Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[Anima]

Well, you certainly like to type words Anima ... but I haven't heard anything substantive. Like, religion gives you some higher sense or worth or whatever. Okay great, enjoy?

Alas not everything fits on a bumper sticker. As stated before I am not an evangelical. I do not agree with the gospel of wealth or that God gives you the warm fuzzies.

"It has been often said, very truely, that religion is the thing that makes the ordinary man feel extraordinary; it is an equally important truth that religion is the thing that makes the extraordinary man feel ordinary." (Gilbert Keith Chesterton)

I mean, anecdotes about daddy guiding you through childhood isn't the type of authoritarianism I'm talking about (so excuse me for saying, I see exactly no value in your analogy).

A shame. I would think you would be able to see some inherent truth in the lesson he endeavored to teach, by which historical authority is exists for a reason and that it one is better served understanding that reason than in just being opposed to said authority. Apparently not. Now I am concerned about putting things as a bumper sticker.

And with the whole myth thing (the implication being, if I'm reading you correctly, we all need myths) ... same old bullshit I hear from every other religious apologist. It's always been a silly argument, and it always will be (although that never stopped religionists)

Than we are on equal footing. As I have yet to hear anything new from your side as well. It is always a selfish argument to ignorance (I have not experienced it so it must not exist, since nothing exists which we have not experienced).

Anyway, cheers & best of luck ... and give Francis my best!

I will let him know upon his next visit to Arizona!

[bennyboy]

Perplexing.  "World view" is a label for the collective ideas one has about the world.  The evidence for world views is that people talk about them all the time, and seem to act on them.  If you want to go solipsism, and argue that we can't prove that other minds exist at all, then I'm with you.  But for me, there's utility in viewing others as minds with ideas, and no utility in viewing the universe as under the control of a goofy God who can create the universe but not save sick babies.

Again your argument is readily adaptable by that of the theist.  And it is paradoxical how you can say the existence of even a fictitious world view of another is of utility, but the the idea there is a goofy God (who has a world view, which includes not saving sick babies and in not killing healthy ones) has no utility.  If there is utility in viewing others as having minds (though they may not) the same argument for that utility suffices to say there is utility in a single authoritative mind (to resolve disputes between all the various fictitious minds).  

No, you are trying to equivocate on two kinds of utility: the utility of an idea which represents actual experience, and the utility of an idea which conveniently solves a philosophical problem, but which doesn't actually represent any actual experience. I've chosen to believe other people have minds because they do ALL the things I'd expect from a mindful being-- get angry or sad, respond in certain ways during conversation, etc.

Now it appears you are saying one's ideas are intrinsically linked to one's life experience (which John Locke would disagree with in accordance with the Tabula Rasa, by which our experience is not intrinsically linked to a world view which has not had sufficient input to exist.  May one have a world view of nothing?).  And one's decision process.  To which I would argue evidence is required in support of your assertion and we are both painfully aware that not all decisions are based on a world view (more implicit evidence in opposition to your assertion).  

Not all behaviors are based on a world view, and I never said they were. However, for one to judge one's actions moral or immoral, they must constitute an intentional reference to a world view.

Let's say, for example, that there's a burning building, and I run in with the intent of saving a baby. However, I don't see a second baby, which I accidentally knock into the heart of the fire. Am I acting morally? Yes-- because my world view includes as "good" the idea that I should save babies from burning, and I was acting with that intent.

As there are not only reactionary decisions (which are of such imminence as to not give rise to rational consideration), subconcious decisions (which may not be said to operate according to a conscious world view), instinctual decisions (which react more according to stimuli of the corporeal than to any world view), emotional decisions (which may be considered simply meta-physical decision in reaction to our sentiments which are not necessarily in consideration of a grandeur world view).  As stated by Desiderius Erasmus:

I'm sorry, but this is all another strawman. I never said that all actions are mediated by the world view, or should be. You're arguing against the wind right now.

My big toe is inherent to my existence, but I wouldn't say person = big toe or that big toe = person.  That's a pretty strange argument.

Your big toe is not inherent to your person.  Your person does not cease to exist with the deprivation of your big toe.  That which is inherent to your person is essential to your person such that your person may not exist without it.  For a world view to be inherent to your person is to state world view is a subset of person such that devoid of that subset there is no person.  Thus it may be argued that your person is your world view.

