Anslem's argument is sound.

[Angrboda]

You think "greater" is subjective because you are confusing the fact that God is the greatest concievable being with our descerning what properties a GCB must possess. These are not the same thing and the former does not depend on the latter.

Since this is not what I think, all this shows is that you haven't understood my argument. Your general complaint here seems to be that I am confusing our imperfect knowledge of the facts of the matter with the belief that this entails that there is no fact of the matter. But this is completely wrongheaded. My argument does not hinge upon what we don't know but rather hinges upon what we do know, namely that there are no objective values. Without any values by which we can rank one thing as objectively greater than another, the concept of greatness becomes vacuous. It's not that we have an imperfect understanding of what constitutes greatness, the problem is that we have perfect knowledge of what it does mean, objectively it doesn't mean anything. It isn't that we are confused about what the term 'greatest conceivable being' refers to -- we know what it refers to because it doesn't refer to anything at all.

A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. In his debates and Q&As, WLC uses the example of Timelessness. Is it greater to be timeless or in time? That is not clear to us. But that does not imply that there are no great-making properties or that the concept of a CGB is subjective. 

You're right. A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. It's the fact that there are no objective values which implies that there is no objective truth about the matter. This is simply an example of ignoratio elenchi on your part.

It could be the case that some properties are not great-making on their own, but are a result of or linked to or limited by some other property. For example, omniscience does not entail knowing all things because there are some propositions not possible to know (like knowing what virtuous feel like). A limit imposed by a superseding great-making property. So, it makes no sense to ask is it greater to have experienced virtue than not--because it is not a logical possibility.

What on earth are you babbling about? Of course experiencing virtue is a logical possibility. What you seem to be trying to say is that it is not possible to be all good and to also experience virtue. I agree. That was the whole point in introducing the subject, namely that the greatest possible being could be all good, or experience virtue. It was brought up to show that there may be aspects to being morally imperfect which are preferable to the advantages of being morally perfect. The choice between the two is purely a matter of personal preference, thus undermining your claim that being morally perfect was necessarily better than being morally imperfect. It was simply an example to show that you haven't in any sense demonstrated that being morally perfect is greater than being morally imperfect. Objective facts cannot settle that question as it is purely a matter of preference. Regardless, my point was simply to show that depending on what one subjectively values, your claim was not necessarily true. As a matter of necessity, moral perfection is not greater than moral imperfection because the term 'great' is not an objective descriptor. Your claim is false, ultimately, because objective values do not exist.

'Conceivable' is metaphysically the same as 'possible'. Not 'imaginable'. 

I don't even know what the phrase "metaphysically the same as 'possible'" even means. Conceiving is "metaphysically the same" as conceiving. I can conceive of a unicorn. In no sense is that the same as saying unicorns are possible, metaphysically or otherwise. There are subtle differences between conceivability and imaginability, but that has nothing to do with this absurd claim. I can only guess that this is some inchoate abbreviation of an objection you failed to bring to full fruition. As such, it means nothing by itself.

For the above reasons, God would have objectively great-making properties regardless of our ability to discern them. In fact, only God is capable of conceiving the complete set of great-making properties.  They would still apply if we existed or not, so to hang coherence on whether we can conceive of them just does not make sense.

Since I haven't hung the claim that there is no such thing as a greatest conceivable being on our ability to discern just what properties are great making, this objection is irrelevant and further proof that you haven't understood the argument. The phrase 'greatest conceivable being' does not refer to anything at all, not because of what we can't discern, but rather because of what we can discern, namely that there are no objective values. Without values by which to express a preference for one thing over another, there can be no preferences. It's not a matter of us not knowing exactly what the phrase refers to, but rather a consequence of knowing exactly what it refers to: it doesn't refer to anything at all. It's a meaningless, nonsense term.

[henryp]

If you don't value actual life, what do you value?

So this is where it gets tricky, because I'm going to say value to mean one thing, and you think of it as another.

