Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

The notion that value judgements are fundamentally irreducible to some "other x" is also contained within and espoused by moral realists. So, again, categorically, you have failed to object to realism.

However.........I think the heart of your non-objection to moral realism is true, and many other moral realists could and do agree. Whatever right or wrong is..if it -is- anything, human beings are remarkably malleable. We can mistake our comfort or our displeasure for morality or immorality not so much as a bug in the system...but more as part of it's normal and useful operation, lol.

[Angrboda]

Fine.  Rape is wrong.  That isn't predicated upon negative feelings.  I may have negative feeling about rape, but my belief that it is wrong isn't predicated on them.  Satisfied?

As I said in my last post, "predicated upon" doesn't mean that once established, moral feelings aren't verbalized.  If nobody cared about rape, and strongly so, there would be no moral rule about it.

The entire code of law is pretty dry, but I'd argue that under the hood, 100% of all of it represents a mediation among various feelings (read: instincts, if you want).  We have feelings about property, about health, and so on.

How does one arrive at any value judgment rationally, if it does not have at its foundation some desire or fear?  All we can do is say, "We've arrived at the idea of social contract, through a desire from mutual protection from harm (which we fear), and for opportunity (which we hope for).  We each want liberty, and are willing to extend it."  And then say that rape constitutes a violation of those ultimately emotional value judgments?

I wasn't saying anything about whether my feelings are or are not verbalized. To say that something is predicated upon something else is to say that it is based on that something else. I may have feelings about rape, but if morals are objective, my feelings are predicated upon the fact of it being immoral, not simply a circle jerk in which my feelings themselves constitute the moral fact. I object to rape because it is wrong and because I have negative feelings about it. My having negative feelings about it isn't necessary for it to be wrong, or for me to object to it based upon it being wrong. That's essentially a form of non-cognitivism, which if that is what you believe, then you need an actual argument for it. Having values about objective things does not make those objective things subjective. If I have values regarding right and wrong behavior, the rightness or wrongness of my behavior doesn't necessarily exist solely as a function of my having values about it. Having values about something isn't evidence that the something doesn't exist. I don't really have any values about fairness other that unfairness is wrong. To a moral realist, unfairness would still be wrong whether or not there were any feelings about it. I can argue in the abstract, that any situation, whether I can imagine it or not, is wrong if it is unfair. Obviously in that case, I'm not reacting to my feelings about some concrete reality but about the concept of fairness itself. Are you suggesting that fairness is only subjective? Your argument has been, more or less, that having feelings about it refutes the possibility that those feelings are about an objective fact, and that's basically a non sequitur if that is the entirety of your argument. I may have feelings about the moon, or about the number 7. That doesn't in itself demonstrate that the moon and the number 7 only exist as examples of my contemplation or feelings about them. So unless you're going to deny physical realism, or mathematical realism, and show that neither is possibly true, then you really don't have an argument that moral realism may not also be possibly true.

And I'm still waiting on your definition of morals and moral to see why you think morals and moral facts are necessarily subjective.

ETA: If no one had feelings about rape, and moral realism is true, there would still be a rule about it because that is what moral realism is saying, that moral propositions, rules about what is or is not moral, exist independent of minds. There might no longer be anybody to act on those rules, but the rules themselves do not require that someone exist to contemplate and act on those rules if moral realism is true.

[bennyboy]

I'm not talking about YOUR feelings. I'm talking about the origin of the more that rape is wrong. You need only be told by parents, or watch a Save by the Bell special or whatever, to establish that rape is considered unacceptable.

[The Grand Nudger]

Sure, the why being the operative part.  

Rape is wrong = "Yuck!"

-non cognitivism.

Rape is wrong because -insert reference to relevant facts about your opinion, the act, or it's consequences here-

-a cognitive moral position that is true which could be subjectivism or realism.

