Explicit vs Implicit Knowledge

[LivingNumbers6.626]

So as I was doing my justice and wasting part of my day on YouTube, I came across a video on philosophy outlining Explicit and Implicit Knowledge. 

This struck a note with me as in the past I believe I had relied predominantly on implicit knowledge while being deeply religious. Now since, by definition, implicit knowledge is inherently inconclusive and is easily deconstructed (i.e. faith, God, supernaturalism) why is it that it is so highly regarded in the religious realm? Now, agreeably, though the topic of "faith" has no sustenance I will concede that the implicit knowledge on faith, as a religious person, comes also with certain favorable assumptions such as "God will help me," "God cares," or "if I just pray harder then I'll feel better." Now these are favorable in that for some people people it certainly works to overcome whatever life obstacle or to deter a certain level of stress. So, admittedly, I'm quite happy for them. 

But for myself...it is not satisfiable nor sufficiently suitable to curve my craving for the truth because it can distract from real solutions and only leave room for band aid remedies. I.E. If I suffer from depression or anxiety then it would be a considerable waste of time to lean on the implicit knowledge of faith which implies "God will save me" rather than take a naturalistic approach, through explicit reasoning, that prescribes the understanding of psychiatry and psychology to diagnose a more rationally savvy explanation, not to exclude a more plausible remedy for a lasting recovery. 

Anyways, that's my two cents on that. Am I applying these two terms correctly? I'm not exactly a philosophy buff, though I appreciate it.

-LN6.626

[robvalue]

I've not heard of these terms, but I understand what you mean.

They have to value that kind of knowledge highly because it's all they've got. Religions have no bearing on reality, so demonstrable knowledge is impossible. They are taught the value of this type of knowledge... for the same reason.

This kind of thinking is reinforced by the placebo effect and confirmation bias. Those two are so powerful, they can fool people their whole lives if they never stop to properly question them.

[Edwardo Piet]

Never heard of it. Sounds to me like implicit knowledge isn't actually knowledge.

I know about analytic and synthetic truths, inductive and deductive reasoning, epistemological and ontological objectivity, empirical and rational knowledge, knowledge in principle and knowledge in practice, but I don't know about "explicit" and "implicit" knowledge.

Thing is, if supernatural "Knowledge" is said to be implicit knowledge, that isn't actually knowledge. One thing all theories of knowledge have in common is knowledge implies truth. If something isn't true you can't know it.

Two most basic things knowledge is made of is truth and belief. But beyond that you have to have a justification. So knowledge is at least "justified true belief".

But that's not enough. Because of the Gettier problem:

Edmund Gettier is best known for a short paper entitled 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' published in 1963, which called into question the theory of knowledge that had been dominant among philosophers for thousands of years. In a few pages, Gettier argued that there are situations in which one's belief may be justified and true, yet fail to count as knowledge. That is, Gettier contended that while justified belief in a true proposition is necessary for that proposition to be known, it is not sufficient. As in the diagram, a true proposition can be believed by an individual (purple region) but still not fall within the "knowledge" category (yellow region).

According to Gettier, there are certain circumstances in which one does not have knowledge, even when all of the above conditions are met. Gettier proposed two thought experiments, which have come to be known as "Gettier cases," as counterexamples to the classical account of knowledge. One of the cases involves two men, Smith and Jones, who are awaiting the results of their applications for the same job. Each man has ten coins in his pocket. Smith has excellent reasons to believe that Jones will get the job and, furthermore, knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket (he recently counted them). From this Smith infers, "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket." However, Smith is unaware that he also has ten coins in his own pocket. Furthermore, Smith, not Jones, is going to get the job. While Smith has strong evidence to believe that Jones will get the job, he is wrong. Smith has a justified true belief that a man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job; however, according to Gettier, Smith does not know that a man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job, because Smith's belief is "...true by virtue of the number of coins in Jones's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief...on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job." (see p. 122.) These cases fail to be knowledge because the subject's belief is justified, but only happens to be true by virtue of luck. In other words, he made the correct choice (in this case predicting an outcome) for the wrong reasons. This example is similar to those often given when discussing belief and truth, wherein a person's belief of what will happen can coincidentally be correct without his or her having the actual knowledge to base it on.

[Edwardo Piet]

[robvalue]

Personally, my confidence that my beliefs are true is generally equal to the confidence I have that I can demonstrate them to be true to another reasonable person.

[Edwardo Piet]

Yup. Justification is paramount.

In many of Plato's dialogues, such as the Meno and, in particular, the Theaetetus, Socrates considers a number of theories as to what knowledge is, the last being that knowledge is true belief that has been "given an account of" (meaning explained or defined in some way). According to the theory that knowledge is justified true belief, in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but one must also have a good reason for doing so. One implication of this would be that no one would gain knowledge just by believing something that happened to be true. For example, an ill person with no medical training, but with a generally optimistic attitude, might believe that he will recover from his illness quickly. Nevertheless, even if this belief turned out to be true, the patient would not have known that he would get well since his belief lacked justification.

[robvalue]

It depends how much you care about your beliefs being true, ultimately. Some people don't seem to care at all, at least where certain subjects are concerned.

[bennyboy]

Ummmm. . . link the video?

Also. . . there's no explicit knowledge which isn't rooted in implicit "knowledge." For example, I know that the things I touch and interact with are real, and this in a sense is an act of faith.

[Edwardo Piet]

It depends how much you care about your beliefs being true, ultimately. Some people don't seem to care at all, at least where certain subjects are concerned.

"Is it fish?"

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Yes, fish is a subject.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yY90pkTm4M

[robvalue]

Ummmm. . . link the video?

Also. . . there's no explicit knowledge which isn't rooted in implicit "knowledge."  For example, I know that the things I touch and interact with are real, and this in a sense is an act of faith.

Sure, we make a fundamental assumption that what we think is real is actually real.

It's not strictly necessary to do so, though. It's "real" in as much as it is part of the reality we are experiencing. Whether that reality ultimately correlates to anything else or not is only of philosophical importance. From a pragmatic point of view, it makes no difference.