Deconversion and some doubts

[vulcanlogician]

Not really, the ought is derived from a goal, a telos.

If I subscribe to some goal such as I ought not harm others. Then if x is harmful to others, it can be said that I ought not do x, as a result.

But if I had no such goal, there’s no ought to derive from x is harmful to others. It’s not based on x being harmful to others, that I ought not to do x,  it’s based on the goal being not to harm others.

The questions I’m asking are in relationship to the nature of these goals/rules.

The ought is derived from understanding an ideal... a better than/worse than thing... once you understand that there is "a good" the ought naturally follows from that.

When pushed, most atheist I’ve spoken to indicate as the previous poster did, that such goals/rules are rooted in unwritten social/culture agreements, we make with others in our society. Implying that it requires our agreement to be bound by them, and that such oughts are not applicable to those who don’t. It’s not clear to me if you agree with this view?

I reject this view. And I'm not like most atheists concerning my ethics. Nor am I "decided" on my ethics. I think moral realism is plausible for X, Y, and Z reasons. Most are found in Plato's Republic. I don't recall Plato ever arguing that morality has anything to do with any god in that book. In fact, he argues the opposite in Euthyphro. But I'm also aware that many Christian Platonists loved to shove their God into that book. That book had nothing to do with their God, Jesus, or "what was written on men's hearts." To Plato, morality is a matter of letting reason control the appetites. (EDIT: there is more to it than that... we can discuss if you are interested.)

Theist, including Plato, Aristotle, etc believe in a transcendent moral order.

Plato and Aristotle had a metaphysical ethics. Is that what you mean by "transcendent moral order"? G.E. Moore was an atheist and his ethics was metaphysical, too. I tend to like non-naturalist and metaphysical ethics... but you'll have to explain to me what metaphysical ethics have to do with gods. I don't think God's existence or nonexistence would have anything to do with morality. If something is morally wrong, it is morally wrong whether God exists or not.

So when you appeal to folks like Plato in defense of your moral view, it’s a bit odd. I believe you’ve expressed some pantheistic leanings previously, an affinity for folks like Spinoza, so it is possible you do subscribe to a teleological view of reality,  but I hope you can be clear here, so that we don’t talk past each other

I'm no pantheist, but I do love Spinoza's "pantheism" (if you want to call it that). Spinoza thinks that "reality is sacred." Interesting idea. There is no teleology with Spinoza's God: (Leibniz used Spinoza's basic deterministic model with a teleology duct taped on... which is where you may have gotten the idea that Spinoza is concerned with a 'telos'). Leibniz said all the stuff about this being "the best of all possible worlds" and all that. Spinoza said nothing like that. He said something like: shit is happening because it is necessary for it to happen. But there is a sort of guilt by association going on with Spinoza and Leibniz. Look it up on Stanford Encyclopedia. We don't need to get into it here.

Spinoza is a difficult case to put into a category, anyway. I've read philosophers claiming he is a moral nihilist, and others that saying he is a moral realist. That's a matter for debate. One thing that isn't up for debate, however, is that he saw most theists as a bunch of fearful, brutish thugs who more used their god as an excuse to abuse others than an inspiration to ever do any kind of good deed. He said that plainly, on multiple occasions, and didn't leave those particular statements open to interpretation like he did some of his others.

I don't want to get segwayed into Spinoza. I'd rather keep our conversation centered around Plato's Republic because that is where the meat and potatoes of my moral realism is found.

[The Grand Nudger]

A moral goal and a moral structure are not ubiquitously interchangeable. A person can understand and accept the structure without having or pursuing a stated goal.

We can know something is shitty and have no interest in avoiding it. VV, as well, of course. It’s silly to say, in a system that uses harm as the moral metric, that being harmful isn’t what makes something “bad”. That’s baked into harm based morality by definition. Objective or subjective.

[Acrobat]

The ought is derived from understanding an ideal... a better than/worse than thing... once you understand that there is "a good" the ought naturally follows from that.

That doesn’t follow. It can stem from an obligation to be like that ideal, but not from merely understanding what the ideal is. I may understand what an ideal basketball player is, but that doesn’t mean I ought to be like him.

You could describe in full detail what an ideally good person would look like to you, nothing in those details obligate me to be like such a person.

