Do you believe in free will?

[Angrboda]

@Whateverist

A book I just read (The Belief Instinct, Jesse Bering) suggests that having a theory of mind — a theory of other minds — pops into existence around 5-7 years old (the "Princess Alice" experiments, IIRC).

Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do.

Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance, p. 17


It's been far too long since I read the Intentional Stance to comment further, but I had an interesting conjecture last year which I offer without even pretense that there is any evidence for it; it's simply food for thought. There is a theory, Simulation Theory, that suggests that we reason about other people's mental states by running the scenario on our own hardware and seeing how we would respond.

The simulation (or, “mental simulation”) theory (ST) is a theory of everyday human psychological competence: that is, of the skills and resources people routinely call on in the anticipation, explanation, and social coordination of behavior. ST holds that we represent the mental states and processes of others by mentally simulating them, or generating similar states and processes in ourselves: thus, for example, anticipating another's solution to a theoretical or practical problem by solving the problem ourselves (with adjustments for evident disparities, e.g., in skill level). The basic idea is that if the resources our own brain uses to guide our own behavior can be modified to work as representations of other people, then we have no need to store general information about what makes people tick: We just do the ticking for them. Simulation is thus said to be process-driven rather than theory-driven (Goldman 1989).

This idea resonates with me because I can't help but suspect that in activities such as visualizing things in our head, we are in effect "highjacking the normal visual hardware" of the brain to create imaginary stimulus; likely the same with both sound and language. There are theories of dreaming, which I won't advocate, but which suggest that dreaming is a result of neuronal activity in the brain stem during sleep triggering activity in higher cortical centers such as the visual cortex. (Are the thoughts in our heads thought in language, or is linguistic thought just a value added extra. I frequently bring up the question of whether people without language — deaf, dumb, blind, whatever — are likely to experience their consciousness as fundamentally different than our own. Anyway, still not my goal; moving on.)

This is the conjecture. It occurred to me that perhaps we have the telescope the wrong way round. How important is it for an animal to have a theory of itself? My thought was that perhaps the cognitive framework in which intentionality and will arose was first applicable, not to the self, but to the other. Take the evolution of say, fish. If we're a fish looking for a smaller fish to eat, we don't require predictive abilities about our own behavior. But if we want to eat, we need to be able to make predictive guesses about what an unpredictable system — the other fish — might do. For that, we need a cognitive framework where our lack of information is a part of the framework — suggesting the fish may do anything, because our information about it isn't sufficiently rich to do otherwise. Wayne Gretzky said, "A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be." A great predator plays where the fish will be, just as a good fighter pilot shoots where his target will be.

Is it possible that the Intentional Stance (of the other) preceded applying that idea to the self? Anyway. No evidence whatsoever, just an interesting thought.

I'll leave you with a couple examples from the animal world which should give us pause about our special place at the top of the cognitive tree (joking).

They tested an elephant for awareness of self. They painted a white cross on her forehead, and let her loose in a pen which contained a mirror at her head height. When she saw her reflection in the mirror, she repeatedly tried to rub the white mark off her forehead (not the reflection).

Crows are a very intelligent species, IIRC, rivaling chimps in some respects. Crows engage in what is known as caching, in which they hide food so that they can eat it later. However, their caching behavior often includes "pretending to cache food" when they in fact cache it elsewhere. Now, this behavior certainly can evolve without any deliberate conscious intent regarding the mental abilities of other crows, but there are a couple points here worth remarking. First, given the intelligence of crows, it's not far-fetched that they might be reasoning intentionally. But more important, how do we divine a line between cognitive behaviors that are teleological because of our ability to think about ends, from those behaviors that, like the crows, may have evolved as a consequence of the stochastic effects of pseudo-teleological behavior on our ability to survive, prosper and breed?

And finally, there is the example of bottlenose dolphins (I may have the species wrong). There was a pair of dolphins who were trained to perform certain tricks when they were flashed certain visual symbols. One of the symbols was the command to "invent a trick" or improvise. They tested two of the dolphins together, and flashed them the symbol for them to wing it. Both dolphins submergeed momentarily, and then emerged and both did the same trick in synchronization. The level of cognitive development necessary to communicate and plan as they did must surely be considered in the ballpark of our own.

