On naturalism and consciousness

[Surgenator]

This is the reason why we're arguing past each other. We can't even agree on definitions. The rest of the discussion if mostly pointless until we do. I'm not gonna accept your definitions because they're inherently biased. I recommend we use mine.

Nope. I use the words as they are meant. You use the words as they would mean given your world view is true. I won't accept any definition of consciousness, mind or qualia that don't explicitly define them in terms of subjective experience-- because that's what ALL people mean by those words, except the ones trying to argue for physical monism.

My definitions do not use physical monist terms. My definitions apply to any world view; that is why I used them. They can be used by monist, dualist, and pluralist of all flavors. But it is you who has to define mind and reality using your idealist monism terminology. It's dishonest.

[bennyboy]

Nope. I use the words as they are meant. You use the words as they would mean given your world view is true. I won't accept any definition of consciousness, mind or qualia that don't explicitly define them in terms of subjective experience-- because that's what ALL people mean by those words, except the ones trying to argue for physical monism.

My definitions do not use physical monist terms. My definitions apply to any world view; that is why I used them. They can be used by monist, dualist, and pluralist of all flavors. But it is you who has to define mind and reality using your idealist monism terminology. It's dishonest.

Dishonest? Defining mind in terms of the experience of thinking is dishonest?

I'd rage against the insult if I wasn't already laughing.

[Surgenator]

My definitions do not use physical monist terms. My definitions apply to any world view; that is why I used them. They can be used by monist, dualist, and pluralist of all flavors. But it is you who has to define mind and reality using your idealist monism terminology. It's dishonest.

Dishonest? Defining mind in terms of the experience of thinking is dishonest?

I'd rage against the insult if I wasn't already laughing.

The ignorances is strong in this one.

[Mudhammam]

This is precisely what I mean. -If a machine ever- begs the question -do they already-. Machines do ask those first two questions constantly, the third is meaningless because they aren't biological entities - in the same way that meds are meaningless. You're asking for an entirely dissimilar architecture to express itself in a way understandable more as "human" than as "conscious" - wouldn't you say?

I'm not begging the question. There's no reason to think any AI is conscious any more than your thermostat (or maybe you think that possesses an inkling of consciousness?). Yes, they can perform incredibly "intelligent" functions. They can't self-introspect, ponder the meaning of their existence, feel emotion, pleasure, pain, etc. I challenge you to provide any material support--as in name one pioneer of AI who claims this to currently be the case--if you seriously contend otherwise. MAYBE that will be possible someday, but it's not at this point, with not even a clear path on how to get there (because we don't know what causes consciousness to arise other than its connection to brains). And how was the third question meaningless? Surely, despite regular maintenance, computers age and eventually "die" too. That I hope it might express itself in a way that is similar to human beings in order to determine the state of its "conscious self," well, I'm not exactly sure how else you'd expect us to be able to confidently assert that it is a conscious mind otherwise.

I don't think pan-psychism has anything to offer us. Not all claims are created equal. We -do- have "Einsteins" doing that btw. Curiously, those einsteins aren't testing beach sand for consciousness, nor are they attempting to understand our architecture as some sort of radio transceiver. They have a good idea as to what they're looking for and where they'll find it (I mention this not because it's indicative of them being right, just that they're doing work on "something" that has a demonstrable effect - juxtaposed with claims that get no further than the claiming). I simply cant place pan-psychism on the same shelf as these. The field isn't wide open, for me.

I disagee. There are no current "Einsteins" just as there are no "Newtons" or "Darwins." That is, these men were truly able to apprehend the magnitude of their respective fields and bring many of the wide ranging conflicts into a revolutionary new paradigm. There are many brilliant men and women working in the field of AI and neurobiology and philosophy of mind and what not, but no one as far as I can tell who has put forth any workable theory that brings all these disputes into an entirely new framework. I say that because if there was, no doubt he or she would be well-recognized above the rest.

