Do you believe in free will?

[NoMoreFaith]

Now, let's consider your arguments here.

"If the choice is certain, you must defend it was freely made between alternatives." - True that. The choice was made free from coercion and it was still certain.

"If there is only one choice that can be made, it is determined" - True that too. But as long as it is you who did the determining and there was no coercion involved - free-will is not contradicted.

Your position has always been a fundamentally contradictory one, here you claim the choice is both free from coercion, but certain and inevitable.

I would avoid using the phrase "you did the determining" because the causes of this determination are empirically traceable, although fundamentally nigh-impossible to fully comprehend. Your "determining" is "determined" by natural causes, and therefore coerced into a certain decision.
It is coerced, and there is no alternatives, it is not free will. You really want to call it free will, but it really does contradict the definition you agreed as true.

Sadly, as we concluded earlier, our discussion cannot overcome this contradiction.

[Norfolk And Chance]

But do you make your decisions, or does a stimulus make your decisions?

Who cares? Consciously I perceive it to be me. So from my perspective, it is me.

[NoMoreFaith]

Can you not think of any instance, where declaring the reality of an abstract concept, due to your limited perception of its effects might be counterproductive?

If so, you can't really criticise a theist for doing the same thing.

[Norfolk And Chance]

I can. Theists have no evidence to support their sky buddy.

I have evidence that I have free will. I'm using free will to decide to converse with you right now.

[genkaus]

Your position has always been a fundamentally contradictory one, here you claim the choice is both free from coercion, but certain and inevitable.

Is it my position in free-will that is contradictory or is it yours?

Your error is your equating certain with coerced. Coercion presupposes existence of a consciousness with the capacity to act contrary to its motivation. Certainty and inevitability do not indicate any necessary conflict between the action and motivation. The action maybe certain and inevitable - however, if the agent's motivation behind the action and the action itself are consistent with each-other, then the action is uncoerced.

You idea of free-will entails that it should be free of causation at the same time being part of the causal chain that leads to the action. That position is necessarily self-contradictory, which is why that idea of free-will can never be true.

I would avoid using the phrase "you did the determining" because the causes of this determination are empirically traceable, although fundamentally nigh-impossible to fully comprehend. Your "determining" is "determined" by natural causes, and therefore coerced into a certain decision.

Actually, when considering the question of free-will, it is the efficient cause that is considered - not the ultimate cause. If we sought the ultimate cause of each action, then there is only one ultimate cause and all actions would cease to hold any meaning.

The causes of determination are empirically traceable, but regarding free-will, they need only be traced to the agent, because it is that capacity of the agent that is in question. Any further investigation about the cause of the agency would be irrelevant to the issue of its capacity - once such a capacity is established.

It is coerced, and there is no alternatives, it is not free will. You really want to call it free will, but it really does contradict the definition you agreed as true.

There is no alternative outcome, but the choice is not coerced if the efficient cause of the choice is the agent and there is no conflict between his motivation and action. So, it really doesn't contradict the definition of free-will that you gave.

Sadly, as we concluded earlier, our discussion cannot overcome this contradiction.

When did we conclude any such thing?

[Norfolk And Chance]

When I stepped in, firing the big guns.

[The Grand Nudger]

Sounds reasonable, now can we establish such a capacity? Can you demonstrate that you are able to change your mind? Can you eliminate the possibility that your mind is changing you? Establish yourself as an agent, and not an effect. It seems like you're glossing over this, attempting to judge relative capacity before establishing that there is anything to possess such a capacity in the first place. So what if "action" would cease to hold any meaning? I think you mean that it would cease to hold the meaning you prefer. But again, so what? The world around us isn't so invested in the meanings of things as we are, and many a "thing" has lost meaning when subjected to further inquiry.

[NoMoreFaith]

I can. Theists have no evidence to support their sky buddy.

I have evidence that I have free will. I'm using free will to decide to converse with you right now.

Do you have evidence for the black dots that keep appearing? Or are they an illusion brought on by the physical process the mind uses to create images?

You have free will because you experience it, is the same as claiming the black dots are real because you experience it.

They are both illusions created by the physical processes of your brain, and how stimuli causes chains of reaction which is beyond our ability to comprehend.

The true question of free will, is what constitutes the reality. Is it purely what we perceive, or is there a higher measure for reality than our limited perceptions.

You claim theists have no evidence for God, yet how often do you hear of their private inner conviction. What you have presented is that you have a private inner conviction that you could have chosen differently. What evidence do you have of that? Its an unfalsifiable self-authenticating private belief, and no different to that of a belief that a sky daddy made the universe and tells you right from wrong.

You believe in free will, completely, just like a theist does with God, but you have no evidence of its existence, beyond the illusion of it. You are deluded I'm afraid.

---

Is it my position in free-will that is contradictory or is it yours?

Definitely yours.

Certainty and inevitability do not indicate any necessary conflict between the action and motivation. The action maybe certain and inevitable - however, if the agent's motivation behind the action and the action itself are consistent with each-other, then the action is uncoerced.

You argument works only from finite regress. You stop the buck at motivation offering no further causation.
Where did the motivation come from? Did it come from somewhere other than the neuron activity of the brain? I know you don't think that. So why do you stop the regression at motivation.

You idea of free-will entails that it should be free of causation at the same time being part of the causal chain that leads to the action. That position is necessarily self-contradictory, which is why that idea of free-will can never be true.

