Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

[quote='Khemikal' pid='1846605' dateline='1541978182']
It's -not- an argument against moral realism, it's an argument -for- moral realism, lol....?

There's no further arguing, you're done.  You've agreed to moral realism, and that's that.  

What you need to figure out now, is why you thought (and still think) that you didn't agree with moral realism.

You are like the chick that wears a low-cut blouse without a bra, and shouts "Stop staring at my tits."

I've given my position, and it's very clearly an argument for subjective morality,

the trouble is that it's not...

[quote]
since it predicates morality on feelings. 

Nope...that;s not at all what you've repeatedly said.

[/quote]
Nope.  Your own idiosyncratic definition includes feeling..ideas..and environment.  The simple fact of the latter two's inclusion is enough to establish moral realism.  You don't realize that...I get that..but that is the fact of the matter.

You can talk around it all you want, but unless you can demonstrate any objective truth that necessitates a particular ought with no subjective evaluation required, then move along.  Stop trying to make this thread about your tits.

Already have, and you've already agreed to them.

Lemme ask you again, to give you a chance to contradict yourself......again.....

Does your toe exist? If it does........qed.

[bennyboy]

Nope.  Your own idiosyncratic definition includes feeling..ideas..and environment.  The simple fact of the latter two's inclusion is enough to establish moral realism.  You don't realize that...I get that..but that is the fact of the matter.

"I'm up here!"

Provide an example of an objective moral fact which necessitates a particular "ought," and is not dependent on the feelings or ideas of a subjective agent.

Do you even disagree that moral ideas are predicated on feelings? Cuz I'm not even sure you do.

[The Grand Nudger]

You've already accepted that the kinds of facts that I..as moral realist, would refer to... can support the kinds of oughts that I..as a moral realist, might levy.

There's nothing else.  You've entirely ceded all of the ground.

Why is this difficult for you to comprehend? You're a filthy moral realist, Benny, just like me. You think that there are mind independent facts that can support a moral ought. That's it...that's the whole enchilada.

(I wouldn't get too down about it, if I were you..remember way back in the beginning, when I mentioned that most people live their lives and describe their moral theory as though they were moral realists..well..that's still true, and you are one of those people)

[bennyboy]

I've never cared about that terminology, only that morality is subjective, since it is predicated mainly on feelings.

I'm reasonably certain that you are misrepresenting or misunderstanding moral realism-- i.e. that moral facts aren't simply facts that you use to support your (subjective) moral opinions. It must be possible to say, "X is moral, and Y is immoral," and to believe those statements to represent reality, i.e. a truth which transcends subjective evaluation, i.e., the ought itself is a moral fact-- some ought ideas are right, and others must be wrong; and where two oppose each other, at least one of them must be wrong-- not wrong TO SOMEONE, mind you, just plain wrong.

It's pretty easy to demonstrate that this is not the case. Look at the case of mercy killing. Is it right or wrong to put someone out of their misery at their request? It must be one of those, without regard to the feelings of either the requester or the person requested to carry out the act, or there's no real moral truth involved.

The fact is that if you choose to value organic life, then the failure of that organism represents a loss to the world, and you will consider the killing immoral (a sin, probably). If you choose other values (freedom over matters of the self, quality of life, money), then you will consider the euthanasia either morally acceptable, or a moral imperative.

So we are back to our meta-ought. Why OUGHT we choose one metric or the other in the first place? The facts here are not in dispute-- someone is sick, they are suffering, they want to die. The moral fact cannot be predicated on each individual's evaluations-- their metric of preference, so to speak.

For there to be a real morality, here, at most one of those positions can be correct. So how do you resolve the dispute? How do you access the moral rightness out there in the ether, and arrive at the one-true-right-choice™?

I've given you the example of euthanasia. Please state your position on it, and explain how moral realism provides any utility in arriving at that position.

*Expected response-- you will NOT do any of that, but will just keep paraphrasing wikipedia pages. But let me say-- I believe that you ought not do that!

[The Grand Nudger]

I've never cared about that terminology, only that morality is subjective, since it is predicated mainly on feelings.

Except that you've rejected that, giving feelings 1/3 billing in your own definition of morality.  I only require that there be a single idea, and an environment, and that's enough to establish my natural realism. Conveniently, those were the other two thirds of what you though morality was.

I'm reasonably certain that you are misrepresenting moral realism-- i.e. that moral facts aren't simply facts that you use to support your (subjective) moral opinions.  It must be possible to say, "X is moral, and Y is immoral," and to believe those statements to represent reality, i.e. a truth which transcends subjective evaluation,  i.e., the ought itself is a moral fact-- some ought ideas are right, and others must be wrong; and where two oppose each other, at least one of them must be wrong.

You may feel certain, but it isn't on account of your being reasonable.

It's pretty easy to demonstrate that this is not the case.  Look at the case of mercy killing.  Is it right or wrong to put someone out of their misery at their request?  It must be one of those, without regard to the feelings of either the requester or the person requested to carry out the act, or there's no real moral truth involved.

It might be, it might not be....to a moral realist, only the objective facts of the matter could lead to a sound conclusion on the matter.

The fact is that if you choose to value organic life, then the failure of that organism represents a loss to the world, and you will consider the killing immoral (a sin, probably).  If you choose other values (freedom over self, quality of life, money), then you will consider the euthanasia either morally acceptable, or a moral imperative.

Moral realists aren't locked into considering just one moral fact - they can incorporate as many moral facts as might be relevant.

So we are back to our meta-ought.  Why OUGHT we choose one metric or the other in the first place?  The facts here are not in dispute-- someone is sick, they are suffering, they want to die.