So you agree, then, that the world view is inherent to the person. Good, because that was what I said. Let's move on.

Which is why subjective morality is untenable and is as useful as a diet that states one may eat as much of whatever they want when they want.  Morality may not be subjective; else we end up stating what is immoral is moral and immoral or what is moral is immoral and moral.

There is no True Scotsman, so a scenario which demands one is a false dilemma.

Once again these paragraphs may readily be converted for the theist who takes the philosophical assumption things are as they seem to them and that God is present, for example.

"He is part of their world view, and his existence (in combination with the ideas of His person associated with Him) affect their acts.  While accepting this thing may be illusory they are willing, on the basis of utility, to make a philosophical/theological assumption those things are as they seem to them:  that god exists...

Their lack of conclusive evidence (by which you mean proof) doesn't matter, because interacting with God as though he is really sentient is central to their experience of life.  The idea of any subjective morality, or of no God who might have created such, is irrelevant, and plays no part in their experience of life."

Is this answer satisfactory for God's utility or existence?  I believe you will say it is not.  

The simple fact is that many people DO believe strongly in God, and for this exact reason: they draw a different philosophical line than I do in attributing experiences to entities.

I see bodies with 10 fingers, and believe them to be people. I see them cry, and therefore believe them capable of experiencing sadness. Christians look at the sunset, and feel that only God could make something so glorious. They are making an extra step of inference, not about what they see, but about the implications of what they see.

Look, you show me something which matches a sensible definition for God, and it won't be hard for me to add that idea to my world view. But I won't hold my breath.

You can see meat.  And that meat seems to have a mind.  You can also see a man who seems to have bitten a quarter in half, a woman who seems to have bent a spoon with the power of her mind, you can see a priest seem to cast out demons by the power of god, and any other number of things which may be, but are not necessarily as they seem.  Since it is useful for you to assume that SEEMS=IS than the man has bitten the quarter in half, the woman did bend the spoon with the power of her mind, and the priest did case out demons by the power of God.  What it seems to be as seen so it is and there is no need to even confront the philosophical question of whether to take seeming as being.

Another straw man. It is in fact NOT of utility for me to believe a spoon has really been bent, or that demons have been cast out. It IS of utility for me to believe that my wife and children are real, or the people I do business with each day, or the people I debate with in online forums.

Indeed I do take your existence pretty compelling.  But for that matter I also take the existence of God as pretty compelling such that I subscribe to a religious view and set of mores in accordance with that belief.  So... does that mean he exists just as your person exists?

If God starts sending me text messages, or shows me a selfie next to Alpha Centauri, then it will be much easier for me to believe that God exists.

Out of curiosity do you have much experience with intangible, immaterial, or metaphysical things?  Thoughts, feelings, a metaphysical world view perhaps?  Would you say those things exist though they are devoid of shape?  If so may one who has an experience with the presence of God (though not necessarily the God-shaped object) say God is as real as the personalities (which are not human shaped) or the other immaterial things you assert as real?  What would you say is a reasonable philosophical position on that?

I've had many religious and spiritual experiences-- more in my youth than these days. I once spent almost an entire summer fasting and reading the Bible, and had many powerful moments of realization, some of which I included in a book.

However, the value of those experiences is in the insights, not in the subscription to a belief about their source. A description of those events is NOT directly descriptive of God, but of my own psychology and emotional state. The Christian cannot see the difference between feelings and their source, and therefore uses as evidence experiences which don't necessarily support his world view.

[Anima]

No, you are trying to equivocate on two kinds of utility: the utility of an idea which represents actual experience, and the utility of an idea which conveniently solves a philosophical problem, but which doesn't actually represent any actual experience.  I've chosen to believe other people have minds because they do ALL the things I'd expect from a mindful being-- get angry or sad, respond in certain ways during conversation, etc.

Alas you have yet to exhibit an actual experinceor (person to experience), experiencee (fictitious persons or things to be experienced), or experience (the act of). In which case your distinction between utility of an idea of actual experience vs convenience are the same. In order to resolve your philosophical problem, by which you need other persons, you choose to believe other people have minds because you have an actual experience (as determined by you, which is not determinate of the truth) they do all the things you would expect from a mindful being (of course they also do things you would not expect from a mindful being such as act without thinking or act in an irrational way).

