On naturalism and consciousness

[dissily mordentroge]

I make the distinction between the brain and mind. In my view, the brain is the hardware, and the mind is the software. This distinction has nothing to do with "desperate [..] wish for personal immortality." It's a praticle distinction.

Fare enough but practical to what purpose? To facilitate discussion or describe a supposed reality? I find myself wondering too if the mind is accepted as the software, how easy is it to re-program it and how easy to wipe the 'hard disk' and instal a new OS?

[Surgenator]

I make the distinction between the brain and mind. In my view, the brain is the hardware, and the mind is the software. This distinction has nothing to do with "desperate [..] wish for personal immortality." It's a praticle distinction.

Fare enough but practical to what purpose? To facilitate discussion or describe a supposed reality? I find myself wondering too if the mind is accepted as the software, how easy is it to re-program it and how easy to wipe the 'hard disk' and instal a new OS?

In my view, the brain is the collection of neurons; the mind is the processes that run on those neurons. So a mind can exist on other mediums if we know what processes/algorithms need to run.

[dissily mordentroge]

Fare enough but practical to what purpose? To facilitate discussion or describe a supposed reality? I find myself wondering too if the mind is accepted as the software, how easy is it to re-program it and how easy to wipe the 'hard disk' and instal a new OS?

In my view, the brain is the collection of neurons; the mind is the processes that run on those neurons. So a mind can exist on other mediums if we know what processes/algorithms need to run.

Neurons and their relationship to each other can be considered as a single entity without any need to postulate a seperate abstraction 'operating' them.
You can, if you find it helpful as a thought experiment, regard the function neurons perform a separate, stand alone program. I suggest though they're one and the same thing.
I'm afraid on this my 'software' and yours don't run the same algorithm.

[dissily mordentroge]

In my view, the brain is the collection of neurons; the mind is the processes that run on those neurons. So a mind can exist on other mediums if we know what processes/algorithms need to run.

Re-reading the above has me wondering if we aren't ignoring something important in the nature of human consciousness, that is physical sensation as component of self-awareness. Any assertion that human consciousness can operate normally without sensory input can be described as somewhat absurd in the light of the effects of prolonged sensory deprivation upon the human mind/brain mechanism.

[Chas]

And scientists are working on it. You can believe whatever you wish, I await actual evidence.

The evidence so far indicate mind as an emergent property of brain, that complexity is intimately part of that. Simpler brains exhibit simpler minds.

When you are quoting something, it's generally good to actually respond to the ideas contained in that quote. We've already established that you can wave your hand toward a brain and claim, "Evidence says it's in there somewhere." But that's as useful as saying, "wetness is in water." That's not really much of a discovery.

Let's say you go to a pie context, and Mrs. smith's delicious pumpkin pie wins it. People start debating what it is that makes it so delicious. Your response would (by anology) be: "The great taste is in the pie."

There are many parts of the brain which do a lot of complex processing but are not part of the conscious stream, so saying the brain as a whole is conscious is like saying a car as a whole generates a lot of torque. "It's in there somewhere" is at the same time obvious, and also a demonstration of disinterest in the subject. What exactly is special about the brain that allows the supervenience of consciousness? You need to identify what systems are both sufficient and necessary, or you're just saying, "the sky-blue color comes from the sky."

And you should read what I actually wrote. I didn't say "the brain as a whole is conscious". Nor did I imply that the mind "is in there somewhere". I said that mind is an emergent property of the brain.

You seem to really like the word supervenience, yet you don't seem to understand it or don't see that it doesn't apply here.
The brain can be damaged without any effect or with a large effect on the mind. And that is at odds with the definition of supervenience.

"A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. "

[dissily mordentroge]

Often discussions on fora delving into deep waters such as those we swim in here sink into tit for tat criticism of posters methodology and logic rather than any mutual effort to approach the truth. Possibly a hangover from being exposed to the absurdities of socratic dialogue?

