Do you believe in free will?

[oxymoron]

Just because we are effected by our past, doesn't necessarily mean that we don't have control over our future decisions. If the waffles make you salivate more so than the pancakes, it does not follow that you are required to eat the waffles - which is what a world without free will would necessitate. The world may be determinate in nature, yet still provide us with the ability to make decisions based on arbitrary whims (this position is known as compatibilism).

This is just confused thinking. Unless something magical is making the final decision, there is only mechanism. And by their nature, mechanisms are deterministic (in that identical inputs will produce identical outputs). The "us" in the last sentence is no different from suggesting there is an invisible homunculus making choices for "us" or a "soul" or some other supernatural thing.

This is your choice: either (as all the evidence strongly suggests) the brain is a mechanism; or it's Magic Pixies. Compatibilism? Magic Pixies powered by Handwavium.

[NoMoreFaith]

To summarise my earlier argument, change to causal chain, exists either to change the prior state of the universe, or to change the laws of the universe, or some unperceived laws.
Free Will can only exist in the third instance, however, I feel it is more apt to invoke occams razor, in that the mind/brain is capable of creating an illusion of free will, so why invent new unfalsifiable rules? You may as well be done with it and claim goddidit.

I'm wary of retreading old ground so i'll leave it at that.

[genkaus]

Just because we are effected by our past, doesn't necessarily mean that we don't have control over our future decisions. If the waffles make you salivate more so than the pancakes, it does not follow that you are required to eat the waffles - which is what a world without free will would necessitate. The world may be determinate in nature, yet still provide us with the ability to make decisions based on arbitrary whims (this position is known as compatibilism).

Is that your understanding of free-will then? The capacity to be arbitrary? So if a decision is thought-out, considered and reasoned - that it, rational - as opposed to arbitrary and whimsical, then it is not an expression of free-will? If that's free-will, I don't see how it is even useful?

[Perhaps]

To the deterministic materialist my argument holds no water, which is fine.

I personally do accept the continuity of the natural laws and fully acknowledge that causation provides a deterministic word view, but I do not ascribe to materialism in the fullest extent. I don't think magic pixies make choices for us, or that we are fated to a certain destiny. I simply believe that the conscious mind, separate from the brain mechanism, provides us with the ability to abstract and to make decisions based on whims. Our physical existence is subject to determined physics, but we have the ability to enact our own causation through the non-material aspect of our conscious.

Not to get too off topic, but let me ask you this: Are you the same person as you were 5 years ago, in so much as your identity hasn't changed? If you are, then what makes that so?

[oxymoron]

I simply believe that the conscious mind, separate from the brain mechanism,

So the conscious mind is the Magic Pixie. The "mind" is a term of rhetorical use only. And "conscious" is terribly difficult to define. There's simply no evidence that anything exists separate from the brain; but why should it, any more than digestion should exist separate from the stomach?

Not to get too off topic, but let me ask you this: Are you the same person as you were 5 years ago, in so much as your identity hasn't changed? If you are, then what makes that so?

Memory, for one thing.

One of the fundamental ideas in quantum physics is that aside from state, two instances of the same atom are indistinguishable. Molecules are interchangeable by transitivity. In your brain, replacing one protein with another identical protein will not change anything, and so over time the encoded state is maintained even though the medium encoding the state changes.

The idea of "temporal continuity" is interesting because it can either be arrived at by a system with very good retention of state or by very poor retention of state. We see a movie ticking past at 24fps because our brains are just not quick enough to process the frames. It looks smooth and continuous, it's just a disjoint collection of images. And so our identity is just that hysteresis, the fact that we retain an after-image of ourselves that smooths over the joins - not because our brains are awesome, but because they're actually very very slow.

[genkaus]

To the deterministic materialist my argument holds no water, which is fine.

I personally do accept the continuity of the natural laws and fully acknowledge that causation provides a deterministic word view, but I do not ascribe to materialism in the fullest extent. I don't think magic pixies make choices for us, or that we are fated to a certain destiny. I simply believe that the conscious mind, separate from the brain mechanism, provides us with the ability to abstract and to make decisions based on whims. Our physical existence is subject to determined physics, but we have the ability to enact our own causation through the non-material aspect of our conscious.

Not to get too off topic, but let me ask you this: Are you the same person as you were 5 years ago, in so much as your identity hasn't changed? If you are, then what makes that so?

1. How can a conscious mind exist separately from the brain mechanism when without the mechanism there would not be any ability of awareness and therefore no consciousness?

2. By what mechanism does this non-material aspect of consciousness able to interfere with material causation and still remain independent of it?

3. Once again, is the ability to make decisions on a whim an expression of free-will, whereas a reasoned and considered decision is not?

[Perhaps]

So the conscious mind is the Magic Pixie. The "mind" is a term of rhetorical use only. And "conscious" is terribly difficult to define. There's simply no evidence that anything exists separate from the brain; but why should it, any more than digestion should exist separate from the stomach?

The very idea that there would be physical evidence for a non-physical entity is confusing at best and contradictory at worst. To object to materialism is not to believe in magic; rather it is simply to believe that non-material things do exist, and in some circumstances have causal interactions.