Of course I know you recognize this argument is readily available to the theist as well. Who chooses to believe because they have an actual experience (as determined by them, which is again not necessarily determinate of the truth) of Him in which he did ALL the things they expect from Him (even if he does somethings they would not expect from him).

Not all behaviors are based on a world view, and I never said they were.  However, for one to judge one's actions moral or immoral, they must constitute an intentional reference to a world view.

Let's say, for example, that there's a burning building, and I run in with the intent of saving a baby.  However, I don't see a second baby, which I accidentally knock into the heart of the fire.  Am I acting morally?  Yes-- because my world view includes as "good" the idea that I should save babies from burning, and I was acting with that intent.

Determination of an action as moral, amoral, or immoral must give consideration to the intention of the actor (on this we agree) as good, indifferent/nonexistent, or bad. I would even agree this relative intention is to be referenced in accordance to an objective evaluation of the good, indifferent, or bad intention in the scenario.

I once again cannot agree with the subjective evaluation of the world view by which one may state my world view is "I do not risk my ass in the slightest for anyone or anything." Now I do not endeavor to give aid to anyone (including those I can aid with only minimal or nominal risk) and such is "good" as it is in accordance with my world view. Or I may adopt the world view of "Their loss is my gain". In which case any act taken by my person resulting in their loss (without specifying what is lost) is "good" because it is in accordance with my world view of it being my gain (regardless of whether their loss was was deserved or not).

I'm sorry, but this is all another strawman.  I never said that all actions are mediated by the world view, or should be.  You're arguing against the wind right now.

Not really a strawman. Just a listing of examples of actions not based on world view. We may move on.

Your big toe is not inherent to your person.  Your person does not cease to exist with the deprivation of your big toe.  That which is inherent to your person is essential to your person such that your person may not exist without it.  For a world view to be inherent to your person is to state world view is a subset of person such that devoid of that subset there is no person.  Thus it may be argued that your person is your world view.

So you agree, then, that the world view is inherent to the person.  Good, because that was what I said.  Let's move on.

I am not saying your world view is inherent to person (that is for you to argue). I am saying if you want to say your world view is inherent to your person than I would be justified in saying your world view is your person and we may readily drop the pretense of the world view as the determinate of morality as being something other than just subjective morality of the whims.

Which is why subjective morality is untenable and is as useful as a diet that states one may eat as much of whatever they want when they want.  Morality may not be subjective; else we end up stating what is immoral is moral and immoral or what is moral is immoral and moral.

There is no True Scotsman, so a scenario which demands one is a false dilemma.

You have evidence to support this assertion? As I am sure many a Scotsman would disagree with your assertion, based on their experience and determination of what is actual. Clearly validation of your experience or world view must be considered to correlate to some objective reality to gain validity.

1. While you are readily willing to believe in the existence of any number of fictitious relative beings which are uniquely un-unique to endeavor to reach a consensus for moral determination. You may more easily believe in the existence of a single fictitious objective reality by which all subjectives are mere perspectives, that serves to grant validity to your own subjective experiences and judgments while simultaneously providing a means of correlation between any number of subsequent fictitious persons one wishes to believe as to reach consensus.

I fail to see why you are bending over backwards to justify the belief in the former and are not willing to believe in the latter which is of greater utility by means of less effort.

The simple fact is that many people DO believe strongly in God, and for this exact reason: they draw a different philosophical line than I do in attributing experiences to entities.

I see bodies with 10 fingers, and believe them to be people.  I see them cry, and therefore believe them capable of experiencing sadness.  Christians look at the sunset, and feel that only God could make something so glorious.  They are making an extra step of inference, not about what they see, but about the implications of what they see.

2. You believe you see bodies with 10 fingers and those bodies are inhabit by a person. But you have not proven you exist, much less that you have seen anything beyond you. Furthermore if we are to say something exists beyond you and that you "see" it then we are lead to our argument of objective vs. subjective existence beyond you (under the assumption that at least you actually exist).

3. Now if what you "see" beyond you is exactly what you expect to see at all times then I would concede what is beyond you is subjective and determined by your person. If what you "see" beyond you is not exactly what you expect to see at all times then I would contend what is beyond you is not defined by you and thus objective (even if observed by a subjective perspective).

