If free will was not real

[The Grand Nudger]

An autonomous decision is, by definition, uncoerced.

Not in-context...and since you're merely attempting to establish free-in-contetext, rather than actually or meaningfully free..it's a dilemma that you've invited.

It's just defined as a decision that a rational agent made in the absence of violent threats or actions from by another agent. My claim that these terms don't apply to causally determined neural processes is quite literally true.

That's not -all- it's defined as, is it?  Come now, don't act like I'm crazy here.  

One thing we agree about is that properties of a system can differ from the properties of its components. Yes, the system that is our decision-making process is not the result of decisions that we made. But this is true whether you're a compatibilist or an incompatibilist.

-and cuts to the heart of the claim to ownership that you are -using- as a claim to freedom.  

Going back several pages, I defined free will as "the experience of making choices." Nest thermostats don't have that, either.

So you say, but by the criteria for free will that you've offered, they do.  Their decisions are made in the absence of duress, as you apply it, from exterior agents, as you apply it.  

But I probably would have made my case better if I'd defined free will in terms of the frontal lobes (which is just the physical correlate of our experience of making decisions).

Which wouldn't help, since I both know and can demonstrate my ability to make my will "your" will..despite the existence of your frontal lobe..and in fact -because- of it's existence....even in those extreme cases where my will, is that you kill someone for me.  

High level indeterminacy? Even supposing that obtained, wouldn't that just introduce randomness into the process?

In-determinate =/= random.  A conscious and self originating decision might be in-determinate, in context, but that in no way establishes that it is random.  

It doesn't happen in me. It is me.

Unfortunately for that proposition (which I agree with) what you are is in no way "free", so far as we can tell..regardless of whether or not it " is you".  

Correct, you're not presenting metaphysical objections. I know you wouldn't go there! That's why I assumed at the outset that you were a determinist. I think you're position is more interesting than the substance-dualists, I just don't think we have any physical evidence to support it, and I don't think we can extrapolate from our experience of making decisions to physical/metaphysical models that explain the experience.

We don't have any evidence to support it?  You mean, like the fact that all evidence we have points to hard determinism with no exceptions, anywhere, anytime we look at anything?  

Now as for Bob--Bob is an agent who is not me, whereas the internal processes that constitute my decision-making mechanisms are me. Which is why it's coercion in the former, and not in the latter.

I can only repeat that I consider this a semantic switch rather than a meaningful distinction.  If you don;t think that your biology is capable of coercing you...then I don;t think there's any way that you and I could ever approach any sort of agreement on this subject.  If you think that your ownership of that biology makes it "not coercion" again..the same comment applies.  Go talk to an addict, see how they feel about that.  Then, maybe, realize that you are also an addict (if "you" literally -are- your brain and it's processes, as we both agree that you are)...even if heroin isn't your drug of choice....and "you" prefer chocolate cake.

[Gemini]

Not in-context...and since you're merely attempting to establish free-in-contetext, rather than actually or meaningfully free..it's a dilemma that you've invited.

But that is the context of compatibilist free will. The social and legal context of autonomy.

That's not -all- it's defined as, is it?  Come now, don't act like I'm crazy here.  

You're not crazy, just not pedantic enough  

-and cuts to the heart of the claim to ownership that you are -using- as a claim to freedom.  

It's a claim to identity, not ownership.

So you say, but by the criteria for free will that you've offered, they do.  Their decisions are made in the absence of duress, as you apply it, from exterior agents, as you apply it.  

Again with the not being sufficiently pedantic. If you define all causal processes as "decisions" then we need a new word to describe what homo sapiens do with their frontal lobes.

Which wouldn't help, since I both know and can demonstrate my ability to make my will "your" will..despite the existence of your frontal lobe..and in fact -because- of it's existence....even in those extreme cases where my will, is that you kill someone for me.   

Just an FYI--I would make a pretty terrible assassin.