Is panpsychism a valuable contribution to philosophy? I don't know. At this point I tend to agree with you on that particular, but so long as it keeps people thinking about the problem in innovative ways, I appreciate it as a theory of mind as I do any other thoughtful hypothesis (again, I myself putting my own position--physical monism--slightly above the rest).

I don't really disagree with the general sentiment you're putting forth, Rhythm. It's just the confidence and certainty that you're expressing (as I perceive it anyhow) in a particular point of view that I'm trying to get you to justify, or at least minimize.

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm not begging the question. There's no reason to think any AI is conscious any more than your thermostat (or maybe you think that possesses an inkling of consciousness?). Yes, they can perform incredibly "intelligent" functions. They can't self-introspect, ponder the meaning of their existence, feel emotion, pleasure, pain, etc.

Can we? What are we referring to when we claim that we can? Our personal experiences, the assumed experiences of others? If we look at our "functions" is it unimaginable that another architecture might be able to express it?

I challenge you to provide any material support--as in name one pioneer of AI who claims this to currently be the case--if you seriously contend otherwise.

I can give you an entire school of thought. Computational theory of mind

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computation...ry_of_mind

---

Prominent scholars[edit]
Daniel Dennett proposed the Multiple Drafts Model, in which consciousness seems linear but is actually blurry and gappy, distributed over space and time in the brain. Consciousness is the computation, there is no extra step or "Cartesian Theater" in which you become conscious of the computation.
Jerry Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is codified in the brain, not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought. In later work (Concepts and The Elm and the Expert), Fodor has refined and even questioned some of his original computationalist views, and adopted a highly modified version of LOT (see LOT2).
David Marr proposed that cognitive processes have three levels of description: the computational level (which describes that computational problem (i.e., input/output mapping) computed by the cognitive process); the algorithmic level (which presents the algorithm used for computing the problem postulated at the computational level); and the implementational level (which describes the physical implementation of the algorithm postulated at the algorithmic level in biological matter, e.g. the brain). (Marr 1981)
Ulric Neisser coined the term 'cognitive psychology' in his book published in 1967 (Cognitive Psychology), wherein Neisser characterizes people as dynamic information-processing systems whose mental operations might be described in computational terms.
Steven Pinker described a "language instinct," an evolved, built-in capacity to learn speech (if not writing).
Hilary Putnam proposed functionalism (philosophy of mind) to describe consciousness, asserting that it is the computation that equates to consciousness, regardless of whether the computation is operating in a brain, in a computer, or in a "brain in a vat."
Georges Rey, professor at the University of Maryland, builds on Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind to produce his own version of a Computational/Representational Theory of Thought.

---

MAYBE that will be possible someday, but it's not at this point, with not even a clear path on how to get there (because we don't know what causes consciousness to arise other than its connection to brains).

Maybe, maybe not. We have a good line of data to pursue, and there's already a ton of conceptual refuse left in the wake.

And how was the third question meaningless? Surely, despite regular maintenance, computers age and eventually "die" too.

They cease to function, but to "die" I think you'll agree, has a whole lot of biological bias built into it, eh? Death is a thing that "living" things have learned to fear. We couldn't really assume a machine to even recognize it as a valid concept. After all, they can be turned on and off many times - and this is likely the best way we could describe it to them. We would expect them to be different if their architecture was different - we would expect them to have anamalous signals that couldn't be interpreted from one group to the other (otherselves) - without translation.

That I hope it might express itself in a way that is similar to human beings in order to determine the state of its "conscious self," well, I'm not exactly sure how else you'd expect us to be able to confidently assert that it is a conscious mind otherwise.

I don't know that I'd be so comfortable with an entity that doesn't have the normal human limitations expressing human attributes (psychotic sci fi AI....). While it's a possibility - I don't see any reason to assume it. I don;t know what sort of confidence being the water in the puddle is bringing us anyway. If we use ourselves as some sort of bar - we are really just exploring "human like things" - not conscious things. If the usage of "alive" were so stacked in our favor we'd be the only living things on this rock, eh? The things we do, assuming we ever see AI, or regarding whether or not our minds are computational systems simply wouldn't be "human attributes" they would be attributes common to conscious entities. All the humanity would require translation (and similarly from them to us). We can use ourselves as a "it can express itself this way" - but not a "it must meet or exceed this bar" sort of way. Thinking of it this way might help to explain why some find computational theories compelling. If we can map this stuff to logic, and logic to gates, and gates to chipsets - perhaps the way that -we- do it is similar. At least we know how machines do it. Explain the unknown by reference to the known.

