What are some good checkmate arguments against religion?

[Rampant.A.I.]

Plantinga himself admits the modal ontological argument is unconvincing and flawed: One must presuppose the conclusion to allow the premises.

What one presupposes in Plantinga's argument is that 1) modal realism is true and 2) God's existence is possible. If those 2 are true, then God would exist. That's no more circular than saying 1) modal realism is true, 2) the existence of ETs is metaphysically possible, 3) Therefore ETs exist (in some possible world, not necessarily ours). You're confusing circularity with entailment. The assumptions I mentioned do entail the conclusion, but that's true of all arguments.

For example, Kalam assumes that actual infinities are impossible and that the A-theory of time is true. These entail the conclusion that the unuverse has a cause for its existence. But that doesn't make Kalam circular.

I'm unsure why you would provide four examples of circular reasoning when I asked you for a logically sound ontological argument, but judging from past responses and your post here, you simply fail to understand why circular reasoning is logically invalid.

I DO understand why circular reasoning is bad, but you're actually wrong. Circular reasoning is not, strictly speaking, logically invalid; it's just unconvincing because it can support any proposition. I'm lazy, so I'll just quote Wikipedia's article:

Circular reasoning is a logical fallacy in which the reasoner begins with what they are trying to end with. The components of a circular argument are often logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. However, the argument is useless because the conclusion is in the premises. Circular logic cannot prove a conclusion because, if the conclusion is doubted, the premise which leads to it will be doubted.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_reasoning

Regardless, what YOU don't seem to understand is that the arguments aren't anymore circular than any other logically valid argument. Take the classical syllogism:

All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man;
Therefore Socrates is immortal.

The first premise entails the conclusion already, but we clearly don't see this as a problem.

Now, you'd have to be a fuckwit if you think I'm supporting circular reasoning. What I am doing is questioning your claims about ontological arguments (esp. Plantinga's) being circular.

Worse, you seem to be confusing validity with circularity. I've never said I thought any ontological argument was sound (I'm an atheist, dumbass), but plenty of them have been valid, i.e the conclusion follows from the premises.

You should learn not to describe presuppositional arguments as "logical proofs," and then condescend to anyone who disagrees with an invalid ontological argument being defined as a "logical proof" like an arrogant 21 year-old suffering from the Dunning-Kreuger effect.

Oh boy, the old standby of "Can't beat the argument, so let's talk about my spurious claims regarding their psychology!"

Anyway, Plantinga's argument is not presuppositional, it's an argument from natural theology. It is almost never disputed as being logically valid (I can only find claims that philosopher Michael Martin disputes this) because, again, it just follows from its premises. Yes, they ARE proofs because given the premises, the conclusion NECESSARILY follows; that's basically what a logical proof IS. That tells you nothing of the soundness however.

The argument is indeed presuppositional, as it presupposes God's existence in order to define necessary existence as a characteristic of God in the opening premises.

It relies on an equivocation between subjunctive possibility and epistemic possibility.

Plantinga's argument has indeed been challenged, and has all the shortcomings of other historical ontological arguments which have been categorically challenged and shown to be invalid.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument

The introduction of "necessary existing being" is problematic. If something exists necessarily, is existence a property of something existing contingently?

If I replace the necessarily existing God with Necessary Unicorn, is the argument still valid as proof of any supernatural entity? What makes a being "necessary," saying it's necessary? You'd have to accept an ontological argument, or assume God's existence for such a concept to even appear coherent in the first place.

I'd rather like to know what my apparent condescension and arrogance has to do with the argument at hand.

It's because you're the douchebag who sits in the front row of Philosophy 101 classes, presenting "new original thoughts of your own" covered in the first few chapters of course material you didn't bother to read.

I can show why you're wrong - and have - but as with many when shown you're wrong, you shift into non sequiturs and ad hominems.

This is because you continue to repeat like a broken record that ontological arguments are logically valid, without even bothering to glance at the historical objections posted in the same Wiki pages you're copying the arguments from.

