Mind is the brain?

[The Grand Nudger]

I think you're grasping at straws now.  General purpose means that it can solve an array of math and logic problems..as well as a host of other functions (by leveraging those two preceding in tandem, for example).  A universal machine.  It's not a just light switch, or a calculator, or a comparator.   These would be examples of things that aren't general purpose, that aren't universal machines......that aren't computers. Data could be numbers, symbols, values, etc. That's what makes it general purpose, universal, in the first place - the ability to do work with abstraction. If it could only compare symbols (a comparator), if it could only manipulate numbers (a calculator), if it could only determine values (a switch)..it would not be general purpose, and so it could not be a computer.

Don't tell me it "seems" circular, because that's no different than saying a toaster "seems" like a 747. Point out the circularity, explicitly. I'm, frankly, astonished...that you think there's a problem with computers and their definitions...rather than your own understanding of them. Armed with nothing more than the definition provided to you, you should be able to determine whether an object is a computer or a rock, and whether "stuff is happening" or "computation is happening" without any help. I wonder how many times you mistakenly attempt to respond to my posts with a melon...and sit there, perplexed...as to why you can't post to the web with it? My guess is none, it never happens. You already know that there's a difference between "stuff happening"...like the stuff happening in the melon, and a computer. You knew it -before- I provided the definition. You're fishing for a term to prevaricate upon, a term like purpose. Too bad.

[Whateverist]

Mind is the brain?

Light bulb is the light?

Smile is the lips?

Seriously?

[The Grand Nudger]

Very well may be.  The question being asked is not about what the mind (or brain) -does-....not the thinking.  The experience thereof, what it -is-, in the first place..would be the question.  That's why the analogy to lightbulbs and lips isn't as informative as it may appear at a glance. We'd have to modify each statement to compare apples to apples.

[bennyboy]

I think you're grasping at straws now.  General purpose means that it can solve an array of math and logic problems..as well as a host of other functions (by leveraging those two preceding in tandem, for example).  A universal machine.  It's not a just light switch, or a calculator, or a comparator.   These would be examples of things that aren't general purpose, that aren't universal machines......that aren't computers.  Data could be numbers, symbols,  values, etc.  That's what makes it general purpose, universal, in the first place - the ability to do work with abstraction. If it could only compare symbols (a comparator), if it could only manipulate numbers (a calculator), if it could only determine values (a switch)..it would not be general purpose, and so it could not be a computer.

Don't tell me it "seems" circular, because that's no different than saying a toaster "seems" like a 747.  Point out the circularity, explicitly.  I'm, frankly, astonished...that you think there's a problem with computers and their definitions...rather than your own understanding of them.  Armed with nothing more than the definition provided to you, you should be able to determine whether an object is a computer or a rock, and whether "stuff is happening" or "computation is happening" without any help.  I wonder how many times you mistakenly attempt to respond to my posts with a melon...and sit there, perplexed...as to why you can't post to the web with it?  My guess is none, it never happens.  You already know that there's a difference between "stuff happening"...like the stuff happening in the melon, and a computer.  You knew it -before- I provided the definition.  You're  fishing for a term to prevaricate upon, a term like purpose.  Too bad.

Then that's a composition fallacy.  Are you saying the brain does all those things?  Nah, different parts of the brain do those things, and YOU see those different parts as a unified, integrated system.  That's like saying my room thinks because I happen to be in it.

A computer is only "a" computer because of the intent imposed by an external thinker-- people.  In reality, there's just a bunch of physics going on.  As for "data"-- you still haven't established what is or isn't data.

[The Grand Nudger]

It appears that our brain -does- do those things. It may not be using comp to do them, but -if- our brain is a computational system, it is a system.  Systems can and do have many parts.  Are you sure that you've used the term composition fallacy properly?

Benny, a computer, is a computer, if it fits the definition of a computer (as opposed to the definition of a switch, or a calculator, or a comparator).  Doesn't have anything to do with whether or not it has an operator, or whether that operator is a human being, and theres no requirement in either case, in any case.  Amusingly, the term itself was borrowed from math (pre-computers)...they called the person solving the problem the computer.   OFC there's a bunch of physics going on, again..that's a "not even wrong" proposition...but it's as insufficient now as it was before.  If a bunch of phyiscs going on was -all- that was required for a computer we'd never have had the need to invent them.  We could ask the air to do our homework.

I already told you what data was.  You're unsatisifed...you being unsatisfied does not mean that something didn't happen.

Here's something to mull over. If the sum total of your objection is to turn everything into a computer (to remove the identity of the descriptors referent)...and you feel that everything has "spark of mind"....are you actually objecting to comp mind, or agreeing with it?

[little_monkey]

I think the consensus that the mind is the brain is more of a pragmatic result than a theoretical one.  We assign the identity because for the most part it works as an explanation of the phenomenon, including its evolution, whereas most other theories are non-starters.  It doesn't mean we couldn't be wrong, but I think you hold the mind-brain paradigm to an unusually high standard of evidence.  Things like the closure of induction and the philosophical understanding of the link between cause and effect pose similarly insurmountable hurdles, yet I don't think you place those problems in the same category.  In short, I think you make an exception of the mind-brain problem in your standards.

