If free will was not real

[The Grand Nudger]

Uh, no? It's useful as a discussion of free will, different descriptions or definitions of free will, and arguments in support of free will by those descriptions and definitions.

[Silver]

Uh, why not?

[The Grand Nudger]

I -just- told you why the thread isn't useless, according to me.  I'm really not sure how you arrived at that in the first place.

[Edwardo Piet]

He's jumping to conclusions. So I assume that means he has eaten 72 boiled eggs today.

[Gemini]

The reasons aren't duress if they don't originate from an agent. I think that's the key point in our difference. Yes, the constraints of physics determine my decisions. But since I myself am a physical process, constrained by natural law, I don't consider the constraints of physics to be duress. Only if they are imposed by some other agent would I consider that.

Dont they all...aren't you an agent?  Before it was duress, but now it's agency, and particularly external?  The goalposts are shifting...and still the question remains.  Are you -not- under duress from external "agents" every single day of your life?  What, exactly, are you making decisions -about-?

I'm under pressure from people, but the pressure (usually) falls short of duress. To refer to my conscious decision to, for instance, eat a slice of chocolate cake for breakfast as being made under "duress" simply because it was causally determined and not contra-causal is a category error. Duress applies to coercion or compulsion by threat or force from agents. Since I am identical to the brain processes that determined the decision, there is no imposition of force involved in my decision.

Lets come at it from another angle, again for you both.

Would it be fair to say that neither of you object to casually determistic this and thats as "free will".  As in, if the process were causally deterministic..you're both still comfortable calling it free-in-context?

Would it be fair to say that the local ownership of reasons, parameters, or decision-making criteria and condition are sufficient to consider it your "free" wills, regardless of where or what those things are..and just as above, whether or not they are products - themselves- of causally deterministic this and thats?

That's fair. "Free-in-context" is a good way of putting it.

I think what the debate boils down to is the proper referent of "free will." If it means "what we have that people with frontal lobe damage don't," then it's irrelevant whether or not it's deterministic. If the referent is "the experience of engaging my executive functions in decision making," then the metaphysics of causality is likewise irrelevant.

If free will is defined as, "I can create events that have no causal antecedents out of nothing by the metaphysical power of my spirit," then I'm not sure free will is well defined. What the hell does that even mean?

[Gemini]

It would probably be better to just repeat myself, since reason does not change.

Free will exists due to choice.  That cannot and never will change.

Choice is the very epitome of free will, for it allows a choice to be made.

If free will does not exist, as atheists claim, then one is clearly unable to make a choice.

Think of it this way. What you experience when you make a choice is the phenomology of decision making. In other words, it's the conscious experience of what it's like to make a decision.

Phenomenology and physical/metaphysical models are two completely different perspectives. I'm sure you'll agree that neuroscience explains a great deal about the brain, and this explains a great deal about our conscious experience. An example would be learning skills. According to neuroscience, when we practice solving math problems, we're forming new connections between neurons. As we establish these connections, we get better at math.

But we would never know this from the experience of solving math problems. The physical model that explains what's going on (connections between neurons) and the experience of solving a math problem are two different perspectives.

What I'm arguing is that "free will" is meaningful as a concept that refers to our experience of making decisions. Whether the physical/metaphysical model that explains our experience is deterministic or not is completely irrelevant to this concept (or should be, IMHO).

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm under pressure from people, but the pressure (usually) falls short of duress.

I think , again, it's a semantic switch rather than a meaningful distinction.  In any case, the most generous assessment of this is that you are discussing -degrees- of duress, compulsion, or coercion..rather than any absence thereof, making your criteria self defeating on it's own terms. You only call compulsion compulsion when it feels really strong...but a low simmer will evaporate water just as surely as a rolling boil will. The effect of a mountain of minor compulsions, perhaps unnoticed by you or unknown to you, will produce the same ultimate effect as a person holding a gun to your head - except that there's no need to go through the trouble to hold a gun to your head.

To refer to my conscious decision to, for instance, eat a slice of chocolate cake for breakfast as being made under "duress" simply because it was causally determined and not contra-causal is a category error. 

I'm referring more to your compulsion to eat chocolate when I say duress, just as a heroin addict is under duress regardless of whether or not any external force or agent is turning the screw.

Duress applies to coercion or compulsion by threat or force from agents. Since I am identical to the brain processes that determined the decision, there is no imposition of force involved in my decision.

