Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[The Grand Nudger]

40 pages to say that caused things have causes?  I'm gonna go out on a limb and say that's 39.99 pages worth of filler. Not entirely unlike this thread.

[GrandizerII]

In the case of the argument, it is the vast majority of scientists, philosophers, and regular people that both premises are likely true.

According to what survey or poll? Or is this you making stuff up again? Regular people, I don't care. But I do want that survey of academic philosophers and scientists.

That reasoning will not work for inductive reasoning. It just does not. Using your method, the more reasons you list that something might be true, the probability of it being true goes down. That is simply not logically possible, so the principle cannot apply.

This is an argument from incredulity, which is a fallacy. Just because you can't see how this is true doesn't mean it's not logically possible.

When you multiply probabilities together, there's going to be a reduction in probabilities when at least one of the probabilities is lower than 1.

Alternative arguments will suffer the same fate, so it's not like this is a deadly problem or anything. It's a matter of comparing the probabilities of each competing conclusion and seeing which one is more likely.

[Silver]

Odin is very real:

https://goo.gl/images/abcYwV

[Amarok]

In the case of the argument, it is the vast majority of scientists, philosophers, and regular people that both premises are likely true.

irrelevant to if it's true and they can make a case for why it is likely .Personnel opinions don't mean shit.

[GrandizerII]

That the universe began to exist can be argued on scientific grounds as well a metaphysical grounds.

That the universe is possibly eternal can also be argued on scientific grounds as well as metaphysical.

The most promising models for 50+ years have posited the beginning of the universe.

Today's promising models are different from past promising models. And where have you been? Everytime I look up articles on cosmology, I stumble upon articles discussing theories positing eternal universes.

All recent observations continue to confirm it and NEVER undercut it.

All recent cosmological observations? Not at all. You need to read more.

Of course you can find a fringe theory that says otherwise.

Just because a theory posits an eternal universe doesn't mean it's a fringe theory. That you don't like the theory doesn't make it a fringe theory.

Metaphysically speaking, there is no way to rationally believe that an infinite number of events could have already happened.

Argument from incredulity. Also, we've addressed this several times in one of your recent threads, and you weren't able to counter with proper logic.

This (and more) translates into premise (2) being much more likely true than not.

Keep dreaming.

[Abaddon_ire]

RoadRunner, you have a problem with your argument. Kalam supports any deity of choice. Yahweh, Allah, Odin whatever. You have no option but to accept that gods which are not yours must also exist.

I agree.... It is a general argument which doesn't point you to any particular history or religion.  However it doesn't follow then, that you must accept all God's or gods that fit that description (I don't believe Odin does fit).  It's not necessary that all are required, so why multiply beyond necessity.

No, you have a bigger problem. Kalam does not point to any deity at all. Not yours, not anyone else's (and there are thousands of those).

The only reason that Kalam gets bandied about is not because it supports any deity on it's own, rather it is because all of the mad god-botherers shoehorn their own personal interpretation of a deity into it.

If I wanted to make the effort, I could shoehorn into Kalam the IPU or the FSM or any deity I made up out of whole cloth. Garage dragon, perhaps.

Get it into your head. If Kalam supports any "god" then, de facto it supports all "gods". Yours and everyone else's. All the thousands of them that have ever existed in the febrile minds of the various flavours of crank belief.

It is a useless line of argumentation for a particular "god" because it applies to all of them.

As if that were not bad enough, we know for a fact that the premises of Kalam are false anyway. You end up using false argument for all gods simultaneously existing.

[SteveII]

Personal: Rather than me reword WLC explanation of Ghazali's explanation, here it is:

If someone says there is no separation from God being to God creating our universe, they are claiming that God has not done anything else. I don't think such a limit is justified or even probable.

I don't agree with your supposition here, but it doesn't matter anyway.  Having had some time to think about Craig/Ghazali's argument, it's plain that it's a load of crap.   By 'eternal' here, Craig/Ghazali are implying that God has existed for an endless or infinite amount of time. 

Why do you insert 'time' here? God can exists in a timeless/unchanging state. Eternal does not imply time, it is simply the absence of time. There is nothing incoherent about this. Now when God created something, he changed from a timeless/changeless state and is now exists in time because of the nature of having interaction with his creation. 

Thus the relevance of pointing out that the universe has existed a finite time.  But that's not what it means to be timeless.  This argument is nothing more than a bunch of confusion caused by an incoherent concept of God existing timelessly.  If God exists timelessly, then there is no paradox between the universe being finite and the conditions for the creation of the universe existing because these things do not occur in time.  God is and God creates.  Those two events occur together in timeless existence, so Craig/Ghazali's argument about water freezing simply doesn't apply. 

There is a prior-than relationship between the two states. God existed prior to creation with the potential for creation. "God creates" is not a timeless event. It is the demarcation between God existing timelessly and temporally. A cause simultaneous with its effect. 

What I find remarkable is that a philosopher who specializes in the theory of time could make such a boneheaded argument.  Either Craig is demonstrating sheer incompetence or he is simply dishonestly making an argument of convenience here.  Regardless, Craig/Ghazali's argument doesn't hold water, and so it can't be used as justification for the belief that the conclusion of the KCA is necessarily a 'personal' god.

