Objective morality as a proper basic belief

[Astonished]

And from an evolutionary standpoint it makes far more sense than anything theists claim; otherwise we'd be perfectly fine with slavery instead of instinctively feeling that it's an abhorrent thing. You have to be indoctrinated or sociopathic to think otherwise (or both). Deference to authority also makes more sense in an evolutionary sense because otherwise we would ONLY consider one authority to be viable and yet it can go in any direction imaginable, not towards the alleged 'one true god' and its will.

OFC it makes more sense than fairies.  It's hard to make less sense.  Deference to authority is, to some extent, our evolutionary inheritance in that we belong to a genus that has elaborate and unmistakable displays and relationships surrounding dominance.  However, a moral standard can both justify or delegitimize an authority.  An objective morality standard would do so demonstrably. 

You just can't remove subjective aspects from it so you have to take that into account. What act is worse than another, whose life is worth more than another if you can only save one or the other, etc., the shitty gritty things we don't deal with as often, thankfully. So while that removes the idea of an absolute authority (which makes no sense anyway) it doesn't render the whole thing irrelevant or incoherent whatsoever. It's all that works with whatever little we have and we don't have anything else that can actually be demonstrated to work in the same consistent way.

An objective moral schema doesn't remove the idea of an absolute authority, in a meaningful sense it becomes one.  This is -why- religions seek to conflate the character of their gods with an objective moral standard.  I don't think that the things you consider to be subjective -are- subjective.  I think that -we- are subjective agents attempting to manufacture moral statements by reference to purportedly objective standards.  What's worse...murder or manslaughter?  Why?

I'm referring to when they try to co-opt this and take credit for it, so their appeal to authority fails where the evolutionary explanation does not.

Do we become the absolute authorities? That doesn't seem to make sense. That seems like a recipe for falling under an absolute authority which in and of itself is not very helpful when it comes to preventing harm. Having an objective ideal is fine but imbuing ourselves with the power rather than the idea is somewhat arrogant and that should, according to the axiom, be avoided for what it can lead to. You could call it an absolute STANDARD we're aiming for (maximizing well-being and minimizing harm) but the agents involved? I don't feel comfortable going that far.

And yes, we use objective standards to make our case for why this is this and that is that, but if we're using the same objective criteria and coming to different conclusions (your example is inappropriate because the two things are not directly comparable; I would cite the sinking ship dilemma here instead) then that's subjective, is it not? Also when it's a question of degrees, even when the action is agreed upon, is a subjective measure. I don't understand why you keep trying to dismiss that, it seems odd.

[RoadRunner79]

What do you mean by "with harm as axiomatic to a moral system"? What are you saying this relationship between harm and morality is"

Just stop, you're done.

No.... I'm not.   But if you are not going to discuss what you mean, then you are the one who is done.  Some mythicist may take your silence to mean, that you do not know.

I don't disagree with that.... I think it is similar what is referred to as an inate sense, in many arguements by theists.

You'd have to be arguing for an objective morality, you aren't. Our innate sense, that provides us with reliable moral guesses, is called "empathy".  It helps us, for example, understand harm.  It doesn't..however, provide or inform us as to an objective moral schema.

So, you don't think that morality is a properly basic belief?

[Astonished]

Just stop, you're done.

No.... I'm not.   But if you are not going to discuss what you mean, then you are the one who is done.  Some mythicist may take your silence to mean, that you do not know.

You'd have to be arguing for an objective morality, you aren't. Our innate sense, that provides us with reliable moral guesses, is called "empathy".  It helps us, for example, understand harm.  It doesn't..however, provide or inform us as to an objective moral schema.

So, you don't think that morality is a properly basic belief?

Your reading comprehension, or lack thereof, is, like the name says, astonishing.

[RoadRunner79]

No.... I'm not.   But if you are not going to discuss what you mean, then you are the one who is done.  Some mythicist may take your silence to mean, that you do not know.