4. I imagine you, like myself, are constantly faced with the observation, judgment, and determination of things not being as we expect them to be. So we may say that which is beyond our un-evidenced person is not defined by our person is thereby objective. We may further say in regards to bullet 1 above that belief in unity of the objective into a single fictitious reality serves the utility of granting my subjective perception of these objective things validity as well as providing me a means by which correlation to other fictitious person may reach a consensus.

Look, you show me something which matches a sensible definition for God, and it won't be hard for me to add that idea to my world view.  But I won't hold my breath.

See 1, 2 ,3 and 4 above.

Another straw man.  It is in fact NOT of utility for me to believe a spoon has really been bent, or that demons have been cast out.  It IS of utility for me to believe that my wife and children are real, or the people I do business with each day, or the people I debate with in online forums.

I am sorry but it was you who argued SEEM = IS. If that is the case than if someone seems to bend a spoon with the power of their mind it is of the utmost utility for you who holds seeming as being to believe they bent the spoon with the power of their mind and take precautionary action therein. The same may be said of one who seems to cast out demons which seemed to have possessed seeming people. If seeming is being than they did cast out actual demons from people who were actually possessed. It is of utility for you to believe this in the event someone you know or yourself seems to be possessed (as seeming is being) so that the demons may be cast out.

In short you cannot argue seeming is being (to say you do not need to determine what seem vs. is) and then start to argue there is utility in recognizing some seeming as being and not others. In doing so your argument becomes hypocritical and special pleading by which one states "seeming is being for what seems that I want to be and seeming is not being for what seems that I do not want to be."

If God starts sending me text messages, or shows me a selfie next to Alpha Centauri, then it will be much easier for me to believe that God exists.

Wait... I have done neither of those things... So it is difficult to believe I exist But we should be honest, even if you received text messages from one identifying themselves as God or a selfie next to Alpha Centuri of the same indentifying themselves as God you would be about as inclined to believe was actually God as you are now. Regardless of what it seems

Out of curiosity do you have much experience with intangible, immaterial, or metaphysical things?  Thoughts, feelings, a metaphysical world view perhaps?  Would you say those things exist though they are devoid of shape?  If so may one who has an experience with the presence of God (though not necessarily the God-shaped object) say God is as real as the personalities (which are not human shaped) or the other immaterial things you assert as real?  What would you say is a reasonable philosophical position on that?

I've had many religious and spiritual experiences-- more in my youth than these days.  I once spent almost an entire summer fasting and reading the Bible, and had many powerful moments of realization, some of which I included in a book.

I would like to read your book! I am writing two books (when I have the time) titled De Ingenium Humanus (The innate character of Humans) and De Iustus Humans (The justice of Humans). I am always looking for some proof readers should you be interested. I will post the Table of Contents after this post.

I was not asking about religious experiences. I was referring to experience with metaphysical things overall. They seem to exist and you are willing to believe they exist without evidence to prove their existence because you determine them to be of utility (which is really a fancy way of saying because you want to since the utility is determined by you and may be for any reason such as it pleases you to do so, though I assume you would argue it is pragmatic to do so. Pragmatism being a sub-branch of idealism and readily lending itself to relativism another sub-branch of idealism).

However, I would like to know a specific answer to my question (bolded above). Not necessarily in terms of your self specifically but generally speaking if you would.

However, the value of those experiences is in the insights, not in the subscription to a belief about their source.  A description of those events is NOT directly descriptive of God, but of my own psychology and emotional state.  The Christian cannot see the difference between feelings and their source, and therefore uses as evidence experiences which don't necessarily support his world view.

Hmm... I does not seem to me that one who is arguing to a world view is capable of separating their feeling from the source; as their feelings are the source (as argued extensively above).

Furthermore the value does not lie in the insights from those experiences alone, but also in the source of those experiences. Otherwise we would be arguing actual and virtual/emotional experiences are of the same value so long as they lead to insights. This would contradict what you are endeavoring to say and would constitute a failing of the ability of the observe to separate their feelings from the reality. By which contention is insights to reality are of utility while insights into feelings are not. Or do we wish to argue seem = is to such a degree that insight derived from reality are on par with insight derived from sentimentality? In which case your actual fictitious people are as real as their sentimental fictitious God.

