Subjective Morality?

[bennyboy]

The idea that lying is wrong is not only a statement about objective morality, but seemingly about absolute morality.  It reeks of religious dogma, methinks.  That being said, some people get so fixated on particular religious ideas that they have strong feelings about them, and this (of course) affects their moral position.

The problem with your original proposition is that it is not able to be challenged or argued against. If someone didn't care to mention the issue in the first place, then the issue would not be mentioned... and we would never have the discussion at all. But if someone DID mention the issue, then he/she would thereby care which (somehow) amounts to an admission of subjectivity as far as you're concerned.

Consider this: If nobody cared about having an accurate description of how the natural world functioned, science wouldn't be considered a valid way of discovering facts about the world. You could even take this further: If nobody cared that Saturn was further from the Earth than Jupiter, then nobody would bother to figure it out. This much is true, is it not?

That's the problem with conflation.  When I say someone cares, in a moral sense, I'm talking about a visceral emotional response, not "Hmmmm. . . I'm curious what the correct answer to #23 was."

[The Grand Nudger]

The problem with these kinds of debates is that the correctness of an answer is more likely to depend on semantics than on any particular truth beyond the semantics.  Morality is subjective if you define subjectivity as I do, and morals as I do. 

Except that it's not, as I keep telling you.  Your definition of morality is a statement that moral realists can agree with, naturalists and non naturalists alike.

It's objective if you define subjective or objective other than as I do, or define morality other than I do.

Definitions aren't the problem, lol.  

I'd say, though, that objective morals exist about as much as objective unicorns exist.  They might exist as brain patterns, or be encoded to some degree in DNA.

Then QED.  If objective morals exist as ideas then they exist exactly as a realist is telling you that they do.

If someone states that objective morals may exist, I will take it much the same way.  I'm agnostic about that, unless someone can define very specifically what they mean by objective morals, and give a concrete enough example for me to put my finger on it.  Without this, then by default I tend toward subjectivism, because I consider mores to be ideas, and ideas for the most part to be subjective mental experiences.

I keep telling you that realists aren't claiming otherwise, lol.  If your whole spiel about objective morality is based on the notion that they're ideas, so that's that.....then.....you......are.....confused.  It's not a definition problem, it's a you problem.

Every single position on the issue that answers that very first question with "yes, I think that our moral propositions express beliefs" thinks that moral propositions are ideas. Every single cognitivist position on the issue. Error theory, judgement dependency, moral naturalism, moral non naturalism, standard reduction, analytic reduction. All are cognitivist positions, all agree that moral propositions are ideas that we have.

---

I'll introduce you to to something you may appreciate.  An intuitionist description of objective morality from idealism.  

As per this position, we don't actually infer what is or isn't good.  We observe it.  This observation is fundamentally autonomous from scientific inquiry because no physical properties reduce to moral properties, nor can any normative proposition be reduced to non-normative semantics.  They are sui generis and non reducible.  Further, any natural explanation of morality will invariably fall at some point or another to the naturalistic fallacy.  

This position contends that if we are equipped with the functioning sensibilities, then by looking carefully enough at any given situation a person ought to be able to directly observe good or bad because these forms are accessible to us.  They are part of our sensible world.  Sometimes it's easy, sometimes it's not.   Seeing that skullfucking your neighbor is bad is simple, understanding why lying to the would-be murderer of your child is wrong, is not.  These represent the limits and flaws of our sensible faculty, and all but ensure that people will come to vastly disparate moral conclusions.   Our emotional response to these moral observations are produced by their recognition..just as, if you were pointing at a duck sitting two feet between you... and a person was arguing that there was no duck...we would all quickly lose our shit.

They think that our moral propositions express beliefs.
They think that our beliefs are sometimes true.
They think that the fact of which are beliefs are constituted can be mind independent.
They think those facts are non natural.

They are realists, just as I am. They think that reality is different than I do, is all. The intuitionist line, btw, equally open to us both. It's the basis of empirical knowledge, after all.

[TwoCultSurvivor]

Hey all,

New user here, I thought this to be a good resource for a layman's morality question:

Whats the deal with Subjective Morality?

