Do you believe in free will?

[genkaus]

It should be pointed out, nobody get resuscitated from brain death. You can take a lot of punishment before that happens.. but brain death. You're shafted.

For now.

[Perhaps]

For your original statement to stand, the non-material must exist separately, if not independently - i.e. it must have a separate identity from the material. What does invalidate your statement is your assertion that consciousness can exist without any mechanism to be conscious.

The original statement:
I simply believe that the conscious mind, separate from the brain mechanism, provides us with the ability to abstract and to make decisions based on whims. Our physical existence is subject to determined physics, but we have the ability to enact our own causation through the non-material aspect of our conscious.

The conscious mind is dependent on the material brain mechanism. It is separate from the material mechanism, yet still dependent.

I think the question of "time" should be left alone here, since it would lead the discussion into a whole different direction of relativity, space-time continuum and quantum mechanics.

The concept of numbers is a bad analogy, since numbers are a product of consciousness, i.e. of a conscious mind. However, if your idea of conscious mind is not independent of material reality, then how does it escape causality?

I agree that the topic of time is deep and possibly misleading to the conversation, but numbers have been argued for centuries to exist outside of the conscience. Many mathematicians and metaphysicians argue that maths have been discovered, not created by the conscious mind. Once again, the non-material conscience is dependent on the material world (if the physical world didnt' exist then neither would our consciences) but its non-material nature allows it to interact with causation in the physical realm (free will).

First, it needs to be established that it does.

It seems you have a confused view of how a thing can exist non-materially. One is an idealist view, where you imagine this whole other dimension to reality with souls and spirits and possibly gods. Other is the conceptual view, where you see consciousness the same way you see ideas, created by and existing within the human mind.

My opinions as they relate to non-material subjects, are simply that they exist outside of the material realm. Other than that, I couldn't be bothered to explain every way in which I can imagine them existing apart from the materialist perspective. I can't demonstrate that a non-material conscience does in fact give us free will, I can only demonstrate that I believe I do have free will.

[genkaus]

The original statement:
I simply believe that the conscious mind, separate from the brain mechanism, provides us with the ability to abstract and to make decisions based on whims. Our physical existence is subject to determined physics, but we have the ability to enact our own causation through the non-material aspect of our conscious.

The conscious mind is dependent on the material brain mechanism. It is separate from the material mechanism, yet still dependent.

Which means that the conscious mind must have an identity separate from the material mechanism. While its existence must be dependent on the material mechanism, its identity must be independent of it. A parallel here would be "cause and effect". While the existence of the effect is dependent upon the cause, its identity is independent of it. Here's where you have to provide the justification of how an entity can be conscious if the mechanism for consciousness is not a part of its identity.

I agree that the topic of time is deep and possibly misleading to the conversation, but numbers have been argued for centuries to exist outside of the conscience. Many mathematicians and metaphysicians argue that maths have been discovered, not created by the conscious mind. Once again, the non-material conscience is dependent on the material world (if the physical world didnt' exist then neither would our consciences) but its non-material nature allows it to interact with causation in the physical realm (free will).

Exactly how does its non-material nature allow it to interact with causation while remaining independent of it - that is the question here.

My opinions as they relate to non-material subjects, are simply that they exist outside of the material realm. Other than that, I couldn't be bothered to explain every way in which I can imagine them existing apart from the materialist perspective. I can't demonstrate that a non-material conscience does in fact give us free will, I can only demonstrate that I believe I do have free will.

Then your belief has no place in the discussion, does it? As you say here - you cannot demonstrate how the non-material might exist independently of the material. You cannot demonstrate how it'd work. You cannot demonstrate how it'd interact with causation, if it actually existed. Your position is unjustified by your own admission. All you can demonstrate is that you believe in free-will, which is accomplished by saying "I believe in free-will". Without justification, that is meaningless.

[Perhaps]

So it's random then. Because numbers and time have mechanism - they're quite deterministic (in that they exhibit regularities which we can write down, known as "mathematics" and "physics"). The specific ontology is irrelevant, however interesting it may be to some.

Further, whilst time and numbers would appear to be independent of matter, brains are not. Again: "mind" is an article of rhetoric, not a scientifically or even philosophically valid term. Since minds are never discussed without brains to host them (or equivalently: this has never been observed, however easily it can be hypothesised), they are contingent upon matter in a way that numbers and time are not (or if they were, would void your argument).

