Ethics Class Homework Assignments: Critiques, Thoughts... Thanks!

[Mudhammam]

I'm currently in a six week Introduction to Ethics class at community college, and part of the course is writing 6 short essays (our professor doesn't want them longer than 2 1/2 pages, double-spaced, though he said he would make an exception for me as my most recent assignment is about 3 pages). I was curious to get some feedback, as our we turned in our 1st essay last Tuesday, and the 2nd one is due this upcoming Tuesday. My professor had a lot to write on my 1st essay. He gave me a 10/10 but seemed to object to many of the claims (to be fair, I don't have a lot of room to really expound in all of the instances I'd like). I think he is a physicalist who believes in objective morality, at least that's the impression I've gotten after having spent a decent amount of time engaging with him in class and in email (he was also my professor for the Introduction to Logic class I took this past Winter semester). Anyway, I'd like to hear your thoughts, critiques, etc. on the subject matter. I'll include the instructions for the assignments so that you'll have a better idea of my aims in each.

Instructions for assignment #1

Address ONE of the following:

1. Briefly outline the following theories: Moral Nihilism, Moral Subjectivism, Moral Relativism, Moral Egoism, and Psychological egoism. Further, outline some of the problems that we discussed in class. Now, regardless of what your personal views are, choose one of the theories and defend it as best you can against our in-class attacks.

2. Explain the differences between Nietzsche's master and slave moralities. Why does Nietzsche think religion and democracy fall under slave morality? Who is part of the master morality, and why? Critically assess Nietzsche's view. Has he convinced you? Why or why not?

My essay

Outline of views discussed in class:

Moral nihilism - Morality doesn’t exist; moral claims are meaningless.
(Positivism - If a claim cannot be empirically confirmed, then it is meaningless.)
Moral realism - Morality does exist; moral claims can be true even if relative.
Moral subjectivism - Right is what I decide is right.
Moral/cultural relativism - Right is what my culture decides is right.
Moral egoism - What is right is in my self-interests.
(Psychological egoism - We always act in favor of self-interests.)

A Defense of Moral Subjectivism

If moral objectivity (MO) cannot be reasonably justified, then one, by default, is left with one of two possibilities: either some form of moral nihilism (MN) or moral subjectivism (MS). I do not believe that MO can be reasonably justified, and so we are, in fact, left with the choice of MN or MS --- in which case, all moral theories are reducible to the subjective inclinations of the individual. Various challenges were raised against the latter situation, viz., How can a proposition simultaneously be right (according to subject A) and wrong (according to subject B)? Also, How can a person alter their point of view if rightness is determined on account of themselves, which would seem to imply that one must be right both prior to and following their change of determination? The first objection is the weaker. People often hold conflicting perspectives in which neither can be satisfactorily conjoined to an objective criteria. What is beauty? Granted beauty is defined within a framework, then an object can be judged accordingly. The same goes with morality; we can define personal values as such, so as to create a paradigm by which moral statements are more or less true, but the paradigm itself can never escape the shackles of caprice, whether instilled by the whip of authority or evolutionary instinct. Much of secular philosophy appears elated at the Nietzschean madman’s declaration of God’s death, and yet they wish to believe that, as from an unlocatable tomb, on the third day emerged the Supreme Good. As the saying goes, you can’t have your cake and eat it too. We can imagine that the multitude of theories concocted are but imperfect representations of the Good, but in reality they are perfect representations of human values, and those values most certainly do not possess a “state or quality of being true even outside of a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings.” Though values may be informed by the operations of the external world, unlike facts established through reason and empirical investigation, they are not derived in part from without but strictly from within . . . the gooey brains of bipedal apes. When I did not exist, neither did my values. When I cease to exist, will my values live on? If so, they will no longer be mine. Those formulations that we call facts, stemming from analytic or synthetic judgments, purport for their sustenance a physical world that does not depend wholly on ourselves, a world that is indifferent to whatever Realm of Forms MO would like us to believe exists. As for the alleged contradiction? There is none. 1st, they are not both true in the same respect. One is true with respect to subject A, the other to B. 2ndly, “X is wrong” simply means “I disprefer X” with the qualification that a degree of feeling, related to one’s conception of well-being and suffering, is involved in a disproportionate fashion when compared to other statements of rejection, such as “I dislike sweets.” Perhaps most evidently, this does reflect, however unfortunate it may seem, the actual world in which we live.