The problem is that, unlike other science, the "results" are not generalizable, one of the principles of a good scientific theory.  So even if you "know" what systems or subsystems or whatever are associated with different kinds of experience, there's no way to generalize that knowledge to non-animal physical systems.  You can study a bowling ball and a feather, and confirm that they both fall at the same rate as gravity, and then generalize that to all objects.  You can't necessarily do that with even a well-mapped human brain-- there is no real THEORY there sufficient to apply our "knowledge" to anything other than some dude sitting in a psych lab.

You'd be surprised that researchers are confirming that many species have a primitive concept of math. And that these animals can learn mathematical concepts. They are teachable. 

See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hwY1Ws5sd58 , around 21:36 for the animal part.

[bennyboy]

No, i'm not surprised at all. It's very interesting research indeed.

[bennyboy]

Here's something to mull over.  If the sum total of your objection is to turn everything into a computer (to remove the identity of the descriptors referent)...and you feel that everything has "spark of mind"....are you actually objecting to comp mind, or agreeing with it?

I still haven't seen a simple thesis statement for your theory, so I cannot really say whether I agree with it.

My idea at least with regard to a physical world view is that mind is intrinsic to matter, i.e. it's matter-mind, and that just as with physical objects, when elements are brought together in complex ways, neat stuff gets built. Saying that anything causes mind, or is mind, doesn't really mean that much. What is significant in people isn't the existence of mind, but the way it manifests: our perceptions of forms, colors, etc.

[I_am_not_mafia]

A computer does not have to be Turing complete. A calculator is a computer. It computes. It literally has logic gates and performs binary logic. This is what's taught at universities.

There is also the field of natural computation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_computing

Natural computing,[1] also called natural computation, is a terminology introduced to encompass three classes of methods: 1) those that take inspiration from nature for the development of novel problem-solving techniques; 2) those that are based on the use of computers to synthesize natural phenomena; and 3) those that employ natural materials (e.g., molecules) to compute. The main fields of research that compose these three branches are artificial neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, swarm intelligence, artificial immune systems, fractal geometry, artificial life, DNA computing, and quantum computing, among others.

Basically if you can get numbers out of it then you can compute with it. The first tools for computing were abacuses. Teams of women calculating Maths used to be called computers. But here is the crucial point:

Computing requires Maths. Maths is a human construct used to reason about the world.

This whole argument about definitions is not relevant to the flawed idea that the mind is the brain. The mind is an emergent phenomenon of the brain. If you start talking about computation happening in natural phenomena then you need to be careful not to make the mistake that theists make in thinking that maths and logic is somehow an objective part of reality. It's not. It's a tool constructed by humans.

[The Grand Nudger]

I still haven't seen a simple thesis statement for your theory, so I cannot really say whether I agree with it.

My idea at least with regard to a physical world view is that mind is intrinsic to matter, i.e. it's matter-mind, and that just as with physical objects, when elements are brought together in complex ways, neat stuff gets built.  Saying that anything causes mind, or is mind, doesn't really mean that much.  What is significant in people isn't the existence of mind, but the way it manifests: our perceptions of forms, colors, etc.

Yes you have, many times.  CTM...is a theory that mind is a comp system.  Could it be any simpler?  If it were, you'd probably complain that it was too simple.........  You've had a comp system defined, explained, demonstrated, you even use one to have this conversation. You've seen not only how CTM explains x or y, but ways it has failed to explain a or b, in all of our conversations...you;ve had a pretty thorough description of what ctm is, and what it isn't. Now I'm not asking you to say "Damn Rhythm, mind is comp, they were totally right"...I just want this bullshit "I've never seen this, never heard that, x can't be defined, y cannot account for" routine to stop. It's insulting, lol.

"Complex ways" is insufficient.  Many things are ludicrously complex, and yet they do not present themselves as candidates for mind.  A particular type of complexity is required for computational systems, for example....and a particular type of complexity is required for a 747.  You don't expect any equally complex sewing machine to begin boarding passengers and making trans-atlantic flights, I assume.   Similarly, I don't expect things to present themselves as candidates for mind due to their complexity alone, and conveniently, they don't.   Matter-mind is a fun word, but it excuses itself from offering any explanation of the phenomena, and is simply nowhere to be found in evidence.

I don't personally state that anything causes mind, I think that brain is mind, remember...but whats the point of this comment anyway?  

Do you think that these manifestations, as you've put it, would present themselves in a mind that didn't exist?  Clearly it's existence is significant.  But hey..if all that you find significant is perception of form and color..you don't even need a theory of mind for that.  You could simply take a look at how a camera works.  I doubt that will satisfy, but you're not asking a very difficult question if it's perception, rather than mind, that sets you to wondering.