Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

[I_am_not_mafia]

Gonna keep you up at night, eh? 

Yeah.

I want to go home and rethink my life.

Maybe start selling death sticks or something.

[SaStrike]

I used to love sticks...then I drove a semi.   Fuck all that noise. All auto all the time for me, now. I put the bitch in drive and cruise, that's how I like it.

I agree. Saying manual is better is like saying a nokia 3310 is better than a smart phone. And I mostly drive manual. I do admit in my teen days I also had a hipster phase where I was all for manual, using the "it's cooler, less boring, more control etc etc" justifications.

[vulcanlogician]

I guess I'm going to have to read this fucking book. I'm a moral realist, so I agree with Sam on this. But I have the sinking feeling that Plato puts it better than Harris.

[robvalue]

Lol, I very much look forward to your thoughts on it!

I'm extremely confused by moral realism as a concept in the first place. As far as I can see, you can only formulate an ethical statement to be a fact once you've picked a framework to evaluate outcomes (as Khem was saying regarding the is/ought problem). Once you've done this, surely the truth of those statements is based on your own framework, and hence only applicable to you? And any person could pick any framework they like.

The second thing that confuses me is how wellbeing is defined. This is such a hugely vague concept that trying to evaluate it, even after deciding on using it as a framework, seems to be impossible if you're coming up with anything nuanced. Of course, we can make very simple statements that I'd be willing to concede as facts for the sake of argument such as, "It's unethical to punch someone for no reason". But all you're really saying is that punching people is bad for their wellbeing.

---

PS: maybe I'm misunderstanding, but moral realism appears to be suggesting there is a "correct" framework to pick. If so, I see this as a circular statement.

[vulcanlogician]

Lol, I very much look forward to your thoughts on it!

I'm extremely confused by moral realism as a concept in the first place. As far as I can see, you can only formulate an ethical statement to be a fact once you've picked a framework to evaluate outcomes (as Khem was saying regarding the is/ought problem). Once you've done this, surely the truth of those statements is based on your own framework, and hence only applicable to you? And any person could pick any framework they like.

The second thing that confuses me is how wellbeing is defined. This is such a hugely vague concept that trying to evaluate it, even after deciding on using it as a framework, seems to be impossible if you're coming up with anything nuanced. Of course, we can make very simple statements that I'd be willing to concede as facts for the sake of argument such as, "It's unethical to punch someone for no reason". But all you're really saying is that punching people is bad for their wellbeing.

---

PS: maybe I'm misunderstanding, but moral realism appears to be suggesting there is a "correct" framework to pick. If so, I see this as a circular statement.

I understand what you are saying. For a couple years of my life, I was a moral nihilist. Then, due to Nietzsche's influence on my thought, I thought that ethics was relative. It was really only after reading Plato's Republic that I began to think of things differently.

I tried (and failed) to locate for you an online copy of David Enoch's brief essay "Why I am an Objectivist about Ethics (And You are, Too)." It's a short, light read and it makes its argument convincingly. (I am aware that the Republic is an intolerable slog for most readers.) If you can get your hands on a copy of Enoch's essay, read it.

Another essay that can be found online is James Rachels' "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism"... even if it doesn't make you a moral realist, you will find it highly logical and thought-provoking. It is a seriously enjoyable read for anyone interested in ethics. If anything, I'd like to hear your thoughts on it. And it's only 12 pages long. And I'm willing to bet it's better than Harris's writing.

I've been philosophizing all day on the forums, it seems. I'm intellectually exhausted. Let me come back to your post tomorrow and see if I can supply a satisfying response.

[bennyboy]

I have to say, I don't really see the two parts of this dilemma as a true dilemma.

For example, you can arbitrarily set moral goals, and then use science to achieve them objectively, whereas arbitrary methods might not be able to.

If the goal is to minimize suffering over time, and maximize a sense of well-being, then there's a lot of science to be done
1) Determine which brain functions are associated with a sense of well-being
2) Determine what situations trigger those functions
3) Statistically determine how best to achieve societal outcomes such that the mean level of well-being is improved.

All of this may or may not be more useful than just making shit up, though.

[robvalue]

Lol, I very much look forward to your thoughts on it!

I'm extremely confused by moral realism as a concept in the first place. As far as I can see, you can only formulate an ethical statement to be a fact once you've picked a framework to evaluate outcomes (as Khem was saying regarding the is/ought problem). Once you've done this, surely the truth of those statements is based on your own framework, and hence only applicable to you? And any person could pick any framework they like.

The second thing that confuses me is how wellbeing is defined. This is such a hugely vague concept that trying to evaluate it, even after deciding on using it as a framework, seems to be impossible if you're coming up with anything nuanced. Of course, we can make very simple statements that I'd be willing to concede as facts for the sake of argument such as, "It's unethical to punch someone for no reason". But all you're really saying is that punching people is bad for their wellbeing.

---

PS: maybe I'm misunderstanding, but moral realism appears to be suggesting there is a "correct" framework to pick. If so, I see this as a circular statement.

I understand what you are saying. For a couple years of my life, I was a moral nihilist. Then, due to Nietzsche's influence on my thought, I thought that ethics was relative. It was really only after reading Plato's Republic that I began to think of things differently.