I value donuts.  They are delicious.  I do not value brussel sprouts.  They are gross.  

I don't believe my valuing donuts but not brussel sprouts says anything about donuts or brussel sprouts having any intrinsic value. 

I do value my life.  But in the same way I value donuts.  It's something I like.  That most of us like being alive does not make life inherently valuable.  It's just a common opinion.  Just like most people liking donuts doesn't make them more valuable than brussel sprouts, which are generally despised.  

What I think you need for your argument is a way to show human life is valuable that isn't based on an opinion, as you can see with many examples that opinion of value and intrinsic value (such as with donuts) are not connected.

[emjay]

I definitely go against the grain of common opinion on that one; I love brussel sprouts and hate donuts. I don't know what everyone's got against that lovely little vegetable... it's about one of the green things that's actually got some flavour and doesn't taste bland. I snack on them like I snack on junk food.

Anyway in addition, opinions change... my favourite foods change... and the value I put on my life... as an opinion as you put it, changes with my mood as well.

[SteveII]

You think "greater" is subjective because you are confusing the fact that God is the greatest concievable being with our descerning what properties a GCB must possess. These are not the same thing and the former does not depend on the latter.

Since this is not what I think, all this shows is that you haven't understood my argument.  Your general complaint here seems to be that I am confusing our imperfect knowledge of the facts of the matter with the belief that this entails that there is no fact of the matter.  But this is completely wrongheaded.  My argument does not hinge upon what we don't know but rather hinges upon what we do know, namely that there are no objective values.  Without any values by which we can rank one thing as objectively greater than another, the concept of greatness becomes vacuous.  It's not that we have an imperfect understanding of what constitutes greatness, the problem is that we have perfect knowledge of what it does mean, objectively it doesn't mean anything.  It isn't that we are confused about what the term 'greatest conceivable being' refers to -- we know what it refers to because it doesn't refer to anything at all.

A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. In his debates and Q&As, WLC uses the example of Timelessness. Is it greater to be timeless or in time? That is not clear to us. But that does not imply that there are no great-making properties or that the concept of a CGB is subjective. 

You're right.  A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter.  It's the fact that there are no objective values which implies that there is no objective truth about the matter.  This is simply an example of ignoratio elenchi on your part.

An omniscient mind could certainly rank value of a property or ability on a better-than scale because it could consider all logically possible scenarios at once. Therefore maximal greatness can be know by an omniscient mind and therefore 'value' is not subjective. 

It could be the case that some properties are not great-making on their own, but are a result of or linked to or limited by some other property. For example, omniscience does not entail knowing all things because there are some propositions not possible to know (like knowing what virtuous feel like). A limit imposed by a superseding great-making property. So, it makes no sense to ask is it greater to have experienced virtue than not--because it is not a logical possibility.

What on earth are you babbling about?  Of course experiencing virtue is a logical possibility.  What you seem to be trying to say is that it is not possible to be all good and to also experience virtue.  I agree.  That was the whole point in introducing the subject, namely that the greatest possible being could be all good, or experience virtue.  It was brought up to show that there may be aspects to being morally imperfect which are preferable to the advantages of being morally perfect.  The choice between the two is purely a matter of personal preference, thus undermining your claim that being morally perfect was necessarily better than being morally imperfect.  It was simply an example to show that you haven't in any sense demonstrated that being morally perfect is greater than being morally imperfect.  Objective facts cannot settle that question as it is purely a matter of preference. Regardless, my point was simply to show that depending on what one subjectively values, your claim was not necessarily true.  As a matter of necessity, moral perfection is not greater than moral imperfection because the term 'great' is not an objective descriptor.  Your claim is false, ultimately, because objective values do not exist.

You understood what I was saying perfectly. Again, an omniscient mind would be able to assess a better-than value. I think is perfectly clear even to a mortal mind, that being morally perfect is better than, in the aggregate, being morally imperfect because there are far reaching consequences to being imperfect that more than outweigh the occasional advantage. Moral perfection is an all or nothing property so therefore an aggregate assessment is the only possible one.