Let me know if my answer above does not address your problem with the argument. If you are interested, here is an address WLC gave on the topic. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings...eternity1/

---

That's simply not true with inductive premises and demonstrably so. 

For example, say you have 2 premises that make it likely that x is the case. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market. (actually, this is not an inductive premise, so there is not probability to assign. However you can assign 100% if you want). 
3. Therefore Today is Wednesday. (95%)

Now say we add premises to that. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market.
3. The street cleaners usually run on Wednesday (80%)
4. The street cleaner just went around the corner 
5. The garbage is picked up on Tuesday evening (80%)
6. The garbage cans in the alley are empty
7. Therefore today is Wednesday. 

According to your reasoning, the probability of today being Wednesday is 95% x 80% x 80% = 61%. What do you think the probability is that it is Wednesday? 

Bayes Theorem is more applicable to this type of reasoning.

However, suppose we have the following:

1. I don't recall a time when Mary went to the market that wasn't a Wednesday. (95%)
2. I don't recall a Wednesday when the street cleaners didn't run (80%).
3. Mary went to the market. (100%).

This can now be used to conclude that the street cleaners are running with (.95*.8=) 76% confidence.

In your example, going from
1. Mary generally goes to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary went to the market.

you need the probability of the converse 1' above, which cannot be derived from the probability of 1 without additional information (how often Mary goes on other days, for example).

Fine, reword the first premise to whatever you want. My point is so obviously clear and it is equally so obvious clear you did not address it. We are NOT looking to make sure all the premises are true and what the probability that all the premises being true is. Read that again to make sure you understand it. We are looking for what the probability of the conclusion is. Number 7 is NOT 61%. If I added five more 80% likely reasons why it might be Wednesday, it will NOT DROP. It goes up!!!!

This is not a difficult concept and it truly amazes me that several of you think you have a point. You don't. 

If you want to understand the underlying mathematical reasons, you want to read up Bayes Theorem and especially Bayesian Inference.

---

Thanks, I'll look it over.   My experience has been that the nondeterminism of QM is sometimes confounded for being non-caused.

The following I think reflects my view from what I have seen. 
https://theosophical.wordpress.com/2012/...principle/

Quntum mechanics merely describe what takes place at the quantum level.  It makes no reference to causes, but that does not imply that there are no causal entities involved.
Feser hypothesizes that perhaps Oerter understands the law of causality to refer to some sort of deterministic cause, and since quantum mechanics are supposedly indeterministic (a disputed interpretation), the law of causality could not apply.  Feser notes that “[t]he principle of causality doesn’t require that.  It requires only that a potency be actualized by something already actual; whether that something, whatever it is, actualizes potencies according some sort of pattern –deterministic or otherwise — is another matter altogether.”

The fact of the matter is that quantum mechanics has not identified causeless effects or invalidated the causal principle.  For any event to occur it must first have the potential to occur, and then have that potential actualized.  If that potential is actualized, it “must be actualized by something already actual,”[2] and that something is what we identify as the cause.

Very succinctly put. 

A lot of internet atheist go wrong here and I think it stems from a complete lack of philosophical training. They cannot differentiate between scientific descriptions and concepts that are clearly not science. It is logical positivism/scientism but, ironically, they cannot identify their mistake because they have no philosophical training. Since they cannot identify that component in their worldview, they don't know that it has been dismissed by nearly everyone for more that 50 years. So, it lives on. 

This QM and now radioactive decay not having a cause is just such nonsense.

[SteveII]

Extrapolating From What We Know Of Cause And Effect Does Not Lead Necessarily to God.

Here is my own little syllogism:

1 The present and past forms of all material things each have a past material cause(s).
2 The universe is a material thing.
3 Therefore, the universe has a past material cause, and that cause has a past material cause an so on for eternity.

I do not offer this as proof of an infinite godless regression, but only as demonstration of the futility of using our knowledge of cause and effect within the universe to extrapolate what occurred before the universe (assuming there is a before) or outside the universe.

Premise (1) is only true within the universe. 

Is premise (2) true? I'm not sure it is. I think it is the sum or all material things--not another thing at the end of the list of all other material things. The distinction is important.

If that is true, then conclusion (3) is a composition fallacy:

The fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole (or even of every proper part). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition

So...not really a demonstration of anything.

[polymath257]

I don't agree with your supposition here, but it doesn't matter anyway.  Having had some time to think about Craig/Ghazali's argument, it's plain that it's a load of crap.   By 'eternal' here, Craig/Ghazali are implying that God has existed for an endless or infinite amount of time. 

Why do you insert 'time' here? God can exists in a timeless/unchanging state. Eternal does not imply time, it is simply the absence of time. There is nothing incoherent about this. Now when God created something, he changed from a timeless/changeless state and is now exists in time because of the nature of having interaction with his creation. 