I tried (and failed) to locate for you an online copy of David Enoch's brief essay "Why I am an Objectivist about Ethics (And You are, Too)." It's a short, light read and it makes its argument convincingly. (I am aware that the Republic is an intolerable slog for most readers.) If you can get your hands on a copy of Enoch's essay, read it.

Another essay that can be found online is James Rachels' "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism"... even if it doesn't make you a moral realist, you will find it highly logical and thought-provoking. It is a seriously enjoyable read for anyone interested in ethics. If anything, I'd like to hear your thoughts on it. And it's only 12 pages long. And I'm willing to bet it's better than Harris's writing.

I've been philosophizing all day on the forums, it seems. I'm intellectually exhausted. Let me come back to your post tomorrow and see if I can supply a satisfying response.

Thank you, I'll check it out

My objection is that moral realism doesn't seem to be actually saying anything. Everyone comes up with statements that apply to them, subject to the way they apply their values to the world. Those are their "ethical facts", if you like. How do you compare one person's facts to another? Is one "better" than another? It depends entirely on what ethics are trying to achieve, which has already been covered in their individuals values; hence it is circular. Maybe you're trying to achieve wellbeing, or survival of the species, or whatever. For these ethical facts to transcend the individual, there has to be a "correct framework", and I find that to be a meaningless idea.

I'll come back with more after I've read the suggested piece.

---

Okay well... I agree that this looks like a better analysis than Harris, but I still find big problems in the framing used here.

The article discusses the idea of "correct ethics" or "correct systems of ethics", without ever defining what that is supposed to mean, as far as I can see. Correct in what way? To say cultural reletavism is or isn't correct is as meaningless to me as saying moral realism is correct. It talks about some objective standard for measuring the ethics of different cultures. Can there be one? Of course there can. There are infinitely many. But which one do you pick? This is again a circular problem. The correct one is correct, because it is the correct one. But correct for what purpose? If I want correct information about something, I need to specify what I actually want to know about it. There seems to be an implicit assumption that there is some "correct goal" of morality here. But morality means nothing until you've set the goal.

To me, cultural relativism is more a matter of observation than anything else. I don't use it to make statements about what is objectively right and wrong, because I find such notions incoherent on their face. The article talks about being unable to criticise other cultures. What I don't get is why this even matters, except to make one culture feel good about themselves; or to try and justify some sort of forcing of ethics onto another society. "We are right and you are wrong, so you should change!" To me, the discussion is all about the underlying values. Do the different cultures have the same values? If so, are they applying them in a logical, scientific and consistent manner? If the values are different, can one side convince the other to be closer to theirs?

So I'm still in the position of being unclear what a "true ethical statement" is supposed to be. If such a thing did exist, if there were somehow ethics that are inherent to the fabric of reality, then no one would care what they are. If they turned out to be different from our own ethics, no one would change them just because the new ones are "correct". A change in ethics requires a reason, and just "being correct" is not a reason.

[bennyboy]

Lol, I very much look forward to your thoughts on it!

I'm extremely confused by moral realism as a concept in the first place. As far as I can see, you can only formulate an ethical statement to be a fact once you've picked a framework to evaluate outcomes (as Khem was saying regarding the is/ought problem). Once you've done this, surely the truth of those statements is based on your own framework, and hence only applicable to you? And any person could pick any framework they like.

The second thing that confuses me is how wellbeing is defined. This is such a hugely vague concept that trying to evaluate it, even after deciding on using it as a framework, seems to be impossible if you're coming up with anything nuanced. Of course, we can make very simple statements that I'd be willing to concede as facts for the sake of argument such as, "It's unethical to punch someone for no reason". But all you're really saying is that punching people is bad for their wellbeing.

---

PS: maybe I'm misunderstanding, but moral realism appears to be suggesting there is a "correct" framework to pick. If so, I see this as a circular statement.

I would agree with you 100%.  Harris uses a particular form of argument by baby-step.  He insists there are some moral positions we would ALL agree on-- that it's better to praise someone than to burn them in an oven, or something.

What he's really doing is finding states so agreeable to all or so reprehensible to all that nobody in a particular audience would be willing to disagree.  It's unlikely that in an academic lecture someone will stand up and shout "No. . . burning babies is fucking great!"

[downbeatplumb]

Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

Probably the queen. She has a lot of paintings.

I'm home sick today.

Expect comments.

[robvalue]

I have to say, I don't really see the two parts of this dilemma as a true dilemma.

For example, you can arbitrarily set moral goals, and then use science to achieve them objectively, whereas arbitrary methods might not be able to.

If the goal is to minimize suffering over time, and maximize a sense of well-being, then there's a lot of science to be done
1)  Determine which brain functions are associated with a sense of well-being
2)  Determine what situations trigger those functions
3)  Statistically determine how best to achieve societal outcomes such that the mean level of well-being is improved.

All of this may or may not be more useful than just making shit up, though.

I agree with what you're saying here, too.

The bigger problem is how completely ill-defined wellbeing is. Even if everyone could agree on the elements involved, how exactly you measure and weight each element is up for grabs. Also, this still doesn't account for the ethics of the methods used to achieve these goals. It's an "end justifies the means" scenario.

This is why I personally don't adhere to any "moral system". I take every situation on its own merits, and I try and consider every aspect of it as thoroughly as I can. The somewhat self-referential problem of how you achieve moral goals, and how you balance this with actually achieving those goals, makes things massively complicated.