In-determinate =/= random.  A conscious and self originating decision would be in-determinate, in context, but in no way random.  

You're talking about an entirely new category of causal processes for physics. Some explanation of how a self-originating decision works would be much appreciated.

We don't have any evidence to support it?  You mean, like the fact that all evidence we have points to hard determinism with no exceptions, anywhere, anytime we look at anything?  

So are you a determinist or what? What I meant was there is no evidence to support incompatibilist free will. Like you said, everything points to hard determinism.

I can only repeat that I consider this a semantic switch rather than a meaningful distinction.  If you don;t think that your biology is capable of coercing you...then I don;t think there's any way that you and I could ever approach any sort of agreement on this subject.  If you think that your ownership of that biology makes it "not coercion" again..the same comment applies.  Go talk to an addict, see how they feel about that.  Then, maybe, realize that you are also an addict (if "you" literally -are- your brain and it's processes, as we both agree that you are)...even if heroin isn't your drug of choice....and "you" prefer chocolate cake.

My biology can't coerce me because my biology literally is me!

[The Grand Nudger]

But that is the context of compatibilist free will. The social and legal context of autonomy.

Don;t even get me started on those..because a: they;ll inevitably be appeals to consequences...and B: literally nothing will or needs be changed in those areas to incorporate a different understanding of will.  

You're not crazy, just not pedantic enough  

It's a claim to identity, not ownership.

Yet another semantic switch.  Your identity is simply that collection of attributes you own.  

Again with the not being sufficiently pedantic. If you define all causal processes as "decisions" then we need a new word to describe what homo sapiens do with their frontal lobes.

I'd contend that we don't..that what human beings do with their frontal lobes is not qualitatively different than what a nest thermostat does with it's kogge/stone cpu.  Thing is...I -can;t be pedantic, because we aren't even discussing -pedantic- freedom, are we?  

Just an FYI--I would make a pretty terrible assassin.

That's just what -you- think.  Give me 14 weeks and you'll be screaming that blood makes the grass grow at the top of your lungs are really -feeling- it. I;d take you into a firefight if you put in the effort, I believe in you .

You're talking about an entirely new category of causal processes for physics. Some explanation of how a self-originating decision works would be much appreciated.

It's not my proposition or position to explain..I'm merely allowing for the possibility as nothing rules it out...and commenting that something like it, would..to me,...be an -actual- rather than semantic, compatibilist free will.  

So are you a determinist or what? What I meant was there is no evidence to support incompatibilist free will. Like you said, everything points to hard determinism.

It does, but I understand the nature of those inferences.  They're inductive, not deductive...and so they are only provisionally likely, rather than demonstrably true.  If you asked me whether or not we are hard determinist minds I;d tell you that we have good reason to think we are, and no reason to propose the contrapositive...but that it remains, at least, a plausibility.  

My biology can't coerce me because my biology literally is me!

That's not our understanding of biology (or brain chemistry) -at all-.  It appears to be -very- coercive...such that you can make a man march - even when you aren't present or actively doing anything to that man- when he does not wish to without any specialized tools or even a working knowledge of human nuerology or psychology. Again, this is ownership or local regionality, not the presence or lack of coercion....and those things in your mind may not be specific and owner determinant in the way that you need them to be to make even -that- stick. You like sugar for the same reasons that I do..which has nothing to do with either of us specifically...but is nonetheless capable of compelling us both equally and predictably.

As I've been saying for a while.....even with my objections...you have a will, it's your own will. I'm not disputing that. I'm not even asking about that. I'm asking whether or not the will you have, that you own, that -is- you...is "free". If it;s just free of external duress from external agents (except when it isn't) then that, to my mind, is nothing more than a triviality.

[Gemini]

Don;t even get me started on those..because a: they;ll inevitably be appeals to consequences...and B: literally nothing will or needs be changed in those areas to incorporate a different understanding of will.  