To be without a mechanism doesn't necessitate that it is random. If something still interacts with causation then it can maintain its ability to be non-random (choices), while being without a specific mechanism (cause and effect created through a deterministic material world). As for the supposed mechanisms of numbers and time, they are ascribed by us to make sense of a non-material abstraction. The only reason 2 comes after 1 is because that is how we make sense of numbers; the same idea is true for time (although, as was said earlier this is a much deeper topic). These non-material subjects are used in a material world only after we have confined them within material constraints so that we can make sense of them.

"Non-physical" = "Magic Pixies".

There's no evidence for a non-physical agent, no need to invoke one, and when you do you just end up with absurdities - like brains being irrelevant to minds.

Once again, how do you provide physical evidence for a non-physical subject? We observe the effects of free will daily while being contained within a deterministic world; we also abstract the possibilities of things which can't be physically observed all the time (dimensional analysis and the topology of other dimensional objects). I've already addressed the idea that the non-material can be dependent on a physical object, while maintaining its individual identity.

---

Which means that the conscious mind must have an identity separate from the material mechanism. While its existence must be dependent on the material mechanism, its identity must be independent of it. A parallel here would be "cause and effect". While the existence of the effect is dependent upon the cause, its identity is independent of it. Here's where you have to provide the justification of how an entity can be conscious if the mechanism for consciousness is not a part of its identity.

Is it not true that cause exists as an identity separate from effect, yet they are dependent on one another? An entity cannot be conscious if the mechanism for consciousness is not physically present, that doesn't mean that the identity of the conscience is dependent on the existence of a physical mechanism. I can still talk about the thoughts and choices (conscience) made by Socrates without his physical mechanism (brain) being present. The conscience retains its identity while being causally linked to the physical brain.

Exactly how does its non-material nature allow it to interact with causation while remaining independent of it - that is the question here.

I can abstract about methods through which it may be possible that a non-material nature allows for interaction with physical causation, but they would simply be abstractions. The question of remaining independent of causation has been half answered already. The conscience is dependent on the physical brain, just as effect is dependent on cause, but past this dependency I don't believe that it is tethered to the line of causation which I think you are leaning towards. To illustrate this differently, if I die so does my conscience, but if an apple falls down beside me it doesn't effect my conscious decision in a deterministic manner - that is my belief. My justification for it not providing a deterministic choice is simply that I believe I have the ability to pick it up, or leave it, or get up and walk away, or... etc..

Then your belief has no place in the discussion, does it? As you say here - you cannot demonstrate how the non-material might exist independently of the material. You cannot demonstrate how it'd work. You cannot demonstrate how it'd interact with causation, if it actually existed. Your position is unjustified by your own admission. All you can demonstrate is that you believe in free-will, which is accomplished by saying "I believe in free-will". Without justification, that is meaningless.

1. The non-material can exist as an identity separate from the material, but its utilized existence is dependent on the material (I can't consciously act if I don't have a brain).
2. The conscious would be outside the deterministic causation of the material world (aside from being dependent on the brain), while still providing interaction with the physical world's causation the same way numbers and time are enacted upon the physical world.
3. The existence of free will isn't easily demonstrated if the observers already believe it to be determined materially. Just as I can't illustrate to you the fourth dimension, but I can draw you the shadow of a hypercube; I can't demonstrate to you the existence of the non-material conscience, but I can show you its effects (free will).

[Norfolk And Chance]

To be without a mechanism doesn't necessitate that it is random. If something still interacts with causation then it can maintain its ability to be non-random (choices), while being without a specific mechanism (cause and effect created through a deterministic material world). As for the supposed mechanisms of numbers and time, they are ascribed by us to make sense of a non-material abstraction. The only reason 2 comes after 1 is because that is how we make sense of numbers; the same idea is true for time (although, as was said earlier this is a much deeper topic). These non-material subjects are used in a material world only after we have confined them within material constraints so that we can make sense of them.

What shite.

[genkaus]

Is it not true that cause exists as an identity separate from effect, yet they are dependent on one another? An entity cannot be conscious if the mechanism for consciousness is not physically present, that doesn't mean that the identity of the conscience is dependent on the existence of a physical mechanism. I can still talk about the thoughts and choices (conscience) made by Socrates without his physical mechanism (brain) being present. The conscience retains its identity while being causally linked to the physical brain.

Hey, I gave you the cause and effect analogy to show you that there both do have separate identities. Here, the requirement is simple. For a non-material entity called "the conscious mind" to exist, it must have a non-material mechanism of consciousness that is a part of its identity. The brain mechanism is not applicable because it is a material mechanism and according to you - a separate entity. You have never even mentioned a non-material mechanism of consciousness, much less demonstrated how it'd work. As it is, your argument doesn't stand.

