Subjective Morality?

[DLJ]

OK.  So, I'm beginning to understand that you see this as 'sides'.  And that 'moral facts' are dogma that one can only accept once one has subconsciously chosen a side (deduced from post #263).  Is there a group name for these sides (e.g. sect, cult, religion, tribe, team, position, school, whatever)?

They're called meta ethical theories or systems.  Trying to get at the ontology of morality.  As opposed to applied or normative ethical theories, or moral epistemology.  
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Thank you. 'Systems' is my preference; I'll use that.

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And what is the tribal name (team name / side etc.) for one who holds that morality is both cognitive and non-cognitive?

Irrational and/or confused would be that tribes name.  The positions describe baseward exclusions. 
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I have no idea what 'baseward' means.

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If you think that our moral propositions express a state of belief,
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My question was about 'morality' not 'moral propositions'.

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That person would be negotiating over how much of morality as practiced is properly non cognitive, not objecting to the fact that our moral propositions can or do express states of belief.

Exactly.

[The Grand Nudger]

Irrational and/or confused would be that tribes name.  The positions describe baseward exclusions. 
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I have no idea what 'baseward' means.

So, the same example.  Moral non cognitivism excludes any moral proposition which expresses a state of belief.  This is it's defining and self circumscribing claim.  Moral propositions -do not- express states of belief.  The true state of any moral expression is the fundamental disagreement here.  Do they express beliefs?

Non cognitivists reject this.  If they exist, if some moral propositions do express states of belief....non cognitivism is wrong.  If they don't, QED..end of discussion, everyone else is wrong for the same reason.

The next question (if you answered in the affirmative and the discussion continued) is whether or not our beliefs are sometimes true.  

Error theorists reject this.  They state for reasons or no reasons we have it wrong.  Our beliefs..at least in this regard, aren't even sometimes true.

If they were, a person would be negotiating over which or how much of our beliefs are sometimes true, not objecting to the notion that they sometimes are.  If they aren't..then QED end of discussion.  Our moral propositions describe states of belief but our beliefs are hilariously wrong.  Everyone else is wrong for the same reason.

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If you think that our moral propositions express a state of belief,
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My question was about 'morality' not 'moral propositions'.  

Our answers to what moral propositions are and to what they refer describes our position on what morality is.  Assertions about them constrain our meta-ethical claims. If I think that moral propositions do describe states of belief, and sometimes our beliefs are true..then, as far as I've described my own positions and beliefs accurately, I am insisting that morality -is- an attempt to approach truth, and at least sometimes..it -is- an attempt that hits truth. I can't maintain emotivism (for example, a form of non cog) at this point (or use it in a valid objection) because what would have to be true about moral propositions for emotivism..as a position on what morality -is-, to be true... I've already declared to be false. I can't maintain error theory as a position on what morality -is-..either (or use it as a valid objection)..because just as above, I've already declared it to be false.

Next up in the meta ethical flow chart is what truth it hits, and this is where subjectivism and realism diverge.

[vulcanlogician]

Here is something that I've been thinking about throughout the moral philosophy/mathematics threads, but it relates to an idea I brought up early on:

One of the things the moral objectivist attempts to show is that moral skepticism is runaway skepticism. A few pages ago, bennyboy demonstrated precisely what I meant by "runaway skepticism" by postulating that a real person was just a complex of ideas and feelings. NOTHING in philosophy can defend against runaway skepticism. It leads directly to solipsism.

Unless you are comfortable being a solipsist, you are going to have to make at least one assumption somewhere along the line. Epistemological assumptions, coupled with empiricist philosophy, form the foundation of the physical sciences (the scientific method). You can't use the scientific method to discover the scientific method; the scientific method rests upon epistemological assumptions. Math makes assumptions as well. We try to be as accurate as possible with our assumptions when we select them. We try to select assumptions that are axiomatically true. But the fact is, every mode of knowledge relies upon assumptions.

All the moral objectivist is trying to argue is that moral philosophy is objective in the same way science is objective. If the criticisms that you level against moral objectivism contain a skepticism so robust that a similar level of skepticism would render the sciences incapable of producing truth statements, I'd call that runaway skepticism.

[DLJ]

I have no idea what 'baseward' means.