(A) is my number one criticism of Daniel Dennett. Fully on board with you there. (B) sounds awfully close to a concession that the compatibilist position is correct.

Yet another semantic switch.  Your identity is simply that collection of attributes you own.  

This is equivalent to saying "My identity is simply that collection of attributes my collection of attributes owns." Once you being applying the concept of ownership to "A owns A," self-ownership, I think you've lost what makes the concept of ownership meaningful.

I'd contend that we don't..that what human beings do with their frontal lobes is not qualitatively different than what a nest thermostat does with it's kogge/stone cpu.  Thing is...I -can;t be pedantic, because we aren't even discussing -pedantic- freedom, are we?  

Representing information, having experiences, previsioning courses of action...how are these processes not qualitatively different from what a nest thermostat does?

That's just what -you- think.  Give me 14 weeks and you'll be screaming that blood makes the grass grow at the top of your lungs are really -feeling- it.  I;d take you into a firefight if you put in the effort, I believe in you .

You know what, you're a scary guy. (In a good way )

It does, but I understand the nature of those inferences.  They're inductive, not deductive...and so they are only provisionally likely, rather than demonstrably true.  If you asked me whether or not we are hard determinist minds I;d tell you that we have good reason to think we are, and no reason to propose the contrapositive...but that it remains, at least, a plausibility.  

Point conceded. I think it would be cool if it were true, in fact.

That's not our understanding of biology (or brain chemistry) -at all-.  It appears to be -very- coercive...such that you can make a man march - even when you aren't present or actively doing anything to that man- when he does not wish to without any specialized tools or even a working knowledge of human nuerology or psychology.  Again, this is ownership or local regionality, not the presence or lack of coercion....and those things in your mind may not be specific and owner determinant in the way that you need them to be to make even -that- stick.  You like sugar for the same reasons that I do..which has nothing to do with either of us specifically...but is nonetheless capable of compelling us both equally and predictably.

As I've been saying for a while.....even with my objections...you have a will, it's your own will.  I'm not disputing that.  I'm not even asking about that.  I'm asking whether or not the will you have, that you own, that -is- you...is "free".  If it;s just free of external duress from external agents (except when it isn't) then that, to my mind, is nothing more than a triviality.

What we're talking about is the cognitive capability that we have that people with frontal lobe damage don't. People with significant damage to both frontal lobes will do things like steal a car...and just drive it till it runs out of gas. Steal stuff they don't even want, just because they see it there...and then give it away. See a second story window open...and jump out. Environmental stimuli use them. They have no ability to resist acting on impulses.

I agree with you that we would be more free if some kind of incompatibilist free will turned out to be true, but in the meantime, what we have is far more than a triviality.

[The Grand Nudger]

(A) is my number one criticism of Daniel Dennett. Fully on board with you there. (B) sounds awfully close to a concession that the compatibilist position is correct.

B is not even remotely a concession that the compatibilist position is correct, but an acknowledgement that it -need not be- and still..precious little would need to be changed.  For example....if we don't have free will...we'd still (justifiably) put people in prisons, for the same reasons, to the same effect, and we don't even have to change the signs on the buildings.  We couldn't maintain moral desert, true, but it's irrelevant to the issue of incarceration - just as one example.    

This is equivalent to saying "My identity is simply that collection of attributes my collection of attributes owns." Once you being applying the concept of ownership to "A owns A," self-ownership, I think you've lost what makes the concept of ownership meaningful.

If the concept of ownership is not meaningful, simply for what it is..then how could it be meaningful in any more elaborate context - like the ownership of will, or possession of a free will?  How can you possibly maintain your argument for freedom-come-ownership if the meaningfulness of ownership is so fragile and tenuous in the first place?

Representing information, having experiences, previsioning courses of action...how are these processes not qualitatively different from what a nest thermostat does?

