My views on objective morality

[Whateverist]

For my two cents, our moral faculties exist in our subconscious and are not amenable to change by consciousness.  Our moral judgements come to us from the depths of our being.  Since we don't have access to the formation of our moral judgements, they appear to us as fixed and objective.  They are semi-fixed, being the product of culture, genes, and development, as well as our current experiences.  So moral judgements are not subjective like tastes in ice cream; they are more durable than that.

My initial reaction to this was to nod and say true,  true.   But after thinking it over, I'm not so sure. My taste in ice cream isn't of any real import, but although it changes over time, I don't think I made a conscious decision to prefer coffee to my previous favorite chocolate chip vanilla.  And I don't think I could have made a conscious choice to change my preference, though I could certainly have chosen to eat coffee instead of vanilla chocolate chip for for some reason other than taste. And if I did, I might have grown to prefer it.

But I think I not only can, but have made changes in my moral judgments based on conscious reasoning or conscious learning.  Some examples include coming to the conclusion that there is nothing morally wrong with being homosexual, a conscious change made thirty years ago, based upon reason over gut feeling.  The reasoned change now feels like a gut instinct.  More subtle, are the gut feelings I have about legal ethical issues such as exparte communications, since I learned that particular set of morals in my twenties in the classroom.  At the time some of them felt intuitively wrong.  But these too now feel like a gut instinct. Finally, when I look at past moral structures now inimical to our current one, I can immerse myself in that world view and read without gut level moral disgust, about events that would disgust me if they were contemporary events.

I don't think I'm unique in this.

I've been missing your voice in all of this. I think what you've written here is a good amplification of what Jorg had written. Probably one way that moral judgements vs taste preferences vary is that moral judgements don't change just because they get old. We don't come to prefer causing pain just because the novelty of avoiding doing so wears off. But novelty seems to play some role in taste preferences for a good proportion of the population (sizable enough to warrant the coinage of the term "foodies" at least).

[Neo-Scholastic]

Can you reason your way out of thinking murdering an innocent is wrong, or that fairness is right?...We can't always see the entailments of our moral judgements and it's our understanding of the entailments which we must temper as we are, or can be, wrong about those entailments. But the moral foundations come to us like immovable pillars within which we must fit our moral reasonings.

You could reason your way out of thinking that physical objects are solid, as opposed to mostly empty space, even though such appearances are naturally compelling. While knowledge and sound reasoning do not always alter someone’s immediate experiences, instincts and/or habitual responses, he or she can still proceed appropriately by understanding things as they actually are rather than how they merely appear to be. I do not think we are that far apart on this issue. What you call ‘immovable pillars’ need not be so compelling that they cannot be countermanded, for good or ill. You seem to acknowledge as much by saying that if people know about their innate biases then they can override them to cultivate virtue.

Where I think we differ is on the critical question of whether there are moral facts about being human, facts that do not depend on the opinion of one individual; but rather, can be discerned independently in the same way other facts are known: reason applied to experience. The validity of moral reasoning depends on such moral facts to justify overruling instinct. The most basic notion of virtue is predicated on the idea that virtues are real attributes related to definable features of human nature. Otherwise value judgments are meaningless.

Anyone that calls some things right and others wrong or talks about justice tacitly accepts the existence of moral facts. I object to those who knowingly deny the existence of moral facts but nevertheless treat human interactions in anything other than power dynamics. Interestingly, I do not recall you ever expressing a moral judgment although many others who deny moral facts do.

[Mister Agenda]

How does Santa deliver all those toys to all the children in the world in one night? He doesn't, it's absolute bullshit. But if you accept for the sake of argument that he does so you can discuss the implications of the feat, it's a little late to backtrack to 'it's complete bullshit'.

As the Xtians say on accepting Jebus as "yaw lawrd n' Save-yawr", "It's never too late".