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ETA: There are studies that seem to indicate that neurological events which signal, say, the movement of a finger precede our conscious intent and awareness of intending to move the finger. (Approx. 150-300 millliseconds, IIRC.) Some aspects are controversial, but it dovetails with another contemporary theory, that of the adaptive unconscious (see Wikipedia). This idea is that our decisions occur below the level of consciousness, and that consciousness simply acts as a reporter, confabulating an explanation for the event it didn't originate. (I suggest looking into the term the adaptive unconscious, confabulation, and Sperry and Gazzaniga's work on split-brain subjects. No time to trace down references, but Jon Haidt's work is of relevance as well. And to a lesser extent, that of Daniel Kahneman; not speaking of Prospect Theory, aka Error Theory, which is unrelated.)

[NoMoreFaith]

Frankfurt's rebuttal to premise 5
1. Franny has a mind control device
2. The device will only be used on Zoe if she deviates from Franny's desired actions.
3. Zoe commits the actions without deviating
4. Zoe acted freely

You may have to expand on this argument or cite the source so I can read it fully in context, as 4 appears to be non-sequitor conclusion. Zoe is free from the influence of the mind control device, but not free from her own deterministic causations. This proves nothing, but a giant leap from 3 to 4.
It is not a rebuttal to the point 5 of the original argument being;
5. If we can only do what we in fact do, then we never act freely.

A matter of chance argument
1. If an agent's act is undetermined, then how the agent acts is a matter of chance
2. If how an agent acts is a matter of chance, then the agent is not morally responsible for the act.
3. If an agent's act is undetermined, then the agent is not morally responsible for the act.

I believe the correct philosophical response here is; So what?

This isn't an argument, but a description that determinism is not preferable to free will, but does nothing to lend weight to the idea that we are not determined.
This does not however give us a carte blanche to commit crime as the complete free will, since part of our morality is rooted in the promotion of social order, and the prevention of harm, and in respect to social order, it is important to maintain the illusion of free will.
To quote the movie, 'You can't handle the truth'. We can't, and even as I write this I feel free to just stop, and have a sandwich if I choose.
At the end of the day, the 'Golden Rule' of morality is a tacit social agreement which through mutual consensus which allows us to go about our business, loving our life without the fear of being harmed on a regular basis. Without it, whether determined or not, affects us directly, and is therefore preferable to basing our moral actions on whether we are determined, but instead basing our moral actions on the illusion of free will.

It is not a contradiction to state, that whilst we may be aware of being determined, and ultimately, we are not responsible, we are equally aware that our own well being depends on affecting the illusion of free will.
Certainly determinism allows us to investigate the environmental factors behind immoral actions and attack the causes rather than the individual. While the individual should be punished, if only to enforce a factor of deterrence and hopefully in some cases rehabilitation, understanding that actions have a long line of causal event, allows us to make decisions that benefit humankind in the long run, such as pushing for greater education, reduction in poverty, and other factors which influence immorality.
To say there is no morality is to ignore your fortunate position that we, as a species have developed a complex, and often contradictory ability for social consensus which is the primary cause for our planetary domination. In order to preserve and continue (with hopefully a little less forceful and damaging domination) requires our morality as a deterministic factor in our decisions.
An understanding of their root, does not absolve us from following them.

I'm waffling a bit on my views, but I'm trying to explain how I see that determinism ties closely with morality and allows for greater empathy with the individual and a more positive outlook to our attitude to corrections, and ultimately addressing the root causes of behaviour which threatens us, rather than a focus on retribution.

I didn't quite understand the conditional argument, so an expansion would be appreciated.

[genkaus]

@ genkaus, thanks for sharing your view, we will have to agree to disagree though, as a christian I see love as selfless not selfish.

Ah, "agree to disagree" - the final attempt at saving face by a retreating loser.
People don't "agree to disagree" on matters of fact - only on matters of opinion. Your use of that phrase shows that you have no rational arguments to offer on the matter and cannot refute mine. So you attempt close the discussion by creating the illusion of equal footing and corresponding compromise.

Well, I don't agree to to disagree. I simply disagree. If you have any better arguments than you being a Christian, then present them. But don;t pretend that there is some sort of consensus between us - that by naming my "agreement" to disagree in advance, I've provided some sort of sanction towards your beliefs. Either put up or shut up.

[NoMoreFaith]

I didn't quite understand the conditional argument, so an expansion would be appreciated.

Too late to edit, but I just went ahead and looked up the conditional analysis, and it also seems irrelevant to me.
The ability of S(individual) to do A(perform a free will action) is subject to S being capable of A.

Irrelevant because in order to prove free will via this argument, you must already have a priori assumption that we are capable of free will. Which is the entire point of the discussion.

I do agree with the premise that if we are capable of free will, then we have, at least partially, free will. However, the assumed premise is not proven, so neither is the argument imo.