Now, Christians like myself would define the moral ideal as Christ, in fact a common moral criticism of Christians, even by non-christians, is how un-Christ like they are. Does this mean we all ought to be Christlike? That you as a non Christian have an obligation to be Christlike?

Most are found in Plato's Republic. I don't recall Plato ever arguing that morality has anything to do with any god in that book. In fact, he argues the opposite in Euthyphro. But I'm also aware that many Christian Platonists loved to shove their God into that book. That book had nothing to do with their God, Jesus, or "what was written on men's hearts." To Plato, morality is a matter of letting reason control the appetites.

This is Plato‘s description of the Good, from the Allegory of the Cave:

“ the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.”


Plato unlike what you might say of Spinoza explicitly subscribed to a teleological view of reality, in fact he’s one of the originators of the term. His views of morality, good are entirely built on teleological assumptions about reality.

Do you share Plato’s teleological beliefs, or do you reject them, and believe you can keep his moral views intact absent of it?

I’d say doing so would render his views about morality as incoherent, but I just want to be clear as to where you stand on the question of teleology here? I think you are an outlier among other unbelievers here, and I prefer to be careful not to make too many assumptions as to what you do or don’t believe.

---

If I subscribe to some goal such as I ought not harm others. Then if x is harmful to others, it can be said that I ought not do x, as a result.

But if I had no such goal, there’s no ought to derive from x is harmful to others. It’s not based on x being harmful to others, that I ought not to do x,  it’s based on the goal being not to harm others.

And who do you think comes up with these goals, besides humans? Whatever divinely sanctioned "ought" there may be out there, it's not evident at all and isn't necessary. As far as us human beings are concerned, atheists and theists alike, our oughts develop from us, consciously/subconsciously, mainly societally/culturally but also individually. What is so hard to accept about this from a logical perspective? The world/system doesn't need to be perfect for it to be doing ok.

I don’t accept it because it’s not true. I didn’t decide that I ought not steal, nor did society or culture impose such an obligation, because it has no such moral power to do so, anymore than it does in obligating you to tuck your shirt in, or keep your hair short, or avoid tattoos.

Hardly anyone would say that the holocaust is wrong because society/culture says it. They would say it’s wrong even if their society didn’t think it was.

Society is sort of like the Twitter verse, if you were to follow their advice on what it means to be good, you’d be worse off, a cartoon of a man, more a phony than good.

[vulcanlogician]

The ought is derived from understanding an ideal... a better than/worse than thing... once you understand that there is "a good" the ought naturally follows from that.

That doesn’t follow. It can stem from an obligation to be like that ideal, but not from merely understanding what the ideal is. I may understand what an ideal basketball player is, but that doesn’t mean I ought to be like him.

You could describe in full detail what an ideally good person would look like to you, nothing in those details obligate me to be like such a person.

And that's the difference between you and me. And that's the difference between you and Plato. Do you think morals are obligations? They aren't.

But for those who realize an ideal and strive to attain it, that is moral realism. Moral realism isn't like the law of gravity that you are compelled to follow whether you want to or not. Moral realism is that which you can either ignore or acknowledge. How you treat others is a reality. It is a significant reality. But no one is forcing you to acknowledge this reality. You could just as easily focus on your personal advancement and ignore the fact that you hurt and abuse others along the way. Nothing is making you acknowledge the reality of the pain and suffering you cause others. But the thing is: the pain and suffering of others is REAL. And when you acknowledge that it is real, then morality becomes an objectively real thing.

This is one of my favorite quotes from Plato's Republic. It is about what a philosopher is. It has nothing to do with God. It has everything to do with Truth.

Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such a one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts --he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.

[The Valkyrie]

Raised Catholic and been clean since my early teens.

We all go through doubts, even 20 years later.

If Catholic Ireland can start throwing off the shackles of the church, so can we as individuals.

If there’s a hell it’s likely over populated with the majority of humanity and all the interesting people. Whereas heaven is probably populated with people you wouldn’t want to know anyway.

[Acrobat]

That doesn’t follow. It can stem from an obligation to be like that ideal, but not from merely understanding what the ideal is. I may understand what an ideal basketball player is, but that doesn’t mean I ought to be like him.

You could describe in full detail what an ideally good person would look like to you, nothing in those details obligate me to be like such a person.