Then how can one find themselves to have been wrong under MS? As alteration often occurs in our values or the reasoning that follows, and one is surely capable of changing (a) their values (neither objectively right or wrong), (b) their empirical knowledge (objectively right or wrong), or © their reasoning (objectively right or wrong), their admittance of error only truthfully applies to (b) or ©. By error I mean as a matter of fact; and as a matter of fact people can probably hold values that rational thought would deem, by definition, insane . . . But is insanity immoral? To the contrary, let us banish any pretense from our philosophy and echo the words of Dostoyevsky: “There is one case, one only, when man may consciously, purposely, desire what is injurious to himself, what is stupid, very stupid --- simply in order to have the right to desire for himself even what is very stupid and not to be bound by an obligation to desire only what is sensible. Of course, this very stupid thing, this caprice of ours, may be in reality, gentlemen, more advantageous for us than anything else on earth, especially in certain cases. And in particular it may be more advantageous than any advantage even when it does us obvious harm, and contradicts the soundest conclusions of our reason concerning our advantage --- for in any circumstances it preserves for us what is most precious and most important --- that is, our personality, our individuality.”[1]

[1]Notes from Underground. Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, Constance Garnett, Ernest J. Simmons. Notes from Underground; Poor People; The Friend of the Family: 3 Short Novels. New York, NY: Dell Pub., 1960. Print. (p. 48). In context, Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man is revolting against Laplacian determinism. Yet somehow, perhaps given that subject’s proximity to the question of moral responsibility, it seemed fitting in the present circumstances.

Instructions for assignment #2

Describe a situation (hypothetical or actual) that would require moral reasoning. The train case we discussed in class is one such hypothetical case, but you should come up with your own.

Then, explain how a utilitarian would reason about the situation. What, according to the utilitarian, would be the morally right way to act? How would a Kantian reason about the situation? What, according to the Kantian, would be the morally right way to act?

Finally, choose either the utilitarian or Kantian approach and defend it against at least one of the objections we raised in class. That is, respond to the objection as a utilitarian or a Kantian might.

My essay:

Utilitarianism Briefly Considered

You and your wife exit the obstetrician's office in languishing despair. You have learned that your first child, a girl, possesses an extra copy of chromosome 21, and will be born with Down syndrome. On your arrival home, you immediately begin to research the plethora of health problems that your daughter is likely to suffer, considering the social and financial obstacles that all but guarantee a vastly diminished quality of life awaiting your child’s future. As a utilitarian, just about every aspect you agonize over seems to point towards the obvious: the consequences of such a condition demand that the only ethical option, in the interests of your child especially, is to abort her. You sit down with your wife to discuss the conclusion you have reached. As you know, she is a Kantian.

Your wife reflects that she ought to “act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” She can reasonably conceive a universal law that, while not permitting abortion in every situation (a categorical imperative obliging as much would surely hasten our species’ path to total annihilation), would require a woman to terminate her pregnancy, viz., when she has knowledge of a disorder that ensures specific complications to follow, and in which the unborn’s lot is sure to be wretched. A refusal to do so, in fact, would be nothing short of cruelty, an action that Kant strictly forbids. Also, as a fetus is not a rational being, nor can it set ends for itself, the issue of its humanity defined by her understanding of Kant does not restrain her from reaching, in one of those rare occasions, complete agreement with your own position. At that moment the phone rings. It is your mother inquiring to see how the doctor’s visit went. You sigh . . . She is Catholic. 

