Deconversion and some doubts

[Acrobat]

-and it’s silly of you to pretend that you have even a basic comprehension of my views or the views of any others when you keep posting this garbage, lol.

You don’t know enough about moral theory to know what you’re disagreeing with, and not for lack of others trying to help you.

So stow that shit where you should have stowed your initial outburst.

Whose moral theory are you referring to? Everyone seems to have their own particular flavor of it here.

[The Grand Nudger]

If you had the slightest clue you wouldn’t need to ask. That’s the point, exactly.

In any case, sure, there are a plurality of moral theories, scant few of which have anything to do with a god, regardless of whether gods exist.

Morality isn’t the absurd dilemma that you imagine it must be in the absence of a god.

[Acrobat]

Gae and Grandy are naturalists. I find non-naturalism more compelling. But I like naturalism too. I think the arguments for both are compelling. Hell. Moral nihilism even holds sway with me.

But, for the most part, I'm a non-naturalist. And if you ask me, I'll tell you exactly why. Grandy and Gae will also tell you (and have been telling you) why they're naturalists. I'll even give you a sound arguments for moral naturalism if you want one.

There is only one person in this thread who hasn't provided a sufficient or coherent explanation for his moral realism: Acrobat.

Gae thinks that by applying measurable criteria to anything commonly treated as subjectively good, like good pizza, good becomes objective. So if a group of us gather together and decides on a criteria good pizza, involving a measurable amount of cheese, crispness, etc.., then good here is objective.

Both Gae and Grandizer seem to render moral statement as descriptive rather than normative. Render the statement stealing is morally wrong, as a descriptive declaration, than a normative one.

Grandizer appears to believe something along the same lines, but it’s not clear to me yet. Grandizer believes in intrinsic wrongness, yet oughts are creation of each society. A view that sounds a bit weird to me, given certain scenarios.


If something is intrinsically wrong, but the society we live in suggests we ought to do it, am I obligated to do what’s wrong, but not to do what’s right here?

In reality societies and people believe that you ought not do what’s wrong, that we’re subject to some transcendent moral order, that our moral obligations are not their creation, just like things like inalienable rights written in the constitution, are seen as intrinsically endowed, rather than extrinsically granted to us by society.

Societies beliefs and more akin to your belief in some metaphysical conception of good, than the sort of relativism, or social construction being implied. No one other than a minority of atheists believe that moral obligation are created and placed on us by our particular society.

[The Grand Nudger]

See, whole bunch of shit that just demonstrates that you need to unclog your ears, but won’t.

: shrugs :

Descriptive moral subjectivity is the most common and well established theory of the practical development and application of moral theories. Secular moral realism is the most common and well established metaphysical theory.

You don’t have a clue what you’re talking about.

[GrandizerII]

Gae and Grandy are naturalists. I find non-naturalism more compelling. But I like naturalism too. I think the arguments for both are compelling. Hell. Moral nihilism even holds sway with me.

But, for the most part, I'm a non-naturalist. And if you ask me, I'll tell you exactly why. Grandy and Gae will also tell you (and have been telling you) why they're naturalists. I'll even give you a sound arguments for moral naturalism if you want one.

There is only one person in this thread who hasn't provided a sufficient or coherent explanation for his moral realism: Acrobat.

Actually, I don't know what I am exactly. And intrinsic may have been the wrong term to use here. I guess objective is more like it. The overall argument I'm trying to make here is that whatever morality is in essence, we set the rules, not some Entity out there.

I was initially answering the question of where oughts come from, not why we ought to do something. My plan wasn't to act like some amazing moral philosopher, just to set things straight with Acrobat, remind him of reality.

I also believe I said "may" before stating intrinsic. But could be wrong.

[Acrobat]

Gae and Grandy are naturalists. I find non-naturalism more compelling. But I like naturalism too. I think the arguments for both are compelling. Hell. Moral nihilism even holds sway with me.