Anyhow, I want to take a different approach for now to the tedious question of brain and mind differentiation. Someone here ( sorry I've forgotten who and am too lazy to read through all the posts) approached the central question by drawing an analogy between human consciousness and the proposal we can create 'life' inside computers or use digital logic processes as an analogue for 'mind' . I'll call it 'cyberlife' for want of a better term.
It would appear a claim is being made that life and mind are not just an attributes of carbon based matter. I can concede that it may eventually be possible to simulate life and mind with a computer, without conceding that life &/or mind would necessarily have been literally created. The problem with so called 'life' inside a computer system is that such a formalistic account gives us no principle of individuation: when do we have one rather than two such creatures?- when we have one rather than two formulae (algorithms?) so that the creature is the formula? Usually, we count creatures according to the bits of matter involved. This is, of course, a standard philosophical objection to such a picture of 'life inside a computer' If we connot individuate such creatures or locate them in the real world, then we connot attribute the to them real needs, emotions and self awareness, which it would seem we would have to be able to do if we were to take cyberlife seriously as life and use it an any argument attempting to shed light onto claims of brain/mind differentiation in humans.

[Chas]

Often discussions on fora delving into deep waters such as those we swim in here sink into tit for tat criticism of posters methodology and logic rather than any mutual effort to approach the truth. Possibly a hangover from being exposed to the absurdities of socratic dialogue?

Anyhow, I want to take a different approach for now to the tedious question of brain and mind differentiation. Someone here ( sorry I've forgotten who and am too lazy to read through all the posts) approached the central question by drawing an analogy between human consciousness and the proposal we can create 'life' inside computers or use digital logic processes as an analogue for 'mind' . I'll call it 'cyberlife' for want of a better term.
It would appear a claim is being made that life and mind are not just an attributes of carbon based matter. I can concede that it may eventually be possible to simulate life and mind with a computer, without conceding that life &/or mind would necessarily have been literally created. The problem with so called 'life' inside a computer system is that such a formalistic account gives us no principle of individuation: when do we have one rather than two such creatures?- when we have one rather than two formulae (algorithms?) so that the creature is the formula? Usually, we count creatures according to the bits of matter involved. This is, of course, a standard philosophical objection to such a picture of 'life inside a computer' If we connot individuate such creatures or locate them in the real world, then we connot attribute the to them real needs, emotions and self awareness, which it would seem we would have to be able to do if we were to take cyberlife seriously as life and use it an any argument attempting to shed light onto claims of brain/mind differentiation in humans.

If mind is an emergent property of the brain, then there is no reason, in
principle, that mind could not be created from a non-living device.
This is the stance of "Strong AI".

To think otherwise requires either dualism or the idea that mind is inextricably tied to the biological brain.

[The Grand Nudger]

"Simulating life" in a computer is actually addressing our usage of the word life in a non technical manner, ie "x has a life". It doesn't address the technical usage of the word life, as in "x is alive" (so there's no need to wonder whether or not "life" has been created unless it fits the technical definition for the term - as we already use the non-technical turn of phrase for inanimate objects without any actual problem - IE, the "the life of a car". Nothing to accept or reject in the hypothetical, really)

But, as to the philosophical objection, of course we can locate "simulated life" -in the real world-. Simply point to the circuitry. Those are the "bits of matter" involved. If we can't assign them real needs, emotion, and self awareness- we can't assign any of it to ourselves either simply by pointing to our "bits of matter". Or, to put it another way, if we choose to dismiss their hypothetical experience on these grounds we dismiss our own. Which is fine, mind you. The idea of no mind, no self - just the appearance of these things also has advocates in neuroscience. Personally, I'd call it a difference that made no difference - but that's only because the hypothetical explicitly involves a scenario in which the observed effect (mind in both cases) is identical or that the simulation is complete or indistinguishable from the "real deal".

"Cyberlife" would be just as material as anything else. Sometimes people forget that the functions of a computer are not airy things floating around in virtual space but physical tumblers, structures that can be seen and held in your hand -doing work. It's the work of those physical objects that implements function (whatever they may be - but in this case, a "simulation" of having a life, or a mind).

[ShaMan]

I find it fascinating that none of you are present in my consciousness as I sleep. Could it be that you are all merely products of my waking mind?

[The Grand Nudger]

You're present in mine sweetheart.

When did you lose your faith, btw Shaman>?