Most are just content to criticize arguments for bad (or at least badly stated) reasons and call it a day. Which always surprises me from a community which generally trumpets its rationality, intellectual capabilities and skepticism. Disagreeing is fine, but accepting bad responses to arguments we reject is just silly.

If you'd bother to look in to the objections to the arguments instead of claiming "no one disputes them" and "they're logically valid," this wouldn't be an issue.

Instead you dismiss objections and continue to introduce largely debunked arguments as "logically valid," and then go on to lecture about rationality, critical thinking and skepticism?

[MindForgedManacle]

The argument is indeed presuppositional, as it presupposes God's existence in order to define necessary existence as a characteristic of God in the opening premises.

It defines what is meant by "God", it does not start by saying God exists and then appends attributes to him.

It relies on an equivocation between subjunctive possibility and epistemic possibility.

That would only be the case if a user of the argument claims it conclusively establishes God's existence.

Plantinga's argument has indeed been challenged, and has all the shortcomings of other historical ontological arguments which have been categorically challenged and shown to be invalid.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument

Not sure what I'm supposed to respond to here, seeing as you just dropped a link. And since I seem to have to repeat myself: I do not, nor have ever stated, that Plantinga's argument actually works.

The introduction of "necessary existing being" is problematic. If something exists necessarily, is existence a property of something existing contingently?

No, but the word salad was a nice move to cover up the incoherence.
All necessary existence is referring to is existing in all possible worlds, i.e being metaphysically necessary in the same way that "2+2=4" is metaphysically necessary.

If I replace the necessarily existing God with Necessary Unicorn, is the argument still valid as proof of any supernatural entity?

I'd like to see your argument for a necessarily existent unicorn that both validly postulates a unicorn as necessarily existent and still retains all the attributes that a unicorn is supposed to have.

It's because you're the douchebag who sits in the front row of Philosophy 101 classes, presenting "new original thoughts of your own" covered in the first few chapters of course material you didn't bother to read.

Tell me just ONE place I've claimed to have "new and original thpughts of my own". You tried lying about this shit in that other thread on the topic of the necessity of God, and I see you keep doing it.

This is because you continue to repeat like a broken record that ontological arguments are logically valid, without even bothering to glance at the historical objections posted in the same Wiki pages you're copying the arguments from.

I've seen them, and pretty much EVERY single one questions the SOUNDNESS of the arguments, not their validity.

If you'd bother to look in to the objections to the arguments instead of claiming "no one disputes them" and "they're logically valid," this wouldn't be an issue.

Okay, I've called you on this before. I have not said that "no one disputes these arguments", as I clearly dispute them, seeing as I'm an atheist. I said they're logically valid, which has been confirmed to the point that they pass automated theorem provers routinely (Gödel's ontological argument was recently prooved (in the sense of validity) recently, in fact).

Instead you dismiss objections and continue to introduce largely debunked arguments as "logically valid."

You've got to be trolling me. As in the last thread on this (which you conveniently abandoned after I showed you were batshit wrong by quoting a post of mine debunking Plantinga's argument), I have not dismissed objections to these arguments, aside from one's which stupidly claim they're logically invalid despite passing automated theorem provers and staying consistent with their logical system's axioms.

[Confused Ape]

Just found an interesting page on wikipedia - List Of converts to Christianity from nontheism

This is a list of notable converts to Christianity who were not theists before their conversion. See Nontheism for specifics of what all fits that. All names should be sourced and the source should indicate they had not been a theist, not merely non-churchgoing, before conversion.

They're a mixed lot according to this article. Some started out as religious before becoming atheist or agnostic for a while. Others started out as atheists or agnostics before converting. I've double checked the information on some of them but will only mention two in this post.