I disagee. There are no current "Einsteins" just as there are no "Newtons" or "Darwins."

Check that tiny list from just one of the competing theories of mind that require no sauce.

That is, these men were truly able to apprehend the magnitude of their respective fields and bring many of the wide ranging conflicts into a revolutionary new paradigm.

You're looking for a/the unifying theory? Alot of work goes into a fields before it approaches that level of refinement. There were "giants" of those fields other than einstein, newton, and darwin, btw. Both before and after them. Einsteins theory appears to be busting up like Newtons did, eh? Darwin was only glimpsing something ultimately beyond his ability to grasp. Darwinism isn't the modern paradigm, or the unifying theory. In any case, computational theory does attempt to unify.

There are many brilliant men and women working in the field of AI and neurobiology and philosophy of mind and what not, but no one as far as I can tell who has put forth any workable theory that brings all these disputes into an entirely new framework. I say that because if there was, no doubt he or she would be well-recognized above the rest.

If you're looking for "The Big Name" - again, there are tons of them. Which ones history will remember in 50 years (or 200) is beyond my ability to predict. I don't know what this is supposed to indicate - what inference you've drawn from this?

Is panpsychism a valuable contribution to philosophy? I don't know. At this point I tend to agree with you on that particular, but so long as it keeps people thinking about the problem in innovative ways, I appreciate it as a theory of mind as I do any other thoughtful hypothesis (again, I myself putting my own position--physical monism--slightly above the rest).

I'd appreciate it more if people applied all of that innovative thought to productive areas of research. There are enough ghost hunters and mediums in the world.

[Mudhammam]

Can we? What are we referring to when we claim that we can? Our personal experiences, the assumed experiences of others? If we look at our "functions" is it unimaginable that another architecture might be able to express it?

Yes, I feel emotion! I have sensuous experiences, a sense of "myself," the profoundly puzzling capacity to close my eyes and--through mindbogglingly complex organic circuitry, cells at bottom (apparently) composed of purely non-mental properties, i.e. atomic structures---"visualize" imagery, smells, sounds...do you really think a machine can abstract like this, not simply performing an algorithm, but have an inner sense of the process--with all the mistakes and self-corrections and feelings of dumbness or brilliance--of doing so?

Unimaginable? Eh, I won't go that far, though I cannot imagine how this is accomplished on the basis of our understanding of physical objects alone (in what part of any object does it become a subject?).

I think we can probably agree that there is something extra, not yet accounted for, but that it's most likely not hyperphysical, yes?

I can give you an entire school of thought. Computational theory of mind

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computation...ry_of_mind

---

Prominent scholars[edit]
Daniel Dennett proposed the Multiple Drafts Model, in which consciousness seems linear but is actually blurry and gappy, distributed over space and time in the brain. Consciousness is the computation, there is no extra step or "Cartesian Theater" in which you become conscious of the computation.
Jerry Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is codified in the brain, not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought. In later work (Concepts and The Elm and the Expert), Fodor has refined and even questioned some of his original computationalist views, and adopted a highly modified version of LOT (see LOT2).
David Marr proposed that cognitive processes have three levels of description: the computational level (which describes that computational problem (i.e., input/output mapping) computed by the cognitive process); the algorithmic level (which presents the algorithm used for computing the problem postulated at the computational level); and the implementational level (which describes the physical implementation of the algorithm postulated at the algorithmic level in biological matter, e.g. the brain). (Marr 1981)
Ulric Neisser coined the term 'cognitive psychology' in his book published in 1967 (Cognitive Psychology), wherein Neisser characterizes people as dynamic information-processing systems whose mental operations might be described in computational terms.
Steven Pinker described a "language instinct," an evolved, built-in capacity to learn speech (if not writing).
Hilary Putnam proposed functionalism (philosophy of mind) to describe consciousness, asserting that it is the computation that equates to consciousness, regardless of whether the computation is operating in a brain, in a computer, or in a "brain in a vat."
Georges Rey, professor at the University of Maryland, builds on Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind to produce his own version of a Computational/Representational Theory of Thought.