And that's the difference between you and me. And that's the difference between you and Plato. Do you think morals are obligations? They aren't.

An ought expresses an obligation. If there are no obligations than there are no oughts.

But for those who realize an ideal and strive to attain it, that is moral realism. Moral realism isn't like the law of gravity that you are compelled to follow whether you want to or not. Moral realism is that which you can either ignore or acknowledge. How you treat others is a reality. It is a significant reality. But no one is forcing you to acknowledge this reality.

Let assume x causes harm to others.

I acknowledge this reality, that x causes harm.

Now if I reject the idea that I ought not do things that harm others, what reality am I refusing to acknowledge?

You indicate that oughts don't exist like the law of gravity, as some of sort moral law woven into the fabric of reality, so i don't see how you can suggest that I'm refusing to acknowledge reality, by rejecting the idea that I ought not do things that harm others? You also seem to reject the idea that oughts are personal goals we assign ourself, or imposed on us by our society of our culture, which I think leaves very little room for you here.

Also I was hoping you might at some point be able to answer the questions i had as to whether you subscribe to a teleological view of reality, like Plato does?

[vulcanlogician]

Plato doesn't have an Aristotelian teleology. Plato thinks that every material thing partakes (to some degree) in the form of the Good. So, if you are looking at a fly wing, you would say that it is a good fly wing inasmuch as it partakes in the form of the perfect fly wing (which is something that exists to Plato... and I agree with Plato. In theory, there IS A SUCH THING as a perfect fly wing.)

But this does not mean purpose. Aristotle saw things backwards. He saw the plants and lower parts of the food chain as meant for food for those higher up on the food chain. But an evolutionary biologist can tell you that's backwards. The "lower" life forms allow the "higher" life forms to evolve. They don't exist for us. We exist for them.

So let's talk about Plato's telos as described in Timaeus. Full disclosure: I have not read this work. But I have read a lot about this work. He proposed a cosmology in this book, sure. And he also proposed a God who fashioned the world. The thing is, the god fashioned the world using the form of the good as a template. This means that goodness exists independently of God in Plato's conception. And if the God Plato proposes in Timeus suddenly ceased to exist... goodness would still exist.

Plato isn't concerned with "the purpose" of things like Aristotle is. Plato is concerned with a very abstract and nonphysical perfection. Plato understood that you cannot draw a perfect circle. Even if the circle appeared to be flawless, if one were to inspect the circle you would see minor squiggles and imperfections. But how can you say that these squiggles are imperfections? Because there is an IDEA of a perfect circle.

To Plato, in our lives we might have some minor squiggles and imperfections. That's to be expected. But we ought to model our behavior after the Form of the Good. There is no teleology. Our purpose isn't to be good. But those who are wise... those who recognize the Form of the Good... they will try their best to model their behavior in the form of the good, just as one who tries to draw a perfect circle tries to model his drawing after the form (idea) of the perfect circle.

[GrandizerII]

The ought is derived from understanding an ideal... a better than/worse than thing... once you understand that there is "a good" the ought naturally follows from that.

That doesn’t follow. It can stem from an obligation to be like that ideal, but not from merely understanding what the ideal is. I may understand what an ideal basketball player is, but that doesn’t mean I ought to be like him.

You could describe in full detail what an ideally good person would look like to you, nothing in those details obligate me to be like such a person.

Now, Christians like myself would define the moral ideal as Christ, in fact a common moral criticism of Christians, even by non-christians, is how un-Christ like they are. Does this mean we all ought to be Christlike? That you as a non Christian have an obligation to be Christlike?

Most are found in Plato's Republic. I don't recall Plato ever arguing that morality has anything to do with any god in that book. In fact, he argues the opposite in Euthyphro. But I'm also aware that many Christian Platonists loved to shove their God into that book. That book had nothing to do with their God, Jesus, or "what was written on men's hearts." To Plato, morality is a matter of letting reason control the appetites.

This is Plato‘s description of the Good, from the Allegory of the Cave:

“ the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.”


Plato unlike what you might say of Spinoza explicitly subscribed to a teleological view of reality, in fact he’s one of the originators of the term. His views of morality, good are entirely built on teleological assumptions about reality.