[genkaus]

I'm jumping in here a little late and I haven't completely read through all the arguments, so I'm not sure if this has been presented before or not. However, here's my take on the subject.

First of all, free-will is usually presented as a part of free-will-determinism dichotomy, that is an extension of mind-body dichotomy, something that I reject completely.

For example, a standard description of determinism goes as - your actions are a result of forces and events separate and apart from you - whether those be your life-experiences, your biological makeup or your environment. This argument presents a "you" as entity separate and independent of your environment, your experiences and your biological makeup. While it is not explicitly stated to avoid religious connotations, it presents "you" as a disembodied, non-physical soul.

By the same standard, the most common explanation of free-will also presents "you" as a soul - but one that can affect the physical reality as well and is not constrained to simply being affected by it. Both these positions require the existence of reality-independent "soul" (you). This makes it a loaded question.

So, when I'm asked if I believe in free-will, i.e., if my actions are the result of predertmined, external forces beyond my control or are they my own, my question would be "what do you mean by "I"?"

My position is that "I" (alternatively referred to as my sense of self, my self, my spirit or my soul), is an emergent property of my biological makeup, my experiences and environment. Since "I" is not independent of reality "I" live in, neither can the my actions. Otherwise, "I" would be able to simply sprout wings and fly off. Free will does not mean that my will should be free from reality - that it should be free from law of identity or causality. It simply means that it should not be wholly determined by forces external to me.

But my biological make-up, my experiences and my environment are not external to me, they are a part of me, as are my thoughts and my emotions. None of them individually could be the whole of me and I wouldn't be me with any of them missing. So, my actions are determined by me - they are a result of my will.

So, when asked if I believe in free-will, I answer, yes I do - to the extent that freedom means relative independence from forces external to me and not freedom from reality.

[The Grand Nudger]

So internal forces are somehow under your control? External, internal, it matters very little.

[NoMoreFaith]

For example, a standard description of determinism goes as - your actions are a result of forces and events separate and apart from you - whether those be your life-experiences, your biological makeup or your environment. This argument presents a "you" as entity separate and independent of your environment, your experiences and your biological makeup. While it is not explicitly stated to avoid religious connotations, it presents "you" as a disembodied, non-physical soul.

Never seen determinism as ever separating the "you" from your biological. Quite the opposite. Are you sure this is standard? I had to google around and never once saw a definition which separated the "you" from the effects of your body and environment.

Could you cite the sources for this standard definition? I checked dictionary, philosophy sites.

Certainly to me, determinism means no such thing as "I" am separate from my biological mind, and is wholly caused by it.

But my biological make-up, my experiences and my environment are not external to me, they are a part of me, as are my thoughts and my emotions. None of them individually could be the whole of me and I wouldn't be me with any of them missing. So, my actions are determined by me - they are a result of my will.

So, when asked if I believe in free-will, I answer, yes I do - to the extent that freedom means relative independence from forces external to me and not freedom from reality.

This is more a description of the illusion of free will than actual free will.

To coin a phrase, you are free to do what you will, but you are not free to will what you will.

EDIT: It has been mentioned however, that the illusion of free will and actual free will are as indistinguishable as to be irrelevant.

[Whateverist]

@Whateverist

I had an interesting conjecture last year which I offer without even pretense that there is any evidence for it; it's simply food for thought. There is a theory, Simulation Theory, that suggests that we reason about other people's mental states by running the scenario on our own hardware and seeing how we would respond.

That seems to be the way of it. When I first began doing this, I remember having a naive confidence in my predictive model. At some point I think we begin creating characters for our simulations with motives and predilections different than our own. Perhaps we all also have the ability to imagine our way into these characters much as actors and writers are able to do. The key in all these cases is to find baser common motives beneath which drive the motives of the characters.

[quote="SEP"]The simulation (or, “mental simulation”) theory (ST) is a theory of everyday human psychological competence: that is, of the skills and resources people routinely call on in the anticipation, explanation, and social coordination of behavior. ST holds that we represent the mental states and processes of others by mentally simulating them, or generating similar states and processes in ourselves: thus, for example, anticipating another's solution to a theoretical or practical problem by solving the problem ourselves (with adjustments for evident disparities, e.g., in skill level). The basic idea is that if the resources our own brain uses to guide our own behavior can be modified to work as representations of other people, then we have no need to store general information about what makes people tick: We just do the ticking for them. Simulation is thus said to be process-driven rather than theory-driven (Goldman 1989).

Seems right to me.

(Are the thoughts in our heads thought in language, or is linguistic thought just a value added extra. I frequently bring up the question of whether people without language — deaf, dumb, blind, whatever — are likely to experience their consciousness as fundamentally different than our own. Anyway, still not my goal; moving on.)