[Anima]

General Book Outlines
Book One Title: De Ingenium Humanus (About the Innate Characteristics of Humans)
A. Ethical Categorization and Moral Definition
1. Phenomena (Physical/Ontological)
2. Noumena (Deontological/Teleological/Aisthimalogial)
3. Hypokeimena (Meta-Physical/Poidiological)
4. Perception
5. Cognition
6. Arbitration
7. Ethical Categorization
8. Affirmitive Moral Definitions
9. Negative Moral Definitions
10. Conclusion
B. Ethical Potential and Moral Possibility
C. Ethical Deceit and Moral Deception
1. Explicit Meaning of Expression
2. Implicit Meaning of Expression
3. Purpose of Expression
4. The Explicit Recipient of Expression
5. The Implicit Recipient of Expression
6. The Intent of Expression
7. Ethical Deceit
8. Understanding
9. Effectiveness of Deceit and Deception
10. Moral Deception
11. Truth
12. Honesty
13. Conclusion
D. Ethical Immorality and Moral Unethicality
E. Ethical Man and Moral Women (Negligible under value by procreation and Fallacy of feminism)
1. Current Critique
2. Moral Foundation (Female Dominant)
3. Ethical Manifestation (Male Dominant)
4. Moral Administrators (Moral Instigators; Female)
5. Ethical Administrators (Ethical Enforcers; Male)
F. Glossary

II. Book Two Title: De Iustus Humanus (About the Justice of Humans)
A. Ethical Action and Moral Will
1. How to Argue Abortion
2. Inalienable Rights
3. Just Confinement by the State
4. Individual and the State
5. Ethical Abortion Arguments
6. Explicit Rules of the Moral Will
7. Subjugation of the Free Moral Will
8. Implicit Rules of the Moral Will
9. Moral Arguments against Abortion
10. Ethical Action Vs. Moral Will
11. Conclusion
B. Ethical Compulsion and Moral Conversion
1. The Utilization of Justice
2. Current Views of Justice
3. Rehabilitation = Moral Conversion
4. Ethical Compulsion = Just Retribution
5. Just Retribution or Just Rehabilitation
6. Utility of Ethical Punishment
7. Conclusion
C. Ethical Punishment and Moral Appeasement
1. Cause of Intentions
2. Stimulation of Intentions
3. Moral Appeasement
4. Stimulation of Moral disposition
5. The Conceptual Realization
6. Ethical Punishment or Moral Appeasement
7. Control Implementation
8. Conclusion
D. Ethical Equality and Moral Diversity
E. Ethical Law and Moral Justice (Punishment of good by law)
F. Glossary

Red = DONE
Green = IN PROGRESS
Blue = REWORK REQUIRED

[bennyboy]

Alas you have yet to exhibit an actual experinceor (person to experience), experiencee (fictitious persons or things to be experienced), or experience (the act of).  In which case your distinction between utility of an idea of actual experience vs convenience are the same.  In order to resolve your philosophical problem, by which you need other persons, you choose to believe other people have minds because you have an actual experience (as determined by you, which is not determinate of the truth) they do all the things you would expect from a mindful being (of course they also do things you would not expect from a mindful being such as act without thinking or act in an irrational way).

Of course I know you recognize this argument is readily available to the theist as well.  Who chooses to believe because they have an actual experience (as determined by them, which is again not necessarily determinate of the truth) of Him in which he did ALL the things they expect from Him (even if he does somethings they would not expect from him).

I don't think the process is the same. My expectations about things are symbolic representations of experience, which I project onto candidates for same-ness. I experience an actual human sentience, my own, and project that onto ten-fingered, ten-toed beings.

So what of the God idea? Obviously, I cannot have a comprehensive experience of God, since by definition God cannot be comprehended. So if I project God-hood onto events I CAN experience, what am I projecting? Only a very distilled, very incomplete idea. But here's the important part-- the idea is so far removed from the hypothetical "reality" of an actual Deity that it cannot be said to be representative at all: the symbol is personal to me, or to people who have described it to me, and CANNOT exist. In short, you are necessarily stuck trying to project a myth onto a thing.