How I found God and peace with my atheist brother: PETER HITCHENS traces his journey back to Christianity

During his teenage years and early 20s, Peter Hitchens lost his faith and rebelled against everything he had been brought up to believe in. Here, in a moving and thought-provoking account from his controversial new book, he describes his spiritual journey back to God - and the end of his feud with his brother

His brother, Christopher had the same upbringing but remained an atheist until his death.

Hitchens was raised nominally Christian, and went to Christian boarding schools but from an early age declined to participate in communal prayers.

Tamsin Greig started out as an atheist.

Greig now lives in a flat in Kensal Green, having moved back in 1996 to be with her dying father.[6] She converted to Christianity at this time, having been raised as an atheist.[10] Greig is also a vegetarian.[34]

I doubt that there's any checkmate argument that would work with Peter Hitchens because he'll have heard them all before from his brother.

[Rampant.A.I.]

The argument is indeed presuppositional, as it presupposes God's existence in order to define necessary existence as a characteristic of God in the opening premises.

It defines what is meant by "God", it does not start by saying God exists and then appends attributes to him.

It relies on an equivocation between subjunctive possibility and epistemic possibility.

That would only be the case if a user of the argument claims it conclusively establishes God's existence.

Plantinga's argument has indeed been challenged, and has all the shortcomings of other historical ontological arguments which have been categorically challenged and shown to be invalid.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument

Not sure what I'm supposed to respond to here, seeing as you just dropped a link. And since I seem to have to repeat myself: I do not, nor have ever stated, that Plantinga's argument actually works.

The introduction of "necessary existing being" is problematic. If something exists necessarily, is existence a property of something existing contingently?

No, but the word salad was a nice move to cover up the incoherence.
All necessary existence is referring to is existing in all possible worlds, i.e being metaphysically necessary in the same way that "2+2=4" is metaphysically necessary.

If I replace the necessarily existing God with Necessary Unicorn, is the argument still valid as proof of any supernatural entity?

I'd like to see your argument for a necessarily existent unicorn that both validly postulates a unicorn as necessarily existent and still retains all the attributes that a unicorn is supposed to have.

It's because you're the douchebag who sits in the front row of Philosophy 101 classes, presenting "new original thoughts of your own" covered in the first few chapters of course material you didn't bother to read.

Tell me just ONE place I've claimed to have "new and original thpughts of my own". You tried lying about this shit in that other thread on the topic of the necessity of God, and I see you keep doing it.

This is because you continue to repeat like a broken record that ontological arguments are logically valid, without even bothering to glance at the historical objections posted in the same Wiki pages you're copying the arguments from.

I've seen them, and pretty much EVERY single one questions the SOUNDNESS of the arguments, not their validity.

If you'd bother to look in to the objections to the arguments instead of claiming "no one disputes them" and "they're logically valid," this wouldn't be an issue.

Okay, I've called you on this before. I have not said that "no one disputes these arguments", as I clearly dispute them, seeing as I'm an atheist. I said they're logically valid, which has been confirmed to the point that they pass automated theorem provers routinely (Gödel's ontological argument was recently prooved (in the sense of validity) recently, in fact).

Instead you dismiss objections and continue to introduce largely debunked arguments as "logically valid."

You've got to be trolling me. As in the last thread on this (which you conveniently abandoned after I showed you were batshit wrong by quoting a post of mine debunking Plantinga's argument), I have not dismissed objections to these arguments, aside from one's which stupidly claim they're logically invalid despite passing automated theorem provers and staying consistent with their logical system's axioms.

And yet you keep referring to it as a "proof."

Plantinga himself ended the paper the modal ontological argument was presented in with:

[57] But obviously this isn't a proof; no one who didn't already accept the conclusion, would accept the first premise. The ontological argument we've been examining isn't just like this one, of course, but it must be conceded that not everyone who understands and reflects on its central premise -- that the existence of a maximally great being is possible -- will accept it. Still, it is evident, I think, that there is nothing contrary to reason or irrational in accepting this premise. What I claim for this argument, therefore, is that it establishes, not thetruth of theism, but its rational acceptability. And hence it accomplishes at least one of the aims of the tradition of natural theology.

http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/r...tinga.html

It's a good idea to read the source material before you copy-paste arguments and refer to them as "logical proofs" or "logically valid."

