Objective morality as a proper basic belief

[Astreja]

RoadRunner, thank you for your thoughtful and nuanced approach.

Observation does seem to support your statement "most people behave as if there is a moral realism.  That morals are objective, and actually honorable or wrong, regardless of the subject, time, or culture."  Certainly most of us tend to behave as if morality could be objective, regardless of whether or not it actually is (or could be) objective.

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On another matter, I see an additional problem with Little Henry's insistence that morality must be grounded in a supreme being of some sort.  What happens when the belief system or the attributes of a god change, as they so often do?  The nature of the being that one believes in will largely determine what is considered good or bad in that system.

[The Grand Nudger]

Attempting to ground an objective morality in a god is pointless.  What can be said, objectively, about god?

[Astonished]

Attempting to ground an objective morality in a god is pointless.  What can be said, objectively, about god?

That he's a dick?

[Amarok]

A moral subjectivist would simply morals across time and culture are anthropological. Because human civilizations did not appear in a vacuum . As morals across time that bullocks. The ancient Greeks thought defined and dealt with rape in totally different way then us for example. Some overarching themes does not objective morality make.

[Angrboda]

I never said God's nature is arbitrarily good.  What I did say was that the standard of goodness which God's nature meets must come from himself, or it must come from somewhere else.  Those are the two horns of the dilemma, and they are inescapable.  Saying that God's nature is "necessary" adds nothing to the question.  It is a non-answer.  Either the standard of goodness comes from God himself, in which case it's arbitrary, or it comes from somewhere else, obviating God.  It's irrelevant whether it "necessarily" comes from God or not.  Contingency and necessity have nothing to do with it.

By saying it can come from somewhere then you are saying that it is contingent.  That is to say it is a property that he could have lacked. This is incorrect. Gods moral character is ESSENTIAL to him. That is why i said it is a part of his nature. That is, there is no possible world in which God could have existed without those attributes. God didn't come to being loving, holy etc by accident or by luck.

Also his nature doesnt come from himself. He didnt decide his own nature.

You are confusing a logical dependency with a temporal/physical dependency. The good is contingent upon having a certain relationship to God's nature in order for it to qualify as the good. You've simply asserted that God is good and has always been good. In order for God to qualify as the source of morals, he must be good in a particular way; not simply be good. In order for God to be the source of morals, the question is not whether or not God is good, but what logical relationship God has to the good. If he simply is good by virtue of his properties, whatever they are, then that is indeed an arbitrary logical relationship. In order for God to be the source of morals, he must have the right sort of relationship to the good. You've simply dodged the question. Whether or not God is the source of morals depends upon his relationship to the good. If the good exists independent of God, and the relationship is that God is good because he meets that standard, then God is not the source of morals. The question is not "Is God considered good?" but rather "Why is God considered good?" You've completely failed to answer that question and it is that question which defines the logical relationship between God and the good. That is the substance of the dilemma, and you've once again failed to meet it.

I did no such thing.  I posed a dilemma with two horns.  Either God's nature is good because the standard of goodness comes from himself, or because the standard of goodness comes from somewhere else.  There is no third option.  Claiming I assumed something I didn't assume is just more waffling on your part.  You can't refute the dilemma, so you're just throwing out arbitrary answers.

Both horns have been refuted.

Not even close. You confused logical with temporal/physical dependency and simply dodged the question by asserting that God is good. In order for God to be the source of morals, he must have the right sort of relationship to the good. You didn't address his relationship to the good at all. You merely offered a definitional argument that God is good by definition. That doesn't answer the dilemma.

[Amarok]

And I repeat you can't simply define god as good regardless of when or where. If you do your arbitrarily attaching the property to him . If you defining the properties he has as good you do so without warrant . So you can keep repeating the same failed point over and over. Or you can get to work solving the dilemma you have thus failed to escape .

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By saying it can come from somewhere then you are saying that it is contingent.  That is to say it is a property that he could have lacked. This is incorrect. Gods moral character is ESSENTIAL to him. That is why i said it is a part of his nature. That is, there is no possible world in which God could have existed without those attributes. God didn't come to being loving, holy etc by accident or by luck.

Also his nature doesnt come from himself. He didnt decide his own nature.

You are confusing a logical dependency with a temporal dependency.  The good is contingent upon having a certain relationship to God's nature in order for it to qualify as the good.  You've simply asserted that God is good and has always been good.  In order for God to qualify as the source of morals, he must be good in a particular way; not simply be good.   In order for God to be the source of morals, the question is not whether or not God is good, but what logical relationship God has to the good.  If he simply is good by virtue of his properties, whatever they are, then that is indeed an arbitrary logical relationship.  In order for God to be the source of morals, he must have the right sort of relationship to the good.  You've simply dodged the question.  Whether or not God is the source of morals depends upon his relationship to the good.  If the good exists independent of God, and the relationship is that God is good because he meets that standard, then God is not the source of morals.  The question is not "Is God considered good?" but rather "Why is God considered good?"  You've completely failed to answer that question and it is that question which defines the logical relationship between God and the good.  That is the substance of the dilemma, and you've once again failed to meet it.

Both horns have been refuted.