So, you don't think that morality is a properly basic belief?

Your reading comprehension, or lack thereof, is, like the name says, astonishing.

As I said, I assume, that when he starts arguing like a 12 year old, he is disagreeing with me.    If you would like to explain, feel free!

[downbeatplumb]

Ok... lets try this in the form of a logical syllogism.

Premise 1:  That which is harmful is immoral
Premise 2:  Jack accidentally tripped Jill causing her harm.

Conclusion:  Jack behaved immorally.


Is this valid?  You already said that is wasn't once when you agreed with the C.S. Lewis reference.  Now granted that you can change your mind, I don't think that you will.  How would you invalidate this syllogism?

It is not immoral because Jack did not intend harm, however Jack can still feel awful because intentionally or not he caused harm.

At that point the harm is the issue rather than the intent.

I can feel sorry for my wife when she stubbs her toe, I had no part in the stubbing but I have empathy.

[The Grand Nudger]

Just stop, you're done.

No.... I'm not.   But if you are not going to discuss what you mean, then you are the one who is done.  Some mythicist may take your silence to mean, that you do not know.

I'm not going to keep explaining the same things that I;ve already explained to you, multiples times..and had already explained multiples times to others before you.  Particularly not every time one of your less than brilliant objections falls flat on it's face.  There is no reset button..and if there were, no thinking person would let you near it.  You'd have busted it with wear by now.  

So, you don't think that morality is a properly basic belief?

It's strange that you'd come to that conclusion, what with me telling you what I think is axiomatic to morality, and how it is an objective standard based upon harm.  Have we found yet another term you don't understand?  Try googling it.

---

I'm referring to when they try to co-opt this and take credit for it, so their appeal to authority fails where the evolutionary explanation does not.

Conversely, their appeal to authority fails when their own proposed authority runs afoul of the objective moral standards.  The butcher of cities does not get to comment on civility, the murderer of the better man knows nothing about justice or atonement.  

Do we become the absolute authorities? That doesn't seem to make sense. That seems like a recipe for falling under an absolute authority which in and of itself is not very helpful when it comes to preventing harm. Having an objective ideal is fine but imbuing ourselves with the power rather than the idea is somewhat arrogant and that should, according to the axiom, be avoided for what it can lead to. You could call it an absolute STANDARD we're aiming for (maximizing well-being and minimizing harm) but the agents involved? I don't feel comfortable going that far.

I was speaking about the standard being an absolute authority in a meaningful sense, not it's operators.  If we want to know whether or not something is immoral or why, we refer to the harm it may cause.  There is no other way to do so and still speak authoritatively about an objective morality.

And yes, we use objective standards to make our case for why this is this and that is that, but if we're using the same objective criteria and coming to different conclusions (your example is inappropriate because the two things are not directly comparable; I would cite the sinking ship dilemma here instead) then that's subjective, is it not? Also when it's a question of degrees, even when the action is agreed upon, is a subjective measure. I don't understand why you keep trying to dismiss that, it seems odd.

Murder and manslaughter not being directly comparable?  That's a new wrinkle.  That's the very first thing we try to determine when one person somehow manages to kill another. That we can determine one to be murder and one to be manslaughter by the same objective standards doesn't make something the least bit subjective.  We are assessing the object - the specifics of the death.   A "question of degrees" is similarly objective.  

I wouldn't, and couldn't dismiss the difference between manslaughter and murder in the first or second..but these things have set conditions and requirements that we can objectively refer to in order to make the distinction.  That doesn't make them subjective, it makes them different things, objectively. The prosecutor doesn;t say to the jury "I'm feeling vindictive today, so I'm going to charge this person with murder in the 1st". They make their case. Similarly, they do not think to themselves "I feel merciful today...so I;m going to charge this murderer with manslaughter" - they assess the specifics of the case. Ultimately, what is legal does not always align with what is or is not moral..but in this instance there's a strong correlation since there is, in murder or manslaughter, a moral fact of the matter. That moral fact of the matter is what is referred to in making the distinctions... it's demonstrable, and independent of any given moral subject.

