Subjective Morality?

[DLJ]

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 Is it -about- something..or are we just saying yuck.

Why is it either/or?

[The Grand Nudger]

Buddy, lol....I think that it is, but that position is not open to a non-cognitivist. Which is why I reject non-cognitivism. I need only refer to the fact that I have beliefs about moral things. That my own moral positions are expressions of those states of belief..to know that non-cognitivism is very likely to be wrong.

They would have to try to convince me that my believing that I believe things is an elaborate ruse (and they do..!)

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That, btw, is motherfuckin progress!  Fist-bump.

Now we know that you and I are both cognitivists.  We both think that a moral proposition can express a state of belief.  We think that morality is about something, that we hold to be true.  So...for us "-show me how/give me a single example of- it's not just feelings" is a closed door of objection, because we have a commitment to cognitivism, now.  

(and we can also state that at least some meta ethicists were right about something, as we see it )

[DLJ]

Thanks for all your hard work.  

I'm beginning to understand your terminology... which is why I can reject it.

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They would have to try to convince me that my believing that I believe things is an elaborate ruse (and they do..!)
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Not a ruse... it's an illusion.  A user-illusion.

And the main illusion is "I".

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That, btw, is motherfuckin progress!  Fist-bump.
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Progress of a kind.

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We both think that a moral proposition can express a state of belief. 
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I don't.  I reject the terminology.

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We think that morality is about something, that we hold to be true. 
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Yes.

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So...for us "-show me how/give me a single example of- it's not just feelings" is a closed door of objection, because we have a commitment to cognitivism, now.  
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Too many negatives for me to be able to parse that statement.

Cognition is required for ethics.  

Cognition is not required for a moral.

Or at least, that would be the case using Wikipedia's description of Cognition which seems to imply consciousness.

Cognition is "the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses".[1] It encompasses processes such as attention, the formation of knowledge, memory and working memory, judgment and evaluation, reasoning and "computation", problem solving and decision making, comprehension and production of language. Cognitive processes use existing knowledge and generate new knowledge.

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(and we can also state that at least some meta ethicists were right about something, as we see it )

Even the bible and quran are not completely wrong.

Just, mostly.

[The Grand Nudger]

Thanks for all your hard work.  

I'm beginning to understand your terminology... which is why I can reject it.

Hey, good, great.  That's legitimately the best possible result....though I'm unconcerned with your rejection of this standard terminology, lol. 

Not a ruse... it's an illusion.  A user-illusion.

And the main illusion is "I".

Well, okay, but does the illusion of I believe that it believes things?  This illusion of I certainly does..and while my beliefs may not actually get at truth (propositional accuracy is not a requirement of cognitivism) that is what I'm trying to express.  I'm not just grunting, at least not all of the time, lol..ergo non cognitivism is false.  I do have beliefs, like any of my other beliefs, about morality.  My moral propositions express those states of belief, just as any other proposition expresses those states of belief.  

They are knowledge of a same kind, and a product of cognition rather than a base response.   

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We both think that a moral proposition can express a state of belief. 
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I don't.  I reject the terminology.

You can reject the terminology all you like.  You've agreed to it's content.  I can go back to using the word cat, if you like?  You prefer to say that ethics is cognitive, but again..ethics and morality are interchangeable for purposes of our discussion.  We're talking about the same thing..and we still would be, even if I called it a cat.  

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We think that morality is about something, that we hold to be true. 
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Yes. 

Ta-da, done, you (re)affirm cognitivism and (again)reject non cognitivism.  It's really that simple.  

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So...for us "-show me how/give me a single example of- it's not just feelings" is a closed door of objection, because we have a commitment to cognitivism, now.  
...

Too many negatives for me to be able to parse that statement.

Cognition is required for ethics.  

Cognition is not required for a moral.

Or at least, that would be the case using Wikipedia's description of Cognition which seems to imply consciousness.

Cognition is "the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses".[1] It encompasses processes such as attention, the formation of knowledge, memory and working memory, judgment and evaluation, reasoning and "computation", problem solving and decision making, comprehension and production of language. Cognitive processes use existing knowledge and generate new knowledge.

-as if on cue, you responded to the post that comment is in with precisely the sort of objection unavailable to us and described by it.  After affirming the position of cognitivism (regardless of how much you don't like the words) many times...you then proceeded to object to cognitivism......by affirming a necessarrily non-cognitivist ojection.  Remember when you asked me about the name of a particular tribe.....?

You're trying to get ahead of some foot you think will fall- cuz those meta ethicists are a silly bunch and they're wrong about something, you just know it.  There is no foot.  

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(and we can also state that at least some meta ethicists were right about something, as we see it )

Even the bible and quran are not completely wrong.

Just, mostly.