Is there no coercion? Is the process itself, by which you make decisions - not coerced, constrained...and at times visciously so, even in the absence of any exterior agent - by that process itself? Is there -ever- a moment where exterior forces such as your environment -aren't- providing coercive input? The term "my will" covers the posession of your will, your ownership of it...that no one else "makes" you do something (by force, by compulsion, by coercion or duress). Why use the term free will for that if it's not meaningfully free, even if it is meaningfully -yours-? In the same vein, are the compulsions you may have - internally, not a legitimate force in context, leveraged in a great many cases against your own best interests. Is cake for breakfast such a wonderful idea?

Lets come at it from another angle, again for you both.

Would it be fair to say that neither of you object to casually determistic this and thats as "free will".  As in, if the process were causally deterministic..you're both still comfortable calling it free-in-context?

Would it be fair to say that the local ownership of reasons, parameters, or decision-making criteria and condition are sufficient to consider it your "free" wills, regardless of where or what those things are..and just as above, whether or not they are products - themselves- of causally deterministic this and thats?

That's fair. "Free-in-context" is a good way of putting it.

Excellent, so in what way, then..does a nest thermostat -not- have free-in-context will?  It;s a learning thermostat that requires no duress or coercion from an exterior agent in order to make selections as regards microclimates within a given structure. If free will is the ability to make a decision free of duress from external agents, then it trivially and absolutely has free will - because it does that. This is why I don't see much utility in the concept.  The free will of a nest thermostat -can't- be what we're hoping to establish or refer to when we discuss this, can it?

I think what the debate boils down to is the proper referent of "free will." If it means "what we have that people with frontal lobe damage don't," then it's irrelevant whether or not it's deterministic. If the referent is "the experience of engaging my executive functions in decision making," then the metaphysics of causality is likewise irrelevant.

Personally, I could never say that something being deterministic is irrelevant if we're going to call it free.  Nor could I ignore causality for that same reason in that same context.

If free will is defined as, "I can create events that have no causal antecedents out of nothing by the metaphysical power of my spirit," then I'm not sure free will is well defined. What the hell does that even mean?

Well, I don;t believe in spirits, but I do acknowledge the existence of a mind.  If the mind has, as an ability, the power to be the initiator of events which are not themselves programmed -into- it by..say, our biology and environment.  If our minds arent just elaborate computers....for example (wherein our decisions aren't the product of a biological algorithm), then I'd be willing to consider them as free in some meaningful context - magical spirit powers are a non-issue to me.  This is obviously what "free-will" is angling for...after all..we're searching for something here that matches our experience of being the initiator and even your invocation of possesion speaks to that. However, compatibalist free will ends up being the business of calling red green, rather than discovering or establishing that something -is- green, and ignoring all of the ways that it is red...even by the self serving criteria one uses to call it green. In your description, for example..it's not a free will, it's an owned will, a possessed will. That it (and the environment) are just as capable of doing all the things that you insist it be free from in the case of exterior agents makes the distinction you've made, imo, difficult to maintain.

Bob didn't make you do something, but your sugar junky brain -did-. Compulsion, coercion, duress....it applies to either case, and seeing as how your internal compulsions have, at their very heart, external value setting mechanisms (why do you like sugar so much?) then the difference is superficial and, imo, uninformative.

(Mind you, I don't doubt your ability to make decisions free of external bob, I just wonder how thoroughly you've considered the bob-of-mind. Your level of control over the process and decisions, assuming that you own them, that they're local rather than distributed.,...and -why- your internal decision-making parameters are whatever they are.)

[Gemini]

I'm under pressure from people, but the pressure (usually) falls short of duress.

I think , again, it's a semantic switch rather than a meaningful distinction.  

Pressure leans on factors that are already present in my decision making (such as the desire for social approval) while duress obliterates my autonomy with violent threats or actual violence. It's not just a pedantic distinction.

I'm referring more to your compulsion to eat chocolate when I say duress, just as a heroin addict is under duress regardless of whether or not any external force or agent is turning the screw.

I read an article that said eating chocolate cake for breakfast can help you lose weight, and decided to try it out. Having a "compulsion to eat chocolate" means something specific about my state of mind which is quite different than the decision I made; a compulsion would be more like an eating disorder.

Excellent, so in what way, then..does a nest thermostat -not- have free-in-context will?  It;s a learning thermostat that requires no duress or coercion from an exterior agent in order to make selections as regards microclimates within a given structure. This is why I don't see much utility in the concept.  

