On naturalism and consciousness

[Surgenator]

Lets me you ask you this, where does the mind store its experiences in your world view?

If it's a human mind, in the brain (at least as far as I can tell).

Monistic idealism holds that consciousness, not matter, is the ground of all being. It is monist because it holds that there is only one type of thing in the universe and idealist because it holds that one thing to be consciousness.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

The human brain is a mechanical element, i.e. a collection of neurons. It is not a consciousness. So again, where do you store your experiences?

The Turing test isn't a test of consciousness. It's a test of the ability of a machine to simulate the behaviors of a conscious person. To claim otherwise wouldn't be a conclusion based on observation, it would be an assumption-- one most people probably aren't willing to make.

First the mind and now it's consciousness, congratulations on moving the goal post . Let me explain now a origins of consciousness that have plague the philosophers minds for centuries in this post. You got to fucking kidding me!

We have subjective minds because everybodies experiences are slightly different. Using the ANN example, you should know that for the same training tasks the hidden nodes values would be different (if your neural network is complex enough) if the starting conditions are slightly different. Nevertheless, the end result would be very very similiar.

That's a narrative, not a mechanical explanation.

No it is the explanation. The bundle of neurons in your brain are consistently trained over your lifetime. The training they get is different for each individual because each individual has a different experiences.

Abiogenesis + evolution + biological neural networks, ta da.

That's like saying "The Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, ta da." You've just put a bunch of words from your world view together. It neither confirms the validity of your model, nor explains how in your model, mind exists.

Bullshit. Each of these processes has been demonstated to exist via science. Abiogenesis takes non living matter and changes it to living matter. Evolution takes the living matter and gets to neurons. Finally, a collection of neurons create a mind.

You still didn't answer why different subsets would have similiar experiences unless the subsets are similiar. In your monism world view, what guarantee's similiar subsets?

[Whateverist]

…Declarations based on interpretations of subjective experience are not automatically valid…the only thing that can be assumed to be valid is the phenomenology of the experience, not its interpretation.

Here I am making a distinction between knowledge and true belief as it relates to speculative ideas for which no one can offer any justification .

Suppose you believe in deceived by a demon, a brain in a vat, the dream of a sleeping god, or something else of that nature. None of these can serve as the basis for knowledge since nothing about them can be confirmed by either logic or inductive inquiry, or as I like to say reason applied to experience. That is just the human condition. However, the lack of omniscience is not reason to believe that no knowledge is possible. Those who think about these things either recognize first principles of reason (like the law of non-contradiction) or fall into self-refuting absurdity. As it specifically relates to philosophy of mind, there are some problems, like the problem of other minds that cannot be properly known since it is amenable to neither deduction nor direct experience.

Those people who do not have a prior commitment to ontological naturalism find the results of contemporary psi research compelling. If a machine were able to produce psi effects of equal magnitude to that of humans I would consider that as satisfactory evidence that they are indeed conscious.

I just see no reason to overstate my case. Why claim knowledge when really I know damn well that it is I interpreting the experience? I'm not infallible and don't require any special status for what I believe. I won't call it knowledge-like, even though is is what I believe. In fact, everything I believe about the mind, the soul and the nature of personal identity can be prefaced with "it is as though.." without any sense of loss on my part.

So it seems you require a more certain stance toward what you believe than I do about what I believe. I wonder what you think about that. Could you imagine holding your personal belief about subjective experience in a provisional way? Are you sure anyone is entitled to such certainty?

[bennyboy]

Monistic idealism holds that consciousness, not matter, is the ground of all being. It is monist because it holds that there is only one type of thing in the universe and idealist because it holds that one thing to be consciousness.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

The human brain is a mechanical element, i.e. a collection of neurons. It is not a consciousness. So again, where do you store your experiences?

Why do you keep ignoring my answers and then re-asking your questions? Also, why do you keep ignoring the implications of the things you yourself choose to quote?

In an idealistic monism, all that exists is reducible only to ideas. That includes everything we experience, including the human brain.

So my answer is still: the brain, so far as I know.

First the mind and now it's consciousness, congratulations on moving the goal post . Let me explain now a origins of consciousness that have plague the philosophers minds for centuries in this post. You got to fucking kidding me!

Your obvious aggravation and subsequent rude tone aside, what point are you trying to make here?

That's a narrative, not a mechanical explanation.
That's like saying "The Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, ta da." You've just put a bunch of words from your world view together. It neither confirms the validity of your model, nor explains how in your model, mind exists.

Bullshit. Each of these processes has been demonstated to exist via science. Abiogenesis takes non living matter and changes it to living matter. Evolution takes the living matter and gets to neurons. Finally, a collection of neurons create a mind.

And by what mechanisms do neurons create the mind? What exactly is it about a particular physical system that allows actual experience to exist, rather than just a biological computer processing input and producing a behavioral output?

You still have only a narrative and a bunch of scientific words thrown together. What you don't have is an explanation.

You still didn't answer why different subsets would have similiar experiences unless the subsets are similiar. In your monism world view, what guarantee's similiar subsets?

First of all, by subsets, you are talking about people. People are similar because they are composed similarly, and have access to some of the same experiences.