Toss us a formulation of whatever dilemma you had in mind. We'll apply an objective standard and see what we come up with?

[Astonished]

No.... I'm not.   But if you are not going to discuss what you mean, then you are the one who is done.  Some mythicist may take your silence to mean, that you do not know.

I'm not going to keep explaining the same things that I;ve already explained to you, multiples times..and had already explained multiples times to others before you.  Particularly not every time one of your less than brilliant objections falls flat on it's face.  There is no reset button..and if there were, no thinking person would let you near it.  You'd have busted it with wear by now.  

So, you don't think that morality is a properly basic belief?

It's strange that you'd come to that conclusion, what with me telling you what I think is axiomatic to morality, and how it is an objective standard based upon harm.  Have we found yet another term you don't understand?  Try googling it.

---

I'm referring to when they try to co-opt this and take credit for it, so their appeal to authority fails where the evolutionary explanation does not.

Conversely, their appeal to authority fails when their own proposed authority runs afoul of the objective moral standards.  The butcher of cities does not get to comment on civility, the murderer of the better man knows nothing about justice or atonement.  

Do we become the absolute authorities? That doesn't seem to make sense. That seems like a recipe for falling under an absolute authority which in and of itself is not very helpful when it comes to preventing harm. Having an objective ideal is fine but imbuing ourselves with the power rather than the idea is somewhat arrogant and that should, according to the axiom, be avoided for what it can lead to. You could call it an absolute STANDARD we're aiming for (maximizing well-being and minimizing harm) but the agents involved? I don't feel comfortable going that far.

I was speaking about the standard being an absolute authority in a meaningful sense, not it's operators.  If we want to know whether or not something is immoral or why, we refer to the harm it may cause.  There is no other way to do so and still speak authoritatively about an objective morality.

And yes, we use objective standards to make our case for why this is this and that is that, but if we're using the same objective criteria and coming to different conclusions (your example is inappropriate because the two things are not directly comparable; I would cite the sinking ship dilemma here instead) then that's subjective, is it not? Also when it's a question of degrees, even when the action is agreed upon, is a subjective measure. I don't understand why you keep trying to dismiss that, it seems odd.

Murder and manslaughter not being directly comparable?  That's a new wrinkle.  That's the very first thing we try to determine when one person somehow manages to kill another. That we can determine one to be murder and one to be manslaughter by the same objective standards doesn't make something the least bit subjective.  We are assessing the object - the specifics of the death.   A "question of degrees" is similarly objective.  

I wouldn't, and couldn't dismiss the difference between manslaughter and murder in the first or second..but these things have set conditions and requirements that we can objectively refer to in order to make the distinction.  That doesn't make them subjective, it makes them different things, objectively.  The prosecutor doesn;t say to the jury "I'm feeling vindictive today, so I'm going to charge this person with murder in the 1st".  They make their case.  Similarly, they do not think to themselves "I feel merciful today...so I;m going to charge this murderer with manslaughter" - they assess the specifics of the case.  Ultimately, what is legal does not always align with what is or is not moral..but in this instance there's a strong correlation since there is, in murder or manslaughter, a moral fact of the matter.  That moral fact of the matter is what is referred to in making the distinctions... it's demonstrable, and independent of any given moral subject.

Toss us a formulation of whatever dilemma you had in mind.  We'll apply an objective standard and see what we come up with?

I'm amazed you could compare murder and manslaughter when the intent is the central difference. This is why I'm concerned about your view and definitions of this and always have been.

