Consciousness Trilemma

[Neo-Scholastic]

My apologies Khem. This is a complicated discussion and I should have read more closely. If there is a physical area inside the brain that suffices to produce consciousness, then you are right, although to be fair, one could argue that some thing like that is necessary without going into specific details about what it is. Personally, I have no problem with the idea of a narrative center of gravity, I just don't think it's the whole story without some nod to the binding problem.

[The Grand Nudger]

My apologies Khem. This is a complicated discussion and I should have read more closely. If there is a physical area inside the brain that suffices to produce consciousness, then you are right, although to be fair, one could argue that some thing like that is necessary without going into specific details about what it is.

One could, but they would only be arguing assertions and axioms.  In the case that they did, and lets use the hypothetical case in which a person -did- propose a non physical "something-like-that", then an eliminativist would ask the same question again, of whatever that proposed x was.  Does the way -that- x works, map to our experience of it?  

Personally, I have no problem with the idea of a narrative center of gravity, I just don't think it's the whole story without some nod to the binding problem.

Dennet, on the binding problem (briefly, sort of).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psOcedY4Ywc

(the presenter felates the guy, lol, push past it)

Notice the very first comment, not that I;m pointing out that the first commenter is some expert..it just shows the dynamic between eliminative materialists and some form of person whop doesn;t think that consciousness is brain function.  They agree...because they can agree, on much....their divergence is in a conclusion of parsimony between two explanations, not in the evidence that leads to those two explanations being on the table.  Uncontroversial propositions, radical reduction.

[bennyboy]

I'm going to have to take a break from this thread and find some good sources on this.  My interest is piqued enough to track down some serious literature on it.

Okay, I'm back. I've read the wikipedia page on eliminativism, which I think gives me a pretty good idea what it's about.

I happen to admire B.F. Skinner, who very much contributed to pulling psychology out of the bullshit of Freudian interpretive psychology and into the realm of science. You can apply some of his techniques on animals, even on some kinds of cells, and right down to ANNs. In fact, maybe we should say that B.F. Skinner is one of the founders of AI.

That being said, it seems to me that many material eliminativists are picking the philosophical cherry. For example, Dennet may not accept that you can say qualia really exist-- and yet he carries on as though conscious agency in other exist. Many have said that the sense of self is illusory (in this thread, I believe)-- that there's no such thing as "self" to be found-- no center for subjective agency.

But here's my question for you-- how do you not ride this same view right down to solipsism or even further? NO category of subjective mental function can be mapped onto material reality; that's why we can't determine whether any given physical system allows for consciousness (defined as the awareness of qualia, say) to exist, and why I've said in the past that the study of mind (again, defined as the subjective experience of sensations and ideas) is outside the reach of science (if it is science being honestly and properly done). I've said that you can study brain function and behaviors, but NOT mind, which cannot be shown even to exist.

My problem with you and Dennet and others isn't that you go too far, but not far enough. You, for example, have consistently insisted on the existence of other-mind, even under the definition of mind as the subjective experience of sensation and ideas (later, we started using the word qualia), despite our obvious inability to locate subjective agency in an objective Universe.

My unwillingness to do so has been largely responsible for my identifying as "agnostic" and why I've also mentioned "truth-in-context" so often. In the context of a universe in which others can actually experience pain, it is true for me that harming others for fun is wrong. In the context of a universe in which others are not accepted as anything more that philosophical zombies, then the term "harm" has no real meaning that matters morally, and I can eat babies for breakfast with a clean conscience.

[The Grand Nudger]

But here's my question for you-- how do you not ride this same view right down to solipsism or even further?

Well, there's not much sense in riding down to solipsism, as you put it..since that particular nut has to be set aside to begin with, to refer to whether or not mental states map - to a brain, and objectively so. 

NO category of subjective mental function can be mapped onto material reality; that's why we can't determine whether any given physical system allows for consciousness (defined as the awareness of qualia, say) to exist, and why I've said in the past that the study of mind (again, defined as the subjective experience of sensations and ideas) is outside the reach of science (if it is science being honestly and properly done).

They simply don't need to refer to subjective mental function..so, regardless of whether or not it exists, it's moot point from that angle.  No, they wouldn't be studying whatever you think mind is...but.......

I've said that you can study brain function and behaviors, but NOT mind, which cannot be shown even to exist.