[The Grand Nudger]

If value is assessed, and objectively so..then by what metric is it assessed? What standard is the omniscient mind using?

Personally, I'm far more interested in whatever those metrics are, whatever that standard is, than some imaginary omniscient mind. By what standard is moral perfection greater than moral imperfection? By what standard are the consequences of either greater than or better than the consequences of the other? Are we still running with the realtionship angle? S;uppose that moral imperfection was greater than or better than moral perfection for building realtionships./ Would that then be the "greatest possible" this that or the other?

We're certainly not unfamiliar with the value of tactful deceit by omission, particularly in the setting of a relationship. A wife certainly does her partner no harm...and probably does him a great deal of good..by not mentioning the bevy of men she slept with before meeting her hubby...and how at least half of them were incalculably better in the sack. Is moral perfection actually conducive to a relationship..or is this your own naive ideological wishthinking, as divorced from reality as the imaginary omniscience which assesses actions by a standard that erodes your own belief in the foundations of morality in the first place?

[Angrboda]

"It's not a question of where he grips it, it's a simple question of weight ratios...."

Since this is not what I think, all this shows is that you haven't understood my argument.  Your general complaint here seems to be that I am confusing our imperfect knowledge of the facts of the matter with the belief that this entails that there is no fact of the matter.  But this is completely wrongheaded.  My argument does not hinge upon what we don't know but rather hinges upon what we do know, namely that there are no objective values.  Without any values by which we can rank one thing as objectively greater than another, the concept of greatness becomes vacuous.  It's not that we have an imperfect understanding of what constitutes greatness, the problem is that we have perfect knowledge of what it does mean, objectively it doesn't mean anything.  It isn't that we are confused about what the term 'greatest conceivable being' refers to -- we know what it refers to because it doesn't refer to anything at all.


You're right.  A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter.  It's the fact that there are no objective values which implies that there is no objective truth about the matter.  This is simply an example of ignoratio elenchi on your part.

An omniscient mind could certainly rank value of a property or ability on a better-than scale because it could consider all logically possible scenarios at once. Therefore maximal greatness can be know by an omniscient mind and therefore 'value' is not subjective.

It's a simple matter, Steve.  Either values are subjective, or they are objective.  According to traditional theist assertions, the universe itself doesn't contain any objective values.  Therefore any values you do find must be subjective.  This notion that with enough knowledge the values would somehow magically appear is incoherent.  It's like trying to assert that there is a "best" flavor of ice cream.  It's not a question of how much knowledge we have about ice cream and potential ice cream eaters.  Knowledge alone can't overcome the basic problem that there simply is no fact of the matter.  Surely the aardvark will say that ant-flavored ice cream is the best, and the lion will swear that it's gazelle-flavored ice cream that's the best.  But these opinions are clearly nothing more than the product of their natures.  If God has a favorite ice cream flavor, it too will be an arbitrary artifact of his nature.  No amount of knowledge on his part will create an objective criterion for evaluating ice cream where none actually exists.  If your God has a preference for one thing or another, that's simply him asserting his subjective values in the matter.  His values are not in any sense privileged over mine.  Knowledge doesn't translate into values, no matter how many times you repeat the argument. 

What on earth are you babbling about?  Of course experiencing virtue is a logical possibility.  What you seem to be trying to say is that it is not possible to be all good and to also experience virtue.  I agree.  That was the whole point in introducing the subject, namely that the greatest possible being could be all good, or experience virtue.  It was brought up to show that there may be aspects to being morally imperfect which are preferable to the advantages of being morally perfect.  The choice between the two is purely a matter of personal preference, thus undermining your claim that being morally perfect was necessarily better than being morally imperfect.  It was simply an example to show that you haven't in any sense demonstrated that being morally perfect is greater than being morally imperfect.  Objective facts cannot settle that question as it is purely a matter of preference. Regardless, my point was simply to show that depending on what one subjectively values, your claim was not necessarily true.  As a matter of necessity, moral perfection is not greater than moral imperfection because the term 'great' is not an objective descriptor.  Your claim is false, ultimately, because objective values do not exist.

