On the consistent use of "objective" and "subjective"

[Edwardo Piet]

I've seen these terms (objective and subjective) thrown around in many different ways. I am surprised when the two terms are placed in opposition. So I thought we could discuss a possible common understanding moving forward.

They can be opposed but not necessarily. There are two kinds of objectivity/subjectivity: Ontological and epistemological. Ontological subjectivity and objectivity are not in conflict. Subjects are also objects. Epistemological subjectivity and objectivity however are in conflict: biased and unbiased are exact opposites.

Objectivity is an attempt to speak about objects without the "bias" "fallibility" or "individuality" of subjective human experience, even while being based upon the subjective experience of humanity itself.

The objectivity you're talking about now is epistemological objectivity. You're talking about being unbiased, scientific. That's about knowledge and epistemology but you started by talking about objectivity like the existence of objects.

Objects act on subjects causing experiences in the subject.

Any experience in a subject IS a subjective reality.

Subjective and objective reality is all part of one ontologically objective reality. Subjectivity is a subset of it. Some objects are also subjects but all subjects are objects. It's not a separate reality, it's another aspect to reality. All reality is ultimately objective whether some of the objects within it are subjects that contain subjectivity or not. Existence is necessarily ontological and ontology is necessarily objective in the ontological sense.

There is no reason to posit that objects cause experiences. Some objects have experiences because some objects are subjects.

Subjectivity and experiences can simply be other objects themselves that are connected to objects without experiences. It's all one objective world full of objects an some of those objects are also subjects. No need to posit an objective world that causes a subjective world.

To speak about "subjective reality" means that the subjective experience about which we speak is real.


To speak about "objective reality" means that the object about which we speak is real.

We can't speak about "objects" besides our own subjective phenomenology. Besides our own subjectivity. This is fine because our subjective phenomenology is merely ontologically subjective and also ultimately an object like any other. We can never know any objects outside of our own phenomenology, we can never know any noumena or thing-in-itself, we can only know phenomena. This is absolutely fine because just because our own subjectivity is ontologically subjective it in no way makes it epistemologically subjective. In fact because we all live in our own subjective phenomenology you may note that the entirety of the way science works is by being epistemologically objective by focusing entirely on phenomenological experience... the scientific method doesn't posit that all swans are white, it assumes nothing about the nature of any platonic forums or any real thing-in-itself, it simply works to falsify any phenomenological hypotheses postulated. Science recognizes nowadays that it can't work to find the thing-in-itself, science studies phenomena, not noumena.

Subjects may also act on objects eliciting new acts from the object, and therefore new experiences in the subject.

Remember subjects are just another kind of object with subjectivity.

e.g. To say "an objective morality exists" is to say that there is one real object which causes the varied and subjective human experience of morality.

Now you're talking about ontological objectivity again. You're talking about the "existence" of moral values as objects. This is bullshit. Whether such objects exist or not as noumena or a thing-in-itself it is unreachable.

To say "there is not 'true' or 'superior' morality" is to say either that many objects cause different subjective human experience, or that the subjective human experience of morality (whatever causes it) is itself the object of morality.

You're only rattling on about unknowable objective values existing as objects in the fundamentally unreachable non-subjective non-phenomenal aspect of reality. Moral ontology is absolutely meaningless.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Thank you, Ignorant for an interesting topic that has nothing to do with Trump. Now on with the show…

Personally, I think you’re investing too much in definitions. The first question is whether the veracity of a proposition about any given state of affairs does or does not depend upon knowledge of that state of affairs. If I say the ice cream is cold, my knowledge of its temperature does not affect whether that proposition is true or false (a fact). If I say that I enjoy eating ice cream, the truth or falsity of that proposition depends on knowledge to which I have privileged access (an opinion). Likewise if I say that an arch transfers a uniformly distributed load to two point loads that is true regardless of what I think, as opposed to when I say that a particular kind of arch is more pleasing to the eye.

The second question is whether any given proposition describes something independent of knowledge (an object) or describes the state of the knower (subjective). So in the previous example, a pint of ice cream can exist even if I don’t know about it. But what is the ontological status of an arch? Is an arch just a personal/cultural description of an accidental arrangement of stones or does the form and function of that arrangement confer something essential that makes it a kind of object (I think it does)?

My major question has to do with the role of the subconscious in all this. Many times theists will throw around the word subjective to imply mere changeable whim. But the evolved structures of our mind are not changeable by whim

I don’t think conscious volition plays any role in determining whether something is objective/subjective or fact/opinion.

[Edwardo Piet]

Exactly. Epistemological objectivity =/= ontological objectivity