Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

What would it matter if he couldn't?

Then we'd need to hire a new consultant/rabbi.

But he wouldn't be alone.  It seems that 'moral facts' is a place-holder term; the 'if' of an 'if/then' statement.

(or perhaps it's the 'then'... who knows?)

 -all statements of knowledge, ie "facts" are if/then statements.

[bennyboy]

Moral non naturalists are also realists.  It's realism for idealists and dualists.  There's no requirement of material monism in realism.  Realists also think that human beings are necessarrily subjective  creatures.  

I didn't say material monism is required in realism.  I said given a complete absence of evidence for moral reality provided by you and Jörmungandr, then brain function might serve as evidence.

[The Grand Nudger]

LOL.  It's funny because you think that no evidence for moral realism has been provided. What's become painfully clear is that you just didn't know what moral realism was going into this.

[bennyboy]

LOL.  It's funny because you think that no evidence for moral realism has been provided.  What's become painfully clear is that you just didn't know what moral realism was going into this.

Oh, there's plenty of evidence for moral realism-- you keep talking about it, and I don't think you are making it up.  What there is zero evidence of is that moral realism is right.  You claim it's based on objective moral facts, but cannot demonstrate that any facts are intrinsically moral, or that the plain old fact facts you choose to consider morally and thereby dub "moral facts" arrive at anything more than an arbitrary (read: subjective) position.

[The Grand Nudger]

Where you think you're taking this is a mystery.

Moral realism makes a claim. Insomuch as this claim can be shown to be demonstrably true, it is right.  Is there some other kind of rightness you're looking for?

I -can't- pick any old thing I like and dub it a moral fact. Moral realism is very restrictive in that. Moral subjectivity offers this, but not moral realism. Further, things that are morally subjective are not arbitrary. Jesus H Christ, lol.

[Angrboda]

If I'm getting heated it's because you are behaving in a palpably stupid manner.  You yourself acknowledge that my inability to show or demonstrate that moral facts are objective proves nothing, yet that has been the bulk of your posts for some time now.  When somebody keeps pushing an argument which they know is false, I have good reason to infer that the person is no longer arguing in good faith and is simply continuing to argue simply to save face.  You're being objectively stupid about this and I don't think that's any accident.

The inability of religious people to show that God is objectively doesn't prove that God isn't real, either.  However, their inability to provide evidence to support their claim means that if I don't already hold their belief, then there's little reason for me to do so.

I don't share your belief that morality is objective, unless you want to appeal to a determinist material monism, and claim it's all just brain states or whatever.  But then, we've given up one of the axioms which I outlined as necessary for me to participate in a discussion about morality: the existence of meaningful subjective agency.

At any rate, here are some of the things you've done which I consider typical of religious faith-based argumentation:
1)  Claimed an objective fact, despite having no real objective data or observations (at all) upon which to base your claim.
2)  Attempted to put the BOP on a critic: "You can't PROVE God objective real morality isn't real."
3)  Switched to dirty debating tactics: ad homs and outrage (feigned or otherwise) in lieu of actual support for your claim.

But what I can't understand (and this is sincere) is WHY an atheist would want to claim that there are objective true mores at all.  Isn't one of the best features of atheism the dropping of shackles which bind you to an inflexible perspective, and the realization that we can live perfectly fine through a process of negotiation and discussion about the kinds of values we each would like to see represented in our society?  It feels to me very much like despite being atheist, you have some kind of hunger for moral absolutism.

So I guess we're not going to see you actually back up your argument. I didn't claim an objective fact, you asked for an example. I provided a prospective one for you to demonstrate your argument upon. You've essentially declined and simply keep asserting your dogmatic religious beliefs. I've repeatedly stated that I am not claiming that morals are necessarily objective, only that they may be, and that because of that, you need to show that they aren't. That you are now lying about that fact is yet more evidence that you are not arguing in good faith, including in this last post of yours. Why are you such a liar, benny? And waffling about like you are when challenged on dogma is about as religious as it gets. You didn't even bother responding to the substantive part of my reply.

You're not simply a critic. You've claimed that morals are subjective. That claim carries a burden of proof. Instead of meeting your burden of proof you've repeatedly attempted to fallaciously reverse the burden and place it on me. Everything you've accused me of I've been innocent of and you yourself have been guilty of. You are the biggest fucking hypocrite.

What the hell is dirty about pointing out that a person who pushes an argument that they know to be false is likely not arguing in good faith? Beyond that, I insulted you. That's not an ad hominem argument, and that you're misrepresenting it as such is yet more evidence that you're not arguing in good faith. Outrage? What the fuck is this bullshit? Being disgusted with someone isn't a dirty debate tactic, and that you characterize it as such, especially without reason, is yet more evidence that you're not arguing in good faith. And I didn't insult and make ad hominems in lieu of actual arguments so that's yet another lie of yours. And again, that is actually something that you yourself have just done. When you repeatedly lie, fail to present arguments and instead simply make what is in fact an ad hominem, namely claiming that I'm acting like a religious person, then you definitely have given plenty of evidence that you aren't arguing in good faith.

