Do you believe in free will?

[genkaus]

So internal forces are somehow under your control? External, internal, it matters very little.

About as much control as you have on when to raise your hand.

[The Grand Nudger]

Which is how much, that's the crux of it.

[Mister Agenda]

What those molecules are doing matters, that's pretty much my point. When don't we want to talk about some other specific?

[genkaus]

Never seen determinism as ever separating the "you" from your biological. Quite the opposite. Are you sure this is standard? I had to google around and never once saw a definition which separated the "you" from the effects of your body and environment.

Could you cite the sources for this standard definition? I checked dictionary, philosophy sites.

Certainly to me, determinism means no such thing as "I" am separate from my biological mind, and is wholly caused by it.

More like this is the implied viewpoint in most of the free-will- determinism discussions I've seen.

Simply put, most of these discussions seem to boil down to one simple question - am I the author of my actions? Proponents of determinism seem to argue that it is your genetic make-up, combined with your experiences, conditioning etc that is the author, thereby implying that "you" are something other than that.

This is more a description of the illusion of free will than actual free will.

How is it an "illusion" if it actually exists? Not exists as in a physical existence, but exists as in a mechanism by which we are able to choose our actions.

To coin a phrase, you are free to do what you will, but you are not free to will what you will.

Again, I disagree. I think we can choose change our will.

[The Grand Nudger]

What is we? What are you changing, and what is doing the changing? How is the change accomplished? Maybe your will changes "you". Maybe, that has something to do with you being "your will" (reverse the order if you like). The author of your actions? I thought we were talking about free will? Is this what free will means to you, being the author of your actions? Well, I concede the argument, by that definition you have free will, you are the author of your actions. I'm not sure what that has to do with free will, but if that's the definition you want to give it, then it's sort of a non-argument, isn't it?

(as has been mentioned, these statements always end up in some sort of dualism)

[NoMoreFaith]

More like this is the implied viewpoint in most of the free-will- determinism discussions I've seen.

Simply put, most of these discussions seem to boil down to one simple question - am I the author of my actions? Proponents of determinism seem to argue that it is your genetic make-up, combined with your experiences, conditioning etc that is the author, thereby implying that "you" are something other than that.

Genetics is only a very tiny part of the equation, I wouldn't highlight it as much as that. I don't see the implications either, however, I freely admit, my views are based more upon my own thoughts rather than bodies of literature, so I am likely to be missing out on a lot of prior thinking.

Frankly, I think these discussions boil down to an even simpler question - can I deal with the consequences of being determined, if not, for sake of sanity, I must invent a non-naturalistic reason for my actions.

More to the point, whilst we are the author of our actions, is it possible to author them in any other way. Its untestable sadly, but I my prediliction is that no, we are not. Fortunately our brains are capable of create grand illusions to help us cope with day to day life. In many ways free will shares a lot with religion.

How is it an "illusion" if it actually exists? Not exists as in a physical existence, but exists as in a mechanism by which we are able to choose our actions.

It does not exist. However, you as a human, lack even a millionth of the ability to comprehend and calculate the factors which come into play in every facial tick, and movement you make.
An inability to factor in the complexities merely makes it appear 'magic'. Thus illusion.

Again, I disagree. I think we can choose change our will.

Simply impossible to prove either way, which does tend to make the discussion pointless, but otherwise a fun stretch of the mind.

One thing I would say however, is that the illusion of free will is such, that it is indistinguishable from the real thing.
Our mind can be changed, but only by and external or independent internal force changing the causations. In another words, "you" are not the author of your actions, unless we define "you" as a product of your electrochemical memories and a million other factors that cause your decisions. But that simply indicates an illusion that you can choose an action.

For instance, a thought experiment I've read is that you can travel back in time and meet 6 year old hitler. You may strangle the child to guarantee he doesn't grow up, or provide a package to his parents which highlights the results of his current course in history.
People often make the mistake that a determinist believes Hitler can't change and therefore must strangle the child, but I would posit that introducing the package changes the antecedents to Hitlers actions, and therefore changes the factors behind his decisions. My position is that each individual moment is reliant on our electrochemical memories and state and Hitler in this case, if given a different childhood where his parents are in full knowledge of the immoral actions he will commit as an adult will immeasurably change the makeup of memory and experience that causes Hitler to commit them.
In another words, the illusion of Hitlers freewill is such the causations of his life can be changed, but his decisions as a result of the current causations, cannot.

[The Grand Nudger]

Or maybe our minds can certainly change us. When discussing magic, nothing is certain. Epic godwin btw, nearly brought a tear to my eye.

[Angrboda]

This is the conjecture. It occurred to me that perhaps we have the telescope the wrong way round. How important is it for an animal to have a theory of itself? My thought was that perhaps the cognitive framework in which intentionality and will arose was first applicable, not to the self, but to the other. Take the evolution of say, fish. If we're a fish looking for a smaller fish to eat, we don't require predictive abilities about our own behavior. But if we want to eat, we need to be able to make predictive guesses about what an unpredictable system — the other fish — might do. For that, we need a cognitive framework where our lack of information is a part of the framework — suggesting the fish may do anything, because our information about it isn't sufficiently rich to do otherwise. Wayne Gretzky said, "A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be." A great predator plays where the fish will be, just as a good fighter pilot shoots where his target will be.

Is it possible that the Intentional Stance (of the other) preceded applying that idea to the self? Anyway. No evidence whatsoever, just an interesting thought.

