism thing compelling for a while. An observational fact which led me to discard the idea again is how easily we lose consciousness. For it to be present, the brain has to function very well, and minor disturbances such as interference from chemicals or electricity lets us lose it. This to me points to consciousness as an emergent phenomenon of feedback circuits i.e. your first category. If consciousness were somehow a deep property of the matter I am made of, I would not expect it to kick the bucket only because there's some C2H5OH around.

If this is not an argument against panpsychism in your sense, I'd be gratetful if you explained where I go wrong.

So one might postulate a fundamental law that says when physical requirements X, Y, and Z are met, you get consciousness, the experience of a subjective feeling, say, pain. The reason this is a fundamental law is that it says consciousness will always emerge when these physical conditions are met. In order to have this psychophysical law be realized, which is consciousness, a coherence principle exists between the psychophysical laws and the physical laws, by which those organize matter in such a way to realize the other (some psychophysical laws are dependent on physical laws if to be effectual). However, deeper still, a coherence holds the physical and psychophysical laws together so that consciousness depends on the physical for its emergent conditions to be met. When a brain is damaged, the physical structure changes, which is closely related to how the psychophysical law gets expressed.