Sounds pretty simple to me, you should help them end their life.  What's the problem?  

For there to be a real morality, here, at most one of those positions can be correct.  So how do you resolve the dispute?  How do you access the moral rightness out there in the ether, and arrive at the one-true-right-choice™?

You don't realize that you're asking a malformed question...do you? Moral realism states that things are objectively right or wrong based upoon mind independent facts. It doesn't say that in every choice brought before you there will be at least one good option, that one of the positions will be the correct one. The One True Right Decision™ has nothing to do with moral realism. That's absolutism.

They can all be fucked up.................say it with me, exclusively sub-optimal decisions. Know what I do as a moral realist, when I find that every option available to me and some other asshole is exclusively sub-optimal, and morally equivalent?

Tell em to do whatever they're comfortable with, since it's all shit.

[Angrboda]

I've never cared about that terminology, only that morality is subjective, since it is predicated mainly on feelings.

A proposition which you've not been able to demonstrate.

[bennyboy]

I've never cared about that terminology, only that morality is subjective, since it is predicated mainly on feelings.

A proposition which you've not been able to demonstrate.

How would you demonstrate, by which you mean demonstrate something objectively, something which is intrinsically subjective?

But let me ask you this-- if nobody has feelings about something, then from whence WOULD "ought" come from?  Why are there differences?  Are there different moral fact for individuals, or are there the same physical facts, which they are feeding through different instances of subjective agency, thereby producing varying results?

[DLJ]

...
moral facts
...

Did we ever get an example of a 'moral fact'? I may have missed it.

...
 Moral realism states that things are objectively right or wrong based [upon] mind independent facts.
...

That's nice and succinct.

It would help me a little if you could reword that without using the words where I think the errors might be... 'things', 'objectively', 'right' and 'wrong'.

I.e. please fill in the blanks with something less prone to equivocation:
"Moral realism states that __A__ are __B__ __C__ or __D__ based [upon] mind independent facts.

Examples might be:
A: current state; required state, etc.
B: quantitatively; qualitatively; independently measurable; goals-oriented; innately; intrinsically; without bias; unprejudiced; impartially, etc.
C: functioning; within accepted tolerance levels, corresponding to a correlation coefficient; insignificant, etc.
D: non-functioning; beyond a threshold tolerance, corresponding to a correlation coefficient; significant, etc.

Thanks in advance.

I've never cared about that terminology, only that morality is subjective, since it is predicated mainly on feelings.

A proposition which you've not been able to demonstrate.

No need to demonstrate it, it's axiomatic i.e. by definition.

There is no morality at all if there is one (or less than one) subject.

'Feeling' is the anthropomorphic term for a sensory data event.

[The Grand Nudger]

But let me ask you this-- if nobody has feelings about something, then from whence WOULD "ought" come from?  Why are there differences?  Are there different moral fact for individuals, or are there the same physical facts, which they are feeding through different instances of subjective agency, thereby producing varying results?

-all moral positions can agree on the fact that human beings are necessarily subjective agents.  This practically ensures that even if morality were a sign on the side of the road, somebody..somewhere, would disagree with somebody else about what it says.

Nevertheless, we insist that it is at least possible for a person, who is a necessarily subjective agent, to be in possession of a fact, and to be able to use systems like reason or the scientific process to further reduce the likelihood of error and make true and accurate statements. Obviously, even that won't be compelling to everyone, see our many creationist threads.

[bennyboy]

But let me ask you this-- if nobody has feelings about something, then from whence WOULD "ought" come from?  Why are there differences?  Are there different moral fact for individuals, or are there the same physical facts, which they are feeding through different instances of subjective agency, thereby producing varying results?

-all moral positions can agree on the fact that human beings are necessarily subjective agents.  This practically ensures that even if morality were a sign on the side of the road, somebody..somewhere, would disagree with somebody else about what it says.

Nevertheless, we insist that it is at least possible for a person, who is a necessarily subjective agent, to be in possession of a fact, and to be able to use systems like reason or the scientific process to further reduce the likelihood of error and make true and accurate statements.  Obviously, even that won't be compelling to everyone, see our many creationist threads.

When I entered the thread, it was on this caveat: that we must consider, at least pragmatically, the matter to be dualistic: that there are subjects and objects, mind and material states to think about.  I do not deny that there are objective facts which a subject might observe, have feelings about, and form ideas about.  You do not deny that any system of thought, including a moral system, involves subjective agency.  I haven't really tried to say that since all our observations are done through mental agency, we should not consider the possibility of objective facts; you haven't tried to argue that the Universe is deterministic, including our brains, and so we don't really need to consider the subjective experience of moral ideas at all.  So we're on the same page up to that point, at least.

Now, I'm willing to assert (I have, actually), that ALL morality, at its root, has feelings upon which it is predicated.  I can refine that-- I'd say they are feelings about social order specifically, rather than about beauty, about mathematics, or about cats.  This, as I see it, is not a point I'm trying to make-- it is a category description.  I would like to believe that we all agree still, up to this point, if not about the need for feeling, but about the category of the content which morality considers.

For most objective truths, I expect there to be a fair chance at directly observing the truth (or following the same path of inference which arrives necessarily at it).  For example in discussing gravity, science teachers are perfectly happy to describe all the relationships, experiments and so on by which one might arrive at an understanding comparable to their own.

I'd very much like, and it's now been asked a few times, for any EXAMPLE of a moral fact, and a description of the process of (purely rational) inference by which it is arrived at, or if it is an observation rather than a conclusion, how that observation leads to a correct moral view.  I believe I can describe how feelings lead to moral views, and to make at least a reasonable speculation about how and why people or groups of people arrive at different views.  Can you do so for moral realism?