Because it -does- those things, by any sense of the words that aren;t completely self serving and question begging....and again..look at how elaborate your criteria have become when the previous criteria turn out to allow for a free will of a thermostat.  Perhaps this was my intention all along.  Is it me coercing you..putting you under duress, here, or your own mind?   

You know what, you're a scary guy. (In a good way )

In the way that only a smiling, goofy clown of a family man can be.  There are people out there in the world who think they're really scary, really intimidating......and then I opine on the value of their annihilation for the mere -convenience- it might bring to my children, in a -totally- wholesome and completely serious way.  

Point conceded. I think it would be cool if it were true, in fact.

I think it would be cool as shit too.  People shouldn't take my sustained resistance to the idea to mean that I'm not rooting for it. In my own way, I like to think that I help incubate it.  I'm trying to help us describe it in an airtight way, if/when we discover it.

What we're talking about is the cognitive capability that we have that people with frontal lobe damage don't. People with significant damage to both frontal lobes will do things like steal a car...and just drive it till it runs out of gas. Steal stuff they don't even want, just because they see it there...and then give it away. See a second story window open...and jump out. Environmental stimuli use them. They have no ability to resist acting on impulses.

I agree with you that we would be more free if some kind of incompatibilist free will turned out to be true, but in the meantime, what we have is far more than a triviality.

Again I'll point out that nowhere, before, was this lobe business present...but I can run with it anyway.  Ever hear about "the man with no brain" - apparently you don't actually need a frontal lobe, or at least a fully (or commensurately) present and similarly organized frontal lobe, to present the behaviors you consider to be indicative of free will.  That and, ofc...we could only be talking about a -human- will if we reference human biology...whether or not it's free is another question.

What we -have- is far more than a triviality...but is it free in a non-trivial sense? Just to resurect an example I led with...if we will, with our own wills...to commit a crime...we need to be isolatyed from the gp. If we -freely- will, to commit a crime..we need to be isolated from the gp. Regardless of whether or not someone else compelled us to commit said crime..we need to be isolated from the GP. If we did so of our own accord, it;s no more or less neceesarry to isolate us from the gp than it would be if we hadn't. Bob made you do it, your biology made you do it...it just doesn't matter...and is completely trivial by reference to that example...in addition to being no different, qualititively..as an effect of the same internal processes either way. Bob gives you input, you act on that input or don't. The extent to wich the input bob gives you is compelling is something you cannot fight against -internally-...and bobs input positively relies on your internal processes despite it's point of origin. Ultimately, you compell -yourself- based upon his input. It's not direct, and the extent to which you find -anything- compelling is not a metric which you have personally set or can claim robust ownership of.

If this is freedom, it's not qualitatively different from non-freedom...and so I just dispense with the term "free" that's causing all the issues...because even without it..we're obviously still describing the same thing. There's no need to use it, it adds nothing, and it makes no distinctions, which are not.....on their very face, superficial and non-distinct. The same thing is understood to be happening, at a fundamental level, whether bob pushes the needle on you, or whether you willingly push it into yourself. Either way you did it., you own those actions and those decisions - regardless of whether or not any freedom is involved in either.

[Gemini]

B is not even remotely a concession that the compatibilist position is correct, but an acknowledgement that it -need not be- and still..precious little would need to be changed.  For example....if we don't have free will...we'd still (justifiably) put people in prisons, for the same reasons, to the same effect, and we don't even have to change the signs on the buildings.  We couldn't maintain moral desert, true, but it's irrelevant to the issue of incarceration - just as one example.    

I wouldn't agree that you can maintain moral desert even if incompatibilist free will did exist.  Whether a person used their contra-causal free will to cause harm or was causally determined to cause the harm is irrelevant. Separate them from the gp as long as they pose a threat, but don't inflict pain on someone who poses no threat to anyone, simply to satisfy one's own need for revenge.

