Consciousness Trilemma

[Amarok]

The maverick philosopher is an idiot

[Little lunch]

I was going to say that I think consciousness is an illusion but then Hammy blew my mind.
Thanks Hammy. :-)

[Alex K]

Pfff, sounds like word games with ill defined terms to me. Don't have the time to unpack that now, maybe later...

[Neo-Scholastic]

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.
2) Conscious experience has an essentially subjective character that purely physical processes do not share.
3) The only acceptable explanation of conscious experience is in terms of physical properties alone.

Here are my thoughts on the matter. Proposition (1) is based on incorrigible experience. To deny (1) is the kind of schoolboy sophistry that takes contrarian hubris so far that it is willing to embrace self-contradiction and present it as some grand and unassailable philosophical Truth. People who deny (1) are not serious thinkers.

Proposition (2) seems to mask a couple of underlying assumptions. It is true that any given subject has privileged access to their own conscious experience of external objects. In a sense that is always true of relationships between all physical objects. The bright side of the moon has "privileged access" to light from the sun that its dark side does not. At the same time, attributing axiological and intentional properties to physical objects presupposes some consciousness already having those properties. Doing otherwise violates the principle that something cannot give what it does not already have.

Proposition (3) is a preferred ontological stance inferred largely from prior experience and perceived parsimony. Parsimony is a useful guide, one best not suppose unnecessary elements in an explanation, but it doesn't rule out complexity or redundancies, and a stubborn insistence on parsimony can commit one to positing too few elements and ignoring the benefits of additional ones.

So from my perspective, only (1) is foundational while both (2) and (3) required a little more work to deserve warrant. While it is intuitive, holding on to proposition (2) is mostly a way to avoid a seemingly intractable circularity, but it is not at all clear that will always be the case. One could deny (2) by essentially issuing a promissory note on one's faith in a future solution. Meanwhile proposition (3) only elevates epistemological tools to ontological commitments. Proposition (3)'s warrant rests on pragmatic concerns that are otherwise ontologically neutral.

[Ben Davis]

Hi Neo,

It appears that of the following three propositions only two can be true:

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.

Depends how you define 'illusion'. 'I' exist, I'm quite certain of that fact but I'm also certain that I can see everything in my field of vision and we can demonstrate that to be false. It could be that consciousness operates like an old Mainframe Batch Scheduler, organising batch runs in the subconscious with my deliberate thought analogous to an Active Directory. If that were true, then consciousness would be no illusion but a necessary, hierarchic function to coordinate effort. Alternatively, 'I' could be a product of emergence with no particular role but an unintended consequence of neural processing. Given it can be demonstrated that even our deliberate thought seems to be generated and processed by the brain before we're 'consciously' aware of it, 'I' could be a fib told by the brain in order to provide the illusion of coherence to the outside world. That would make my conscious control an illusion because what I think I'm ordering myself to do is what the brain has already decided that I should order myself to do in order for it to seem to the world that I'm ordering myself to do it. I'm aware that I think I'm ordering myself to do it but is that also my brain telling me that I'm aware that I think I'm ordering myself to do it? There's a rabbit hole there that seems to go a long way but does that make 'me' illusionary?

2) Conscious experience has an essentially subjective character that purely physical processes do not share.

The first part of the statement is a tautology. I don't think there's any question about the subjectivity of individual experience and awareness. The second part is brimming over with assumptions. As far as can be demonstrated, there are no processes other than 'purely physical' ones. Some of them are subjective, some are objective but all are part of the superset 'purely physical'.

3) The only acceptable explanation of conscious experience is in terms of physical properties alone.

Well... yes. Consciousness is a property of brains (or similar mass networks) so it's a property of a physical system. Easy!

I must hand it to Maverick Philosopher because this trilemma so neatly identifies and clarifies the dominant positions with respect to philosophy of mind. Like him, I am inclined to accept 1) and 2) which entails that I must reject 3). I have some inkling of where other AF members would place their bets but it would be nice to let people weight in and see where the discussion leads.

The issue is that none of these 3 positions are mutually exclusive so I fail to see any trilemma.

[Angrboda]

(*Hat-tip Maverick Philosopher, here)

It appears that of the following three propositions only two can be true:

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.

The supposition that consciousness is an illusion is all too frequently taken as the absurd claim that consciousness doesn't exist; that we are all zombies. But I don't interpret it this way, and I think it's little more than an appeal to ridicule to do so. In the world of stage magic, an illusion is giving the appearance that something is one thing, say sawing a woman in half, when in reality it is another thing. If we apply this definition to consciousness, then the claim is that consciousness is something other than it appears. This appearance of consciousness includes the following: that it is unified; exists as a point in space; exists in the present moment; and so on. If consciousness is viewed as a process of some sort, then none of these attributes can actually be real. So the person that is claiming that consciousness is not an illusion is indirectly claiming that it is not a result of a process; that it is a thing in itself. This entails ontological commitments to the existence of a unique entity that is totally unlike the physical entities with which we are familiar. I don't think most non-illusion advocates are aware of the ontological commitments they are taking on. It's true that parsimony is a heuristic and not a law, and even at that is frequently misinterpreted. However, I think that taking such an ontological stance is not only against the law of parsimony, it is an extravagant addition to our ontological repertoire. Gods? Souls? Consciousnesses? How manyfold must the ontological categories multiply before it is recognized as absurd? This is the defeater for #1.

---

It appears that of the following three propositions only two can be true:

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.
2) Conscious experience has an essentially subjective character that purely physical processes do not share.
3) The only acceptable explanation of conscious experience is in terms of physical properties alone.

Perhaps, but it's also quite possible that all three are false.