Two of the issues discussed with regards to consequentialist ethics were that it makes demands that are impossible to satisfy, and that it necessarily limits one’s capacity for personal achievement, their time and energy constrained by efforts to increase the overall happiness of others rather than themselves. However, I should think that what one may be inclined to call “urbane consequentialism” would include the happiness of the individual as much as anyone else, accounting for what a person can sensibly be expected to contribute so as not to render humanity miserable from the guilt of feeling as if each had never done, nor could even hope to do, enough. I would rather like to briefly consider an objection and a defense of consequentialism from a different angle. The latter first.

Every ethical theory that I can conceive, and that we have thus far discussed, with the exception --- and to the credit? --- of Plato (whose Good simply cannot be imagined), at bottom betrays itself to a consequentialist point of view. What is believed to be the Good, (from whence or to which every action ought to proceed), whether defined by ataraxia, eudaimonia, Master morality, deontological ethics, the commands of a deity, etc., always has for its modus operandi some consequential end that is merely assumed to be, or has as its result (perhaps by some Escher-esque self-referential loop[1]), the Good. If you peel away the mask of prescriptive ethics you are left staring at a face that is essentially descriptive, and consequentialist, in nature. That brings me to my objection.

Similar to my argument for moral subjectivism, it would appear that as a matter of reductionism we are left with a variety of possible rationales that stem from definitions unjustifiable as objective truths, unlike the case with objects bounded by the necessary truths of arithmetic and geometry, which exist in relation to the properties of physical spacetime (like a “chair”). Even if we agree on what it is we value, and qualitative differences between extremes, e.g. freedom and slavery, guarantee that we will often find some causes for common ground, it still doesn’t eliminate our dependence on “individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings” in defining what the “best consequence” actually means for a given scenario.[2] Envision a world where all of mankind is snuffed out of existence. This is a possibility that I’m willing to bet all consequentialists would place at the opposite end of the spectrum in what they consider as goals for moral progress. Yet what might Timon of Athens[3] say at such a prospect? Why would he be wrong? If you’ll pardon the expression, how would “Mother Nature”[4] be worse off if human beings were to cease to be? I can imagine the relief that she might enjoy. The insoluble blemish with consequentialism as a sort of anchor for objective morality is the same as with all other efforts.[5] I call to mind Pascal, who observed “nothing but infinites on all sides, which surround me as an atom, and as a shadow which endures only for an instant and returns no more,”[6] and I cannot help but wonder, in earnestness and amusement, how men can exaggerate their self-importance so that whatever happens to coincide with their desired ends is asserted as the true Good to be sought by everyone else. 

“Is it by reason that you love yourself?”[7]

[1]Or rather, by begging the question.
[2]Even if I grant that “best consequence” means something like “maximal happiness,” it still seems as though we have not arrived at a conception that everyone, by compulsion of rational argument (and support of empirical investigation), must agree upon.
[3]A notorious misanthrope. “[He] indeed went so far as to hate the whole human race.” The quote comes from Pliny the Elder’s Natural History. Pliny, and John F. Healy. Natural History: A Selection. London, England: Penguin, 1991. Print. (p. 86)
[4]By this I mean to include both sentient and non-sentient life.
[5]Cf. note 1.
[6]Pascal, Blaise, W F. Trotter, and Thomas M'Crie. Pensées: The Provincial Letters. New York: Modern Library, 1941. Print. (p. 68)
[7]Ibid. (p. 95)

Thanks in advance for your time and thoughtfulness!

[Cato]

I'll limit my initial response to the second assignment.

I don't think you've done enough to demonstrate that aborting a fetus diagnosed with Down's syndrome meets Kant's CI as universal law, primarily because the end in itself aspect of CI cuts against any you. Children with Down's syndrome certainly require additional care obligations along with the quality of life considerations you mentioned arguing the utilitarian point; however, I think this only gets you to a hypothetical imperative, which Kant wouldn't agree is sufficient to justify a universal law.

Despite immense interest in some of your commentary in the last two paragraphs, I question their inclusion in this assignment. The second portion of the assignment was to defend utilitarianism, your choice, against the objections (lack of ubiquitous satisfaction and limits on personal achievement). I think your defense would work better by using the abortion example to help concretize your argument. 