Mind -is- behavior, from this pov.  Both the behavior of the system, and the behavior of the creature /w the system.  

My problem with you and Dennet and others isn't that you go too far, but not far enough.  You, for example, have consistently insisted on the existence of other-mind, even under the definition of mind as the subjective experience of sensation and ideas (later, we started using the word qualia), despite our obvious inability to locate subjective agency in an objective Universe.  

I assume you have a mind because you act like one.  Behavior.  Regardless of what that mind is made of, that's how you act.  If you don't have one, or if there is no mind...you still act that way and I'd still need to have some explanation for that.  

My unwillingness to do so has been largely responsible for my identifying as "agnostic" and why I've also mentioned "truth-in-context" so often.  In the context of a universe in which others can actually experience pain, it is true for me that harming others for fun is wrong.

Sure is, but that's a hell of an aside, lol.

In the context of a universe in which others are not accepted as anything more that philosophical zombies, then the term "harm" has no real meaning that matters morally, and I can eat babies for breakfast with a clean conscience.

OFC harm still has meaning.  The same meaning.  We talk about harming ecosystems, harming the planet, harming this that or the other not-even-a-p-zombie thing.  

Lay all of that aside though.  Let's suppose that it's not wrong to harm others for fun because harm has no meaning in a universe where em is true.  So what?  It would still be true. Similarly, regardless of whether or not we lived in a universe where there was no clean cut moral answer to the question of eating babies...you'd probably still feel bad about it. The moral angle just isn't relevant with regards to the truth of any theory of mind. Even an evil creatures immoral mind would still need to be explained. To a functional theory, the moral status of the mind or it's actions make no difference.

[bennyboy]

Mind -is- behavior, from this pov.  Both the behavior of the system, and the behavior of the creature /w the system.  

Without an appreciation of the subjective capacity, in particular for the experience of suffering, then this view negates any meaningful sense of morality.

OFC harm still has meaning.  The same meaning.  We talk about harming ecosystems, harming the planet, harming this that or the other not-even-a-p-zombie thing.  

Nah, you're equivocating. In establishing a moral system, we do so in recognition largely of the fact of subjective suffering.

But let's examine even your definitions of harm. They are only "harm" because they matter to a subjective agent who feels value in things. Sure, you might have a philosophical zombie who acts like it cares about "X," but since it cannot experience the harm of damage to "X," in what sense does it matter whether its behavioral goals are or aren't achieved? What, morally, distinguishes between a blue Earth and one covered pole to pole in nuclear craters?

Lay all of that aside though.  Let's suppose that it's not wrong to harm others for fun because harm has no meaning in a universe where em is true.  So what?  It would still be true.  Similarly, regardless of whether or not we lived in a universe where there was no clean cut moral answer to the question of eating babies...you'd probably still feel bad about it.  The moral angle just isn't relevant with regards to the truth of any theory of mind.  Even an evil creatures immoral mind would still need to be explained.  To a functional theory, the moral status of the mind or it's actions make no difference.

Why are you referencing my feelings at all, moral or otherwise, or referring to the concept of evil? All these things, I'm pretty sure, are illusory by the standards of EM, no?

[The Grand Nudger]

Without an appreciation of the subjective capacity, in particular for the experience of suffering, then this view negates any meaningful sense of morality.

I don't think so, but assuming it did, so what?  

Nah, you're equivocating.  In establishing a moral system, we do so in recognition largely of the fact of subjective suffering.

-or the compelling illusion of subjective suffering as it expresses itself in behavior.  Honestly, Benny, it doesn;t matter.  I don't think you have anything here, but if you did...that wouldn't make EM any more or less true.

But let's examine even your definitions of harm.  They are only "harm" because they matter to a subjective agent who feels value in things.  Sure, you might have a philosophical zombie who acts like it cares about "X," but since it cannot experience the harm of damage to "X," in what sense does it matter whether its behavioral goals are or aren't achieved?  What, morally, distinguishes between a blue Earth and one covered pole to pole in nuclear craters?

Meh, let's not.

Why are you referencing my feelings at all, moral or otherwise, or referring to the concept of evil?  All these things, I'm pretty sure, are illusory by the standards of EM, no?

...because nothing about this life or my experience ...or yours, changes on account of any particular theory of mind being true or false.  We, both, are what we are regardless.

[bennyboy]

Without an appreciation of the subjective capacity, in particular for the experience of suffering, then this view negates any meaningful sense of morality.