[The Grand Nudger]

It would be an act of desperate intellectual dishonesty to quote this assertion out of context!

Dennet, Consciousness Explained.  

[Neo-Scholastic]

Hi Neo,

Hey.

It could be that consciousness operates like an old Mainframe Batch Scheduler, organising batch runs in the subconscious with my deliberate thought analogous to an Active Directory. If that were true, then consciousness would be no illusion but a necessary, hierarchic function to coordinate effort.

There was a time when consciousness was compared to pumps and clocks, then steam engines, and now computers. While there is some value in the comparison it is too tempting to stretch the analogy. The underlying physical structures are not even remotely similar. At best, current computer technology can simulate and model the mental capacities while not actually being them.

As far as can be demonstrated, there are no processes other than 'purely physical' ones. Some of them are subjective, some are objective but all are part of the superset 'purely physical'… Consciousness is a property of brains (or similar mass networks) so it's a property of a physical system. Easy!

I would turn that around. As far as we know there are only mental processes because everything we know about the physical world is mediated by experience.

Depends how you define…Given it can be demonstrated that even our deliberate thought seems to be generated and processed by the brain before we're 'consciously' aware of it, 'I' could be a fib told by the brain in order to provide the illusion of coherence to the outside world.

The binding problem cannot be solved using binding. In other words, the question of how multiple cognitive processes pull together in an apparent self-identity is not solved by positing an apparent self-identity.

The supposition that consciousness is an illusion is all too frequently taken as the absurd claim that consciousness doesn't exist; that we are all zombies. But I don't interpret it this way…the claim is that consciousness is something other than it appears. This appearance of consciousness includes the following: that it is unified; exists as a point in space; exists in the present moment; and so on.

Personally, I would not lay claim to all those assumptions. The contents of consciousness may not be, and probably are not, of a piece, but that does not entirely dispense with a kernel of consciousness capable of unifying disparate parts. Theseus’s ship comes to mind. Insisting that either its form or the substance defines it misses the boat (pun intended). The uniting factor, what maintains the ship as an identifiable ship is its purpose. It should come as no surprise that without intentionality the parts from which consciousness is assembled fall apart, in the same way that a parliamentary body dissolves without common cause.

While there is a folk expression about “a voice in your head” that doesn’t translate into the philosophical placement of a ghostly mind directing a body-machine pulling levers from the inside. As far as I can tell the general consensus is that, if it exists, mind/mental properties have no spacial extension and are without physical location although they may have apparent local effects. As for temporal extension, I have mixed feelings about that; time for me is a huge looming mystery. So I wouldn’t make any assumptions about the relationship between consciousness and time.

If consciousness is viewed as a process of some sort, then none of these attributes can actually be real… the person that is claiming that consciousness is not an illusion is indirectly claiming that it is not a result of a process; that it is a thing in itself. This entails ontological commitments to the existence of a unique entity that is totally unlike the physical entities with which we are familiar.

Or perhaps so familiar that it is easily missed, like Poe’s map game. Tables appear to be solid but are mostly empty space yet we don’t conclude from that that physical states and processes are not real. The world does not present itself to us directly as physical objects; but rather as experiences of objects. We live in a world of impressions, representations, signs, goals, and values. It is true that the properties of intelligible objects may not be as we suppose but that is not a reason to say they don’t exist at all just because they do not follow the same rules as physical objects. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that physical and intelligible objects don’t interact. Even if they are mostly empty space, tables are still tables – materials having forms fitted to specific purposes.

[The Grand Nudger]

Or perhaps so familiar that it is easily missed, like Poe’s map game. Tables appear to be solid but are mostly empty space yet we don’t conclude from that that physical states and processes are not real. 

Nor is the comment that consciousness is illusory meant to convey any notion that those physical states and processes are not real.

The world does not present itself to us directly as physical objects; but rather as experiences of objects. We live in a world of impressions, representations, signs, goals, and values. It is true that the properties of intelligible objects may not be as we suppose but that is not a reason to say they don’t exist at all. They just follow different rules than physical objects.

I'm not sure what the point in invoking different stuff and different rules is now, what with your only example of anything remotely alike what you're trying to say....being a table. Hey, it works. The way we experience a table is not the most accurate description of a table at a molecular or quantum level (no surprise there, if we had eyes that could see in that range we wouldn't need microscopes and particle accelerators). No special sauce required.

If the same were true about consciousness......then what, what's the problem?

[Whateverist]

(*Hat-tip Maverick Philosopher, here)

It appears that of the following three propositions only two can be true:

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.
2) Conscious experience has an essentially subjective character that purely physical processes do not share.
3) The only acceptable explanation of conscious experience is in terms of physical properties alone.

I must hand it to Maverick Philosopher because this trilemma so neatly identifies and clarifies the dominant positions with respect to philosophy of mind. Like him, I am inclined to accept 1) and 2) which entails that I must reject 3). I have some inkling of where other AF members would place their bets but it would be nice to let people weight in and see where the discussion leads.

I sure don't see why you think your acceptance of 1 and 2 requires you to reject 3. The problem must lie with the third statement.

That there are physiological systems that support conscious experience which can be altered by physical means is easy to establish in a lab. An account of the physical basis for consciousness is therefore necessary for a complete account of conscious experience. However most people interested in questions of consciousness would find that insufficient for a complete explanation as it doesn't account for the phenomenological quality of consciousness.

But why in the world would you want to toss away the only part of the explanation we are currently capable of acquiring just because it doesn't answer every question? That seems pretty arbitrary.

You are still at liberty to speculate lavishly about the subjective parts, you just can't ignore what is known about physical underpinnings of conscious experience if you want to be taken seriously.