So, the same example.  Moral non cognitivism excludes any moral proposition which expresses a state of belief.  This is it is defining and self circumscribing claim.  Moral propositions -do not- express states of belief. 

I ask for definitions and you give me examples; I ask for examples and you talk about 'systems of faith' and their dogma.

I'll ask again:
What is the definition of 'baseward'? (I've never come across that term before).
Please give an example of a 'moral fact'.

I can't get as far as choosing some side or other until I can agree on the terminology i.e. I haven't decided whether 'moral proposition' is a valid term.  'Ethical proposition' makes perfect sense but 'moral proposition' does not.

So, while we're about it, could you please provide definitions for:
- beliefs
- states of belief
- moral
- moral proposition
- ethical/ethics
- ethical proposition

Are these propositions system-inputs or system-outputs?

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The true state of any moral expression is the fundamental disagreement here.  Do they express beliefs?
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To answer that I'd need a definition for and an example of a 'moral expression' and a definition of beliefs.

Specifically, I'm thinking... does sweating or blushing or raised hair count as a moral expression? And are beliefs both cognitive and non-cognitive and if so do philosophers distinguish between them (terminology-wise)?  

Again, I am not interested in which school/club/religion thinks what, I'm after terminology.

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[More team-related stuff]

The next question ... is whether or not our beliefs are sometimes true.  
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That might depend upon your definition of 'beliefs'.

Given that 'true' is always relational/axiomatic then the answer is likely to be yes.

My question was about 'morality' not 'moral propositions'.  

Our answers to what moral propositions are and to what they refer describes our position on what morality is. 
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I think that's the wrong way round.  

The component parts don't mean much without a description of the system to which they belong.  

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I am insisting that morality -is-
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:holds breath:

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I am insisting that morality -is- an attempt to approach truth, and at least sometimes..it -is- an attempt that hits truth.
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It's not.

Morality is an evolved system (a value stream).  Evolution cares not one iota about 'truth'.  Morality is all about utility and warranty.

Benny is much much closer to the mark...

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Remember my original description of morality-- that it is a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environment,
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That's a start.  Awfully fluffy but it's a start.

[bennyboy]

I'd say that there is a fact that you either do or don't have such fantasies. 

If by "moral fact" you mean anything factual which is connected with any part of the moral process at all, then I'd say:
1) That's not what people mean when they talk about moral facts.
2) Everything in existence is a moral fact to some degree, as you seem to take it-- that terminology has no value in distinguishing important facts (like the actual source of mores) from unimportant facts (like the fact that gravity undoubtedly is connected to the process of moral thought).

My view is crystal clear: mores are a mediation among feelings, ideas, and the environment, and they are predicated ultimately on feelings. You could call feelings a "moral fact" if you like, but then we just have to find new words to talk about objective mores rather than those that are made up by a subjective agent in accord with how they experience their world.

[The Grand Nudger]

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I am insisting that morality -is- an attempt to approach truth, and at least sometimes..it -is- an attempt that hits truth.
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It's not.

Morality is an evolved system (a value stream).  Evolution cares not one iota about 'truth'.  Morality is all about utility and warranty.

Benny is much much closer to the mark...

I'm wasn't arguing for my position...so..okay?  I'm trying to get people familiar with the terms and the divisions of these positions, lol...by using my own positions to state how that constrains my objections or arguments.  

That said...there's nothing that you just wrote up above that a realist can't agree with.  However, and I keep baiting this hook..here again we have to find ourselves asking how morality, as an x evolved....has that utility, if it refers to no natural facts, if it does not leverage natural facts, if there can be no facts of the matter...a moral matter, if natural moral realism is categorically unacceptable?

You see..this dilemma only arises because the commitments to both realism and naturalism are -implicit- in any comment on morality as an evolutionary artifact.  People who object to realism in this way..reject those things required to support scientific conclusions like evolutionary biology.  

I'd say that there is a fact that you either do or don't have such fantasies. 

If by "moral fact" you mean anything factual which is connected with any part of the moral process at all, then I'd say:
1)  That's not what people mean when they talk about moral facts.

It -is- what subjectivists are referring to when they refer to moral facts.  What other people mean when they say the term has absolutely no bearing on that discussion.  

2)  Everything in existence is a moral fact to some degree, as you seem to take it-- that terminology has no value in distinguishing important facts (like the actual source of mores) from unimportant facts (like the fact that gravity undoubtedly is connected to the process of moral thought).