This seems entirely likely. Possibly the notion of ones own intentional stance may have arisen given the strategic advantage of anticipating how the other side is evaluating us. We could have used that information for the sake of projecting deceptive stance or merely to better anticipate their planning. I read recently that most of our brain's bulk and complexity arose not for the sake of getting enough to eat but rather for the sake of negotiating our own complex cultures. That seems likely to me.

(emphasis added)

Jesse Bearing makes a similar argument in The Belief Instinct, to the end that, with language came the social "infrastructure" of gossip, and that in order to successfully negotiate a social group in which news of one's bad deeds could spread like wildfire — thus one always had to act "as if" someone might be watching, as a mistake when someone actually is watching could be devastating for our reproductive prospects. I find that a little too far fetched for several reasons. First, it's not particular credible. Second, I doubt that social self-consciousness arose that dramatically. Two case examples. There is a species of monkey, which I'd have to look up, but this species regularly travels in groups up to 1,000. There is another set of about 6-8 monkey species which cohabitate — and while they don't form monolithic social groups, each species in the set understands the others' warning calls. I suspect that like other mental traits, social consciousness exists on a continuum. Third, this argument is adaptationism at its worst — its reasoning that a trait evolved because it was adaptive. But the most critical fault I find with it is the timeline. In the last 100,000 years, even the last 35,000 years, evolution has not been silent. There are recent changes in the genome. However, from what I understand, the most rapid expansion of the cranial vault occurred between 2 Mya and 6 Mya. This corresponds to a period of climactic instability on the African continent where the early hominids were evolving. It is hypothesized that the climactic changes exerted a strong selection bias in favor of brains for hominids, thus the resulting great intelligence. Does a "social explosion" fit in here (perhaps, but more likely after the 2 Mya, and likely around either the 100,000 year population bottleneck, or the later migrations out of Africa). In short, I think this rapid expansion in brain size, under severe environmental pressures, likely had more to do with these meta-cognitive features, than the possibility of severe selection pressures resulting from "social behaviors".





As you can see, brain volume doubled between 6 Mya and 2 Mya. This is not an appropriate comparison, however, because the strongest correlate with intelligence is the ratio of brain size to body mass, and this table has not been adjusted for that; later species of hominid had larger brains, but they also had larger bodies; the two offset in estimating intelligence.

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[genkaus]

What is we? What are you changing, and what is doing the changing? How is the change accomplished? Maybe your will changes "you". Maybe, that has something to do with you being "your will" (reverse the order if you like).

Me - being the sum of my will, my experiences, my biological makeup etc - is doing the changing of my will, which is a part of me. And, in doing so, I am changing myself. I'm changing my will and by doing so, changing myself in the process.

The author of your actions? I thought we were talking about free will? Is this what free will means to you, being the author of your actions? Well, I concede the argument, by that definition you have free will, you are the author of your actions. I'm not sure what that has to do with free will, but if that's the definition you want to give it, then it's sort of a non-argument, isn't it?

(as has been mentioned, these statements always end up in some sort of dualism)

I think that the problem is that the term "free-will" is so loosely defined, more or less carried as it was coined by religion, that it is difficult to put it in practical terms.

Suppose, in near future, technology develops enough that it is able to map the neural network of human brain completely - down to every neuron firing. Suppose this is then used to map the brain of a person in the process of telling a lie. We see the question being passed from his ears to the brain. We see different sections of the brain (memory, thoughts, rationality etc) firing as he processes the question and we see the final answer (the lie) being issued.

Now a determinist, seeing this in play, would come to the conclusion that at no point was the agent (the liar) was in control of the situation since there were no intermediate events that couldn't be sufficiently explained by prior events. At all times the sequence could be described as one or the other neuron firing and therefore, the agent could not have given any other answer than what he did.

What is being ignored here, in my opinion, is that every neuron that fired was a part of the agent himself. It was a complex and intricate play in which one part directed the other and vice versa, to the extent the result was practically free from the external input. In this case, without the involvement of magical entities such as a soul or spirit or god, we can show the practical expression of free-will.

[NoMoreFaith]

What is being ignored here, in my opinion, is that every neuron that fired was a part of the agent himself. It was a complex and intricate play in which one part directed the other and vice versa, to the extent the result was practically free from the external input. In this case, without the involvement of magical entities such as a soul or spirit or god, we can show the practical expression of free-will.

I think you're right that religious Free Will, and philosophical Free Will are defined in different ways, and we are both rejecting a supernatural entity of our will, that it is determined through naturalistic sources.

I asked a question earlier on in this which may allow me insight into how you are considering the issue, which I hope you'll answer, as I am by no means definite about my views, and I'd like to consider your version further.
I'll get to the question in a second, but I'll outline my "presuppositions" first.

Let's play God and pause time for one second;

The universe can only be changed in a limited number of ways.
1) Changing the current or past state of the universe in this instant we have paused.
2) Changing the fundamental laws of the universe that dictate how the universe progresses from one instant to another.

In my view, changing 1 or 2 requires supernatural means (potentially technology sufficiently advanced as to appear magical).

You were created by the causal events of the universe leading up to this point. You lack the ability to change either premise 1 or 2 of the universe therefore you lack the ability to change the future of the universe.

In order to prove free will, I believe that either a supernatural 3rd cause (which I dismiss) or a problem with the 2 assumptions I have made about causal events.

So the question is thus; At what point were you able to exert a force upon the universe that changes the future. Was it at conception? The sensory development in the womb? The formation of the ego?

This may also go some way to display my own definition of free will, that any illusion of changing causal event, is merely that.. a pure illusion of the mind.