Stop the bullshit, benny. You're just being an ass because you can't show that morals are any less objective than reality. We do observe objective moral facts. It's called having a conscience and moral intuitions. Even if morals were in some sense subjective, based upon properties of mind, it wouldn't mean that they are predicated upon our feelings. I don't know anyone who is convinced that their moral judgements are just a preference for some things that make them feel good and an aversion to things which make them feel bad. Unless I'm special and exceptional, I don't know anybody who experiences morals this way. People tend to default to trying to argue that morals are subjective because they can't establish an objective basis for morals and are embarrassed by that fact. I strongly suspect this applies to you. In response to your bullshit about me hungering for moral absolutism, that's yet another side of an ad hominem argument, and I don't, so you can take that shit and shove it up your ass sideways.

Regardless, I've made a valid analogy between objective physical facts and objective moral facts. If you can't prove that physical perceptions necessarily correspond to objective physical facts, then requiring me to demonstrate that moral intuitions necessarily correspond to objective moral facts is just special pleading.

Get to work or shut the fuck up.

[bennyboy]

I gotta disengage from this. While I'm interested in the nature of morality, and have opinions about it, there's not enough intellectual interest in this argument to make it worth digging in my heels for a real old-school forum flame-fight. It's just not that important to me.

If you want to take a few breaths and tone down the attitude, then I might consider interacting with you. But I suspect neither one of us believes that's likely to happen.

[Angrboda]

I gotta disengage from this.  While I'm interested in the nature of morality, and have opinions about it, there's not enough intellectual interest in this argument to make it worth digging in my heels for a real old-school forum flame-fight.  It's just not that important to me.

If you want to take a few breaths and tone down the attitude, then I might consider interacting with you.  But I suspect neither one of us believes that's likely to happen.

Shutting up it is then. Wise choice, benny.

[vulcanlogician]

JFC. WTFE. (I gave you good logic to present, and you ignored it.) You know who you are.

(1) A property P is genuine if it figures ineliminably in a good explanation of observed
phenomena.
(2) Moral properties figure ineliminably in good explanations of observed phenomena.
Therefore
(3) Moral properties are genuine.

The ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations is one perennially attractive argument in favour of the metaphysical claims of realism. The initially attractive thought is that moral properties earn their ontological rights in the same way as the metaphysically unproblematic properties of the natural and social sciences, namely by figuring in good explanatory theories. So just as, for example, a physicist may explain why an oil droplet stays suspended in an electro-magnetic field by citing its charge, or a social scientist may explain high levels of mental illness by citing income inequality, a ‘moral scientist’ may explain the growth of political protest movements or social instability by citing injustice. Likewise, just as an observer of the physicist may explain why he believes that the oil droplet is charged by citing the charge itself, and an observer of the sociologist may explain why she believes that income inequality exists by citing the inequality itself, an observer of the ‘moral scientist’ may explain why they believe that a situation is unjust by citing the injustice itself. In such cases, it appears that the instantiation of a moral property – injustice – is causally relevant in producing an effect – a political protest movement or moral judgement.

http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1930/1/T...prints.pdf

[DLJ]

JFC. WTFE. (I gave you good logic to present, and you ignored it.) You know who you are.

(1) A property P is genuine if it figures ineliminably in a good explanation of observed
phenomena.
(2) Moral properties figure ineliminably in good explanations of observed phenomena.
Therefore
(3) Moral properties are genuine.

The ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations is one perennially attractive argument in favour of the metaphysical claims of realism. The initially attractive thought is that moral properties earn their ontological rights in the same way as the metaphysically unproblematic properties of the natural and social sciences, namely by figuring in good explanatory theories. So just as, for example, a physicist may explain why an oil droplet stays suspended in an electro-magnetic field by citing its charge, or a social scientist may explain high levels of mental illness by citing income inequality, a ‘moral scientist’ may explain the growth of political protest movements or social instability by citing injustice. Likewise, just as an observer of the physicist may explain why he believes that the oil droplet is charged by citing the charge itself, and an observer of the sociologist may explain why she believes that income inequality exists by citing the inequality itself, an observer of the ‘moral scientist’ may explain why they believe that a situation is unjust by citing the injustice itself. In such cases, it appears that the instantiation of a moral property – injustice – is causally relevant in producing an effect – a political protest movement or moral judgement.

http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1930/1/T...prints.pdf

BINGO!

And there you have it. Nobody is completely satisfied with a tautology.

Thus, it takes a second order explanation to avoid Tarski's undefinability theorem.

The physicist needs a quantum physicist to explain 'charge';
The sociologist needs an evolutionary biologist to explain 'inequality'; and
The ‘moral scientist’ needs a best-practivist to explain 'injustice'.

Although, to be more precise, a best-practivist is more focused on the proximate 'why'... one still needs an evolutionary biologist for the ultimate 'why'.

If anyone wants a best-practice explanation of morality, let me know. Consultant rates apply.