The concept compatibilists define as "free will" has plenty of utility, once you get all the philosophizing about causality out of the way. It's a particular cognitive process that humans with healthy frontal lobes engage in, which we experience as decision making. Which is why your reductio fails--nest thermostats don't have frontal lobes.

Well, I don;t believe in spirits, but I do acknowledge the existence of a mind.  If the mind has, as an ability, the power to be the initiator of events which are not themselves programmed -into- it by..say, our biology and environment.  If our minds arent just elaborate computers....for example, then I;d be willing to consider them as free in some meaningful context - magical spirit powers are a non-issue to me.  This is obviously what "free-will" is angling for...but compatibalist free will ends up being the business of calling red green, rather than discovering or establishing that something -is- green.  It;s a redifinition of a term in the face of evidence to the contrary, and dearth of evidence or explanation in support of...rather than the abandonment of a failed idea.  To me, that would be like deciding that zues really did exist, except that the term zues refers to a cumulonimbus cloud.  Well, I'll just keep calling it a cloud - just as i refer to my will.  There's no use for the prefix "free".  It describes nothing.

(Bold added)

You're defining via negative. Which leaves my question on the table. Is there a coherent definition of incompatibilist free will?

Bob didn't make you do something, but your sugar junky brain -did-. Compulsion, coercion, duress....it applies to either case, and seeing as how your internal compulsions have, at their very heart, external value setting mechanisms (why do you like sugar so much?) then the difference is superficial and, imo, uninformative.

My sugar junky brain didn't make me do something. My sugar junky brain (which is identical to me) did something.

You've got to agree there's a distinction between the two. It isn't relevant to the metaphysics of causality, but it's a distinction nonetheless. And it's not obvious to me why concerns over specious metaphysics should supersede a useful definition of an actual measurable cognitive process.

[The Grand Nudger]

Pressure leans on factors that are already present in my decision making (such as the desire for social approval) while duress obliterates my autonomy with violent threats or actual violence. It's not just a pedantic distinction.

It doesn't obliterate it.  You -could- tell the man holding a gun to your head, demanding your purse...to just go ahead and shoot you because you're not going to give it to him.  Or, in another context, you could tell the enemy joe on the other side that he;s going to have to gnaw his way through you with his teeth before you ever let him cross the line you've drawn in the sand.  Degrees of compulsion...and here an additional layer, their efficacy, not the presence or absence of it.  

I read an article that said eating chocolate cake for breakfast can help you lose weight, and decided to try it out. Having a "compulsion to eat chocolate" means something specific about my state of mind which is quite different than the decision I made; a compulsion would be more like an eating disorder.

Having a compulsion to eat chocolate, but more in context sugar..in the way I'm using it, is the demonstrable chemical seeking habit of your brain.  Sugar does something pleasurable to us and so we seek it out, it's not even a conscious thing.  It becomes a weighted value in our decision making that we do not, ourselves, decide to set.  

The concept compatibilists define as "free will" has plenty of utility, once you get all the philosophizing about causality out of the way. It's a particular cognitive process that humans with healthy frontal lobes engage in, which we experience as decision making. Which is why your reductio fails--nest thermostats don't have frontal lobes.

It also appears to be compatible with a nest thermostat having free will..since it satisfies your criteria.  They don;t -need- frontal lobes to satisfy your -previously stated- criteria..and why do you keep adding and modifying the criteria anyway?  

(Bold added)

You're defining via negative. Which leaves my question on the table. Is there a coherent definition of incompatibilist free will?

I'm not -defining- anything, only presenting one example in which it would not be free...to give you an idea of the criteria -I- would use.  As to your question..ish, I don't think there is if we limit ourselves to sound evidentiary propositions...which is why I just call it -my will-.  That doesn't mean there can't be, or that it's impossible.  There's no shortage of examples, in this world, of things which..as a system, have abilities or properties that none of their constituent parts have.  The brain is one such system...so it's at least -plausible- that even though it;s made of "deterministic stuff" and worlks in a "deterministic way" that it's product, and it's abilities...are themselves something other than deterministic.  In that sense there -could- be a coherent "incompatibilist free will"...but it's a bit of a misapplication of terms.  That, to me, would be a legitimate -compatibilist- free will...rather than a game of semantic hide and seek.

Metaphorically, the ghost in the machine.

My sugar junky brain didn't make me do something. My sugar junky brain (which is identical to me) did something.

For reasons it does not control, by parameters it did not set.  In this case, it's not only not free...you don't even have ownership.  It just happens "in you".  