Christians don't have to offer adequate excuses for God's inaction. If God is super-good and omniscient and all-powerful and has freewill himself; then his actions or inactions MUST be completely justified by definition and if Christians can't explain how they're justified, it just means God has super good reasons that we can't currently perceive, and might not be equipped to comprehend if we could. The standard Christian answer to the Problem of Evil is that evil exists because without it a greater good could not be achieved or a greater evil would not be prevented. At this point, they have to accept some limitations on God's power, usually starting with not being able to do the impossible (though Drich goes after the super-good part). At this point, their concept of God is reduced (once again) to something unfalsifiable: An omnibenevolent being that knows everything that can be known and can do anything that can be done, that created the universe. He doesn't want there to be any evil, because he's omnibenevolent, so any evil that exists must be because there is a reason why it's not possible to avoid all of it. Presumably God is doing the best he can and things would be a lot worse if not for his efforts. It's a fairy tale, but it's a consistent and unfalsifiable one.

I'm not sure how Christians justify 'omnipotence' for a being that has to rest after a long week of creating everything in the first place.

If the Xtian god's power is limited in any way, then he is not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, then he would not allow anything to happen which really and truly displeases him. If Xtians accept limitations on his power, then they contradict their assertion on his omnipotence, which they invariably make, regarding his power. In respect to these conditions, they do engage in special pleading when they fail to hold him culpable for allowing evil things to happen.

The above simply couldn't have been summed up better by Epicurous, whose words apply no differently to Xtians:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”

Thanks for rephrasing my post.

[abaris]

Anyone that calls some things right and others wrong or talks about justice tacitly accepts the existence of moral facts. I object to those who knowingly deny the existence of moral facts but nevertheless treat human interactions in anything other than power dynamics. Interestingly, I do not recall you ever expressing a moral judgment although many others who deny moral facts do.

It's hardly up for debate that some basics exist within all cultures. What's very much up for debate is the divine nature of these basics. And these basics can pretty much be reduced to not murdering a member of your own tribe. Everything else shifts throughout time, region and culture.

And what all of you fail to adress or even to look at, is recent animal research. I pointed it out again with some names to go with, very early in this thread. We, as humans aren't that special. We only have developed more complex structures to deal with what nature has provided - at least - for mammals with a higher degree of social intelligence. In short, as a social species there have to be certain - for lack of a better word - rules, to prevent that the species takes too much harm from it's inside.

[Mister Agenda]

No worries. My skin isn't particularly thick, but it's almost impossible to annoy me while being polite and sincere.

The question is whether an exception for God is properly justified. In the case of arguments that posit God as a solution to infinite regression, the fallacy of special pleading is being committed. It is asserted that everything must have a cause, that this would mean an infinite regression of cause and effect, that an infinite regression is impossible so there must be a First Cause, and the First Cause is God. That an infinite regression is impossible is assumed, and God not needing a cause is asserted only to provide a solution to the assumption without establishing that even if a First Cause is necessary, that it must be a conscious being. Special pleading isn't the only flaw in the argument.

For the problem of evil (and let me state outright that the theodic version of God is rife with its own problems), we are bringing in an entity that is, or very nearly is, omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent. If you accept the definition for the sake of argument, it necessarily follows that there must be an overriding reason to allow evil, or such a being wouldn't allow it. You can argue, I'm pretty sure successfully, that our state of affairs is inconsistent with a being that literally can do anything, literally knows everything, and would never allow any evil it could prevent. And believers usually dial one or more of their version of God's attributes down to account for this. But it's not special pleading to claim that a being so far beyond mortal limitations that sets all the rules can't be judged by mortal standards.

Does the God of theodicy exist? No. It's a big awkward pile of Omni-attributes that are not only in contradiction to the observed world but to each other (particularly if you claim God has free will, which is a nearly universal claim among theists) that is clearly the end result of generations of a 'my God is better than your God' contest. But if it did exist, would everything it does be good and right by definition? Yes. Would any perceived injustice or malice on its part be due to our not having all the information that it has? Also yes.

Of course my certainty doesn't mean I'm necessarily right. It's just what I think.

But...isn't that saying, "it's not a logical fallacy because it's logical within the framework of the internally illogical definition of God that is being used"?   Lol. [emoji13]. My head hurts...

Right, the definition itself is problematic, but if you accept the definition for the sake of argument, God is so super-special that almost any special exception for him is justified.

I think a bigger problem for God is his own free will. Free will is the ability to choose between your options. Omniscience is knowing everything, including everything you will ever do. God can't choose not to do what he already knows he will do. If he did, then his knowledge was not perfect.