Between those two you have error theory, which doesn't so much deny that there are or could be facts, as it suggests that for whatever reason or no reason we do not have access to them, or if we do, we butcher that access. Beyond non cognitivism, every position refers to a moral fact of a matter - a moral fact. The fact that makes something wrong, to a subjectivist, is a fact of our holding some particular opinion, which is mind dependent. If we didn't hold that opinion, as a point of fact..and opinions were what made things wrong, then x wouldn't be wrong. If we changed our opinion then x wouldn't be wrong. Nothing about the act has to change. No reference to any specifics about the act need to be made. Consequences are irrelevant. There is no mediation between those opinions and some environment, and a subjectivist can consider some thing they think is abhorrent to be the right thing to do - or some thing they really like to be the wrong thing to do.

[bennyboy]

If you want to call the things which cause feelings, or about which we have individual opinions, "moral facts," then rock on with that. I suppose you could call my fantasies about young Angelina Jolie "bennyboy-fucking-Angelina-Jolie facts" if you were really determined to do. But that doesn't mean that the whole thing isn't something I just thunk up because I felt like it.

[The Grand Nudger]

Benny, I'm not telling you what -I- want to call anything..lol... I'm explaining to you how the positions are self defined, described, and differentiated.

I do this only so that, if you were operating under some misconception (and you have been) you would be able to accuratley express the position you legitimately hold.  If you thought, for example, that you were a subjectivist, because there are no moral facts and moral propositions reduce to some expression of our feelings about x...then you were wrong.  You are a non cognitivist.

If you thought, for example, that since you believe that there isn't a you or things so much as ideas with names attached and morality is all about ideas and this meant that you rejected realism..you were wrong, moral non naturalists are realists.  If you thought that it meant that you rejected scientific or naturalist realism..you are wrong, because both of those positions -also- think that moral propositions express ideas.

I'd say that there is a fact that you either do or don't have such fantasies.  That would be the fact of the matter of your angelina jolie fantasies existence.  Either you do or don't have them. I doubt that you thunk them up -just- because you felt like it, it seems like your biology might be giving you a push in the fantasy manufacturing dept, lol.......but hey, minor details, right? This is the same way that subjectivists refer to moral facts. There is a fact of the matter when it comes to whether or not you hold an opinion. Since the subjectivist considers this the basis of morality, this is the moral fact. If this fact is the -only- reason that x is wrong..then morality truly is subjective. However, this fact can coexist with realists facts in a world where moral realism is the more accurate description.

It might help to remember, that as you go up (or down) that flow chart, the next position in line doesn't deny the existence, or the facts, of the position before it. I can accept that some moral expressions are non cognitivist. I accept the validity of error theory and it's test cases. I accept that we hold subjective opinions not referent to any objective fact and that we sometimes build our morality out of them. I accept that even if there is no "natural world" moral propositions and facts could still be empirical, sensible, and objective.

Obviously, I don't see the point in deferring to you over the entirety of academia and the thousands of years that people have been engaging in moral philosophy. If you want to go to spain and order a drink...then learn fucking spanish, lol. It's not as if we could have a cogent or informative conversation if you insist on inconsistent and idiosyncratic definitions and semantics for common and well developed moral positions. Has it occurred to you that some of the answers you've been receiving are unsatisfying because they are the answers to the questions or objections you asked..but that you fielded the wrong objection for what you wanted an answer to? You stepped up to the bar intending to order a drink..and asked for a cat instead.

For example..you want a response to cognitivism, but for whatever reason you think that this response should demonstrate realism. You want a response to realism in comparison to subjectivism..but for some reason you think that this must include some non cognitivist objection. In reality, both subjectivists and realists have heard the non cognitivists assertion, and decided that they are meaningfully wrong. Both are moral cognitivists. Moral cognitivism does not demonstrate moral realism, but it is required for moral realism (just as it's required for moral subjectivism).

Is your every moral utterance a rube goldbergian way to say "yuck" - or are there positions and beliefs and ideas in there, that you take to be true? Don't worry about other peoples ideas, whether people agree with you, or any arguments...because, frankly, we're just not there yet. The status between realism and subjectivism is completely unaffected at this level, but we need to be able to answer this question in a specific way to even gt there. If you want to take it from the beginning..for -every- moral position, this is the first question.