But let me illustrate a specific situation that you are not grasping, perhaps that will shed some light. The sinking ship dilemma I'm referring to (which I first learned about in a sociology class, so maybe it's not commonly known) is a hypothetical wherein there's a ship sinking and only one lifeboat, able to only hold X number of people while the ship contains some number greater than X. One must decide which of those number of folks get on the lifeboat and which ones drown. Yes, you would base the decision upon objective criteria (a doctor is more valuable than a medical student, for instance) but not everyone would reach the same conclusion, even if using the exact same objective fact to justify their decision. You can't simply remove subjectivity from the equation and I don't understand why you would want to do that anyway.

And what I meant by degrees is, if two situations are extremely similar (please don't make the mistake of one where intent is the difference, that's just silly) then a subjective decision on the application of disciplinary measures is required for both. Or even a situation on its own, not needing comparison to another, is still in need of a subjectively determined solution. Simple compensation for whatever was lost or damaged, or some other penalty on top of that? If so, just how severe of a penalty? That's all subjective. Those are the kinds of things you're not going to get a consensus on or be able to say definitively that it's always the correct approach to a given situation.

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm amazed you could compare murder and manslaughter when the intent is the central difference. This is why I'm concerned about your view and definitions of this and always have been.

Is there something less than objective about demonstrable intent?  Your amazement is misplaced, we routinely compare some death x to the standards of both in order to determine which it is from the outset. That's the point of discovery, the point of a trial, the point of it being overseen by a judge, and the point of a jury panel. All of these things exist, ideally, so that we might reach an objectively justifiable charge.

But let me illustrate a specific situation that you are not grasping, perhaps that will shed some light. The sinking ship dilemma I'm referring to (which I first learned about in a sociology class, so maybe it's not commonly known) is a hypothetical wherein there's a ship sinking and only one lifeboat, able to only hold X number of people while the ship contains some number greater than X. One must decide which of those number of folks get on the lifeboat and which ones drown. Yes, you would base the decision upon objective criteria (a doctor is more valuable than a medical student, for instance) but not everyone would reach the same conclusion, even if using the exact same objective fact to justify their decision. You can't simply remove subjectivity from the equation and I don't understand why you would want to do that anyway.

Moral disagreement exists, I can only say this so many times.  No one's removing our necessarily subjective natures from the issue, I told you at the outset that it's pointless to do so.  That doesn't make the moral standard, itself, any less objective.  Nor, in my opinion, is it -impossible- for a subjective agent like ourselves to arrive at an objective conclusion, nor is the nature of the moral agent as a subjective agent an impediment to making objective statements about that agent.  If we used the exact same objective facts about something, and a consistent moral reasoning, we could not help but arrive at the same conclusion. That we do not demonstrably shows that we refer to different moral facts, or a different moral reasoning. You might save a child, and I might save an experienced mariner (or vv). What could account for our disparate decisions?

And what I meant by degrees is, if two situations are extremely similar (please don't make the mistake of one where intent is the difference, that's just silly) then a subjective decision on the application of disciplinary measures is required for both.

Is it, or is an objective assessment regarding the differences and any pursuant moral desert required?  I, obviously, tend towards the latter.  That's -why- we standardize consequences in ethics and law, so that it isn't up to the whim of any particular subjective agent. 

Or even a situation on its own, not needing comparison to another, is still in need of a subjectively determined solution. Simple compensation for whatever was lost or damaged, or some other penalty on top of that? If so, just how severe of a penalty? That's all subjective. Those are the kinds of things you're not going to get a consensus on or be able to say definitively that it's always the correct approach to a given situation.

Is a subjective agent incapable of making an objective determination?  Isn't the purpose of objective standards, or of rigorous application of logic....to overcome whatever bias we may possess as subjective agents?  Simply saying " a person made that assessment therefore it;s subjective " is not only wrong, it's a meaningless distinction.  All assessments made by human beings are made by subjective creatures.  That doesn't make those assessments subjective by fiat.

