Subjective Morality?

[Duty]

"I'm innocent your honour! It wasn't me that did it, it was just my body!" Noooooooooooooooooooooooooo lol

[The Grand Nudger]

Mackie’s Challenge (MC): If ethical naturalism is true, then ethical conservativism is false. 

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Many of us desire a meta-ethical position that allows us to take ordinary ethical discourse seriously. It seems to those of us, that is, that much of what we say about right and wrong or good and bad, for example, is true. Even more, it seems to those of us that we typically know many of these truths. What many of us desire, in other words, is a meta-ethical position that sees our ordinary ethical discourse as tracking important features of an accessible reality, as opposed to seeing it as some kind of mistake, mystery, or fiction (however useful). As we will put it, this is a desire for conservativism about ethical discourse, or ethical conservativism for short. Many of us, just as much, desire a meta-ethical position that respects the success of scientific inquiry. It seems to those of us, that is, that certain scientific explanations are the most impressive and secure examples of knowledge of the world around us, and that we are thereby required to conform our methods of inquiry and the ontological commitments of our theories to its methods and commitments. Put a bit differently, it seems that the correct scientific account of the world has a special kind of privilege: the methods it deploys, and the entities that it requires—which we will hereafter refer to as natural—are the ones that we have most reason to employ and believe exist. What those of us desire, then, is a meta-ethical position that does not commit us to non-scientific (non-natural) methods and entities. As we will put it, this is a desire for naturalism about ethical discourse, or ethical naturalism for short. Ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism, however, seem in tension. We see this when we notice that ordinary ethical discourse seems on its grammatical surface no different than other familiar kinds of discourse about the world. Just as the claim ‘cars are heavy’ seems to predicate the property ‘heaviness’ to the object-type ‘car’, the ethical claim ‘murder is wrong’ seems to predicate the property ‘wrongness’ to the act-type ‘murder’. Since ethical conservativism is committed to much of such discourse being true, it seems it is thereby committed to the existence of some such property as ‘wrongness’.1 And since ethical conservativism is also committed to much of such discourse being an expression of bits of knowledge, it seems it is thereby committed to some sort of successful cognitive access to the property of ‘wrongness’ as well. But ‘wrongness’ seems non-natural: it does not seem to be the kind of entity that is required for scientific explanations, and scientific methods of inquiry seem incapable of producing knowledge about it. 

https://philpapers.org/archive/OLICRE.pdf

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[Duty]

That's very interesting, kinda hard going for me as no training in philosophy. It seems to me the thing with the criminal justice system, and society at large (ie. murder in war or self defence is often deemed ok) proves that the current mode of operation is, erm, pfff, malleable? Depending on who's judging? Judges needed basically...and no vested interests...and good representation by equally expert, dispassionate and disinterested "barristers" who have a pathological aversion to exploiting loopholes lol...actually maybe better to do away with barristers alltogether, cut out the middle man muddying the waters. Mitigation, diminished responsibility, gradients of weighting for a crime...muddy, murky waters indeed.

[The Grand Nudger]

I think we'd end up with a worse situation if fewer people were involved.  We have a justice system rather than a justice person because justice people were kind of hang-ey for a few millennia.

[Duty]

I'm just not so sure about a free market for barristers. There's that phrase "the best legal team money can buy." I think it likely that "best team" would actually be the least moral "team."

[Rhondazvous]

Morality exists on a sliding scale.

That help?

True, but morality is guidance through out stages, so it must recognized, not made up by us.

And if it's recognized, it's objective, although of various stages, not created by subjectivity.

And it's a guidance, it must truly a guidance, and not something that can lead correctly or incorrectly, and that there is no way to discern truth of it from falsehood.

Because warped morality is the cause of all oppression and chaos, it's people warping morality and justifying evil through it.

Guidance to be reliable, must have not only a reliable source (God) but a reliable means (Kings like Jesus, Moses, Abraham, Isaac, etc).

”Then said Jesus unto him, Put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.”

And yet, the reason why this erstwhile fisherman had a sword to begin with was because Jesus told them

… and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one.

So apparently there’s time to put away your sword and a time to take it up.  And since god doesn’t speak to us in an audible voice, it’s up to each person to decide what the almighty wants him to do in any situation. The bible is full of this kind of equivocation. Why reject subjective morality when your “source” offers nothing but?

[bennyboy]

Because it is your opinion that matters, in a subjective system, not any fact of the matter x that you may discover - and you don't need to discover any fact of any matter to have an opinion.  Facts of the matter are the purview of moral realism, as thats the position of moral realism, that there are facts of the matter.  Subjectivism denies this, fundamentally obviating discovery since it contends that there is no there...there...to discover.  