Not even close.  You confused logical with temporal dependency and simply dodged the question by asserting that God is good.  In order for God to be the source of morals, he must have the right sort of relationship to the good.  You didn't address his relationship to the good at all.  You merely offered a definitional argument that God is good by definition.  That doesn't answer the dilemma.

As always Jorm you right on point

[Whateverist]

Watching Jormandy argue with slap-dash apologists is a lot like watching the GS Warriors play the local high school team. I mean, yeah, it's a mismatch but you still have to admire the quality of play by the winning side.

[The Grand Nudger]

The assertion that god is good needn't be argued against or criticized.  We are still, then, basing our morality off "the good"- with god as a convenient proxy for whomever may believe in whatever god is good. If god were not good, then it would not be moral to base ones decisions on whatever that god did or had to say. We've already seen one believer justify the assertion with a harm based assessment of goodness. Well....okay?

 Skip god, aim for the good.

[JackRussell]

Jormangandr certainly speaks far more clearly and eloquently than I could ever hope to.

I am kind of sick of the rape thing, as I was raped as a child over the course of nearly 3 years. The person that raped me was a theist. I cannot prove that to you, I am just a random person on the internet, but I am not interested in being untruthful.

Morality is about personal responsibility and wellbeing. This is why we treat minors in a different way to adults that break the law.

I am not interested in clever sophistry, I am interested in what works in the real world. Secular morality, a morality that go develop in the light of new information and better evidence is preferable to a morality by fiat.

I am reminded of Hitchen's question: can you name a moral action that a theist could follow that a non-theist couldn't also. But religion can certainly make a good person do bad things.

Slavery is fine in the bible, was fine in most of the world until recently, and sadly continues. I would rather be part of a system that seeks to end this than part of a system that can still justify this if it wants too.

I am not a deep thinker, like some that post here on both sides of the divide, but I am human, I try to be moral and I have never experienced any gods.

[Mister Agenda]

I had hoped at least the first one would be obvious, since I named it: Appeal to emotion and appeal to consequences. And maybe appeal to incredulity.
Plus it is factually untrue that that people who believe morality is entirely subjective can't condemn Nazi war crimes. They can and usually do.

As a side note, the Nazis, who largely subscribed to OM, did not seem to often consider their atrocities to be crimes.

In my view I don't think that either side, can make a definitive argument for the conclusion.   However I don't think that it is incorrect, to appeal to the consequences of the logical conclusion of a view (especially when adherents to that view don't behave in a manner inconsistent with that belief). This is part of what is meant, by appealing to an innate sense concerning objective morality.  Now I would agree, that just because we don't like the consequences or it gives a negative emotional reaction, that we cannot logically conclude that it is either true or false.   This would be the fallacy that you speak of.  But I find a dissonance between what is said that subjective moralist believe, and how they behave.  Requiring you to accept the consequences of said belief is not illogical or incoherent.  Your example about condemning the Nazis is apropos.

It is a pickle. I have had a similar initial visceral reaction to a friend going with 'morality is subjective', however my cognitive dissonance at the idea doesn't mean it's wrong or that I get to try to back him into a corner regarding endorsing atrocities if he doesn't accept that doing so is an implication of his position.

I can't comment intelligently on the Nazis position on OM (perhaps they had varying views as the label doesn't require any particular holding that I know of) Also, an incorrect belief, doesn't change whether the topic at hand, is objective or subjective by nature (regardless of the subjects belief about it's nature).  Here I normally ask the question though.   What is it based on the subject that makes it wrong?   Is it merely against your tastes or preferences?  With a different subject thus a different basis, isn't their position equally valid; subjectively?

I think there is a repetitive attempt to make those that hold that morality is subjective as having a morality equivalent to having a preference for a particular kind of ice cream. I think that's a false equivalence, because moral choices are drastically more consequential. It's an attempt to demean the position rather than refute it, like saying team sports hold little value because it's just people chasing balls. Morality can be subjective, but involve life-and-death consequences...and virtually everyone subjectively does not want to be murdered or tortured.

Now I find that most people behave as if there is a moral realism.  That morals are objective, and actually honorable or wrong, regardless of the subject, time, or culture.  That there is an innate sense, that some things are definitely wrong, outside of the subject (culture), and anything within them.  Subjective is not the default position (neither is objective).  And as I said, I don't think either can make a strong argument that it is one way or the other. However I find that the behavior of people shows more about what they really believe, rather than any statements or what they think the believe.   It's similar to the post modern notion held by some, of objective truth or that of philosophical nihilism.  In reality, they quickly betray what they say it is they believe.

Do they really say they believe that all actions are morally equal? Just because they don't conform to how you think a moral subjectivist 'must' behave doesn't mean they aren't a moral subjectivist. None of those things you say people have an innate sense about is universal; and if it was an innate sense, it would be universal. There could reasonably be defective individuals who didn't have that 'sense', but there wouldn't be cultural differences over whether genocide is okay.

I'm a moral realist, btw, but I get that if you don't find the axiom that what is good for people is good self-evident, you're not going to agree with my moral reasoning, though you may coincidentally agree with my moral conclusions. When someone says their morality is grounded on a deity's pronouncements, they're just basing their morality on a different axiom than I do. I don't find that one self-evident at all.