No, again, moral facts are specific.  Every fact cannot be a moral fact.  Moral facts are those things which refer to morality and are true.  If morality really is mind dependent, then that is a moral fact...even as random nubs use any of those words.....

Any reference to the specific mind dependent x that a subjectivist accurately refers to as the causal factor in a moral position is the fact of that matter, which is a moral matter....that makes their subjective morality declare y to be wrong.

Yes, what a subjectivist is refering to is not the same thing as what  realist refers to..but both of them refer to purported facts of a matter..which is moral...for...fucks...sake......

My view is crystal clear: mores are a mediation among feelings, ideas, and the environment, and they are predicated ultimately on feelings.  You could call feelings a "moral fact" if you like, but then we just have to find new words to talk about objective mores rather than those that are made up by a subjective agent in accord with how they experience their world.

Your view may be.  I don't doubt that you know your own mind.  I'm explaining to you all of the ways that this knowledge is lost in translation within meta-ethical semantics.

No one thinks that feelings are moral facts.  Non cognitivism (not subjectivism, for the umpteenth time) is a position that categorically rejects any moral facts.  If you hold to it, fine, but hold to it.  This business about mediation between ideas and environment is inconsistent with non cognitivism, however. If there -are- ideas to mediate between, that's an affirmation of cognitivism. If there -is- an environment to mediate between, this is an affirmation of objectivity. The presnece of feelings in this tripartate theory does not mean what you think it means, imply what you think it implies, demonstrate what you think it demonstrates, or conform to your stated position that morality is subjective.

You are arguing, with, yourself....

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I'll ask again:
What is the definition of 'baseward'? (I've never come across that term before).
Please give an example of a 'moral fact'.

Now, into the weeds.

Baseward is just cracker archea for something pointed at the bottom of something else. 

So, while we're about it, could you please provide definitions for:

sure-

- beliefs

Things we hold to be true.

- states of belief

The act of holding something to be true.

- moral

-a descriptor, it denotes things with a moral component.

- moral proposition

an expression of one's moral positions.

- ethical/ethics

interchangeable with morality to meta ethicists.

- ethical proposition

interchangeable with moral proposition to meta ethicists.

Are these propositions system-inputs or system-outputs?

They can be either.  This is wrong and this is wrong because are both moral propositions.  One refers to the input from which the conclusion is derived, the other does not. In the most clinical sense..they would be outputs, as your statement (or idea) about the the thing is not the thing itself. Just a description of what you see.

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I do expect, btw, to see some progress from someone, after all these questions and answers.  If it's just stonewalling bullshit...well.....Imma start cracking dick jokes real quick -and stop wasting my time explaining these positions to folks who are uninterested in their own positions and those positions implications..much less anyone elses.  

[DLJ]

It's not.

Morality is an evolved system (a value stream).  Evolution cares not one iota about 'truth'.  Morality is all about utility and warranty.

Benny is much much closer to the mark...

I'm wasn't arguing for my position...so..okay?  I'm trying to get people familiar with the terms and the divisions of these positions, lol
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Oh, I see. In that I take it you are referring to Vulcan's diagram in post #152.

I have yet to decide whether that first question (regarding belief) is the best place to start.

I'll ask again:
What is the definition of 'baseward'? (I've never come across that term before).
Please give an example of a 'moral fact'.

Now, into the weeds.

Baseward is just cracker archea for something pointed at the bottom of something else. 
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"cracker archea"? What? White non-slave-owning single-celled microorganisms?

So, while we're about it, could you please provide definitions for:
- beliefs

Things we hold to be true.
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And are these 'things' held to be true unthinkingly/intuitively/subconsciously/non-cognitively or thinkingly/tuitively/consciously/cognitively?

Or both?

- states of belief

The act of holding something to be true.

A state is an action?

Doesn't it make more sense to think of 'status' i.e. one/zero or t/f?

- moral

-a descriptor, it denotes things with a moral component.

Let's test that one:
"The moral of the story is..." >
"The descriptor denoting a thing with a moral component of the story is..."

Oh wait, we still have "a moral" in there, so let's keep going:
"The descriptor denoting a thing with descriptor denoting a thing with a moral component component of the story is..." >
"The descriptor denoting a thing with descriptor denoting a thing with descriptor denoting a thing with a moral component component component of the story is..." >

Anyway, a 'descriptor' implies, indeed requires, 'cognition' which means that you have excluded the non-cognitive components by definition.