You've got to agree there's a distinction between the two. It isn't relevant to the metaphysics of causality, but it's a distinction nonetheless. And it's not obvious to me why concerns over specious metaphysics should supersede a useful definition of an actual measurable cognitive process.

No, I don;t have to agree...because even whatever compulsion bob puts you through is...as you yourself noted above...going to manifest itself via the same internal processes.  Those internal processes are themselves, capable of coercing you and producing the same effect as bob can.  Bob could, in fact, coerce you in such a subtle way as you don't even notice - far in advance-, and the decision at the end of this process in the distant future would seem to be, and in many important ways -is- your own but entirely in accordance with the will of bob (that's how we train people to kill people). It's not a question of metaphysics...we're not having a metaphysical discussion, and I;m not presenting metaphysical objections......so?

[Gemini]

It doesn't obliterate it.  You -could- tell the man holding a gun to your head, demanding your purse...to just go ahead and shoot you because you're not going to give it to him.  Or, in another context, you could tell the enemy joe on the other side that he;s going to have to gnaw his way through you with his teeth before you ever let him cross the line you've drawn in the sand.  Degrees of compulsion...and here an additional layer, their efficacy, not the presence or absence of it.  

An autonomous decision is, by definition, uncoerced. It's just defined as a decision that a rational agent made in the absence of violent threats or actions from by another agent. My claim that these terms don't apply to causally determined neural processes is quite literally true.

Having a compulsion to eat chocolate, but more in context sugar..in the way I'm using it, is the demonstrable chemical seeking habit of your brain.  Sugar does something pleasurable to us and so we seek it out, it's not even a conscious thing.  It becomes a weighted value in our decision making that we do not, ourselves, decide to set.  

One thing we agree about is that properties of a system can differ from the properties of its components. Yes, the system that is our decision-making process is not the result of decisions that we made. But this is true whether you're a compatibilist or an incompatibilist.

It also appears to be compatible with a nest thermostat having free will..since it satisfies your criteria.  They don;t -need- frontal lobes to satisfy your -previously stated- criteria..and why do you keep adding and modifying the criteria anyway?  

Going back several pages, I defined free will as "the experience of making choices." Nest thermostats don't have that, either.

But I probably would have made my case better if I'd defined free will in terms of the frontal lobes (which is just the physical correlate of our experience of making decisions).

I'm not -defining- anything, only presenting one example in which it would not be free...to give you an idea of the criteria -I- would use.  As to your question..ish, I don't think there is if we limit ourselves to sound evidentiary propositions...which is why I just call it -my will-.  That doesn't mean there can't be, or that it's impossible.  There's no shortage of examples, in this world, of things which..as a system, have abilities or properties that none of their constituent parts have.  The brain is one such system...so it's at least -plausible- that even though it;s made of "deterministic stuff" and worlks in a "deterministic way" that it's product, and it's abilities...are themselves something other than deterministic.  In that sense there -could- be a coherent "incompatibilist free will"...but it's a bit of a misapplication of terms.  That, to me, would be a legitimate -compatibilist- free will...rather than a game of semantic hide and seek.

Metaphorically, the ghost in the machine.

High level indeterminacy? Even supposing that obtained, wouldn't that just introduce randomness into the process?

For reasons it does not control, by parameters it did not set.  In this case, it's not only not free...you don't even have ownership.  It just happens "in you".  

It doesn't happen in me. It is me.

No, I don;t have to agree...because even whatever compulsion bob puts you through is...as you yourself noted above...going to manifest itself via the same internal processes.  Those internal processes are themselves, capable of coercing you and producing the same effect as bob can.  Bob could, in fact, coerce you in such a subtle way as you don't even notice - far in advance-, and the decision at the end of this process in the distant future would seem to be, and in many important ways -is- your own but entirely in accordance with the will of bob (that's how we train people to kill people).  It's not a question of metaphysics...we're not having a metaphysical discussion, and I;m not presenting metaphysical objections......so?

Correct, you're not presenting metaphysical objections. I know you wouldn't go there! That's why I assumed at the outset that you were a determinist. I think your position is more interesting than the substance-dualists, I just don't think we have any physical evidence to support it, and I don't think we can extrapolate from our experience of making decisions to physical/metaphysical models that explain the experience.

Now as for Bob--Bob is an agent who is not me, whereas the internal processes that constitute my decision-making mechanisms are me. Which is why it's coercion in the former, and not in the latter.