I would rather like to briefly consider an objection and a defense of consequentialism from a different angle.

If I'm the instructor, my immediate interpretation of this is "fuck your assignment, I'm going to talk about what I want". I find what you want to discuss much more interesting; however, I just caution that it may be too far afield given what was asked.

[Mudhammam]

I'll limit my initial response to the second assignment.

I don't think you've done enough to demonstrate that aborting a fetus diagnosed with Down's syndrome meets Kant's CI as universal law, primarily because the end in itself aspect of CI cuts against any you. Children with Down's syndrome certainly require additional care obligations along with the quality of life considerations you mentioned arguing the utilitarian point; however, I think this only gets you to a hypothetical imperative, which Kant wouldn't agree is sufficient to justify a universal law.

Despite immense interest in some of your commentary in the last two paragraphs, I question their inclusion in this assignment. The second portion of the assignment was to defend utilitarianism, your choice, against the objections (lack of ubiquitous satisfaction and limits on personal achievement). I think your defense would work better by using the abortion example to help concretize your argument. 

I would rather like to briefly consider an objection and a defense of consequentialism from a different angle.

If I'm the instructor, my immediate interpretation of this is "fuck your assignment, I'm going to talk about what I want". I find what you want to discuss much more interesting; however, I just caution that it may be too far afield given what was asked.

Sweet, thanks Cato. I can see where my professor might interpret it that way; maybe I'll phrase the line differently so that I don't come across as too obstinate... really, I'm not sure what else that I could add to the comments on utilitarianism with regards to abortion, and the two objections, that wouldn't just be restatements of the point I think I said decently well in brief (since I'm be limited to 2 1/2 pages, as I said it is almost impossible to consider anything in any truly serious way). The primary reason for the inclusion of the last two paragraphs, was (as you said) that I found them more interesting observations, and partly in response to some of the things he wrote on my last essay (for instance, he asked why it is that I should presume all definitions of objective good to be equally correct and likened it to the concept of a "chair").  

As for Kant, you might be right. He's one of the two (along with Mill) whose writings on morality I'm not acquainted with too much (the others we have covered thus far have been Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Nietzsche). I did do a little research, to see how Kantians view abortion, and from their arguments and the words of Kant it seems there is some disagreement over his ideas of "rational being" and "humanity," and how this fits into our obligations to the unborn. The categorical imperative, at least as I would imagine it, would be something like, "All fetuses that suffer from a disorder or a defect that is sure to substantially lower their future quality of life should be aborted," granting that an unborn child doesn't meet his definition of humanity (rational, can set ends for itself) and that it would even be cruel to not abort the fetus (cruelty not even being permitted towards animals, as it debases human character and increases the likelihood of acting cruelly towards other humans). But I'm sure there are Kantians who would disagree with that reading of Kant, and probably others who would seek to justify abortion in certain instances for other reasons.

Anyway, I really appreciate the input.

[Pyrrho]

I have a couple of questions.  Are you saying that the first essay has already been turned in and graded?  Is it included to give us an example of what the teacher found acceptable, to be a guide for evaluating the second essay?  Or are you wanting us to comment on the first essay anyway, even though it has already been graded?

Or are you saying that these are both new assignments?

I will wait for a response to offer much of a response (though I may change my mind later, so I might not reply again later), but I will include a couple of quick comments.

Regarding the first, you seem to simply dismiss the idea of objective morality rather than give any argument against it.