Determination of an action as moral, amoral, or immoral must give consideration to the intention of the actor (on this we agree) as good, indifferent/nonexistent, or bad.  I would even agree this relative intention is to be referenced in accordance to an objective evaluation of the good, indifferent, or bad intention in the scenario.  

I once again cannot agree with the subjective evaluation of the world view by which one may state my world view is "I do not risk my ass in the slightest for anyone or anything."  Now I do not endeavor to give aid to anyone (including those I can aid with only minimal or nominal risk) and such is "good" as it is in accordance with my world view.  Or I may adopt the world view of "Their loss is my gain".  In which case any act taken by my person resulting in their loss (without specifying what is lost) is "good" because it is in accordance with my world view of it being my gain (regardless of whether their loss was was deserved or not).

The Biblical God takes this position constantly. The commandments, which are supposed to be good, says "Thou shalt not kill," and yet he kills. He also counsels his followers to kill, at least sometimes, as the loss of non-Judaic people represents a gain for the Jews. Is this moral? How about the laying to waste of whole towns, or the killing of the first-born in Egypt? Had all those first-born boys committed sins worthy of death?

I am not saying your world view is inherent to person (that is for you to argue).  I am saying if you want to say your world view is inherent to your person than I would be justified in saying your world view is your person and we may readily drop the pretense of the world view as the determinate of morality as being something other than just subjective morality of the whims.

This is non sequitur. The love of chocolate is inherent to my person, but I am not my love of chocolate.

1.  While you are readily willing to believe in the existence of any number of fictitious relative beings which are uniquely un-unique to endeavor to reach a consensus for moral determination.  You may more easily believe in the existence of a single fictitious objective reality by which all subjectives are mere perspectives, that serves to grant validity to your own subjective experiences and judgments while simultaneously providing a means of correlation between any number of subsequent fictitious persons one wishes to believe as to reach consensus.  

You could say that in my world view, there's a kind of archetypal man, from which everyone else deviates in small ways, and that whatever I think this being's mores would be represent my moral views-- so long as we recognize that we are still just talking about my ideas, not projecting this archetypal man onto an actual being which we are positing.

2. You believe you see bodies with 10 fingers and those bodies are inhabit by a person.  But you have not proven you exist, much less that you have seen anything beyond you.  Furthermore if we are to say something exists beyond you and that you "see" it then we are lead to our argument of objective vs. subjective existence beyond you (under the assumption that at least you actually exist).  

I think we're on the third trip around the merry-go-round, now. This will be my last time restating this line.

If I'm living in the Matrix, then I am OF the Matrix, and the apparent existence of other Matrix people is sufficiently convincing that I take the philosophical position that they are real. If I'm in the mind of God or a brain in a jar, little matter: I still talk to (apparent) people all the time, and believing them to be real is necessary in order for any of my social behaviors to make sense.

In ANY of these contexts, the idea of God is irrelevant, because it isn't founded on any of the observations I'm able to make, and comes FROM OTHERS. Best case scenario, other people are real, and their God ideas represent truth-- but I have means of establishing the other as representing truth. Next best, other people are real, and their God idea is mythological-- not representing truth. But add your suspicion of the reality of people, and you are just shooting yourself in the foot, because now, other people are not real, and so I'm deriving my God idea from something that is itself unreal.

I'm sorry, but the posts are getting tl;dr. I'll have to stop there, and I may attempt to take up the rest of your post later.

[Anima]

I don't think the process is the same. My expectations about things are symbolic representations of experience, which I project onto candidates for same-ness. I experience an actual human sentience, my own, and project that onto ten-fingered, ten-toed beings.

So what of the God idea? Obviously, I cannot have a comprehensive experience of God, since by definition God cannot be comprehended. So if I project God-hood onto events I CAN experience, what am I projecting? Only a very distilled, very incomplete idea. But here's the important part-- the idea is so far removed from the hypothetical "reality" of an actual Deity that it cannot be said to be representative at all: the symbol is personal to me, or to people who have described it to me, and CANNOT exist. In short, you are necessarily stuck trying to project a myth onto a thing.

1. In regards to your expectations being a symbolic representation of experience projected for sameness. I would first point you to the commonly vaunted Nietzche (whom I have not read in 20 years but have been convinced to re-read):

“I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds--namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION of the facts of the
case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"--even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula--"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates--the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps someday we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).” (Beyond Good and Evil 17.)