---

Fair enough. I will comment only on Dennett, that while I found his book Consciousness Explained highly valuable and enlightening, I tend to side with his critics who charge him with not really dealing with consciousness itself, but the processes that correlate to it. As they like to say, he doesn't explain it, he explains it away!

(Side note, Dennett and Daniel Hofstadter edited a compilation of articles and excerpts into a book called The Mind's Eye, which I recommend, and I think it poses more of the substantial problems, or rather puzzles, that Consciousness Explained just seemed, in my mind's eye, to disregard as irrelevant).

They cease to function, but to "die" I think you'll agree, has a whole lot of biological bias built into it, eh? Death is a thing that "living" things have learned to fear. We couldn't really assume a machine to even recognize it as a valid concept. After all, they can be turned on and off many times - and this is likely the best way we could describe it to them. We would expect them to be different if their architecture was different - we would expect them to have anamalous signals that couldn't be interpreted from one group to the other (otherselves) - without translation.

No major disagreement here but I'll just make a few subtleties that I'd enjoy your thoughts further on. First, I don't think death necessarily implies a biological bias and we use it all the time to speak of any process that culminates in termination--from our cars, to the Sun, to the Universe! So that was the intent of my usage. I'm only nitpicking on that point but you started it! Second, wouldn't it be fair to call a machine that possessed consciousness a "living" being? Can consciousness really exist in inanimate matter? I'd say no, but if you open that door of possibility then you're nudging quite a bit closer to the panpsychist's point of view, don't you think? Lastly, isn't our daily requisite for rest a biological function that comes--at least analogously--pretty darn close to "turning off and on," needing our "batteries," so to speak, recharged? (now I've just seemed to reverted to your side of the argument, haven't I? )

If we use ourselves as some sort of bar - we are really just exploring "human like things" - not conscious things.

Isn't that what we tend to do for everything in which we look at a thing's utility? I don't think that's a tendency we can escape really. What other bar can we appeal to? When we talk about animal consciousness or one of its biological functions, for example, we also tend to anthropomorphisize--i.e. whether its an "emotion" or a "thought" or a "purpose" we're talking about. Can we really get out of that without losing any conception of what it is we're really discussing?

If the usage of "alive" were so stacked in our favor we'd be the only living things on this rock, eh? The things we do, assuming we ever see AI, or regarding whether or not our minds are computational systems simply wouldn't be "human attributes" they would be attributes common to conscious entities. All the humanity would require translation (and similarly from them to us). We can use ourselves as a "it can express itself this way" - but not a "it must meet or exceed this bar" sort of way. Thinking of it this way might help to explain why some find computational theories compelling. If we can map this stuff to logic, and logic to gates, and gates to chipsets - perhaps the way that -we- do it is similar. At least we know how machines do it. Explain the unknown by reference to the known.

Perhaps. I'll have to think about that more.

Check that tiny list from just one of the competing theories of mind that require no sauce.

You're looking for a/the unifying theory? Alot of work goes into a fields before it approaches that level of refinement. There were "giants" of those fields other than einstein, newton, and darwin, btw. Both before and after them. Einsteins theory appears to be busting up like Newtons did, eh? Darwin was only glimpsing something ultimately beyond his ability to grasp. Darwinism isn't the modern paradigm, or the unifying theory. In any case, computational theory does attempt to unify.