I know right..and that's the focus of the next question with profound implications for moral ontology! Are our beliefs...that we do possess..sometimes true?

[DLJ]

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but again..ethics and morality are interchangeable for purposes of our discussion. 
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Which is why it has become obvious that we are not discussing the same thing.

[The Grand Nudger]

Words, how do they work? What is word, too?

You can call it a cat, I'll call it cuten master race.....and it will still be a picture of Grey Cat.

[bennyboy]

I know right..and that's the focus of the next question with profound implications for moral ontology!  Are our beliefs...that we do possess..sometimes true?

The more important question is-- what beliefs can be said to be true, and how would we know?

I think you're about half a step away from church, buddy. You are talking about a level of truth that people cannot knowingly access, but you refer to it as though it means something.

[The Grand Nudger]

The more important question is-- what beliefs can be said to be true, and how would we know?

Both great questions, but both meaningless unless our beliefs can sometimes be true, so that we can present such an example.  If our beliefs are never true...then we can provide no example of a true belief or how we would know it was one.  

Do you think it's true that you think your question is a more important question?  Is that a true statement of your own beliefs?  How do you know?

I think you're about half a step away from church, buddy.  You are talking about a level of truth that people cannot knowingly access, but you refer to it as though it means something.

This is just getting weirder and weirder.  Are you unable to access the truth of the matter of whether or not you hold a belief about something? If you can access that, you have access to the level of truth I'm talking about.

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This is for both of you.  All that's being asked on the issue between cognitivism and con cognitivism, is whether or not some moral proposition expresses a state of belief.  

It doesn't have to be an accurate belief.
There's no mention of what that belief refers to.

Subjectivism, realism, and error theory......are all positions of moral cognitivism.

[bennyboy]

The more important question is-- what beliefs can be said to be true, and how would we know?

Both great questions, but both meaningless unless our beliefs can sometimes be true, so that we can present such an example.  If our beliefs are never true...then we can provide no example of a true belief or how we would know it was one.  

Do you think it's true that you think your question is a more important question?  Is that a true statement of your own beliefs?  How do you know?

I don't know. That's why I consider all beliefs in context-- a philosophical position, for example. Always implied is this: GIVEN X, then I believe Y.

My context is defined by the following philosophical positions (maybe a few more that I'm not aware of):
-other people are real
-the word "subjective" is a meaningful description
-the difference between morality and other ideas is that it discusses what should be done or believed
-"Should" requires goals, which serve as the context for moral actions and beliefs. It's another level of GIVEN X, then Y, but now it's SHOULD Y.

I'll give an example. Given that unnecessary human suffering is wrong, then rape is wrong; having established that moral truth by definition, we can now objectively establish in what cases someone has been raped, and to what degree the rape has caused unnecessary human suffering. Given that property ownership is a thing which should be protected, then thievery is wrong. Having established that moral truth by definition, we can objectively determine (through checking ID numbers etc.) whether thievery has occurred.

But where do the Prime Givens come from? Is there something outside human agency which dictates them? In my view, there is not, unless you either include the idea of God, or discard the concept of subjective agency.

[The Grand Nudger]

I don't know.  That's why I consider all beliefs in context-- a philosophical position, for example.  Always implied is this: GIVEN X, then I believe Y.

My context is defined by the following philosophical positions (maybe a few more that I'm not aware of):
-other people are real
-the word "subjective" is a meaningful description
-the difference between morality and other ideas is that it discusses what should be done or believed
-"Should" requires goals, which serve as the context for moral actions and beliefs.  It's another level of GIVEN X, then Y, but now it's SHOULD Y.

Sure, I agree with all of that, unreservedly...but I asked you whether or not you even believed in a statement you made.  That's all I asked.  The answer to that is all that matters to cognitivism/noncognitivism.  Do you believe anything you just said, or was that all a really elaborate way to grunt?

I'll give an example.  Given that unnecessary human suffering is wrong, then rape is wrong; having established that moral truth by definition, we can now objectively establish in what cases someone has been raped, and to what degree the rape has caused unnecessary human suffering.  Given that property ownership is a thing which should be protected, then thievery is wrong.  Having established that moral truth by definition, we can objectively determine (through checking ID numbers etc.) whether thievery has occurred.

Do you believe that any of what you said above is true?  

But where do the Prime Givens come from?  Is there something outside human agency which dictates them?  In my view, there is not, unless you either include the idea of God, or discard the concept of subjective agency.

Right, and that's a question that's just over the horizon as we proceed.  Thing is, there are no "prime givens" unless ..at least..-those- beliefs can sometimes be true...as we diverge into different cognitivist theories you'll get different answers for where our prime givens come from.

An error theorist rejects prime givens. A subjectivist thinks that prime givens are mind dependent. A realist thinks that prime givens are externally referent. All three concede that there could be (or are) true prime givens.