It may thus be stated you have not experienced anything. You further allude to this in your final quote by which you say in reference to God, "add your suspicion of the reality of people, and you are just shooting yourself in the foot, because now, other people are not real, and so I'm deriving my God idea from something that is itself unreal." You are correct in this regard which further extends to say in like manner you would be deriving your symbolic representation of experience from something which itself is unreal.

As stated in the beginning of this thread this is a resultant of the general (though not monolithic) position stating God does not exist for want of evidence. By which inquiry into what constitutes evidence resulted in a general definition of evidence for God that when applied to knowledge as a whole (to avoid special pleading on the part of Atheists) would result in our person, experience, other persons, and all knowledge not existing for want of this same evidence. No point to the contrary has been presented to this initial stipulation beyond special pleading where existence desired is held to a lower threshold of proof than existence not so desired.

While it may be said the theist special pleads to anthropomorphize the God of philosophy, which may be derived by means of synthetic apriori and aposteriori under a uniform threshold of evidence as applied to our person, experience, other persons, God, and all other knowledge; the atheist special pleads the existence of self, experience, other persons, and all they consider knowledge at a lower threshold than the strenuous threshold for proof imposed on the existence of a particular displeasing existence (God). Thus, as untenable as the theist position may be for want of proof of a particular thing it seems the atheist position is even more untenable for want of same proof for numerous things.

As a matter of utility one should apply the same threshold of proof to God as they do to their own person and knowledge, in which case sufficient experience exists to infer the existence of any number of metaphysical things which may be consolidated into the readily inferable single proactive cause without cause as the objective existence to which all existence bears relation to. Thereby giving validity and allowing for correlation of particular subjective observations. Furthermore, it is of greater utility to simply special plead a single end that implies the beginning (as the theist) rather than to have to special plead the beginning/foundation and all that is built upon it (as is done by the atheist in regards their person, experience, and other persons) to reach some desired end.

2. I like your introduction of a comprehensive experience to then state by definition God cannot be comprehended. I take this to mean God may not be comprehended in full though God may be comprehended in part as neither our own person, the person of others, time and space, or existence itself may be comprehended in the entirety. Thus, I take your statement to mean comprehension as comprehension in part and not in the entirety.

I further take your statement in relation to a metaphysical thing such as experience to be in the same regard as to God; which is to say in no way may you experience directly, but may only do so indirectly by means of sentimentality. To paraphrase Neitzche:

“So let us for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let
us say that in all experience there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we go," the sensation of this
"FROM" and "TOWARDS" itself, and then besides, an accompanying muscular
sensation, which, even without our putting in motion "arms and legs,"
commences its action by force of habit, directly we “experience” anything. Therefore, just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognized as ingredients of the experience, so, in the second place, thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the experience there is a ruling thought;--and let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the "experiencing," as if the experience would then remain over! In the third place, the experience is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in fact the emotion of the change. That which is termed "experience" is essentially the emotion of change in respect to him who claims: "I experienced, 'what' must be"--this consciousness is inherent in every experience; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that reality is rendered--and whatever else pertains to the position of the sentiment...

on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term "I": a whole series
of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the
experience itself, has become attached to the act of experiencing--to such a degree that he who experiences believes firmly that experiencing SUFFICES for being. Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of experience when the effect of the sentiment--consequently change, and therefore being--was to be EXPECTED, the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he who
experiences believes with a fair amount of certainty that experience and being are somehow one; he ascribes the sentiment, the carrying out of the experiencing, to the experience itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of change which accompanies all success.” (Beyond Good and Evil 19.)

While Neitzche limits his argument to the will the same argument serves readily in regards to personal experience, by which we deceives ourselves by means of the “I” that experiencing suffices for being. The same was said of Descartes in his cognition ergo sum (which is merely a tautology of if I then I). In truth nearly all of Neitzche’s diatribe regarding freewill is applicable to personal experience. It is funny he would denigrate the former while vaunting the latter.

The Biblical God takes this position constantly. The commandments, which are supposed to be good, says "Thou shalt not kill," and yet he kills. He also counsels his followers to kill, at least sometimes, as the loss of non-Judaic people represents a gain for the Jews. Is this moral? How about the laying to waste of whole towns, or the killing of the first-born in Egypt? Had all those first-born boys committed sins worthy of death?