Agreed. Your argument is purely from the illusion created by the causal forces, and call the illusion, free will.

The causes of determination are empirically traceable, but regarding free-will, they need only be traced to the agent, because it is that capacity of the agent that is in question. Any further investigation about the cause of the agency would be irrelevant to the issue of its capacity - once such a capacity is established.

So physiological imbalances which cause psychotic episodes should not be considered, because it is the capacity of the agent that is in question? This is part of the capacity of the agent then yes? What else should we consider? Their blood sugar levels? Seratonin levels? Where do you draw the line. Where does free will start, and determinism end?

There is no alternative outcome, but the choice is not coerced if the efficient cause of the choice is the agent and there is no conflict between his motivation and action. So, it really doesn't contradict the definition of free-will that you gave.

I refer back to the finite regress of motivation. What "motivates" the motivation and so on and so forth. Where is the line you draw.

When did we conclude any such thing?

When we noted that the definition of "illusion of free will" is equivalent to your "free will". It precludes any further discussion on the matter apart from how you define free will itself.

[genkaus]

You argument works only from finite regress. You stop the buck at motivation offering no further causation.
Where did the motivation come from? Did it come from somewhere other than the neuron activity of the brain? I know you don't think that. So why do you stop the regression at motivation.

Because, it is at that point, the question of coercion stands answered. Once you have shown that the motivation and the action were in line with each-other, you've shown that no coercion was present - therefore, the action was an exercise of free-will.

Agreed. Your argument is purely from the illusion created by the causal forces, and call the illusion, free will.

Read my argument again and point out where the motivation and the action become inconsistent - thereby negating free-will?

So physiological imbalances which cause psychotic episodes should not be considered, because it is the capacity of the agent that is in question? This is part of the capacity of the agent then yes? What else should we consider? Their blood sugar levels? Seratonin levels? Where do you draw the line. Where does free will start, and determinism end?

You've mired yourself so deep in the dichotomy that you cannot see that wherever free-will may start - determinism doesn't end.

As for where free-will starts, that is determined by what constitutes the self of an agent - a question there is no clear answer to as of yet - as there is none to the question of the role these factors have in determining what an agent is.

I refer back to the finite regress of motivation. What "motivates" the motivation and so on and so forth. Where is the line you draw.

I told you. Where free-will is concerned, I draw the line at answering the question of whether any coercion was present.

When we noted that the definition of "illusion of free will" is equivalent to your "free will". It precludes any further discussion on the matter apart from how you define free will itself.

Yes, I recall you saying something of the sort. I also recall saying that though functionally similar, these two were fundamentally different - the former being the result of irrational understanding of what constitutes an agent and mistaken view of what free-will is supposed of be free of. Further, how you define (or rather understand) free-will would be critical in determining whether its real or illusory. So, no, no agreement was reached on the subject.

[NoMoreFaith]

Because, it is at that point, the question of coercion stands answered.

There is still a lack of alternative choices, the other part of free will. If you are unable to choose a different alternative, then you cannot posit any rational description of free will.

The correlation between motivation and its corresponding action is a demonstration of Will, but not Free. You had no alternatives.

Read my argument again and point out where the motivation and the action become inconsistent - thereby negating free-will?

Firstly, incapability of opting for an alternative. Secondly, the motivation and action become inconsistent because the motivation is the rationalisation of the action itself. Based upon our own private perception, it appears that we rationalise then act, which is far more debatable than most people realise, and in regards to minor movements, actively wrong. Whether this applies to large rational decisions rather than instinct is where it gets very fuzzy, its an area which we may never fully understand.

If we limit things to the motivation leading to the action, it ignores the reactionary nature of motivation. You are motivated only as result of external or internal stimuli. You are drawing a line where no line need be drawn in order to justify your definition from my perspective.

I agree on a certain level, that the apparent correlation between our motivation and the action is strong, and strong enough to make a case that we have a will, but I do not go so far as to call it free because I do not ignore the causations which led to the motivation.

So
You've mired yourself so deep in the dichotomy that you cannot see that wherever free-will may start - determinism doesn't end.

On the contrary, that makes the assumption of free will at all. I do not, therefore cannot see free-will starting. Determinism doesn't end, and free will never starts.
From my position you are mired so deeply in the assumption of free will, that you fail to see it is an irrelevant term for our actions.

As for where free-will starts, that is determined by what constitutes the self of an agent - a question there is no clear answer to as of yet - as there is none to the question of the role these factors have in determining what an agent is.

I think we can both agree, that any attempt to define the self, is fuzzy and incomplete as to be pointless to reach consensus.

Yes, I recall you saying something of the sort. I also recall saying that though functionally similar, these two were fundamentally different - the former being the result of irrational understanding of what constitutes an agent and mistaken view of what free-will is supposed of be free of. Further, how you define (or rather understand) free-will would be critical in determining whether its real or illusory. So, no, no agreement was reached on the subject.

You certainly asserted the illusion, and actuality of free will were different, but never coherently backed up the assertion. Which I note you have done once more.

What you are doing, is asserting something which is compatible with free will, and hijacking the phrase free will to a deterministic causal chain as an explanation via creation of action through motivation to do so.
So far neuroscience seems to indicate, although only in terms of non-consequential actions, that the activity to commit to an action, occurs before the conscious motivation to do so.
Whether this is also true of larger conscious decisions is open to debate, but it would not surprise me if all actions occur on this level, which are merely rationalised by the conscious mind.