It is also worth noting that the list of options for morality does not seem to be exhaustive.  For example, one could take the position I take in the following posts, which does not appear to fit in any of your categories:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid934918

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid935583

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid937797

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid938152


Regarding the second essay, I am not convinced that Kant would go the way you say at all.  You might want to read his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, variously translated as Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, and possibly a couple of other ways (unfortunately, there is no standard wording of the title in English).  I like the Lewis White Beck translation.  You can also take a bit of a shortcut to see why Kant is not likely to go along with your rendering of his position by doing a search for "Kant suicide" without the quotes.  You will find that he does not care if it is in your best interests to die or not; you ought not kill yourself, according to Kant.  It is similar to his absolute pronouncement regarding lying, which he says you ought never do, no matter what.  So I don't think you have a convincing story that his views somehow reduce to consequentialism, nor do I think you have the specific outcome of the abortion issue that I would expect of Kant.  But it would depend on what, exactly, Kant had to say about the status of a fetus, and I cannot recall reading anything that would suggest what his opinion of the status of a fetus is.

You also seem to include extra bits in the story that seem unnecessary.  For example, what is the point in mentioning the Catholic mother?  If it serves no purpose, you should ruthlessly prune it out of your essay, as it otherwise may serve as a distraction.

And, as Cato observes, it seems a bit unclear how your concluding paragraphs relate to the assignment.  You might want to spend your efforts in more fully addressing the task at hand.  Or explain how it is that they are fulfilling the requirements, though if one needs to argue for that, one should probably rethink their inclusion, as it will not be good if your teacher finds your reasoning on that point unconvincing.

[Mudhammam]

I have a couple of questions.  Are you saying that the first essay has already been turned in and graded?  Is it included to give us an example of what the teacher found acceptable, to be a guide for evaluating the second essay?  Or are you wanting us to comment on the first essay anyway, even though it has already been graded?

Or are you saying that these are both new assignments?

I will wait for a response to offer much of a response (though I may change my mind later, so I might not reply again later), but I will include a couple of quick comments.

Regarding the first, you seem to simply dismiss the idea of objective morality rather than give any argument against it.

It is also worth noting that the list of options for morality does not seem to be exhaustive.  For example, one could take the position I take in the following posts, which does not appear to fit in any of your categories:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid934918

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid935583

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid937797

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid938152


Regarding the second essay, I am not convinced that Kant would go the way you say at all.  You might want to read his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, variously translated as Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, and possibly a couple of other ways (unfortunately, there is no standard wording of the title in English).  I like the Lewis White Beck translation.  You can also take a bit of a shortcut to see why Kant is not likely to go along with your rendering of his position by doing a search for "Kant suicide" without the quotes.  You will find that he does not care if it is in your best interests to die or not; you ought not kill yourself, according to Kant.  It is similar to his absolute pronouncement regarding lying, which he says you ought never do, no matter what.  So I don't think you have a convincing story that his views somehow reduce to consequentialism, nor do I think you have the specific outcome of the abortion issue that I would expect of Kant.  But it would depend on what, exactly, Kant had to say about the status of a fetus, and I cannot recall reading anything that would suggest what his opinion of the status of a fetus is.

You also seem to include extra bits in the story that seem unnecessary.  For example, what is the point in mentioning the Catholic mother?  If it serves no purpose, you should ruthlessly prune it out of your essay, as it otherwise may serve as a distraction.

And, as Cato observes, it seems a bit unclear how your concluding paragraphs relate to the assignment.  You might want to spend your efforts in more fully addressing the task at hand.  Or explain how it is that they are fulfilling the requirements, though if one needs to argue for that, one should probably rethink their inclusion, as it will not be good if your teacher finds your reasoning on that point unconvincing.

The first assignment was turned in. The second is due on Tuesday. I posted it to get whatever insights, criticisms, etc. that you might consider.

On Kant---I plan to read his works on morality when I get to him in my survey of the history of western philosophy (currently on a minor digression with Plutarch's Lives; Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius are next up). But from our summary of Kant in class, his basic notion of what the good is boils down to what he calls "good will," which is, I think, essentially consequentialist. How else would one evaluate whether intentions are good if not for their consequence in the behavior that results from them? How else is any intention determined to be a good one or not? Now, Kant wishes to avoid grounding morality in consequentialism, but he cannot do so by reducing the Good to good and bad intentions; all he does is limit the flexibility of judging actions as good or bad based on the consequences of a given situation, as those often vary, while his categorical imperatives do not. 