[Surgenator]

In an idealistic monism, all that exists is reducible only to ideas. That includes everything we experience, including the human brain.

So my answer is still: the brain, so far as I know.

Your answers aren't ignored they're refuted. And the question is asked again. Your conflating the idea of storing experience and the action of storing experience; the idea of a storage device and the existence of a storage device. There is a difference between ideas, actions, and existence. So where are your storage devices?

Bullshit. Each of these processes has been demonstated to exist via science. Abiogenesis takes non living matter and changes it to living matter. Evolution takes the living matter and gets to neurons. Finally, a collection of neurons create a mind.

And by what mechanisms do neurons create the mind? What exactly is it about a particular physical system that allows actual experience to exist, rather than just a biological computer processing input and producing a behavioral output?

If an ANN would be able to pass the Turning Test than there is no question (or set of questions) you can ask it that doesn't sound like a human. Since humans have consciousness, then you cannot distinquish it from having consciousness. If you cannot distinquish the two, then they are equivalent. Hense, the ANN has developed consciousness.

You still didn't answer why different subsets would have similiar experiences unless the subsets are similiar. In your monism world view, what guarantee's similiar subsets?

First of all, by subsets, you are talking about people. People are similar because they are composed similarly, and have access to some of the same experiences.

First off, thats a nice narrative, but where is your explanation?

Also, your missing the point. Why should humans be composed similarly? Why should humans have access to the same experiences?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Here I am making a distinction between knowledge and true belief as it relates to speculative ideas for which no one can offer any justification ....

...everything I believe about the mind, the soul and the nature of personal identity can be prefaced with "it is as though.." without any sense of loss on my part.

So it seems you require a more certain stance toward what you believe than I do about what I believe...Could you imagine holding your personal belief about subjective experience in a provisional way? Are you sure anyone is entitled to such certainty?

Yes, a person can go through life without pondering much of anything on a deep philosophical level and still enjoy life immensely. And, yes, I can imagine it because I think that way about many things. At the same time, I am by temperament a man that wants to know about reality on the most fundamental level. Some things I used to believe have proven to be more tentative that I first thought and some things I've come to know with great certainty. I see this only as a good thing.

[bennyboy]

Your answers aren't ignored they're refuted. And the question is asked again. Your conflating the idea of storing experience and the action of storing experience; the idea of a storage device and the existence of a storage device. There is a difference between ideas, actions, and existence. So where are your storage devices?

I'm not conflating anything. You asked where experiences are stored, and I said that they seem to be stored in the brain. I'm not sure what your problem is with this.

And by what mechanisms do neurons create the mind? What exactly is it about a particular physical system that allows actual experience to exist, rather than just a biological computer processing input and producing a behavioral output?

If an ANN would be able to pass the Turning Test than there is no question (or set of questions) you can ask it that doesn't sound like a human. Since humans have consciousness, then you cannot distinquish it from having consciousness. If you cannot distinquish the two, then they are equivalent. Hense, the ANN has developed consciousness.

That's a non sequitur. Maybe it has and maybe it hasn't. I'd have to be an ANN to know. And the reason I have to be an ANN to know is that experience is not physical, and cannot therefore be observed by anyone but the experiencer.

First off, thats a nice narrative, but where is your explanation?

My explanation for why there is mind in a universe which is mind? I don't know-- what's your explanation for why physical things exist in a physical universe?

Also, your missing the point. Why should humans be composed similarly? Why should humans have access to the same experiences?

I don't know why things are as they are. I know what you know-- that people have experiences, and that some of them are shared. Nor do I know why gravity exists, or quantum particles, or the four fundamental forces in the universe. I don't know why atoms are organized with electrons in orbit, or how they interact to cause chemical reactions.

I do, however, that all our knowledge about these things is expressible only in terms of ideas, and that our only way to get new information about these things is by experiencing them in some way.

[Surgenator]

I think I'm finally understanding the discrepency you have with physical monism. You think (correctly if I'm wrong) that physical monism says consciousness is a physical object like paper. It is not. Consciousness and the mind are a set of processes between physical things. Like an algorithm excuted by a program, the mind is to the brain. So I cannot give you a chunk of matter and say here is the mind because it is non-physical; it is a process. In the ANN example, the ANN is not the mind itself, but the processes that it has.

Please don't reply saying that physical monism is wrong because I said the mind is non-physical. That would a staw man.

I'd have to be an ANN to know. And the reason I have to be an ANN to know is that experience is not physical, and cannot therefore be observed by anyone but the experiencer.

Your answer creates one major problem. You don't know if anybody else is conscience. For example, how do you know I'm a conscience individual? So do you believe that there are third party agents? And why?

I'm not conflating anything. You asked where experiences are stored, and I said that they seem to be stored in the brain. I'm not sure what your problem is with this.

To understand the heart of my question "Where do you store your experiences", lets first cover some ground work.
In your world view, define me what is an idea and an action. How do ideas and actions interact? How do you know if something exist or not (for example, a coffee table)?

[Whateverist]

...everything I believe about the mind, the soul and the nature of personal identity can be prefaced with "it is as though.." without any sense of loss on my part.

