What do you think of this argument for God?

[ignoramus]

Theists, I've come to a compromise.
Yes, your god exists outside of time and space..... Sort of.
You see, he exists at the quantum level only.
How do I know this?
Because prayers come true (by chance) when you least expect them, but when you look for god, he's never there.
Basically if he exists, he does but not for us.....sorry about that....

I bet the goat herders didn't know that one!

[Nay_Sayer]

It's terrible.

[SteveII]

The human mind is not the problem. Using 'possible' creates a couple of problems.

Defining God as the greatest possible being is not the definition of God. How do you define what is 'possible'? Since it is not clear that God would necessarily exist from premise 1, you you have an unsupported assertion in 2. 

The whole argument hinges on greatest conceivable (maximally great) being concept and it is a greater to exist in all possible worlds than one possible world. Premise 3 requires understanding of S5 Modal Logic. Substituting "possible" does not allow you to bridge the argument from 2 to 3 because you need it to be necessarily so.

True, God is the postulated to be the greatest possible being in theistic thinking, but this argument fails to demonstrate neccessity and what this being is. {A}

As for the ontological argument you mentioned, the greatest conceivable being is no better since that relies on epistemic possibility rather than metaphysical possibility. {B}  Also, how do you define 'greater'? It suffers from the same problem as the "possibility" argument, that would be, How do you define what is 'conceivable'? I cannot conceive a being that is outside space-time, immaterial, and omnipresent at the same time, therefore the monotheist concept of God doesn't count in this argument, since it is inconceivable. Being conceivable is dependent upon experience and knowledge. {C}

I fail to see any more success in that argument.

The real argument can be formulated as follows:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4- If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5- If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6- Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3) and as such, you need to clearly understand how the word is used. The opposite of necessary is contingent. Since being contingent on something is a defect it would not be considered maximally great to be contingent. A maximally great being would be a necessary being because it could not be contingent on another (then that would be a greater being).  It is important to understand the S5 modal logic that if something is even possibly necessary, it is actually necessary. If God necessarily exists in one possible work, then he exists necessarily in all possible worlds.

B. The key is understanding the difference between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

C. When Anselm first wrote this argument, he was careful to distinguish between what we could think of as the greatest possible being and God is the greatest being possible, that is to say, it is impossible for there to be any being greater than God. While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not. If a description of God allowed for a greater being, then God would not be God because that being would be God and the definition becomes a logical impossibility. Even a limited grasp of God's properties does not entail that our conception of God is false because it would be impossible to have full knowledge of God.

[Nonpareil]

The real argument can be formulated as follows:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

Incoherent terms, bare assertion.

2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Non sequitur.

A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3)

The argument does not make use of the "necessary" concept.

Even if it did, it would remain nonsensical. A being that is possibly necessary in one world is not... well, necessarily necessary in other worlds, as there is possibly a world where it is not necessary.

This is why the modal ontological argument is such complete bunk; even granting that its definitions are coherent (and they aren't), it fails to establish that they actually apply.

While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not.

Asserting this does not make it true. "Greatness" is still a value judgment. It is still subjective. Adding "maximal" to it does not make it any less so.

[SteveII]

The real argument can be formulated as follows:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

Incoherent terms, bare assertion.

2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Non sequitur.

A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3)

The argument does not make use of the "necessary" concept.

Even if it did, it would remain nonsensical. A being that is possibly necessary in one world is not... well, necessarily necessary in other worlds, as there is possibly a world where it is not necessary.

This is why the modal ontological argument is such complete bunk; even granting that its definitions are coherent (and they aren't), it fails to establish that they actually apply.

While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not.

Asserting this does not make it true. "Greatness" is still a value judgment. It is still subjective. Adding "maximal" to it does not make it any less so.

You don't want to discuss this. You want to lecture me on something you do not even understand. To old, don't care.

[Nonpareil]

You don't want to discuss this.

I do, actually. It's just that there isn't much to discuss. It is flatly wrong.

You want to lecture me on something you do not even understand.

You have no idea of my credentials. Do not assume. You will be wrong.

I fully understand the ontological arguments. I fully understand Plantinga's arguments. I can say with near absolute certainty that I have studied them in more depth than you have, and am more familiar with the terms and rules in play. That is why I can dismiss them so completely in so few sentences. I possess the knowledge necessary to do so.

All you have done, thus far, is to parrot them and assume that they will be taken at face value. You don't answer any actual objections. You simply accuse anyone who points out the fallacies contained in your posts of not understanding the subject matter, when, in fact, the exact opposite is true.

The arguments you present are fallacious, Steve. I'm sorry that you don't like it, but the facts don't change just because you don't like them.

[SteveII]

You don't want to discuss this.

I do, actually. It's just that there isn't much to discuss. It is flatly wrong.

You want to lecture me on something you do not even understand.

You have no idea of my credentials. Do not assume. You will be wrong.