The line about the Catholic mother was just meant for light comedic relief for an otherwise weighty subject... perhaps also to make a passing comment about how different such a person would view the question compared to a utilitarian/Kantian... also, I didn't want my paper to be too dry and impersonal. But I'll consider omitting it. As for the other paragraphs, on the one hand, I do see that you guys have a point, on the other hand, I think as the commentary is related to utilitarianism and expresses thought not discussed in the class, they are of some value... but I may just keep them in there to see if the professor appreciates where I decided to take the assignment or not...

[Pyrrho]

If you are not going to read Kant yet, you might want to look at a summary:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantview/#H5

His idea of a "good will" is not consequentialist.  From the link above:

... Even happiness, according to Kant, is not unconditionally good. Although all humans universally desire to be happy, if someone is happy but does not deserve their happiness (because, for instance, their happiness results from stealing from the elderly), then it is not good for the person to be happy. Happiness is only good on the condition that the happiness is deserved.

Kant argues that there is only one thing that can be considered unconditionally good: a good will. A person has a good will insofar as they form their intentions on the basis of a self-conscious respect for the moral law, that is, for the rules regarding what a rational agent ought to do, one’s duty. The value of a good will lies in the principles on the basis of which it forms its intentions; it does not lie in the consequences of the actions that the intentions lead to. This is true even if a good will never leads to any desirable consequences at all: “Even if… this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose… then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself” (4:393). This is in line with Kant’s emphasis on the unconditionalgoodness of a good will: if a will were evaluated in terms of its consequences, then the goodness of the will would depend on (that is, would be conditioned on) those consequences. (In this respect, Kant’s deontology is in stark opposition to consequentialist moral theories, which base their moral evaluations on the consequences of actions rather than the intentions behind them.)

Wikipedia also has articles on this, and, of course, there are other online articles elsewhere on Kant.

Also, Kant's basic idea of what is good is best represented by his ideas regarding his categorical imperative.  See link above.

I do not get the impression that you have the right ideas about what Kant is up to at all.  Of course, I have no idea what your teacher said in class, so it may well be that he did not satisfactorily explain Kant.

[Mudhammam]

If you are not going to read Kant yet, you might want to look at a summary:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantview/#H5

His idea of a "good will" is not consequentialist.  From the link above:

... Even happiness, according to Kant, is not unconditionally good. Although all humans universally desire to be happy, if someone is happy but does not deserve their happiness (because, for instance, their happiness results from stealing from the elderly), then it is not good for the person to be happy. Happiness is only good on the condition that the happiness is deserved.

Kant argues that there is only one thing that can be considered unconditionally good: a good will. A person has a good will insofar as they form their intentions on the basis of a self-conscious respect for the moral law, that is, for the rules regarding what a rational agent ought to do, one’s duty. The value of a good will lies in the principles on the basis of which it forms its intentions; it does not lie in the consequences of the actions that the intentions lead to. This is true even if a good will never leads to any desirable consequences at all: “Even if… this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose… then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself” (4:393). This is in line with Kant’s emphasis on the unconditionalgoodness of a good will: if a will were evaluated in terms of its consequences, then the goodness of the will would depend on (that is, would be conditioned on) those consequences. (In this respect, Kant’s deontology is in stark opposition to consequentialist moral theories, which base their moral evaluations on the consequences of actions rather than the intentions behind them.)

Wikipedia also has articles on this, and, of course, there are other online articles elsewhere on Kant.

Also, Kant's basic idea of what is good is best represented by his ideas regarding his categorical imperative.  See link above.

I do not get the impression that you have the right ideas about what Kant is up to at all.  Of course, I have no idea what your teacher said in class, so it may well be that he did not satisfactorily explain Kant.

I think I get what Kant wants to say, but as I said, I don't think he avoids consequentialism at all. He requires it for determining what is good about his notion of good will. Where he differs from the consequentialists in vogue during his era is in his claim that something is good on the basis of intention, rather than the results that follow action.