Subjective Morality?

[Foxaèr]

Subjectivists, always subjecting themselves.

[The Grand Nudger]

IKR?  FWIW, that's why theists are constantly bitching about subjective morality, insisting that atheists just have to be subjectivists.  They would very much like for that to be the case..because..at the least, it legitimizes their crap moral systems, lol.

[bennyboy]

Even if we concede that moral facts actually refer to people's opinions and judgements (rather than some mind independent property of x) - not all moral assessments are created equal.  Hilariously, we think that..because we don't think that the plant watering guy is on-point with the relationship between his predicate and properties of x accurately identified.

How many times are you going to say "we think" in attempting to demonstrate that morality is objective?

You've trotted out a list of things that people generally consider immoral.  That, I would contend, is because they are people, and there's a lot of overlap among people in their feelings and ideas about things.  You haven't considered the moral positions of bats or Volgons.

If a computer decided that X should be done (given some goal) and Y should not be done, would you call that a moral position?  I wouldn't.  This is because the computer doesn't have feelings about things-- it cannot be offended, or angered, or frightened.

My position is super simple.  Mores are a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environmental factors, but they exist only as ideas.  Fortunately, there's a word for that.

[Foxaèr]

I wonder why people confuse objectivity with being robotic, computerized, without emotion.

[Whateverist]

Even if we concede that moral facts actually refer to people's opinions and judgements (rather than some mind independent property of x) - not all moral assessments are created equal.  Hilariously, we think that..because we don't think that the plant watering guy is on-point with the relationship between his predicate and properties of x accurately identified.

How many times are you going to say "we think" in attempting to demonstrate that morality is objective?

You've trotted out a list of things that people generally consider immoral.  That, I would contend, is because they are people, and there's a lot of overlap among people in their feelings and ideas about things.  You haven't considered the moral positions of bats or Volgons.

If a computer decided that X should be done (given some goal) and Y should not be done, would you call that a moral position?  I wouldn't.  This is because the computer doesn't have feelings about things-- it cannot be offended, or angered, or frightened.

My position is super simple.  Mores are a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environmental factors, but they exist only as ideas.  Fortunately, there's a word for that.

For whatever reason I'm imagining the way Jedi knights would discuss morality.  


Young Luke Skywalker:  But Yoda, how do we know the dark side is not an important advantage without which we will be ill equipped to face the Sith?  

Yoda:  Consult your feeling Luke.  Imagine a world in which we all tap into the dark side.  Is that the world you wish to live in, that you wish for everyone to live in?

YLS:  But Yoda, the Sith use righteous anger in the service of a world and a universe which serves only them.  We're different than that.  We would use it to create a republic which respects everyone's rights.

Y:  The dark side blinds you it will.  Once embraced perspective lost will be.

YLS:  So you're saying getting in touch with my inner Hulk just is channeling a motivation which is separate from whatever end goal I may have in mind?  That unbridled smashing just is ... wrong?

Y:  Got it you have.


So Yoda is a moral objectivist, Luke leans pragmatist and Sith lords -everyone will agree- are moral monsters?

[The Grand Nudger]

Even if we concede that moral facts actually refer to people's opinions and judgements (rather than some mind independent property of x) - not all moral assessments are created equal.  Hilariously, we think that..because we don't think that the plant watering guy is on-point with the relationship between his predicate and properties of x accurately identified.

How many times are you going to say "we think" in attempting to demonstrate that morality is objective?

The above wasn't a demonstration of moral realism, it even began with the assumption of subjectivism.  

You've trotted out a list of things that people generally consider immoral.  That, I would contend, is because they are people, and there's a lot of overlap among people in their feelings and ideas about things.  You haven't considered the moral positions of bats or Volgons.

The moral positions of bats or volgons would be objective or subjective or other for the same reasons.  

If a computer decided that X should be done (given some goal) and Y should not be done, would you call that a moral position?  I wouldn't.  This is because the computer doesn't have feelings about things-- it cannot be offended, or angered, or frightened.

Moral statements don't have feelings either, nevertheless, they could be true or false like any other such statement - none of which have feelings - according to any form of cognitivist..which includes subjectivism and realism.   

My position is super simple.  Mores are a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environmental factors, but they exist only as ideas.  Fortunately, there's a word for that.

There are alot of words for positions that can make that claim.  Realism is among them.

---

I wonder why people confuse objectivity with being robotic, computerized, without emotion.

: shrugs :  

Because it's something that a computer could do, I guess?  Or maybe because they think that only a (robotic, emotionless) computer could..that our emotions and feelings fundamentally prevent us from being able to describe something objectively.