If the concept of ownership is not meaningful, simply for what it is..then how could it be meaningful in any more elaborate context - like the ownership of will, or possession of a free will?  How can you possibly maintain your argument for freedom-come-ownership if the meaningfulness of ownership is so fragile and tenuous in the first place?

I think the argument for "freedom-come-ownership" is more your interpretation of my argument than my actual argument. My argument is "freedom-come-identitity." I.e., I am identical to the processes that determine my decision, so they are not imposed by an external source, and hence free.

Because it -does- those things, by any sense of the words that aren;t completely self serving and question begging....and again..look at how elaborate your criteria have become when the previous criteria turn out to allow for a free will of a thermostat.  Perhaps this was my intention all along.  Is it me coercing you..putting you under duress, here, or your own mind?   

Explain how a nest thermostat previsions courses of action.

In the way that only a smiling, goofy clown of a family man can be.  There are people out there in the world who think they're really scary, really intimidating......and then I opine on the value of their annihilation for the mere -convenience- it might bring to my children, in a -totally- wholesome and completely serious way.  

To someone who stands in the way of intelligence, intelligence is more frightening than malice. Or should be.

Again I'll point out that nowhere, before, was this lobe business present...but I can run with it anyway.  Ever hear about "the man with no brain" - apparently you don't actually need a frontal lobe, or at least a fully (or commensurately) present and similarly organized frontal lobe, to present the behaviors you consider to be indicative of free will.  That and, ofc...we could only be talking about a -human- will if we reference human biology...whether or not it's free is another question.  

What we -have- is far more than a triviality...but is it free in a non-trivial sense?  Just to resurect an example I led with...if we will, with our own wills...to commit a crime...we need to be isolatyed from the gp.  If we -freely- will, to commit a crime..we need to be isolated from the gp.  Regardless of whether or not someone else compelled us to commit said crime..we need to be isolated from the GP.  If we did so of our own accord, it;s no more or less neceesarry to isolate us from the gp than it would be if we hadn't.  Bob made you do it, your biology made you do it...it just doesn't matter...and is completely trivial by reference to that example...in addition to being no different, qualititively..as an effect of the same internal processes either way.  Bob gives you input, you act on that input or don't.  The extent to wich the input bob gives you is compelling is something you cannot fight against -internally-...and bobs input positively relies on your internal processes despite it's point of origin.  Ultimately, you compell -yourself- based upon his input.  It's not direct, and the extent to which you find -anything- compelling is not a metric which you have personally set or can claim robust ownership of.

The man with no brain was an anomaly. Most people with severe frontal lobe damage will manifest symptoms consistent with what I described.

I agree you can isolate people from the gp without imposing moral desert on them. For example, if we diagnose a kid as a sociopath, we can isolate him from the gp simply based on that.

To say that a decision is made by neurally healthy agent free from duress by other agents is to say that the decision is free in a non-trivial sense. Not in the ultimate sense that incompatibilists want, sure, but non-trivial all the same.

If this is freedom, it's not qualitatively different from non-freedom...and so I just dispense with the term "free" that's causing all the issues...because even without it..we're obviously still describing the same thing. There's no need to use it, it adds nothing, and it makes no distinctions, which are not.....on their very face, superficial and non-distinct. The same thing is understood to be happening, at a fundamental level, whether bob pushes the needle on you, or whether you willingly push it into yourself. Either way you did it., you own those actions and those decisions - regardless of whether or not any freedom is involved in either.

I think you're too hung up on the physical model of our decision making. Yes, that's not free. "Free" refers to an experience of making a decision while not under duress, whose neural correlate is the frontal lobes. That's a real referent which justifies the use of the term.

[The Grand Nudger]

I wouldn't agree that you can maintain moral desert even if incompatibilist free will did exist.  Whether a person used their contra-causal free will to cause harm or was causally determined to cause the harm is irrelevant. Separate them from the gp as long as they pose a threat, but don't inflict pain on someone who poses no threat to anyone, simply to satisfy one's own need for revenge.