But before you move on I must add that I have no doubt that linguistic thought are value additive. It is possible to listen and understand without producing any language of ones own. I think of this value added as a kind of inner narrative, no more needed for understanding than it is in a novel .. though that is one way to tell a story. My preference is not to narrate my experience to myself. For me, language is just for other minds. If there is no audience or nothing to say then I don't want to 'hear' any linguistic thoughts.

This is the conjecture. It occurred to me that perhaps we have the telescope the wrong way round. How important is it for an animal to have a theory of itself? My thought was that perhaps the cognitive framework in which intentionality and will arose was first applicable, not to the self, but to the other. Take the evolution of say, fish. If we're a fish looking for a smaller fish to eat, we don't require predictive abilities about our own behavior. But if we want to eat, we need to be able to make predictive guesses about what an unpredictable system — the other fish — might do. For that, we need a cognitive framework where our lack of information is a part of the framework — suggesting the fish may do anything, because our information about it isn't sufficiently rich to do otherwise. Wayne Gretzky said, "A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be." A great predator plays where the fish will be, just as a good fighter pilot shoots where his target will be.

Is it possible that the Intentional Stance (of the other) preceded applying that idea to the self? Anyway. No evidence whatsoever, just an interesting thought.

This seems entirely likely. Possibly the notion of ones own intentional stance may have arisen given the strategic advantage of anticipating how the other side is evaluating us. We could have used that information for the sake of projecting deceptive stance or merely to better anticipate their planning. I read recently that most of our brain's bulk and complexity arose not for the sake of getting enough to eat but rather for the sake of negotiating our own complex cultures. That seems likely to me.

I'll leave you with a couple examples from the animal world which should give us pause about our special place at the top of the cognitive tree (joking).

We're certainly animals and the best place to understand our nature is there. When you look closely at what they can do without our sort of language, you will be less inclined to assign much instrumental significance to language in considering questions such free will.


v

ETA: There are studies that seem to indicate that neurological events which signal, say, the movement of a finger precede our conscious intent and awareness of intending to move the finger. (Approx. 150-300 millliseconds, IIRC.) Some aspects are controversial, but it dovetails with another contemporary theory, that of the adaptive unconscious (see Wikipedia). This idea is that our decisions occur below the level of consciousness, and that consciousness simply acts as a reporter, confabulating an explanation for the event it didn't originate. (I suggest looking into the term the adaptive unconscious, confabulation, and Sperry and Gazzaniga's work on split-brain subjects. No time to trace down references, but Jon Haidt's work is of relevance as well. And to a lesser extent, that of Daniel Kahneman; not speaking of Prospect Theory, aka Error Theory, which is unrelated.)

More support for thinking language is less key to the expression of our will than seems commonly assumed. Thanks for the references. They sound interesting.

[Mister Agenda]

Hey guys, I'm Catholic but I enjoy talking with people of other view points and I'm just looking to learn a little bit about some of your ideas so help me out if you would please.

Sorry to jump in late, Flobee. Welcome.

I'm just looking to get some insights as to how most of you feel about free will and how exactly it fits into the materialist world view.

We're not all necessarily materialists. Both theism and atheism are merely opinions on a very specific topic, we're not in the habit of assuming much about theists without knowing some details of their religion or worldview, hopefully it will be the same with atheists someday. There are atheists who believe in an afterlife, astrology, psychic powers, and so forth. The thrust of Western atheism seems to involve rational skepticism and humanism, and those labels can probably be fitted to most atheists on this forum. As skeptics, we tend to not believe in physical/spiritual dualism due to lack of convincing evidence for it.

If we are composed of nothing other than matter then doesn't that mean all that we are as humans is a bunch of chemicals and particles being governed by physical laws?

You've loaded the question and inadvertently committed a fallacy of composition, that is, that what we're made of is all we are. None of the molecules of water have the properties of wetness or liquidity or iciness or vapor. Even if matter, energy, space, time, and physical laws are all there is; it doesn't mean that 'human beings are matter and energy in space and time governed by physical laws' is an adequate summary of humanity.

Do we have no more control over ourselves then a rock does when falling down a hill, or a computer governed completely by our programming?

I don't know, but it doesn't feel that way, and I find myself incapable of acting as if I have no control over myself.

It seems like that is the only option if materialism is true, however it just doesn't seem like that explanation fits in with the universal experience of free will. I mean if an object is dropped it must necessarily fall to the ground because of gravity. But there is no physical law that makes it necessary for me to post on this forum, it seems like I freely chose to do it myself.