As stated:

Name a logically sound ontological argument, that doesn't require presupposition of the conclusion.

The author of the updated modal ontological argument admits it is circular reasoning, and not proof of anything. Which you would already know if it you actually read Plantinga's paper.

Time to sit down, and stop disrupting threads with lectures on "skepticism" and "critical thinking" when you aren't applying any.

[MindForgedManacle]

And yet you keep referring to it as a "proof."

Plantinga himself ended the paper the modal ontological argument was presented in with:

[57] But obviously this isn't a proof; no one who didn't already accept the conclusion, would accept the first premise. The ontological argument we've been examining isn't just like this one, of course, but it must be conceded that not everyone who understands and reflects on its central premise -- that the existence of a maximally great being is possible -- will accept it. Still, it is evident, I think, that there is nothing contrary to reason or irrational in accepting this premise. What I claim for this argument, therefore, is that it establishes, not thetruth of theism, but its rational acceptability. And hence it accomplishes at least one of the aims of the tradition of natural theology.

http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/r...tinga.html

It's a good idea to read the source material before you copy-paste arguments and refer to them as "logical proofs" or "logically valid."

Failing your reading comprehension, I see. It's clear hear that in this context, Plantinga is equating 'proof' with a demonstration. That's why he's saying people who don't accept the conclusion won't accept the first premise, and vice-versa. And I hate to have to say it, but as I have reas the source material, and read up on the relevant concepts, I actually understand WHY that is the case. It's not because the argument is circular, that is not what Plantinga is saying. As I've repeatedly said, his argument relies on the position known as modal realism and makes use of the concept of possible worlds. The reason why an atheist wouldn't accept the first premise is because it would entail that God necessarily exists, given the metaphysics the argument holds to. That's basically what the parts I underlined are getting at.

As stated:

Name a logically sound ontological argument, that doesn't require presupposition of the conclusion.

The author of the updated modal ontological argument admits it is circular reasoning, and not proof of anything. Which you would already know if it you actually read Plantinga's paper.

He did not say it was circular, he said that an atheist could not accept the first premise because it entails its conclusion.

You would do well to actually understand what is being said in the paper.

Time to sit down, and stop disrupting threads with lectures on "skepticism" and "critical thinking" when you aren't applying any.

I didn't disrupt te thread, I directly replied to a claim (not even having to do with this) that theists can provide a logical proof of God, and about how atheist-turned-Christian stories are bullshit. I agreed that they were, my only response was that most Christian-turned-atheist stories sound much the same. And then you decided to turn this into a thread about the ontological argument, as if I said I support it. I mentioned the argument merely as an aexample of proofs theists could provide, not something I accept.

[Ryantology]

If you're okay with being on Heywood's shit list (and who wouldn't be):

[Angrboda]

I think the fundamental premise of this thread is that the application of reason will ultimately lead out of unreason for the individual. We're much too irrational a species, with our biases and psychology; reason is as likely to lead you deeper into darkness as it is not.

[Mudhammam]

I think the fundamental premise of this thread is that the application of reason will ultimately lead out of unreason for the individual. We're much too irrational a species, with our biases and psychology; reason is as likely to lead you deeper into darkness as it is not.

The answer is rational humanism.

[Artur Axmann]

I think the fundamental premise of this thread is that the application of reason will ultimately lead out of unreason for the individual. We're much too irrational a species, with our biases and psychology; reason is as likely to lead you deeper into darkness as it is not.

The answer is rational humanism.

Can something create itself?

is that rational?

think about it..

[Chad32]

It requires something to be eternal. Except that somehow space and molecules are exempt from being eternal. Somehow. Omnipotent eldritch abominations are, despite no concrete evidence for any such thing existing.