No doubt, but as to the computational theory, I'm just not really sure that I'm convinced it's really talking about consciousness as philosophers as diverse from Descartes to David Chalmers or Thomas Nagel, have traditionally conceived it. Maybe it boils down to nothing more than semantics, but I do tend to think there is something to be said about "qualia," which Dennett (I don't know about the others in your list) simply flat out denies as being an entirely mythical, useless concept.

If you're looking for "The Big Name" - again, there are tons of them. Which ones history will remember in 50 years (or 200) is beyond my ability to predict. I don't know what this is supposed to indicate - what inference you've drawn from this?

Nothing too major, we can drop the "Einstein" comment as a moot point. I was only saying that perhaps this area of inquiry needs someone who blows the door open to a radically new field of possibilities that others, who no doubt are significant contributors, haven't quite been able to attain as of yet.

I'd appreciate it more if people applied all of that innovative thought to productive areas of research. There are enough ghost hunters and mediums in the world.

And while I share your disdain for so-called ghost hunters and mediums, I'd love to see scientists treat alleged psychical experiences of telepathy or what have you (if there are genuine accounts, genuine as in something unexplained really being experienced) seriously. Take the placebo effect for example--how does the mind seem to effect the body so as to cure illness?--that seems rather mystical, yet it is so widely reported that hard-nosed scientists I think would be better served to take some of these bizarre instances into consideration rather than dismiss them off-hand (as far as I know, the placebo effect is still simply treated as an unknown phenomena, which should at least cause us to be less dogmatic about what we think is and isn't possible).

[The Grand Nudger]

Yes, I feel emotion!

Output 1 at io address "x" - write to register A.

I think we can probably agree that there is something extra, not yet accounted for, but that it's most likely not hyperphysical, yes?

I don't think so, just what we already know allows for computational power orders of magnitude greater in a biological system than an artificial system - at present. It's not even a limit of what we know regarding computation, but what we can currently manufacture to achieve it. Nuerons have a scale and complexity that bitchslaps our modern systems. They are capable of expressing much more than any conceivable artificial gate (they may connect to many thousands of other nuerons, instead of the one, two, or three common at this level of abstraction in artificial gates) - and there are approx 16x times as many of them as there are gates on a modern computer. Even if they aren't using computational theory to operate (that's a possibility) - if they did (and we -know- they're capable), they'd be incredibly powerful. That our current weak systems can achieve effects that mimic what we call consciousness (albeit not the full package) gives us a solid reason to say that a system 16 times as powerful, and 10k times as dense - just might trick us to the point where wqe could not distinguish ourselves from them. That raises suspicions about what we are, not what they are.

As to whether or not a sentient machine could be considered "alive" - why? Is all "life" sentient"? Is that a requirement or a factor of eligibility for inclusion in the club? I'd say no, they would be sentient, not "alive". I suppose they could be engineered to fit any definition we gave for life though, conceptually (just that sentience or consciousness isn't enough in and of itself).

you're nudging quite a bit closer to the panpsychist's point of view, don't you think?

You're going to have to take a closer look at their point of view, mine is a negation of theirs in every sense. I don't see consciousness as a primordial anything, out of which other things derive. I think it's a derivative because that's what the evidence suggests. It suggests it very, very strongly.

Isn't that what we tend to do for everything in which we look at a thing's utility?

Utility, not existence or attributes. Utility. Of course we consider ourselves when we consider utility (we also have to know a fair bit about the thing being considered).

I don't think that's a tendency we can escape really. What other bar can we appeal to? When we talk about animal consciousness or one of its biological functions, for example, we also tend to anthropomorphisize--i.e. whether its an "emotion" or a "thought" or a "purpose" we're talking about. Can we really get out of that without losing any conception of what it is we're really discussing?

Sure, we're good at abstraction (so are computers btw, in fact...computing -is- abstraction, at multiple concurrent levels)

No doubt, but as to the computational theory, I'm just not really sure that I'm convinced it's really talking about consciousness as philosophers as diverse from Descartes to David Chalmers or Thomas Nagel, have traditionally conceived it.