You call me Khemikal. Is the fact that you call me Khemikal somehow -not- an objective description of who I am, simply for it having been mouthed by yourself, a subjective agent? If that were so, there would be no such thing -as- a fact to begin with, no such thing as an objectively true statement. My wife, however, calls me by a different name (and many here know me by another, lol). The existence of (at least) three different answers for this single question is not indicative of subjectivity, but of competing facts objectively expressed by subjective agents. Everyone who calls me by any name is right, simultaneously (just don't call me late for dinner).

[RoadRunner79]

Ok... lets try this in the form of a logical syllogism.

Premise 1:  That which is harmful is immoral
Premise 2:  Jack accidentally tripped Jill causing her harm.

Conclusion:  Jack behaved immorally.


Is this valid?  You already said that is wasn't once when you agreed with the C.S. Lewis reference.  Now granted that you can change your mind, I don't think that you will.  How would you invalidate this syllogism?

It is not immoral because Jack did not intend harm, however Jack can still feel awful because intentionally or not he caused harm.

At that point the harm is the issue rather than the intent.

I can feel sorry for my wife when she stubbs her toe, I had no part in the stubbing but I have empathy.

Keep in mind, that I was just examining the reasons given by the other poster. In doing so, I'm not making any assumptions, beyond what they had said (because it causes harm, and that you can equate harm and immorality).

I agree, that most people are going to come to a similar conclusion as you did. And thus come to the outcome that the syllogism is wrong. While harm may normally be involved in what we call immoral, harm alone, isn't a sufficient basis. Intent also comes into play. I would say that the intent is more important in the matter than the harm (actualized or not). Would you agree?

What of a man who is cheating on his wife and ensures that she never finds out. There is no harm done (physical or emotional). There is not an intent to harm, which is why he keeps it from her. But there is betrayal and disloyalty. Is this immoral?

[The Grand Nudger]

It is not immoral because Jack did not intend harm, however Jack can still feel awful because intentionally or not he caused harm.

At that point the harm is the issue rather than the intent.

I can feel sorry for my wife when she stubbs her toe, I had no part in the stubbing but I have empathy.

Keep in mind, that I was just examining the reasons given by the other poster.  In doing so, I'm not making any assumptions, beyond what they had said (because it causes harm, and that you can equate harm and immorality).

I agree, that most people are going to come to a similar conclusion as you did.  And thus come to the outcome that the syllogism is wrong. While harm may normally be involved in what we call immoral, harm alone, isn't a sufficient basis.  Intent also comes into play.  I would say that the intent is more important in the matter than the harm (actualized or not). Would you agree?

What of a man who is cheating on his wife and ensures that she never finds out.  There is no harm done (physical or emotional). There is not an intent to harm, which is why he keeps it from her. But there is betrayal and disloyalty.  Is this immoral?

Who said it was?  Why would it be? If you want to respond to what other posters have said, then you'll have to respond to what other posters have said.  Try my 1-2-3

The moral fact of the matter, the agency of the subject, and moral desert pursuant to 1 and 2.

Or maybe assess moral compulsion by a reference to 1, 2, and 3.

Is a society which promotes or ignores betrayal and disloyalty a harmful society, or a society which by it;s action or inaction becomes complicit to harm? Why yes, yes it is. Can society understand and do something about that? Why yes, yes it can. Does a society which prevents or discourages such harm deserve our moral support? Why, yes, it does. See how we could, if we wanted to, completely leave out the man in question? There's no need, really, since...you've contradicted yourself by the end of the breath claiming that he causes no harm but then asking about betrayal and disloyalty, which -is- harmful. Apparently, he did cause harm....and intentionally so, he simply hasn't been caught yet.

Being a supernice guy otherwise, and trying to hide his acts -betrays- the fact that he knows it's harmful, that you know it's harmful, that we all know it's harmful. Does your own betrayal, here, imply or uggest that you are an immoral person? Or could there be something in the 1-2-3 that gives you a pass for actively continuing to supply dishonest argumentation? Ignorance, perhaps? Diminished agency?