Materialism doesn't imply predetermination. It's pretty clear that there's so little determinacy at the quantum level that much of what occurs, particularly in any given tiny corner of the cosmos, couldn't possibly have been predicted just knowing the initial conditions of the universe. The only thing I know of that would definitely imply predetermination would be an omnipotent, omniscient creator. If a God exists who set the initial conditions and know every detail of how it will unfold, no one can do other than what has been foreseen by this hypothetical being.

Any way if any one feels up to it please explain your thoughts on the topic for me. Thanks

You're quite welcome. I hope you find our discourse helpful.

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According to your world view rocks and computers are quite analogous to the human mind because they are all the product of unintelligent physical laws governing matter actually. It is atheist scientists like Steven Pinker who are the ones that compare the human person to a computer not me.

You went from asking about our worldview to telling us about it rather quickly. Your argument means no more than saying rocks are quite analogous to human minds because they both the product of a divine creator. Human brains and computers ARE analogous, to an extent. So what?

You say above that free will is our own and not given to us by God. I'd like to know how you can prove that and demonstrate how in a purely naturalistic universe unintelligent forces can combine unconscious matter to somehow create consciousness and a free will that stands apart from such matter.

You say free will is not our own and is given to us by God. I'd like to know how you can prove that and demonstrate it any way, shape, or form.

Boy you sound just like another prepositional naturalist who argues from the belief that only the natural world exists and your not willing to consider the possibility of anything more even though there has yet to be a naturalistic explanation for the big bang, fine tuning, the origins of life, consciousness, the moral law, rationality, or free will.

I'm perfectly happy to consider something existing that is not part of the natural world. Just show it to me. You don't consider it reasonable to just take your word for something like that, do you? For starters, I'd like to know how you know. If you want to argue cosmology, a separate thread would be appropriate. It's easy to throw questions around, not so easy to answer the big ones in a post. Maybe you should consider reading up on these subjects from a different point of view?

Show me one way that my beliefs are not reasonable.

So far you have not demonstrated that your religious beliefs are based on reason or evidence. Being based on reason and evidence is what makes a belief reasonable. You do have the argument from ignorance on your side, in the form of 'we can't know for sure your beliefs aren't true, therefore they are reasonable'.

You know you guys really aren't arguing against me you are arguing against leading atheists such as Francis Crick, E.O. Wilson, Will Provine, Susan Blackmore and many others who all state that atheism is simply incompatible with free will.

Most atheists are freethinkers. The idea that we should kowtow to your argument just because you cherry-picked a list of atheists who agree with you carries no weight here. Argument from authority dismissed.

I believe in free will just as all of you seem to be saying that you do, however if you think through what naturalism really means and if you read the works of your own atheist philosophers and scientists, a few of whom I have named above, you find that they disagree with you.

So? Does it matter to you if Shinto theologians disagree with you? They're theist religous authorities, you're a theist, so how much weight do their teachings carry with you?

If you think you can prove them wrong and somehow show how it is possible to have things such as consciousness, rationality, absolute objective morality, and free will while still maintaining your belief in a purely naturalistic universe then I would be glad to hear what you have to say.

They aren't here. If you find their arguments so convincing, present them. It is sad that you think 'you guys prove these other guys wrong if you want me to listen to you' is somehow clever. And we don't really care if you listen to us. Judging by your post count, you weren't here long, and we've managed to muddle on.

If not I suggest you either come to the natural consequences of your belief system like those people above have done, or you continue believing in free will and consciousness and absolute objective morality and you embrace a world view that does not eliminate forces beyond mere matter which can actually explain such phenomenons.

That was quite a sentence! Atheism isn't a belief system, although I suppose materialism could be a small portion of one. Made up stuff can't explain phenomena. Saying free will comes from God doesn't provide any more information than saying free will comes from leprechauns. In case you check back, I think you should know that I defeated all of your atheist philosophers in another thread on another forum. If you want to know how, look it up.

[The Grand Nudger]

While none of the molecules of water have the properties of wetness or liquidity or iciness or vapor, those are the properties of those molecules when in the configuration that we call water. Similarly, we are matter and energy in space and time governed by physical laws, but that doesn't mean what some people seem to think it means. It is an adequate summary in and of itself. We are more than that, of course, but only if you want to talk about some other specific, and again, those other things that we are all boil down to properties of that summary when arranged into something we call a human being. We could postulate other things, all day long, but at some point, somebody is going to ask for evidence (or at least I hope somebody would ask for evidence).