Maybe not, that notion isn't lost on those people either. They fully realize that what they have to say may be regarding something else entirely, that's what "folk nuero-science" is a reference to. The idea that people who formulated their ideas of what "consciousness" is - before they could really glimpse into the workings of the brain - mechanically, before the ability to do so even existed....just might not have had a good enough picture with which to decipher the mystery they hoped to tackle. We still may not, but it's bound to be a better picture than what we had, eh?

Maybe it boils down to nothing more than semantics, but I do tend to think there is something to be said about "qualia," which Dennett (I don't know about the others in your list) simply flat out denies as being an entirely mythical, useless concept.

-entirely mythical and useless as people so often express it, yes.

And while I share your disdain for so-called ghost hunters and mediums, I'd love to see scientists treat alleged psychical experiences of telepathy or what have you (if there are genuine accounts, genuine as in something unexplained really being experienced) seriously.

They have and do. It happens, we are continually disappointed.

Take the placebo effect for example--how does the mind seem to effect the body so as to cure illness?--that seems rather mystical, yet it is so widely reported that hard-nosed scientists I think would be better served to take some of these bizarre instances into consideration rather than dismiss them off-hand (as far as I know, the placebo effect is still simply treated as an unknown phenomena, which should at least cause us to be less dogmatic about what we think is and isn't possible).

Regression to the mean accounts for a portion. It's not quite as mystical to me, but maybe we have access to different information?

Is that really "mind over matter" btw? How, in what way, especially if mind -is- matter.....lol.
(computational theory can offer an explanation for that mechanism, btw..a computational system acts on the inputs it receives regardless of whether or not those inputs are descriptive of reality, everything is handled as abstraction)

[Mudhammam]

Very well, Rhythm. Do you have any recent books on computational theory that you'd recommend? And one further issue I'd like to press a bit more, regarding your response that:

Output 1 at io address "x" - write to register A.

It seems to me that you've offered an account for the easy part. I wasn't disputing that emotions and sensations in the central nervous system are physical components reducible to chemical formulas. The relevant component that your suggested equation does not address is the "I feel emotions." Why should certain biological functions be accompanied by a conscious subject which experiences said functions? I still hold that a machine can, and at this point does, operate without having any conscious experience of said operations, unless your suggestion is that the experiences we have in mind are nothing more than certain automatons such as "Output 1 at io address "x" - write to register A." If this is all consciousness really is, I would simply want to ask what gives nerve cells in the brain such a privilege that others throughout the body are not accompanied by? As silly as it may sound, why doesn't my heart think?

And also, to slightly detour and indulge in an additional philosophical question this raises, on what basis do you think can we really deem abstract concepts, as these are but effects of such automations, as "rational" or "irrational"? Is it their ability to "copy" reality accurately, or is it their success at survival (though this was certainly synonymous at one time, I don't think the same is necessarily always the case today)?

[bennyboy]

I lean to the other extreme. At the quantum scale it appears that entanglements between sub-atomic particles spanning space, and perhaps time, give every part of the cosmos a kind of Plank limit minimum of awareness. Every particle reacts to the state of other particles - aware in some way - of what is going on around them. So I regard awareness much like I envision any of the fields in physics, permeating and enfolding all of the interactions of energy / matter. Which makes awareness is as much a part of the physical universe as gravity or electromagnetism.

I also think the question as to whether or not this phenomenal quality of mind is more intrinsic to matter than our current physical sciences account for, as panpsychism claims it is, would still be left unanswered. Maybe we need ourselves another Einstein to do for mind and matter what he did for time and space. Mattermind?

As an idea about dualism, I like this one. If mind is intrinsically a property of all matter, then you don't have to explain how some physical systems magically have it and some don't.

One possibility I suggested in the last thread about this stuff is that every energetic interchange results in a kind of quantum consciousness-- a tiny little spark of qualia. Then, you are looking at a quantative difference between systems, rather than a mysterious quantitative one. It's easy to imagine that the brain involves many orders of magnitude more interchanges of energy than a rock does, as would an active thinking brain involve more such interchanges than one in a coma.