Thus the relevance of pointing out that the universe has existed a finite time.  But that's not what it means to be timeless.  This argument is nothing more than a bunch of confusion caused by an incoherent concept of God existing timelessly.  If God exists timelessly, then there is no paradox between the universe being finite and the conditions for the creation of the universe existing because these things do not occur in time.  God is and God creates.  Those two events occur together in timeless existence, so Craig/Ghazali's argument about water freezing simply doesn't apply. 

There is a prior-than relationship between the two states. God existed prior to creation with the potential for creation. "God creates" is not a timeless event. It is the demarcation between God existing timelessly and temporally. A cause simultaneous with its effect. 

What I find remarkable is that a philosopher who specializes in the theory of time could make such a boneheaded argument.  Either Craig is demonstrating sheer incompetence or he is simply dishonestly making an argument of convenience here.  Regardless, Craig/Ghazali's argument doesn't hold water, and so it can't be used as justification for the belief that the conclusion of the KCA is necessarily a 'personal' god.

Let me know if my answer above does not address your problem with the argument. If you are interested, here is an address WLC gave on the topic. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings...eternity1/

---

However, suppose we have the following:

1. I don't recall a time when Mary went to the market that wasn't a Wednesday. (95%)
2. I don't recall a Wednesday when the street cleaners didn't run (80%).
3. Mary went to the market. (100%).

This can now be used to conclude that the street cleaners are running with (.95*.8=) 76% confidence.

In your example, going from
1. Mary generally goes to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary went to the market.

you need the probability of the converse 1' above, which cannot be derived from the probability of 1 without additional information (how often Mary goes on other days, for example).

Fine, reword the first premise to whatever you want. My point is so obviously clear and it is equally so obvious clear you did not address it. We are NOT looking to make sure all the premises are true and what the probability that all the premises being true is. Read that again to make sure you understand it. We are looking for what the probability of the conclusion is. Number 7 is NOT 61%. If I added five more 80% likely reasons why it might be Wednesday, it will NOT DROP. It goes up!!!!

This is not a difficult concept and it truly amazes me that several of you think you have a point. You don't. 

If you want to understand the underlying mathematical reasons, you want to read up Bayes Theorem and especially Bayesian Inference.

Yes, and the probability of the conclusion is the product of the (relative) probabilities for the premises involved in the conclusion.

In your addition of other premises, you are providing alternative ways to get to the conclusion, not additional premises for a deduction of that conclusion.

So, for example, suppose we have

A and B implies Z

and also

C and D implies Z

and also

E and F implies Z.

We first multiply the probabilities of A and B to get the probability of going *that* route to Z. Then we multiply the probabilities of C and D for *that* route to Z. Finally, we multiply the probabilities of E and F for the probability that *that* route to Z works.

Then, to find the *overall* probability of Z, we multiply the probabilities that *all* routes fail and subtract that from 1.

Of course, at each stage we should use relative probabilities.

---

Thanks, I'll look it over.   My experience has been that the nondeterminism of QM is sometimes confounded for being non-caused.

The following I think reflects my view from what I have seen. 
https://theosophical.wordpress.com/2012/...principle/

Very succinctly put. 

A lot of internet atheist go wrong here and I think it stems from a complete lack of philosophical training. They cannot differentiate between scientific descriptions and concepts that are clearly not science. It is logical positivism/scientism but, ironically, they cannot identify their mistake because they have no philosophical training. Since they cannot identify that component in their worldview, they don't know that it has been dismissed by nearly everyone for more that 50 years. So, it lives on. 

This QM and now radioactive decay not having a cause is just such nonsense.

OK, what 'actualizes the potential' for a nuclear decay?

[SteveII]

Fine, reword the first premise to whatever you want. My point is so obviously clear and it is equally so obvious clear you did not address it. We are NOT looking to make sure all the premises are true and what the probability that all the premises being true is. Read that again to make sure you understand it. We are looking for what the probability of the conclusion is. Number 7 is NOT 61%. If I added five more 80% likely reasons why it might be Wednesday, it will NOT DROP. It goes up!!!!

This is not a difficult concept and it truly amazes me that several of you think you have a point. You don't. 

If you want to understand the underlying mathematical reasons, you want to read up Bayes Theorem and especially Bayesian Inference.

Yes, and the probability of the conclusion is the product of the (relative) probabilities for the premises involved in the conclusion.

In your addition of other premises, you are providing alternative ways to get to the conclusion, not additional premises for a deduction of that conclusion.

So, for example, suppose we have

A and B implies Z

and also

C and D implies Z

and also

E and F implies Z.

We first multiply the probabilities of A and B to get the probability of going *that* route to Z. Then we multiply the probabilities of C and D for *that* route to Z. Finally, we multiply the probabilities of E and F for the probability that *that* route to Z works.

Then, to find the *overall* probability of Z, we multiply the probabilities that *all* routes fail and subtract that from 1.

Of course, at each stage we should use relative probabilities.

Yes. So the example of these observations:


1. Mary usually goes to the market only on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market. 
3. The street cleaners usually run on Wednesday (80%)
4. The street cleaner just went around the corner 
5. The garbage is picked up on Tuesday evening (80%)
6. The garbage cans in the alley are empty
yields the probability that today is Wednesday 1-(5% x 20% x 20%) at 99.8%