I think we can do better than that. We need a definition without the bias.

- moral proposition

an expression of one's moral positions.

So if the processing of a moral (not the descriptor but the event) requires expression... can one express without cognition? Yes, if "Yuck" can be an example of an expression of one's moral position.

But "Yuck" doesn't strike me as a valid example of a proposition.

- ethical/ethics

interchangeable with morality to meta ethicists.

In which case, meta-ethicists should read some Best Practice manuals. Having two words for one thing is amateurish.

- ethical proposition

interchangeable with moral proposition to meta ethicists.

See above.

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Are these propositions system-inputs or system-outputs?

They can be either.  This is wrong and this is wrong because are both moral propositions.  One refers to the input from which the conclusion is derived, the other does not.  In the most clinical sense..they would be outputs, as your statement (or idea) about the the thing is not the thing itself.  Just a description of what you see.
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I concur ... for 'ethical propositions'. I do not think that moral propositions exist... a moral does not require cognition but a proposition does.

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I do expect, btw, to see some progress from someone, after all these questions and answers.  If it's just stonewalling bullshit...well.....Imma start cracking dick jokes real quick -and stop wasting my time explaining these positions to folks who are uninterested in their own positions and those positions implications..much less anyone elses.   

In that case I'll ask no more questions. I am not interested in the positions. I'm just trying to determine where the meta-ethicists have gone wrong.

Cheers.

[The Grand Nudger]

I concur ... for 'ethical propositions'.  I do not think that moral propositions exist... a moral does not require cognition but a proposition does.

Why is a moral proposition different, in this way, from some other proposition?  Your belief that moral propositions do not exist is ridiculous on it's face, lol.  I think you know that.

In that case I'll ask no more questions.  I am not interested in the positions.  I'm just trying to determine where the meta-ethicists have gone wrong.

Cheers.

I'd been getting that vibe, lol yeah.  Thing is, they've already described whatever you believe about morals or ethics.  You agree with some of them no matter what dismissive nonsense you might come up with.

[DLJ]

I concur ... for 'ethical propositions'.  I do not think that moral propositions exist... a moral does not require cognition but a proposition does.

Why is a moral proposition different, in this way, from some other proposition?  Your belief that moral propositions do not exist is ridiculous on it is face, lol.  I think you know that.
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Once one has realised that morality is a value stream it's a case of looking at the component parts and determining which are intrinsic, which are contextual, external vs. internal, which require conscious thought processing and which do not.

It then makes sense to distinguish between the internal (subjective - 'of the self') mechanisms and the elements that require interaction with the environment (which includes other subjects).

Given that terms like 'code of ethics' are well established as existing at the group level we might as well lean towards using 'ethics' for the social/cultural layers and then leave 'moral' as a category term (descriptor) for the sense-data related stuff.

Thus, 'ethical proposition' (we should, you should, thou shalt) makes sense but 'moral proposition' does not as it may only require/involve the reptilian brain and not the neo-cortex (unless one is OK with "Yuck" as an example of a moral proposition).

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In that case I'll ask no more questions.  I am not interested in the positions.  I'm just trying to determine where the meta-ethicists have gone wrong.

Cheers.

I'd been getting that vibe, lol yeah.  Thing is, they've already described whatever you believe about morals or ethics.  You agree with some of them no matter what dismissive nonsense you might come up with.

Not dismissive. The cart is useful but it should follow the horse.

[The Grand Nudger]

What cart, what horse?  The meta ethicists have it wrong, remember? 

Now were arguing that the term moral proposition is insensible?  Please, this is absurd, lol.

Moral propositions (and ethical propositions - they are the same thing-) may, indeed, reduce to "yuck". This is one of the claims of non-cognitivism. If they are right - as a position-, that's what all of your moral/ethical propositions reduce to. You possess no cognitive moral/ethical propositions. They categorically reject the idea..that our moral or ethical propositions..are ideas, beliefs, that we are in a state of belief, that there is a process of consideration.

They believe that morality, ethics..is..drumroll please......non-cognitive.

So, yeah, that's pretty much the base of any moral system. Is it -about- something..or are we just saying yuck.