You understood what I was saying perfectly.

No, Steve, I still don't understand what you're trying to say.  You remarked that being morally perfect and experiencing virtue preclude one another.  And......  And what?  No point that I could see followed from that observation.

Let's go back to what you said.  First, there was, "For example, omniscience does not entail knowing all things because there are some propositions not possible to know (like knowing what virtuous feel like)."  This seems to be an arbitrary and flawed assertion.  God, being morally perfect, cannot know what virtue feels like because his knowledge is limited, not because of any impossibility in knowing what virtue feels like.  He doesn't know simply because he doesn't know.  Possibility has nothing to do with it.  Then you followed with, "A limit imposed by a superseding great-making property."  That's not even a complete sentence, so I have no clue what you were trying to express with it.  (With the value of hindsight I can see that you were trying to sneak in an arbitrary value by using the word 'superseding'. Since you haven't justified calling it a superseding property, at best this is just a bare assertion.) And then you said, "So, it makes no sense to ask is it greater to have experienced virtue than not--because it is not a logical possibility."  Which doesn't seem to follow from anything said prior.

Again, an omniscient mind would be able to assess a better-than value."

Subjectively, sure.  Objectively, no.  Being omniscient doesn't create values where none exist.  Since better-than assessments require values to derive them, no such assessments can be objectively made without objective values.  Failing that, the idea of "better-than" is simply undefined.

I think is perfectly clear even to a mortal mind, that being morally perfect is better than, in the aggregate, being morally imperfect because there are far reaching consequences to being imperfect that more than outweigh the occasional advantage.

Again with the ipse dixit arguments!  Are you so used to simply asserting your truths that you've completely forgotten how to rationally justify something?

Moral perfection is an all or nothing property so therefore an aggregate assessment is the only possible one.

Aggregate or not, the only way to express a preference for moral perfection is by asserting values.  But you're precluded from doing so by the complete absence of relevant values.  And as long as we're on the subject of moral perfection I will simply say that I think the whole concept of moral perfection or imperfection rests implicitly on a category error.  I don't believe there is such a thing as having a moral or immoral "nature."  As pointed out in the last thread, the whole concept rests on the dubious notion that persons or beings can be intrinsically good or bad.  As a general matter, the moral concepts of good and bad apply to actions, not one's nature.  We figuratively say that Hitler was evil, but only because of the immoral acts he performed, not because of any supposed character defects.  This notion that people have intrinsic moral natures leads to seemingly paradoxical results.  According to it, it's possible that a person who never commits a single immoral act could still nevertheless be considered a "bad person."  I think that most people would find that usage queer, if not downright nonsensical.  Yet it is the conclusion your notions of intrinsic moral character lead us toward.  Personally, I think it's bollocks.  Morals apply to actions, not to "being."

[henryp]

"It's not a question of where he grips it, it's a simple question of weight ratios...."

An omniscient mind could certainly rank value of a property or ability on a better-than scale because it could consider all logically possible scenarios at once. Therefore maximal greatness can be know by an omniscient mind and therefore 'value' is not subjective.

It's a simple matter, Steve.  Either values are subjective, or they are objective.  According to traditional theist assertions, the universe itself doesn't contain any objective values.  Therefore any values you do find must be subjective.  This notion that with enough knowledge the values would somehow magically appear is incoherent.  It's like trying to assert that there is a "best" flavor of ice cream.  It's not a question of how much knowledge we have about ice cream and potential ice cream eaters.  Knowledge alone can't overcome the basic problem that there simply is no fact of the matter.  Surely the aardvark will say that ant-flavored ice cream is the best, and the lion will swear that it's gazelle-flavored ice cream that's the best.  But these opinions are clearly nothing more than the product of their natures.  If God has a favorite ice cream flavor, it too will be an arbitrary artifact of his nature.  No amount of knowledge on his part will create an objective criterion for evaluating ice cream where none actually exists.  If your God has a preference for one thing or another, that's simply him asserting his subjective values in the matter.  His values are not in any sense privileged over mine.  Knowledge doesn't translate into values, no matter how many times you repeat the argument. 