I fully understand the ontological arguments. I fully understand Plantinga's arguments. I can say with near absolute certainty that I have studied them in more depth than you have, and am more familiar with the terms and rules in play. That is why I can dismiss them so completely in so few sentences. I possess the knowledge necessary to do so.

All you have done, thus far, is to parrot them and assume that they will be taken at face value. You don't answer any actual objections. You simply accuse anyone who points out the fallacies contained in your posts of not understanding the subject matter, when, in fact, the exact opposite is true.

The arguments you present are fallacious, Steve. I'm sorry that you don't like it, but the facts don't change just because you don't like them.

First, I did not start this thread, I was trying to explain to TheAtheologian why 1) you can't change it up and expect it to hang together, and 2) what the real argument is within the premises. BTW, he knows how to have a discussion without sounding like a condescending prick. 

Regarding the Ontological Argument, philosophers on both sides in every generation for a thousand years have been discussing this argument and you can dismiss it in a few sentences. Good thing you came around to point out their error. Too bad it wasn't sooner. You could have save them writing thousands of papers and books on the subject. 

No, I don't know your credentials. I couldn't care less. I am not impressed with your content and how you deliver it.

[Nonpareil]

Because I'm bored and have some time to kill, let's go over the various ontological arguments and their failings in more detail.

For those who have never really studied the term before, an ontological argument is a specific type of theistic argument that attempts to establish the existence of God using nothing but a priori knowledge - that is, nothing but pure logic, entirely independent of any need for actual evidence.

In practical terms, this means that an ontological argument is an argument that attempts to define God into existence. They all essentially boil down to this:

1. We define "God" as "something that must exist".
   
2. Therefore, God exists.

But, in order to make them look more impressive than they actually are, they usually take this form:

1. We define "God" as "something that, if it is possible for it to exist or be conceived of, must exist".
   
2. It is possible that God exists and/or can be conceived of.
   
3. Therefore, God exists.

This is every single ontological argument at its core. Everything else is window dressing.

The various forms of the ontological arguments, then, are different theistic philosophers' attempts to rephrase this basic premise in order to get rid of the different issues that other variants have run up against. Unfortunately, none of them actually address the central problem with the idea of any ontological argument: it utterly fails to establish its conclusion.

This is because ontological arguments, by definition, are only capable of using two things: definitions and pure logic. They cannot actually make use of evidence or reference the real world. This means that, while they might be valid, they not only will never but can never be sound.

(For those who have not heard those terms before, "valid" means that, given that an argument's premises are true, its conclusion must be true. "Sound", on the other hand, means that an argument is valid and that its premises are actually true, so it has actually established the truth of its conclusion. As an illustration, "All men are green + a pterodactyl is a man = a pterodactyl is green" is valid, but not sound; its conclusion follows from its premises, but its premises are not true, so it has not actually established its conclusion to be true.)

This is the fatal flaw for all variants of the ontological argument, because it is in the very definition of "ontological argument": even if the premises are coherent and the conclusion follows, by definition the argument has still not established that its conclusion is true. Ontological arguments are, at best, ipse dixit (a specific variation on the bare assertion fallacy, basically equal to bare assertion that has become dogma). They utterly fail to actually prove their conclusion, to the point that even Alvin Plantinga, a theistic philosopher responsible for one of the more popular modern versions of the ontological argument, says: "Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion."

(In the interest of completion, it must be noted that Plantinga then goes on to say: "But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion.", but this is exactly the ipse dixit mentioned before; there is no way to show that the central premise - God's necessity, possibility, conceivability, or what-have-you, according to the specific variation of the argument - is actually true, he is forced to fall back on "but I think it's true anyway, even though I can't show how, so you should all accept it, too".)

And this is ignoring all the issues with specific variations, which always end up making a mess of their premises. They don't even get as far as simply failing to establish their soundness. They collapse at the first hurdle, with incoherent terms and nonsensical leaps.

For example, Steve's favored version:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

"Greatness" is a value judgment. Value judgments are inherently subjective. "Maximally great" is a nonsensical contradiction in terms, even ignoring its complete lack of an actual, coherent definition (it never supplies any way to actually measure "greatness", so it's a complete non-starter).

This is also where the ipse dixit comes in, and why I mentioned bare assertion when examining this premise above. There is no reason to accept that it is possible that a "maximally great being" exists.

2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

Again, ipse dixit - there is no reason to accept that this premise is true. Nor does "possible world" have any actual, coherent meaning (this could imply an attempt to tie into modal logic, in which case this specific premise would be slightly less incoherent, but the argument as a whole still collapses).

3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

And another unjustified leap. The asserted basis for this is that, if a being does not exist in every possible world, then it isn't "maximally great" - but, again, there's no actual established way to judge "greatness".

Theists attempt to get around this by saying, as Steve already helpfully asserted:

While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not.