2. First I was not making reference to the biblical God. Again I do not subscribe to sola scriptura. But; is your argument we should be as vicious as the Tyrant in the great book of fairytales? Or because it is okay for the fictitious God to act in such a manner we are justified in acting in such a manner? Or do you want to argue that a God is bound by the same rules as a man and subsequently that a man is bound by the same rules as animal?

This is non sequitur. The love of chocolate is inherent to my person, but I am not my love of chocolate.

Correction, your statement is non sequitur. Love of chocolate is not inherent to your person. That which is inherent to your person is that which is essential to your person. If your person may exist without said thing than it is not inherent to it. I believe you may be confusing the terms inherent (essential to) and inherited (derived from or related to).

You could say that in my world view, there's a kind of archetypal man, from which everyone else deviates in small ways, and that whatever I think this being's mores would be represent my moral views-- so long as we recognize that we are still just talking about my ideas, not projecting this archetypal man onto an actual being which we are positing.

I would say if we are willing to say all of the above in regards to your archetypical man there is no reason why we should refrain from anthropomorphizing this archetypical man as being an actual being. As stated many posts ago sufficient implicit circumstantial evidence exists (which is sufficient for the theist) for the inference of said man as possible; and if possible than possibly actual (since we may not limit actuality to probability given the probability of all that is currently actual.) We have as much evidence of him existing as an actual entity as we do as an effective entity. If desired we may constrain this by saying the objective archetypical man should effectuate its self in multiple persons, but this may only be state if and only if there is an objective archetypical man to which the myriad world views have a subjective perspective of, but may not necessarily be a complete and accurate depiction of.

However, if the threshold of this archetypical man is to be in accordance with the argument (to avoid special pleading) of evidence required by very diverse atheistic community of explicit direct evidence you would be correct in stating we may not reasonably anthropomorphize it. However, under such a requirement we cannot concede it exists as part of a world view of a personality we cannot evidence as existing by explicit direct evidence.

I think we're on the third trip around the merry-go-round, now. This will be my last time restating this line.

If I'm living in the Matrix, then I am OF the Matrix, and the apparent existence of other Matrix people is sufficiently convincing that I take the philosophical position that they are real. If I'm in the mind of God or a brain in a jar, little matter: I still talk to (apparent) people all the time, and believing them to be real is necessary in order for any of my social behaviors to make sense.

In ANY of these contexts, the idea of God is irrelevant, because it isn't founded on any of the observations I'm able to make, and comes FROM OTHERS. Best case scenario, other people are real, and their God ideas represent truth-- but I have means of establishing the other as representing truth. Next best, other people are real, and their God idea is mythological-- not representing truth. But add your suspicion of the reality of people, and you are just shooting yourself in the foot, because now, other people are not real, and so I'm deriving my God idea from something that is itself unreal.

I'm sorry, but the posts are getting tl;dr. I'll have to stop there, and I may attempt to take up the rest of your post later.

To try to keep this answer short:
1. What do you mean you have means of establishing others as representing truth? You do not have means of establishing others much less what those other know/experience or the truth of those experiences therein. How would you establish the truth of these others, their knowledge/experience, and the truth of that knowledge/experience in such a manner as to stipulate the previous other’s knowledge/experience is not true?

2. Above you argue these fictitious persons are simply projections of you on what is around you. So they are not essential to your social conduct. There is no need for the projection as your social conduct is simply determine by your subjective ethical determinations (since social is not moral but ethical). So why do you waste your time arguing their existence as if it grants any support to your argument? At best their person is just your person and is thereby superfluous.

3. Furthermore I fail to see how God is irrelevant. If the belief of the existence of any number of fictitious persons is of utility to your argument (which I do not think it is) than the person of God is relevant for the same reason of granting your social behavior validity. Above it seems you were trying to say it cannot be because you can project yourself upon the other humans, but not upon God. An idea I find humorous as most people project themselves upon God quite readily (so I have the utmost faith you will be capable of doing so as well). Thus there is no reason why belief in the fictitious person of God, as a projection of your person, does not serve the same utility as the fictitious person of people, as projections of your person. You could say it is ridiculous and pointless to which I would agree as it is equally ridiculous and pointless to do for all the fictitious people your are positing.