That's not how I see it. I see moral objectivism as the idea that there are MORAL facts, i.e. moral ideas which are true whether people think so or not. There aren't, though very many people have claimed their moral flavor-of-the-time to be so. There are physical facts, and subjective interpretations of their meaning and importance.

One example of a physical fact would be that a human being's body has been disrupted, and has stopped functioning, due to insertion of an object into its heart. The moral interpretation depends greatly on the feelings of other people about that particular human, and the narrative behind the killing. Was it a revenge murder? Was it done to silence a rape victim? Was it done in a ritual sacrifice meant to stop the Volgons from attacking Earth?

The reason we need to establish this narrative is that we need to feed it through our world view and through our emotional system, to see how we FEEL about things. Unless you want to argue that feelings aren't subjective, since they're mediated by hormones, etc. etc., then I can't see how it could be clearer that our moral ideas are subjective expressions of subjective agency in response to a (mostly mythological and also highly subjective) narrative ABOUT objective truths.

[The Grand Nudger]

Because it is your opinion that matters, in a subjective system, not any fact of the matter x that you may discover - and you don't need to discover any fact of any matter to have an opinion.  Facts of the matter are the purview of moral realism, as thats the position of moral realism, that there are facts of the matter.  Subjectivism denies this, fundamentally obviating discovery since it contends that there is no there...there...to discover.  

That's not how I see it.  I see moral objectivism as the idea that there are MORAL facts, i.e. moral ideas which are true whether people think so or not.  There aren't, though very many people have claimed their moral flavor-of-the-time to be so.  There are physical facts, and subjective interpretations of their meaning and importance.

Read the bolded again, with your own comments set right alongside.  Yes, moral realists contend that there are (or at least could be) moral facts.  Subjectivism denies this.  

One example of a physical fact would be that a human being's body has been disrupted, and has stopped functioning, due to insertion of an object into its heart.  The moral interpretation depends greatly on the feelings of other people about that particular human, and the narrative behind the killing.  Was it a revenge murder?  Was it done to silence a rape victim?  Was it done in a ritual sacrifice meant to stop the Volgons from attacking Earth?

The reason we need to establish this narrative is that we need to feed it through our world view and through our emotional system, to see how we FEEL about things.  Unless you want to argue that feelings aren't subjective, since they're mediated by hormones, etc. etc., then I can't see how it could be clearer that our moral ideas are subjective expressions of subjective agency in response to a (mostly mythological and also highly subjective) narrative ABOUT objective truths.

In some way more, or more fundamentally...than any other narrative about any other kind of objective truth? More than this, it might be useful to point out that moral realists don't contend that we, the moral agent...-don't- do all of the above. It's coherent for a moral realist to say "this moral system x is deeply subjective" - and that will be one of the chief criticisms of a subjective morality from a moral realist. Proving that, a position which you could share with any moral realist, doesn't endanger the contention of moral realism. What a moral realist might see as the shortcomings of moral systems as currently devised or practiced provide the backdrop of moral realisms utility or ability to compel.

The far more difficult problem is reconciling naturalism with the conservativism required to maintain a realist position.

[bennyboy]

That's not how I see it.  I see moral objectivism as the idea that there are MORAL facts, i.e. moral ideas which are true whether people think so or not.  There aren't, though very many people have claimed their moral flavor-of-the-time to be so.  There are physical facts, and subjective interpretations of their meaning and importance.

Read the bolded again, with your own comments set right alongside.  Yes, moral realists contend that there are (or at least could be) moral facts.  Subjectivism denies this.  

Right. I deny that there are moral facts. I will say only that there are physical facts upon which a subjective morality draws in establishing the complex of feelings and ideas which, taken as a whole, represent a moral system.

[The Grand Nudger]

Read the bolded again, with your own comments set right alongside.  Yes, moral realists contend that there are (or at least could be) moral facts.  Subjectivism denies this.  

Right.  I deny that there are moral facts.  I will say only that there are physical facts upon which a subjective morality draws in establishing the complex of feelings and ideas which, taken as a whole, represent a moral system.

-and again, the moment you refer to facts you are drifting away from subjectivity.  

You do this because your academic position or position for this discussion is that morality is subjective, but the way you employ your own morality and make moral statements or statements -about- morality is de facto realism.  This isn't a dig, this is the way that we -all- approach our moral conjectures, lol.

If there are physical facts to which your morality refers in explanation, then not only is that a claim to realism, but a naturalists realism. OFC you also have feelings about it, ofc it's complex, ofc you may be wrong about this or that and no..not everyone will agree with you. Facts, however, are mind-independant, and so..... not subjectivism . Physical facts about baseball are baseball facts. Physical facts about boats are boat facts. Physical facts about morality are.....what?