Do you share Plato’s teleological beliefs, or do you reject them, and believe you can keep his moral views intact absent of it?

I’d say doing so would render his views about morality as incoherent, but I just want to be clear as to where you stand on the question of teleology here? I think you are an outlier among other unbelievers here, and I prefer to be careful not to make too many assumptions as to what you do or don’t believe.

---

And who do you think comes up with these goals, besides humans? Whatever divinely sanctioned "ought" there may be out there, it's not evident at all and isn't necessary. As far as us human beings are concerned, atheists and theists alike, our oughts develop from us, consciously/subconsciously, mainly societally/culturally but also individually. What is so hard to accept about this from a logical perspective? The world/system doesn't need to be perfect for it to be doing ok.

I don’t accept it because it’s not true. I didn’t decide that I ought not steal, nor did society or culture impose such an obligation, because it has no such moral power to do so, anymore than it does in obligating you to tuck your shirt in, or keep your hair short, or avoid tattoos.

Hardly anyone would say that the holocaust is wrong because society/culture says it. They would say it’s wrong even if their society didn’t think it was.

Society is sort of like the Twitter verse, if you were to follow their advice on what it means to be good, you’d be worse off, a cartoon of a man, more a phony than good.

You're strawmanning me now. We were talking about where ought and ought nots come from, not whether stealing or the Holocaust is bad because society says so.

Ought and ought nots imply rules. Rules, as far as we know, are set by human societies. You don't need rules to believe that stealing or the Holocaust are wrong, and that they are to be avoided because they are wrong. But there are moral societal rules here and there that members of these societies are expected to follow even if you opt not to; it's not some external entity out there formulating these rules.

Also, something to be stated because theists make this mistake quite often: something is not false just because you don't like it to be true.

[vulcanlogician]

@Acrobat If God ceased to exist would rape be okay?

[Acrobat]

@Acrobat If God ceased to exist would rape be okay?

That question doesn't make any sense to me.

I don't believe in a concept of God distinct from the Good.

A more accurate rendition of the question, would be to ask whether if Good did not exist would rape be morally okay?

And my answer is yes. Without Good having an objective existence, than nothing could be morally right or wrong, anymore so than your taste in music, or clothes could be right or wrong.

---

You're strawmanning me now. We were talking about where ought and ought nots come from, not whether stealing or the Holocaust is bad because society says so.

Ought and ought nots imply rules. Rules, as far as we know, are set by human societies. You don't need rules to believe that stealing or the Holocaust are wrong, and that they are to be avoided because they are wrong. But there are moral societal rules here and there that members of these societies are expected to follow even if you opt not to; it's not some external entity out there formulating these rules.

Also, something to be stated because theists make this mistake quite often: something is not false just because you don't like it to be true.

Oughts implies duties and obligation, all of which implies rules, regardless of whether those rules are explicitly spelled out, or listed in their entirety.

If they didn't imply a rule, than it wouldn't be oughts at all. It wouldn't be I ought not steal, but rather synonymous with wishes, I wish you didn't' steal.

And you need oughts for any sort of coherent moral statement, such as the holocaust is wrong. People ought not do things like the holocaust, rather than I wish people didn't do things like the holocaust.

In fact much of the language we would use when referring to legal laws, is analogous to the way we speak of morality. We treat morality as if its some transcendent law, binding on all human being, regardless of the laws and practices of their society. The holocaust is wrong not just for Americans, but for the Germans partaking in it, even if it was legal in that particularly society.

If you still disagree, than perhaps you can tell me what you think the difference is between saying someone ought not steal, and saying I wish people didn't steal? What is the nature of "ought" as distinct from the nature of a "wish" here?

---

A moral goal and a moral structure are not ubiquitously interchangeable.  A person can understand and accept the structure without having or pursuing a stated goal.

We can know something is shitty and have no interest in avoiding it.  VV, as well, of course.  It’s silly to say, in a system that uses harm as the moral metric, that being harmful isn’t what makes something “bad”.  That’s baked into harm based morality by definition.  Objective or subjective.

Without a moral goal, such as we ought not do things that are harmful to others, the structure is just a structure. You'd just be indicating the physical details of that structure. By calling the structure moral, you're sneaking in moral goals. Without goals, subjective or objective, moral statements would be incoherent.