[DLJ]

...
 If we changed our opinion then x wouldn't be wrong.  
...

Is there such a thing as 'non-cognitive opinion'? If it has a name, would that name vary per dogma?

If there is such a thing, how would it be changed?

Cheers

[The Grand Nudger]

That's the rub, no..there isn't.  The very minute that a person refers to our opinions or ideas they have firmly come down on the side of cognitivism.  If they think that at least some of our moral propositions refer to opinions that we hold, then they are describing -themselves- as cognitivists...and because of this, any non cognitivist objections are rendered inconsistent and made either in ignorance or bad faith.

It is completely impossible to resolve some question set up from a cognitivist position -between- two cognitivist positions when a person will simply abandon their prior commitment to cognitivism if they get the response they sought but it doesn't bear out the conclusions they had arrived at beforehand. That sort of nonsense is the moral philosophy version of a ranting shitpost, and, academically, it's not moving the goalposts so much as picking up the goalposts, putting them in the back of your truck...and running your truck off a cliff out of spite and frustration. Knocking over a pile of blocks because it was demonstrated to you that they were..in fact, blocks, lol.

[DLJ]

That's the rub, no..there isn't.  The very minute that a person refers to our opinions or ideas they have firmly come down on the side of cognitivism.  If they think that at least some of our moral propositions refer to opinions that we hold, then they are describing -themselves- as cognitivists...and because of this, any non cognitivist objections are rendered inconsistent and made either in ignorance or bad faith.
...

OK. So, I'm beginning to understand that you see this as 'sides'. And that 'moral facts' are dogma that one can only accept once one has subconsciously chosen a side (deduced from post #263). Is there a group name for these sides (e.g. sect, cult, religion, tribe, team, position, school, whatever)?

And what is the tribal name (team name / side etc.) for one who holds that morality is both cognitive and non-cognitive?

...
It is completely impossible to resolve some question set up from a cognitivist position -between- two cognitivist positions when a person will simply abandon their prior commitment to cognitivism if they get the response they sought but it doesn't bear out the conclusions they had arrived at beforehand.  That sort of nonsense is the moral philosophy version of a ranting shitpost, and, academically, it's not moving the goalposts so much as picking up the goalposts, putting them in the back of your truck...and running your truck off a cliff out of spite and frustration.  Knocking over a pile of blocks because it was demonstrated to you that they were..in fact, blocks, lol.

I ran that through Google Translate and it said "I dunno either"

[The Grand Nudger]

That's the rub, no..there isn't.  The very minute that a person refers to our opinions or ideas they have firmly come down on the side of cognitivism.  If they think that at least some of our moral propositions refer to opinions that we hold, then they are describing -themselves- as cognitivists...and because of this, any non cognitivist objections are rendered inconsistent and made either in ignorance or bad faith.
...

OK.  So, I'm beginning to understand that you see this as 'sides'.  And that 'moral facts' are dogma that one can only accept once one has subconsciously chosen a side (deduced from post #263).  Is there a group name for these sides (e.g. sect, cult, religion, tribe, team, position, school, whatever)?

They're called meta ethical theories or systems.  Trying to get at the ontology of morality.  As opposed to applied or normative ethical theories, or moral epistemology.  

And what is the tribal name (team name / side etc.) for one who holds that morality is both cognitive and non-cognitive?

Irrational and/or confused would be that tribes name.  The positions describe baseward exclusions.  If you think that our moral propositions express a state of belief, you have accepted cognitivism and rejected non cognitivism as a position, but you can obviously still accept that some moral propositions are properly non-cognitive.  A noncognitivist cannot make this distinction or accept this as a fact and remain a non-cognitivist.  If our moral propositions do express states of belief (any of them) - then their position is roundly and completely false on it's own terms.

That person would be negotiating over how much of morality as practiced is properly non cognitive, not objecting to the fact that our moral propositions can or do express states of belief.