I can abstract about methods through which it may be possible that a non-material nature allows for interaction with physical causation, but they would simply be abstractions. The question of remaining independent of causation has been half answered already. The conscience is dependent on the physical brain, just as effect is dependent on cause, but past this dependency I don't believe that it is tethered to the line of causation which I think you are leaning towards. To illustrate this differently, if I die so does my conscience, but if an apple falls down beside me it doesn't effect my conscious decision in a deterministic manner - that is my belief. My justification for it not providing a deterministic choice is simply that I believe I have the ability to pick it up, or leave it, or get up and walk away, or... etc..

That is a very simplistic approach - something FNM often refers to as the illusion of free-will. In case of the apple, you are only conscious of the immediate cause - the apple falling beside you. You ignore all the other lines of causation, which, put together, would determine whether you pick up the apple or not. It is simply because you are unaware of them that you think you are making a free-choice.

1. The non-material can exist as an identity separate from the material, but its utilized existence is dependent on the material (I can't consciously act if I don't have a brain).

This doesn't explain how it exists, what exists in it and how it interacts with the material.

2. The conscious would be outside the deterministic causation of the material world (aside from being dependent on the brain), while still providing interaction with the physical world's causation the same way numbers and time are enacted upon the physical world.

Given the absence of any explanation of how the non-material interacts with the material, your assertion that consciousness would be outside deterministic causation is unsupported and meaningless. I can state with equal certainty here that "Consciousness, while existing in the non-material world, is completely determined by the causation of material world" and none of your given argument go against that.

3. The existence of free will isn't easily demonstrated if the observers already believe it to be determined materially. Just as I can't illustrate to you the fourth dimension, but I can draw you the shadow of a hypercube; I can't demonstrate to you the existence of the non-material conscience, but I can show you its effects (free will).

Then show me. You haven't done anything like that yet. All you have done is make unjustified assertions.

[Perhaps]

Hey, I gave you the cause and effect analogy to show you that there both do have separate identities. Here, the requirement is simple. For a non-material entity called "the conscious mind" to exist, it must have a non-material mechanism of consciousness that is a part of its identity. The brain mechanism is not applicable because it is a material mechanism and according to you - a separate entity. You have never even mentioned a non-material mechanism of consciousness, much less demonstrated how it'd work. As it is, your argument doesn't stand.

Under what assertion? I'm stating that there need be no mechanism, it is truly free of any deterministic attribute. A mechanism is a material concept which you are transposing on a non-material subject. Simply stated, the conscience is non-material with a individual identity; while the brain is material with an individual identity. The non-material cannot exist without the material in so much as it is ontologically dependent. The identity of the non-material may still be preserved without the material, which is how/why they differ.

That is a very simplistic approach - something FNM often refers to as the illusion of free-will. In case of the apple, you are only conscious of the immediate cause - the apple falling beside you. You ignore all the other lines of causation, which, put together, would determine whether you pick up the apple or not. It is simply because you are unaware of them that you think you are making a free-choice.

I'm aware of the theory of epistemic free will as compared to metaphysical freedom. I don't base my belief in free will solely on the idea of non-material consciousness, though I've focused only on that subject in this discussion because of the way it has been presented.

This doesn't explain how it exists, what exists in it and how it interacts with the material.

Nor is any of that required in this discussion (let alone the fact that it most likely can't be physically known other than through induction). We aren't discussing whether I'm right or you're right, it's whether free will can exist, and if so how would that be so. I believe it can - and does - exist, and I am justifying my belief. This isn't a discussion which has an answer, it's a discussion to analyze free will and its possibilities. You can analyze the validity of my argument (which you are doing), but I can't bring you to perceive what I perceive if we differ so greatly on our original perspectives.

You believe free will is an illusion and that the world is deterministic and material. I believe that there is more outside of ourselves which we must abstract to even attempt to understand. Our perceptions limit our knowledge, and you favor the side of complete knowledge, I favor the side of not-knowing but being inspired by its awe.

3. The existence of free will isn't easily demonstrated if the observers already believe it to be determined materially. Just as I can't illustrate to you the fourth dimension, but I can draw you the shadow of a hypercube; I can't demonstrate to you the existence of the non-material conscience, but I can show you its effects (free will).

Then show me. You haven't done anything like that yet. All you have done is make unjustified assertions.