But, for the most part, I'm a non-naturalist. And if you ask me, I'll tell you exactly why. Grandy and Gae will also tell you (and have been telling you) why they're naturalists. I'll even give you a sound arguments for moral naturalism if you want one.

There is only one person in this thread who hasn't provided a sufficient or coherent explanation for his moral realism: Acrobat.

Actually, I don't know what I am exactly. And intrinsic may have been the wrong term to use here. I guess objective is more like it. The overall argument I'm trying to make here is that whatever morality is in essence, we set the rules, not some Entity out there.

I was initially answering the question of where oughts come from, not why we ought to do something. My plan wasn't to act like some amazing moral philosopher, just to set things straight with Acrobat, remind him of reality.

I also believe I said "may" before stating intrinsic. But could be wrong.

If wrong is objective, and we ought not do things that are wrong? What rule is society setting, “we ought not do wrong”? It’s just one rule here, that is required if wrong is objective.

[The Grand Nudger]

Why indeed. Any answer to that is nothing more or less than a description of a great many evaluative premises that are required to go from is to ought.

We shouldn’t do “wrong” things is an effective catchall for every answer, in point of fact.

All moral systems require these premises to traverse the distance between those two distinct categories, which you habitually conflate with each other.

The....is......ought.......dilemma. Is wrong doesn’t imply shit, is wrong -and- we shouldn’t do wrong(or its content equivalent) is what leads to the statement “you shouldn’t do x”.

Always, in every system. Regardless of whether some silly god exists.

[GrandizerII]

Actually, I don't know what I am exactly. And intrinsic may have been the wrong term to use here. I guess objective is more like it. The overall argument I'm trying to make here is that whatever morality is in essence, we set the rules, not some Entity out there.

I was initially answering the question of where oughts come from, not why we ought to do something. My plan wasn't to act like some amazing moral philosopher, just to set things straight with Acrobat, remind him of reality.

I also believe I said "may" before stating intrinsic. But could be wrong.

If wrong is objective, and we ought not do things that are wrong? What rule is society setting, “we ought not do wrong”? It’s just one rule here, that is required if wrong is objective.

It's not simply this one general rule, it's a set of more specific ones. Remember, I said the rules are unwritten, and they are often implied (not explicit). And in some cases, quite circumstantial and malleable.

I gave you a few examples already of social powers setting oughts and ought nots.

Now you tell me where are you getting the oughts and ought nots, if it's not from human beings employing reason (or even not employing it well). If (as you say) we ought not to steal because stealing is wrong, what is making stealing wrong? Sure, you have an inner voice that tells you stealing is wrong, but is it wrong just because your inner voice says so?

[Acrobat]

If wrong is objective, and we ought not do things that are wrong? What rule is society setting, “we ought not do wrong”? It’s just one rule here, that is required if wrong is objective.

It's not simply this one general rule, it's a set of more specific ones. Remember, I said the rules are unwritten, and they are often implied (not explicit). And in some cases, quite circumstantial and malleable.

I gave you a few examples already of social powers setting oughts and ought nots.

Now you tell me where are you getting the oughts and ought nots, if it's not from human beings employing reason (or even not employing it well). If (as you say) we ought not to steal because stealing is wrong, what is making stealing wrong? Sure, you have an inner voice that tells you stealing is wrong, but is it wrong just because your inner voice says so?

If wrong is intrinsic/objective, what are some specifics rule that I need, that’s not covered by the general rule ought not do things that are wrong?

Stealing is objectively wrong in your view.

I don’t need to be specific and say you ought not steal, when all I need to say is you ought not do things that are objectively wrong.

[The Grand Nudger]

ir wouldn’t really matter if it was simply on account of an inner voice that something -is wrong-. You’d still need to add at least one evaluative premise to get -ought not- steal from that inner voice.

It’s a feature of all moral systems, explicit or silent.

Ought not do wrong and stealing is wrong are not identical statements. There’s your evaluative premise. You -do- need to add that if you’re offering a full rational variant of the deontological product.