[bennyboy]

My position is super simple.  Mores are a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environmental factors, but they exist only as ideas.  Fortunately, there's a word for that.

There are alot of words for positions that can make that claim.  Realism is among them.

I don't think moral reason can or does make the claim, "Mores are a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environmental factors."

---

The moral positions of bats or volgons would be objective or subjective or other for the same reasons.  

The moral positions of bats or volgons would be different, because what it's like to be a bat or a volgon is different than what it's like to be a human being. They will have different feelings about things.

If you want to argue that there are statistically normal feelings or mechanisms in people which lead them to behave a certain way, then that can be an objective basis for understanding morality. But even then, it doesn't make mores objectively real.

[Angrboda]

The word "good" can be used to describe objective AND subjective phenomena. Language has got you hung up. You can say, that piece of cheesecake is "good"-- that refers to your subjective experience. You derived pleasure from it. When you say "Michael Jordan is a 'good' basketball player" you are referring to something objective. He isn't good at basketball in your opinion because there are objective criteria for measuring his goodness.

Michael Jordan is good by established rules.  That's because basketball is a subset of life.  We can say so-and-so is a good salesperson, or perhaps even a good parent, by similar methods.  But when we want to talk about how to live IN GENERAL, we have a problem-- there is no definite context.  It's like telling kids they have to make their own rules, and then saying, "Nu uh uhhhh. . . some rules are right and some are wrong."  It doesn't make sense.

It's easy to do the same with specific mores-- I can say "Not picking up after your dog is bad," and we can agree on that rule, and then it's pretty easy to take pictures of people not picking up after their dogs.

A symphony is a bunch of marks on a paper, or certain frequencies of sound traveling around an auditorium.  They are an expression of an artist's ideas and feelings about the organization of sound.  However, to say therefore that music is objective would be a misrepresentation.

And a moral realist would argue that there exists an objectively existing context in which moral propositions are either true or false. The moral realist may be wrong about that, or she may be unable to demonstrate that satisfactorily, but it would be incorrect to suggest, as Rob has, that such a position cannot be defined or coherently maintained. It can. I'm not clear whether you are making a similar objection to that which Rob has made. Are you?

[bennyboy]

And a moral realist would argue that there exists an objectively existing context in which moral propositions are either true or false.  The moral realist may be wrong about that, or she may be unable to demonstrate that satisfactorily, but it would be incorrect to suggest, as Rob has, that such a position cannot be defined or coherently maintained.  It can.  I'm not clear whether you are making a similar objection to that which Rob has made.  Are you?

I have a problem with dealing with semantics at this level. For me, at extremes, polar opposites break down into superposition a la QM.

An example would be the concept of subjectivity itself. In a deterministic universe, what does subjectivity even really mean? After all, the mind is just the experience of some component of brain function, which is an object. In an experiential existence, what does objectivity even really mean? After all, even cold, hard facts are known only through the agency of a subjective experiencer.

All this being said, I'd say that in this kind of argument, we are assuming substance dualism, practically if not really-- a subjective experiencer, and an objective universe which is experienced. In that context, I see individual mores as an interaction between learned ideas and direct experience. There are no mores "out there" anywhere which I would say to have objective truth.

[Angrboda]

And a moral realist would argue that there exists an objectively existing context in which moral propositions are either true or false.  The moral realist may be wrong about that, or she may be unable to demonstrate that satisfactorily, but it would be incorrect to suggest, as Rob has, that such a position cannot be defined or coherently maintained.  It can.  I'm not clear whether you are making a similar objection to that which Rob has made.  Are you?

I have a problem with dealing with semantics at this level.  For me, at extremes, polar opposites break down into superposition a la QM.

An example would be the concept of subjectivity itself.  In a deterministic universe, what does subjectivity even really mean?  After all, the mind is just the experience of some component of brain function, which is an object.  In an experiential existence, what does objectivity even really mean?  After all, even cold, hard facts are known only through the agency of a subjective experiencer.

All this being said, I'd say that in this kind of argument, we are assuming substance dualism, practically if not really-- a subjective experiencer, and an objective universe which is experienced.  In that context, I see individual mores as an interaction between learned ideas and direct experience.  There are no mores "out there" anywhere which I would say to have objective truth.

ob·fus·ca·tion
/ˌäbfəˈskāSH(ə)n/
noun

the action of making something obscure, unclear, or unintelligible.
"when confronted with sharp questions they resort to obfuscation"