[The Grand Nudger]

It seems to me that you've offered an account for the easy part. I wasn't disputing that emotions and sensations in the central nervous system are physical components reducible to chemical formulas.

Then current physical theories handily account for "consciousness", it's constituent components, etc - it makes no sense to claim otherwise after such a caveat. Maybe they don;t account for a convincing human mind and personality, so be it (I wouldn't agree or disagree on that...in totality, lol). I would hesitate to call that the easy part, btw, may have taken us a quarter of a million years just to figure it out, after all - at the low end, 50k.

The relevant component that your suggested equation does not address is the "I feel emotions." Why should certain biological functions be accompanied by a conscious subject which experiences said functions?

The circuit "experiences" data flow as well, that's the traveling signal and data regarding that signal (which is a service that a system can provide architecturally, without any need for high lvl language). Self reference and experience are interchangeable in computational theory - because the one can provide the effect of the "other".

I would ask you, why shouldn't they? Should they have "objective experiences" while connected to their nervous systems and sense apparatus - not someone else's? I wouldn't expect that. I would expect any system attached to your eyes to describe something seen, subjectively, by those eyes - not by anothers. So there goes -all- the mystery in half the question. Why should conscious subjects be? Because certain arrangements of matter can act as logic gates (the basis of computational theory). So if the universe we live in allows it, but limits it - and what we see conforms to what the universe allows, and it's limits.........I suppose it just doesn't seem like such a hardball question for -any- theory of mind from that POV.

I still hold that a machine can, and at this point does, operate without having any conscious experience of said operations,

As do I.

unless your suggestion is that the experiences we have in mind are nothing more than certain automatons such as "Output 1 at io address "x" - write to register A."

"Nothing more than" gives it the short shrift. It would still be amazing. Automation doesn't mean easy or simple. I don't actually think that they're completely automated either. Plenty seems to be (whens the last time you told your heart to beat?) but not -everything- seems to be.

If this is all consciousness really is, I would simply want to ask what gives nerve cells in the brain such a privilege that others throughout the body are not accompanied by? As silly as it may sound, why doesn't my heart think?

Nuerons don't "think" either under the computational system. Only systems that can be shown to have computational ability. 1 nueron, meh, an eyespot...maybe...., 80 billion.....a human brain. If something "thinks" some other way - we truly have no idea how (including hearts, or any other object traditionally thought of as non-thinking.) The heart does make a gate, but it definitely doesn't make enough gates, nor do the gates possess the raw power that gates composed of nuerons would possess, if they are "doing computation".

And also, to slightly detour and indulge in an additional philosophical question this raises, on what basis do you think can we really deem any such automations as "rational" or "irrational"?

On their ability to operate within the rules delineated by the system which describes what is or is not rational. Gates and computation are all about logic. From a (current)machine standpoint, it's entirely rational (it may not be with regards to human beings). I think that it would be difficult to classify any such automation as irrational if it resembled current machine architecture. We're actually not entirely certain that biological architecture is thusly arranged. We see that it could be, we don't know that it -is-.

Is it their ability to "copy" reality accurately, or is it their success at survival (though this was certainly synonymous at one time, I don't think the same is necessarily always the case today)?

I gave the criteria above which applies to any thinking thing. I'm not sure what value accuracy or survival has in a vacuum, certainly, with regards to what may be called rational accuracy might apply. Accuracy is the soundness component, after all. Survival, though, for a machine, seems off the mark. We know that we engage in alot of irrational shit based upon a survival advantage. Rational/irrational - neither matters with regards to survival in and of themselves. We have to describe an environment - and that environment might favor one or the other. We can't call ourselves rational -based solely on survival-, so why would we extend that claim to a machine?

(my list of book reccomendations and people I need to shoot files to is long, I'll give it a look, but no promises...- I still owe Whatevs some Karen Armstrong that I haven't yet loaded to my new pc, I think that as far as books go, Dennets are the newest from that camp that I'm aware of - that I would recommend, probably more recent papers from other researchers - a few have been linked throughout the last two consciousness threads)