[Mister Agenda]

Is Tibs screwing with me? Is this a test?

Hmm...

This God he describes is feeble indeed and nothing like the ones theists generally present. If he was this crap (God) I'd have no problem admitting he is hugely limited and maybe can only manage this bollock of a universe.

Lots of theologians are happy to assert that it doesn't even make sense for omnipotence to include doing what's logically impossible. Their version of God either can't make a rock to heavy for God to lift; or can and actually wouldn't be able to lift it if he did.

Your usual Christian often does the same, without really being conscious of it. All the time they will tell you things God can't do, like let sinners into heaven, or fix evil.

If there is a God, I prefer the version that's hugely limited and doing the best he can under the circumstances to Drich's version who frankly doesn't like us very much.

[Angrboda]

Where I think we differ is on the critical question of whether there are moral facts about being human, facts that do not depend on the opinion of one individual; but rather, can be discerned independently in the same way other facts are known: reason applied to experience. The validity of moral reasoning depends on such moral facts to justify overruling instinct. The most basic notion of virtue is predicated on the idea that virtues are real attributes related to definable features of human nature. Otherwise value judgments are meaningless.

I'm open to the possibility that there are moral facts, but I do think that if they exist, there is nothing supernatural about them. We are a cooperative species with certain givens that we can't change (preconditions) and things that we can change. For example, it's a well worn chestnut that the strategy of tit for tat will prevail in a group over time compared to other strategies such as always defecting. This is an objective fact and it likely constrains what strategies can be considered good or efficacious and which are considered bad. Thus by the preconditions of humanity, our given status, some things will align with certain shared goals such as pleasure and survival, and other things will not.

This is completely opposed to the idea that we get our morals from a god, though one could hypothesize that the ideal of these naturalistic moral facts is The Good, and is something that we all strive for.

[robvalue]

Indeed. Noticing trends in human behaviour and saying, "Look, we're all the same, it's magic!" is just lazy thinking.

It's not at all surprising once you actually study it.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Anyone that calls some things right and others wrong or talks about justice tacitly accepts the existence of moral facts.

Nonsense, this is simply you asserting by fiat what you haven't demonstrated with reasoning or evidence.

People can, and do, have opinions, which do not appeal to factuality for justification, all the time.

[Chas]

Can you reason your way out of thinking murdering an innocent is wrong, or that fairness is right?...We can't always see the entailments of our moral judgements and it's our understanding of the entailments which we must temper as we are, or can be, wrong about those entailments.  But the moral foundations come to us like immovable pillars within which we must fit our moral reasonings.

You could reason your way out of thinking that physical objects are solid, as opposed to mostly empty space, even though such appearances are naturally compelling. While knowledge and sound reasoning do not always alter someone’s immediate experiences, instincts and/or habitual responses, he or she can still proceed appropriately by understanding things as they actually are rather than how they merely appear to be. I do not think we are that far apart on this issue. What you call ‘immovable pillars’ need not be so compelling that they cannot be countermanded, for good or ill. You seem to acknowledge as much by saying that if people know about their innate biases then they can override them to cultivate virtue.

Where I think we differ is on the critical question of whether there are moral facts about being human, facts that do not depend on the opinion of one individual; but rather, can be discerned independently in the same way other facts are known: reason applied to experience. The validity of moral reasoning depends on such moral facts to justify overruling instinct. The most basic notion of virtue is predicated on the idea that virtues are real attributes related to definable features of human nature. Otherwise value judgments are meaningless.

Morality is based on feelings and assumptions, not on facts.  That something is generally believed (e.g. killing is wrong) does not make it a fact.

Anyone that calls some things right and others wrong or talks about justice tacitly accepts the existence of moral facts.

No.  Right and wrong are emotional responses.  They are subjective judgments, not statements of fact.

I object to those who knowingly deny the existence of moral facts but nevertheless treat human interactions in anything other than power dynamics. Interestingly, I do not recall you ever expressing a moral judgment although many others who deny moral facts do.

I object to those who claim there are moral facts without making the slightest effort to justify them or explain how they can be identified.