Well...the only comment I made about moral desert is how it -couldn't- be maintained...so I don't know who you're disagreeing with, here.  

I think the argument for "freedom-come-ownership" is more your interpretation of my argument than my actual argument. My argument is "freedom-come-identitity." I.e., I am identical to the processes that determine my decision, so they are not imposed by an external source, and hence free.

It's not, it just sounds shitty when I phrase it that way, and so you don't like it.  

Explain how a nest thermostat previsions courses of action.

Explain how you do..or it's an empty objection/question.

To someone who stands in the way of intelligence, intelligence is more frightening than malice. Or should be.

I think that the two, together, are the perfect human combo.  A malicious intelligence......wewt!  

The man with no brain was an anomaly. Most people with severe frontal lobe damage will manifest symptoms consistent with what I described.

That's true, but his mere existence makes the whole "frontal lobe" business moot point (in addition to being a shifting of goal posts) even if he's the only example.  Obviously...it isn't necessary.

I agree you can isolate people from the gp without imposing moral desert on them. For example, if we diagnose a kid as a sociopath, we can isolate him from the gp simply based on that.

To say that a decision is made by neurally healthy agent free from duress by other agents is to say that the decision is free in a non-trivial sense. Not in the ultimate sense that incompatibilists want, sure, but non-trivial all the same.

I don't say that, though..because I can't identify any instance n which someone is free from the duress of external agents.  I can see times when they are under -less-..or more duress.....but meh.  You;re taking issue to the term trivial as though I were calling our -will- trivial..rather than your description of it as free trivial.

I think you're too hung up on the physical model of our decision making. Yes, that's not free. "Free" refers to an experience of making a decision while not under duress, whose neural correlate is the frontal lobes. That's a real referent which justifies the use of the term.

Except that you can;t justify even -that- use of the term, thusfar...you can only play with the idea if we count the hits and ignore the misses...if we draw arbitrary lines...and we;re now talking about frontal lobes..so agian...not a free wil...just a "human will". Ofc it's a "real referant"...but is it an accurate one..is the human will, your will, that comes from your frontal lobes........ free?

[bennyboy]

Free will is the capacity to express oneself in a given situation, Rhythm. The self includes brain, body, senses, memories, all of that. So unless you demand that the self must be able to free itself FROM itself, then what's left? The ability of the agent to interact according to its own nature in any given situation is the only sensible definition of free will. What that nature is composed of is irrelevant.

Again, if you want to argue against free will, you have to argue against the entire concept of agency. Are you willing to do that?

[Edwardo Piet]

Phenomenology[...]

Rawr! I love it when you go all phenomenological on me

[Edwardo Piet]

I consider that free will is either trivially true (compatabilist free will) or completely false to point of logical incoherence (contra-causal/libertarian/incompatabilist free will). Unfortunately many people do believe in the logically incoherent incompatabilist version of free will and even when compatablists explain that their version of free will works just the same in a completely deterministic universe: laypeople quickly go back to behaving as if people can do otherwise in the silly contra-causal magical-like sense as if they didn't learn a thing from the exchange. Whereas rejecting all forms of free will altogether seems to genuinely impact there life -- the only danger is that they will take that too far and slip into fatalism: But that is something that can be more easily cleared up and a distinction that can be easily been drawn and fully explicated -- unless they're completely fucking stupid as fuck (and unfortunately a lot of people are): but if that's the case it's pointless discussing philosophy with them anyway.

So I believe compatabilist free will is trivally true but I am no compatabilist.

No kudos required, I'd happily kudos myself for this one... this post was too pontificantingly pretentiously verbosely pedantically awesome to be arrogant

I've discussed this subject so many times over the years I know it to death. Most of the time I can't be arsed to say anything other than "Compatabilism is trivally true and labelling "will" as "free will" whereas contra-causal free will is a bunch of silly magic most people believe in" or something to that effect.