I know subjective morality is in nowadays, but I don't really understand how it's functional. Isn't the purpose of morality to rationally distinguish between good and bad actions? Can subjective morality do that, or are people defining things differently?


Thanks, any insight appreciated,
Mikolaj

Responding to the OP; haven't read the thread:

In my opinion, morality is a system of value judgments, and value judgments are subjective by definition.

All morality is subjective.

However, we can BASE morality on objective criteria. We can ask ourselves a series of questions about the motivations and effects of particular actions and determine, based on the answers, whether those actions are moral.

As such, we may not alway AGREE on what is and is not moral, but we will agree on the objective bases for making that determination.

But there is no such thing as "objective morality." If there were, we would be able to define it easily (and lest someone claim that Judeo-Christian theism offers such a definition, we need only remind them that their God found time to ban shellfish but not slavery).

[bennyboy]

The problem with these kinds of debates is that the correctness of an answer is more likely to depend on semantics than on any particular truth beyond the semantics.  Morality is subjective if you define subjectivity as I do, and morals as I do. 

Except that it's not, as I keep telling you.  Your definition of morality is a statement that moral realists can agree with, naturalists and non naturalists alike.  

It's objective if you define subjective or objective other than as I do, or define morality other than I do.

Definitions aren't the problem, lol.  

I'd say, though, that objective morals exist about as much as objective unicorns exist.  They might exist as brain patterns, or be encoded to some degree in DNA.

Then QED.  If objective morals exist as ideas then they exist exactly as a realist is telling you that they do.

If someone states that objective morals may exist, I will take it much the same way.  I'm agnostic about that, unless someone can define very specifically what they mean by objective morals, and give a concrete enough example for me to put my finger on it.  Without this, then by default I tend toward subjectivism, because I consider mores to be ideas, and ideas for the most part to be subjective mental experiences.

I keep telling you that realists aren't claiming otherwise, lol.  If your whole spiel about objective morality is based on the notion that they're ideas, so that's that.....then.....you......are.....confused.  It's not a definition problem, it's a you problem.

Every single position on the issue that answers that very first question with "yes, I think that our moral propositions express beliefs" thinks that moral propositions are ideas.  Every single cognitivist position on the issue.  Error theory, judgement dependency, moral naturalism, moral non naturalism, standard reduction, analytic reduction.  All are cognitivist positions, all agree that moral propositions are ideas that we have.

---

I'll introduce you to to something you may appreciate.  An intuitionist description of objective morality from idealism.  

As per this position, we don't actually infer what is or isn't good.  We observe it.  This observation is fundamentally autonomous from scientific inquiry because no physical properties reduce to moral properties, nor can any normative proposition be reduced to non-normative semantics.  They are sui generis and non reducible.  Further, any natural explanation of morality will invariably fall at some point or another to the naturalistic fallacy.  

This position contends that if we are equipped with the functioning sensibilities, then by looking carefully enough at any given situation a person ought to be able to directly observe good or bad because these forms are accessible to us.  They are part of our sensible world.  Sometimes it's easy, sometimes it's not.   Seeing that skullfucking your neighbor is bad is simple, understanding why lying to the would-be murderer of your child is wrong, is not.  These represent the limits and flaws of our sensible faculty, and all but ensure that people will come to vastly disparate moral conclusions.   Our emotional response to these moral observations are produced by their recognition..just as, if you were pointing at a duck sitting two feet between you... and a person was arguing that there was no duck...we would all quickly lose our shit.

They think that our moral propositions express beliefs.
They think that our beliefs are sometimes true.
They think that the fact of which are beliefs are constituted can be mind independent.
They think those facts are non natural.  

They are realists, just as I am.  They think that reality is different than I do, is all.  The intuitionist line, btw, equally open to us both.  It's the basis of empirical knowledge, after all.

Let me reboot with a simple idea.  We are talking about in WHAT WAY things are bad, morally speaking.

But how do you establish whether they are bad at all? Why is murder bad? Or rape? Or suffering in any form? How do you even arrive at the idea of badness, if everything is just the objective Universe grinding through its paces?

[The Grand Nudger]

Let me reboot with a simple idea.  We are talking about in WHAT WAY things are bad, morally speaking.