So it seems you require a more certain stance toward what you believe than I do about what I believe...Could you imagine holding your personal belief about subjective experience in a provisional way? Are you sure anyone is entitled to such certainty?

Yes, a person can go through life without pondering much of anything on a deep philosophical level and still enjoy life immensely.

Not sure where you get that. Ponder? Surely. But that is a separate question from expecting finality .. which was my actual point.

And, yes, I can imagine it because I think that way about many things. At the same time, I am by temperament a man that wants to know about reality on the most fundamental level. Some things I used to believe have proven to be more tentative that I first thought and some things I've come to know with great certainty. I see this only as a good thing.

I'm not sure why you bother with the word "know". Why not stick to "faith"? I have great faith in my ability to observe and interpret my
subjective experience. But no way would I throw around claims of knowing it in an interpersonally persuasive way.

Our epistemic position in trying to describe and explain our inner workings just is not all that good. Fortunately not much rides on it. It fascinates me but I won't go hungry if I get it wrong.

[The Grand Nudger]

Our epistemic position in trying to describe and explain our inner workings just is not all that good. Fortunately not much rides on it. It fascinates me but I won't go hungry if I get it wrong.

Hehehe, but you probably -would- go hungry if you withheld action based upon those inner workings on the basis of not possessing "knowledge" about them - suspecting that they were untrustworthy, perhaps.

Dinner, not truth, eh Whatevs?

@Benny

Maybe it has and maybe it hasn't. I'd have to be an ANN to know. And the reason I have to be an ANN to know is that experience is not physical, and cannot therefore be observed by anyone but the experiencer.

That applies to other living human beings in the here and now, doesn't it Benny? How do you even know that being an ANN would grant you this knowledge? Perhaps the sim is designed not just to fool you, but also to fool the ANN, or we could double blind it, see if an ANN can remotely turing test another ANN (or perhaps they could turing test each other, simulataneously (would we even know which ANN was testing which, if we put enough blinds in there?). Where is the therefore, can you demonstrate that anyone is capable of observing these experiences whatsoever? Why would a single observer have access to this non-physical thing in a way that precluded observation by anyone else? Or, another way to approach the same question - why would you, a being (presumably) capable of observing this non-physical thing....this is an ability that you possess, suddenly lose that ability when presented with an ANN or another being or entity? Why is this ability limited only to observing your own "experience"?

[bennyboy]

I think I'm finally understanding the discrepency you have with physical monism. You think (correctly if I'm wrong) that physical monism says consciousness is a physical object like paper. It is not. Consciousness and the mind are a set of processes between physical things. Like an algorithm excuted by a program, the mind is to the brain. So I cannot give you a chunk of matter and say here is the mind because it is non-physical; it is a process. In the ANN example, the ANN is not the mind itself, but the processes that it has.

You could say mind is a thing, or a property of a thing, or a mechanical function, or that it supervenes on a thing, property or function. You could even say that there are layers of supervenient things, properties and functions which together manifest as the conscious human mind. Any of these views I would accept as being physically monist

But none of this explains why, in our universe, mind manifests rather than not.

Please don't reply saying that physical monism is wrong because I said the mind is non-physical. That would a staw man.

No, I wouldn't argue that. I think you could, however, make a case for things like mathematical truths being non-physical.


Let me phrase our opposition in the simplest terms I can. Given a universe in which objects and energy interact according to mathematically-determinable rules, which view is "correct"?
1) The underlying reality is mathematical (or otherwise conceptual), and this reality manifests in the form of matter and movement. For example, if you look at a wave, you'd say that the pure wave function is the reality, and the position of atoms around that idealistic wave represents a crude approximation.
2) The underlying reality is that of form of matter and movement, and the math is a symbolic representation of that underlying reality. Again looking at the wave, you'd say that the molecules are just moving in response to constantly-changing forces acting on them, and the wave function is a highly-simplified statistical "best fit" for a gazillion atoms, which we cannot possibly calculate individually.


I think all "things" ultimately will reduce down to concepts. Things get squirelly at QM, and if we try to discover what framework or sub-particles QM particles consist of, we'll end up with lots of beautiful math, and no actual things we can put our finger on. To me, this represents case (1) above. I'd argue that if all things are reducible only to concepts, then the universe is conceptual-- even though there is a subset of things which behave so incredibly consistently that for convenience's sake we address them on their own level without reference to that underlying reality.

I believe you and others here would flip the whole view, and say that even though we normally address mind without viewing it in physicalist terms, mind supervenes on a purely physical reality, and must therefore be more properly called physical.

---

That applies to other living human beings in the here and now, doesn't it Benny? How do you even know that being an ANN would grant you this knowledge . . .

Quite right. Even with other people, I have to make a philophical assumption. In the case of people, it's a fairly comfortable assumption to make: I'm a person, and I think, so I look at other people, and assume they also think.
The same goes for mammals and birds. They have similar brains to mine, and they respond in ways that I do to much of their stimuli.

Mosquitos, I'm less sure. Microorganisms, I'm VERY unsure whether they have anything I'd call subjective consciousness. In the end, I can't even disprove a solipsistic world view in an absolute sense.