I don't think so, but assuming it did, so what?  

Nah, you're equivocating.  In establishing a moral system, we do so in recognition largely of the fact of subjective suffering.

-or the compelling illusion of subjective suffering as it expresses itself in behavior.  Honestly, Benny, it doesn;t matter.  I don't think you have anything here, but if you did...that wouldn't make EM any more or less true.

But let's examine even your definitions of harm.  They are only "harm" because they matter to a subjective agent who feels value in things.  Sure, you might have a philosophical zombie who acts like it cares about "X," but since it cannot experience the harm of damage to "X," in what sense does it matter whether its behavioral goals are or aren't achieved?  What, morally, distinguishes between a blue Earth and one covered pole to pole in nuclear craters?

Meh, let's not.

Why are you referencing my feelings at all, moral or otherwise, or referring to the concept of evil?  All these things, I'm pretty sure, are illusory by the standards of EM, no?

...because nothing about this life or my experience ...or yours, changes on account of any particular theory of mind being true or false.  We, both, are what we are regardless.

Our capacity for moral feelings, and their resulting behaviors, are real enough, are they not?  If you have a theory of mind to which morality is irrelevant, but the reality is that it IS relevant, then your theory of mind is incorrect or incomplete.

[The Grand Nudger]

Our capacity for moral feelings, and their resulting behaviors, are real enough, are they not?  If you have a theory of mind to which morality is irrelevant, but the reality is that it IS relevant, then your theory of mind is incorrect or incomplete.

They're no more or less what they are, regardless of how they are arrived at. Saying that a theory of mind is incorrect or incomplete because you believe it rubs up against a negatively valued consequence of some moral system you have in your mind?

What sense does that make?

[bennyboy]

Our capacity for moral feelings, and their resulting behaviors, are real enough, are they not?  If you have a theory of mind to which morality is irrelevant, but the reality is that it IS relevant, then your theory of mind is incorrect or incomplete.

They're no more or less what they are, regardless of how they are arrived at.  Saying that a theory of mind is incorrect or incomplete because you believe it rubs up against a negatively valued consequence of some moral system you have in your mind?

What sense does that make?

First of all, so far as I can tell, eliminativism isn't a theory of mind.  It's a theory of nope-not-that.  You can say, for example, that morality, free will, and a sense of self are illusory because it doesn't "map" to any locatable physical system, process or property.  What you can't say is what it is like to experience moral ideas and feelings, and why that should matter.

The sense of it is that we are clearly highly social animals, and that our social behaviors are mediated by emotions, experiences and ideas.  Claiming that this-or-that feeling is illusory leaves a void-- you have to explain why we DO behave certain ways, and hopefully be able to establish some sense of how we SHOULD behave.

I can pretty simply explain moral ideas in subjective terms-- mothers feel great pain at the idea of harm coming to their offspring, and so they will struggle very hard to avoid that happening.  Where does eliminativism stand on ANY description of any part of humanity except nitpicking about what consciousness-is-not, what love-is-not, what self-is-not and so on?

[The Grand Nudger]

First of all, so far as I can tell, eliminativism isn't a theory of mind.  It's a theory of nope-not-that.  You can say, for example, that morality, free will, and a sense of self are illusory because it doesn't "map" to any locatable physical system, process or property.  What you can't say is what it is like to experience moral ideas and feelings, and why that should matter.

The sense of it is that we are clearly highly social animals, and that our social behaviors are mediated by emotions, experiences and ideas.  Claiming that this-or-that feeling is illusory leaves a void-- you have to explain why we DO behave certain ways, and hopefully be able to establish some sense of how we SHOULD behave.

I can pretty simply explain moral ideas in subjective terms-- mothers feel great pain at the idea of harm coming to their offspring, and so they will struggle very hard to avoid that happening.  Where does eliminativism stand on ANY description of any part of humanity except nitpicking about what consciousness-is-not, what love-is-not, what self-is-not and so on?

Eliminative materialim isn't going to tell you how you should feel about anything, or why some x should matter.  Honestly, you're going to feel the way you do regardless, right?  

Void?  This is like claiming that the person who establishes that dragons don't exist has to fill the void they leave behind. There were never dragons to begin with. There is no void, all is exactly as it was before.

Eliminative materialism is a position on how the brain might achieve these things.  A position on what is or is not true with regards to that operation.  That's it, that's all.