Unfortunately, this is utterly nonsensical. "Greatness" is not an objective quantity, and no actual coherent method of measurement can be supplied. Simply asserting that "maximal greatness" is not an incoherent concept does not actually make it so. Nor does trying to say that it is objective rather than subjective.

Also note the way that Steve's chosen "real" variation of the ontological argument fits into the condensed version that I supplied at the beginning of this post. "God" is defined as "a maximally great entity"; the rest of the argument, then, is spent trying to show how a "maximally great entity" is defined as existing, without at any point even attempting to establish that a maximally great entity is actually possible. It simply asserts that it is, and expects to be taken at face value.

It's the same issue every time, in every variation of the ontological argument. There is always, at one point or another, a complete ipse dixit moment, whereupon it collapses on its face. And, again, that's without getting into the completely incoherent mess that is the actual premises. This is why the ontological arguments have never been relevant in philosophy outside of theistic circles that refuse to let them die because they're desperate for anything that they can lay their hands on.

The ontological arguments are always, invariably, regardless of specific wording, worthless.

---

First, I did not start this thread

It's an open forum. If you don't want replies, don't post.

BTW, he knows how to have a discussion without sounding like a condescending prick.

I'm sorry that you consider bluntness and directness to be equivalent to condescension, but it doesn't make you any more right.

Regarding the Ontological Argument, philosophers on both sides in every generation for a thousand years have been discussing this argument

No. A small but vocal crowd of rather silly people on the theist side have refused to let it die because they really, really wish it was true.

To people who actually study and understand philosophy, regardless of whether they are theist or not, the various formulations of the ontological argument are little more than historical curiosities. As are the rest of Anselm's works. Important from a historical standpoint, but not actually compelling.

and you can dismiss it in a few sentences.

Anyone can. I just happen to be the one doing it.

[Kernel Sohcahtoa]

@Nonpareil

Thanks for post number 58 (along with many of your other posts).  I'm learning a lot from you.

Out of curiosity, suppose we have a turncoat debate here, and you were arguing for the existence of god. How would you go about making a persuasive and convincing argument? Do you think that it is possible to do so without making use of Ipse dixits or other forms of assertions? Does god need to be properly defined and does evidence for his existence need to be established in order to avoid usage of Ipse dixits?  Thanks.

Edit.

P.S. In your opinion, is it currently possible to make a sound argument for the existence of god?

[Nonpareil]

Thanks for post number 58 (along with many of your other posts).  I'm learning a lot from you.

Thank you.

Most of my posts are extremely short and to the point because that is all that is required to rebut the arguments being put forth, but if you ever have a question or want something expanded on, feel free to ask.

Out of curiosity, suppose we have a turncoat debate here, and you were arguing for the existence of god. How would you go about making a persuasive and convincing argument?

Rhetoric.

There are basically three parts to any philosophical argument: semantics (what all the various terms mean), logic (the structure of the argument and the evidence presented to support it), and rhetoric (the language and writing style used to convey the information). Theistic arguments tend to be very weak on the first two, so, in order to make up for this, they have to lean very, very heavily on the third.

Which is actually kind of fortunate for them, because, for most people, semantics and logic aren't particularly convincing on their own. You can show someone a perfectly reasonable and rational refutation of something, but unless you convey it in the right way, they'll still say "eh, I dunno, I'm still not convinced". Likewise, you can show them an argument that's a complete pile of dog shit logically, but because you've dressed it up and made it sound convincing, they'll accept it.

This is part of why there are so many variations of the ontological argument, and why none of them really do anything other than change up the language in it. Theistic arguments rely heavily on rhetoric, rather than logic and reason, for their persuasive power, so when one version of the ontological argument gets knocked down, they just give it a new coat of paint and roll it out all over again. It's the philosophical equivalent of the used car salesman who puts a new coat of paint over the rust, rolls it out on the lot, and sells it off for a huge chunk of change because it's just so shiny and perfect-looking.

If all you want is to be convincing, then you just have to sound like you know what you're talking about.

Do you think that it is possible to do so without making use of Ipse dixits or other forms of assertions?

Not really, no. Bare assertion tends to be the best-case scenario, anyway, when it comes to theist arguments.

Does god need to be properly defined and does evidence for his existence need to be established in order to avoid usage of Ipse dixits?

Yes. If you can't actually establish that a premise is true, than you are committing the bare assertion fallacy.

I do think that I should note that ipse dixit isn't really a technical term, though. I know of a few people who use it - one of my professors, when I was still in school, for example - but it's really just the bare assertion fallacy. It's got some icing on it, with the whole attitude of "yeah but you should accept it anyway", but that's what it boils down to, and you might get some strange looks from people if you use the term without explaining yourself.

P.S. In your opinion, is it currently possible to make a sound argument for the existence of god?

Sound, yes. The "God is defined as necessary -> therefore, God necessarily exists" thing from my previous post is sound. It's trivially easy to make a sound argument for anything you like.

That's why soundness on its own doesn't count for much.