You ask to know how a non-material subject operates in a materialist perspective. You limit the abilities of the non-material to the confines of materialist physics and determinism. And then you ask me to show you the effects a non-material subject causes in a material world without allowing me the supposition that free will does come from this non-material subject.

If I asked you to show me the effects a sharpened pencil has on a piece of paper (writing), yet didn't allow you the supposition that a sharpened pencil is the method through which writing is possible, then I could easily tell you you're wrong about the whole illustration. But how would you prove that the pencil does actually cause writing to occur when applied to paper? Surely you would tell me to write my name down with the said pencil and paper, but what if I told you that the paper read my mind and the words appeared on the paper, therefore the pencil didn't cause the writing to exist? If I fight you at every turn, then of course I'm never going to see that the pencil does in fact cause the writing to appear on the paper.

[Angrboda]

I think the question of "time" should be left alone here, since it would lead the discussion into a whole different direction of relativity, space-time continuum and quantum mechanics.

The concept of numbers is a bad analogy, since numbers are a product of consciousness, i.e. of a conscious mind. However, if your idea of conscious mind is not independent of material reality, then how does it escape causality?

I agree that the topic of time is deep and possibly misleading to the conversation, but numbers have been argued for centuries to exist outside of the conscience. Many mathematicians and metaphysicians argue that maths have been discovered, not created by the conscious mind. Once again, the non-material conscience is dependent on the material world (if the physical world didnt' exist then neither would our consciences) but its non-material nature allows it to interact with causation in the physical realm (free will).

Yes, and the consensus in philosophy has been that these arguments are unsuccessful, failing on the same point that dualistic notions of free will fail, the interface between the material and the non-material. If the non-material affects the material, it would be detectable as a violation of the normal laws of nature; if there is no violation, the non-material, even if it exists, is irrelevant as it does not change the material. Yes, mathematicians and philosophers have tried the same argument with numbers (Godel being a grand example of one such Platonist), however none has constructed a convincing argument. Appealing to one failed argument in an attempt to rescue your current one is just evading the frying pan by jumping into the fire.

---

You believe free will is an illusion and that the world is deterministic and material. I believe that there is more outside of ourselves which we must abstract to even attempt to understand. Our perceptions limit our knowledge, and you favor the side of complete knowledge, I favor the side of not-knowing but being inspired by its awe.

[compass]

Free will would surely go out the window as soon as you were "forced" to be born. You can therefore never have free will living a life that was not freely chosen.

[genkaus]

Under what assertion? I'm stating that there need be no mechanism, it is truly free of any deterministic attribute. A mechanism is a material concept which you are transposing on a non-material subject. Simply stated, the conscience is non-material with a individual identity; while the brain is material with an individual identity. The non-material cannot exist without the material in so much as it is ontologically dependent. The identity of the non-material may still be preserved without the material, which is how/why they differ.

Under the assertion of law of identity. A thing cannot be what it is and not be what it is at the same time. Without any mechanism for consciousness, a conscious mind in not conscious. You can make all the assertions you like about ontological dependence and which principles do or do not translate to the non-material, but this one is inescapable.

Nor is any of that required in this discussion (let alone the fact that it most likely can't be physically known other than through induction). We aren't discussing whether I'm right or you're right, it's whether free will can exist, and if so how would that be so. I believe it can - and does - exist, and I am justifying my belief. This isn't a discussion which has an answer, it's a discussion to analyze free will and its possibilities. You can analyze the validity of my argument (which you are doing), but I can't bring you to perceive what I perceive if we differ so greatly on our original perspectives.

The problem is that so far, your attempted justifications only go as far as to say that free-will can exist. And in that they are incomplete. In order to assert that it can exist, you should give a possible scenario of how it can exist.

You believe free will is an illusion and that the world is deterministic and material. I believe that there is more outside of ourselves which we must abstract to even attempt to understand. Our perceptions limit our knowledge, and you favor the side of complete knowledge, I favor the side of not-knowing but being inspired by its awe.

Don't assume anything about my position. My position on freewill has already been spelled out in this thread. Refer to that is you wish to know what it is.

You ask to know how a non-material subject operates in a materialist perspective. You limit the abilities of the non-material to the confines of materialist physics and determinism. And then you ask me to show you the effects a non-material subject causes in a material world without allowing me the supposition that free will does come from this non-material subject.

The materialistic perspective here is an assumption on your part. The limits I'd proscribe are the logical confines of identity and causation, unless, ofcourse, you are saying that logic is not applicable to the non-materia, in which case it'd be simply nonsense.