1. How can a conscious mind exist separately from the brain mechanism when without the mechanism there would not be any ability of awareness and therefore no consciousness?

2. By what mechanism does this non-material aspect of consciousness able to interfere with material causation and still remain independent of it?

3. Once again, is the ability to make decisions on a whim an expression of free-will, whereas a reasoned and considered decision is not?

1. To exist as a non-material object does not require that it exist independently of material subjects. When the material brain ceases, so too does the conscience. This doesn't invalidate my original statement about the conscience's effects.

2. There is no mechanism, it is outside of the material realm, just as some would argue numbers and time exist outside of the material realm. We know numbers exist in so much as we have utilized them in a material sense to enact physical changes, but they are not tangible nor do they possess mass, volume, etc.. We know time exists, but we have no physical way to obtain or measure it - aside from our arbitrary choice of movement relative to other objects. More simply, the non-material conscience can effect the material world, but it is not independent of the material world, in so much as its existence relies on a material entity - the brain.

3. The ability for the non-physical conscience to effect the material world is the action of free will.

---

Memory, for one thing.

One of the fundamental ideas in quantum physics is that aside from state, two instances of the same atom are indistinguishable. Molecules are interchangeable by transitivity. In your brain, replacing one protein with another identical protein will not change anything, and so over time the encoded state is maintained even though the medium encoding the state changes.

The idea of "temporal continuity" is interesting because it can either be arrived at by a system with very good retention of state or by very poor retention of state. We see a movie ticking past at 24fps because our brains are just not quick enough to process the frames. It looks smooth and continuous, it's just a disjoint collection of images. And so our identity is just that hysteresis, the fact that we retain an after-image of ourselves that smooths over the joins - not because our brains are awesome, but because they're actually very very slow.

Does someone who suffers from complete amnesia after a horrific accident maintain their identity? Similarly, if a person is declared dead, then resuscitated with no remarkable changes to their brain functioning, do they retain their identity - even if their temporal continuity has been interrupted by a brief instance of non-existence (death)?

[genkaus]

1. To exist as a non-material object does not require that it exist independently of material subjects. When the material brain ceases, so too does the conscience. This doesn't invalidate my original statement about the conscience's effects.

For your original statement to stand, the non-material must exist separately, if not independently - i.e. it must have a separate identity from the material. What does invalidate your statement is your assertion that consciousness can exist without any mechanism to be conscious.

2. There is no mechanism, it is outside of the material realm, just as some would argue numbers and time exist outside of the material realm. We know numbers exist in so much as we have utilized them in a material sense to enact physical changes, but they are not tangible nor do they possess mass, volume, etc.. We know time exists, but we have no physical way to obtain or measure it - aside from our arbitrary choice of movement relative to other objects. More simply, the non-material conscience can effect the material world, but it is not independent of the material world, in so much as its existence relies on a material entity - the brain.

I think the question of "time" should be left alone here, since it would lead the discussion into a whole different direction of relativity, space-time continuum and quantum mechanics.

The concept of numbers is a bad analogy, since numbers are a product of consciousness, i.e. of a conscious mind. However, if your idea of conscious mind is not independent of material reality, then how does it escape causality?

3. The ability for the non-physical conscience to effect the material world is the action of free will.

First, it needs to be established that it does.

It seems you have a confused view of how a thing can exist non-materially. One is an idealist view, where you imagine this whole other dimension to reality with souls and spirits and possibly gods. Other is the conceptual view, where you see consciousness the same way you see ideas, created by and existing within the human mind.

[oxymoron]

2. There is no mechanism, it is outside of the material realm, just as some would argue numbers and time exist outside of the material realm.

So it's random then. Because numbers and time have mechanism - they're quite deterministic (in that they exhibit regularities which we can write down, known as "mathematics" and "physics"). The specific ontology is irrelevant, however interesting it may be to some.

Further, whilst time and numbers would appear to be independent of matter, brains are not. Again: "mind" is an article of rhetoric, not a scientifically or even philosophically valid term. Since minds are never discussed without brains to host them (or equivalently: this has never been observed, however easily it can be hypothesised), they are contingent upon matter in a way that numbers and time are not (or if they were, would void your argument).

3. The ability for the non-physical conscience to effect the material world is the action of free will.

"Non-physical" = "Magic Pixies".

There's no evidence for a non-physical agent, no need to invoke one, and when you do you just end up with absurdities - like brains being irrelevant to minds.

Does someone who suffers from complete amnesia after a horrific accident maintain their identity?

Depends on what "complete" might constitute. You'd pretty much need to liquidize their entire brain for that to happen. But in general, from real-life case studies, no, they could be unrecognisable to others in terms of personality, and the identity they do construct post-incident would be different to that previous to the accident.

Similarly, if a person is declared dead, then resuscitated with no remarkable changes to their brain functioning, do they retain their identity - even if their temporal continuity has been interrupted by a brief instance of non-existence (death)?

Probably. Memory is encoded in structure, and a brief blip of the power (so to speak) which does not affect that structure then does not affect that memory, by definition. A difference that makes no difference is not a difference.

[NoMoreFaith]

It should be pointed out, nobody get resuscitated from brain death. You can take a lot of punishment before that happens.. but brain death. You're shafted.