But how do you establish whether they are bad at all?  Why is murder bad?  Or rape?  Or suffering in any form?  How do you even arrive at the idea of badness, if everything is just the objective Universe grinding through its paces?

It's a good question, right?  I suspect that everything is just the universe grinding through it's paces, but there's still enough clarity to distinguish between this or that detail of the grinding.  Most descriptions of how we arrive at that are some form of intuitionism.  Essentially, the same way we know that something is a cat at all.

[bennyboy]

Let me reboot with a simple idea.  We are talking about in WHAT WAY things are bad, morally speaking.

But how do you establish whether they are bad at all?  Why is murder bad?  Or rape?  Or suffering in any form?  How do you even arrive at the idea of badness, if everything is just the objective Universe grinding through its paces?

It's a good question, right?  I suspect that everything is just the universe grinding through it's paces, but there's still enough clarity to distinguish between this or that detail of the grinding.  Most descriptions of how we arrive at that are some form of intuitionism.  Essentially, the same way we know that something is a cat at all.

If it walks like a cat, and quacks like a cat, it's probably a cat.  Or, you can just say that "cat" means whatever that is.

That's the difference.  A cat HAS a "whatever that is."  Whatever it is, it has whiskers, a tail, says "Meow" a lot, and acts like a little bitch most of the time.  What has the whatever-that-is of goodness?  What do the words "right" or "wrong" even point to?  What experience, real or illusory, intuited or otherwise, are the words even intended to talk about?

If they talk about observable properties of things, I'd call them objective.  If they do not, I would not.

[The Grand Nudger]

If it walks like a cat, and quacks like a cat, it's probably a cat.  Or, you can just say that "cat" means whatever that is.

Something like that.  A cat is a cat, right?  You could say "late model chevy" while pointing at a cat...and it's still a cat.  

That's the difference.  A cat HAS a "whatever that is."  Whatever it is, it has whiskers, a tail, says "Meow" a lot, and acts like a little bitch most of the time.  What has the whatever-that-is of goodness?  What do the words "right" or "wrong" even point to?  What experience, real or illusory, intuited or otherwise, are the words even intended to talk about?

If they talk about observable properties of things, I'd call them objective.  If they do not, I would not.

Well, non naturalists aren't really talking about properties of things, the way that naturalists are, obvs....but they still maintain that what they are referring to is sensible, objective, and accessible.

[bennyboy]

If it walks like a cat, and quacks like a cat, it's probably a cat.  Or, you can just say that "cat" means whatever that is.

Something like that.  A cat is a cat, right?  You could say "late model chevy" while pointing at a cat...and it's still a cat.  

That's the difference.  A cat HAS a "whatever that is."  Whatever it is, it has whiskers, a tail, says "Meow" a lot, and acts like a little bitch most of the time.  What has the whatever-that-is of goodness?  What do the words "right" or "wrong" even point to?  What experience, real or illusory, intuited or otherwise, are the words even intended to talk about?

If they talk about observable properties of things, I'd call them objective.  If they do not, I would not.

Well, non naturalists aren't really talking about properties of things, the way that naturalists are, obvs....but they still maintain that what they are referring to is sensible, objective, and accessible.

The Buddhists call mind the 6th sense.  It kind of makes sense, since when you think, you are watching the thought pass through your conscious awareness.  However, so long as they are passing only through YOUR awareness (you can't see my imaginary unicorn, bruh!), then for me it's a stretch to call that objective in any meaningful sense.

[The Grand Nudger]

Ish, but that is the main point of contention between non naturalists and other realists.  Naturalists think that their epistemology is better..that it's easier to call something like what they're talking about objective.  That said, the non naturalists aren't telling us that things which only you can experience are objective.  Their fundamental assumptions are much the same as a naturalist.  They assert that we can make observations - that this thing we experience is empirical...just not in the same way or to the same criteria as scientific objectivity, for example.

(recall, a non naturalist has to maintain that moral sense and moral propositions, at least.... don't refer to natural facts - if anything does)

[bennyboy]

Maybe we need a case study. Let's start with a moral statement, and walk through from start to end.

"Rape is wrong."

What objectively observable "fact" arrives at this conclusion, if it isn't already held due to one's feelings about it?