As a creator, would a God be able to create value in his creation?  Like in Monopoly.  If you are playing the game, Boardwalk costs 400 monopoly dollars.  Those are the rules of the game.  Outside of the game, the value is subjective, but in the game, if you want to buy Boardwalk, it's a fixed cost.

If our existence is God's creation, couldn't It assign value to random shit, and as long as you're existing, those be the rules?  Seems like their could be some authority in being the creator/designer on this front.

[The Grand Nudger]

He could assert his valuation..but anyone who's ever bought property knows that this is only the opening salvo in a negotiation. If you tell me that the thing you have is worth $400, you could only be asserting what it's worth to you, to me..it's worth decidedly less than $400. Even within a game of monopoly, real life or on the board, "the rules" of such valuations are inherently variable, and no specific authority lies with the person making the demand of $400. How many times have you been offered a railroad and declined?

Note that this is a departure from some "rules of the game" as regards monopoly in the first place, but if we wanted to use that analogy strictly, the players haven't determined the values of the board spaces. That would be an invocation of an separate and objective standard that even a god had to defer and adhere to. It's also not in any way analogous to "greatness".

I doubt that any believer will be satisfied with either valuation scheme. Beyond being a terribly strained analogy, if we simply assumed that morality (or any other valuation) was this way as part of some divine design, that this is the way it is..ought it be that way? It's the latter that believers angle for, it's the latter that is the question of morality..of standards of goodness and greatness as used. The analogy by board game to divine valuation is positively disastrous to god concepts no matter which way you run with it.

[Mystic]

If you don't value actual life, what do you value?

So this is where it gets tricky, because I'm going to say value to mean one thing, and you think of it as another.

I value donuts.  They are delicious.  I do not value brussel sprouts.  They are gross.  

I don't believe my valuing donuts but not brussel sprouts says anything about donuts or brussel sprouts having any intrinsic value. 

I do value my life.  But in the same way I value donuts.  It's something I like.  That most of us like being alive does not make life inherently valuable.  It's just a common opinion.  Just like most people liking donuts doesn't make them more valuable than brussel sprouts, which are generally despised.  

What I think you need for your argument is a way to show human life is valuable that isn't based on an opinion, as you can see with many examples that opinion of value and intrinsic value (such as with donuts) are not connected.

You may not like brussel sprouts for personal use, but if others do eat them, you should value them for other's sake. And that should value is due to objective standards, they are beneficial for people. And that is based on facts. Whether you like them or not, doesn't take away their value to others.

God knows the benefit of everything with respect to everything and the grand design. No one else knows the value and measurement of things like him. The closest to measuring everything as God is the leader of time, but even his vision is not absolute, just accurate, it is accurate and true, but not absolute like God's.

God knows the secret of your intentions, while many humans, deceive themselves about their intentions and states.

God knows the ranks of our states with respect to each other, and with respect to our potential. We don't know our potential, but God does, at each time, so he is the best of judges.

His vision defines us as we are, his act of creating is by the truth of his vision, which is respect to wisdom and knowledge he has of himself.

You take away the objective value of humans and all that is left is us defining what we are by our mere desires and judgment of ignorance with no reality to our actions.

[The Grand Nudger]

You may not like brussel sprouts for personal use, but if others do eat them, you should value them for other's sake. And that should value is due to objective standards, they are beneficial for people. And that is based on facts. Whether you like them or not, doesn't take away their value to others.

Excellent, so..what is beneficial to people is the objective standard.  I can live with that.  The wishes and designs and plans of furnace operating pixies are irrelevant.