Is God a logical contradiction?

[John 6IX Breezy]

You have a philosophic objection to science which proceeds from ideological positions that consider consciousness to be irreducible.

You seem to think that viewing consciousness as irreducible goes against cognitive science. I want to make sure we’re clear that many cognitive scientists do view consciousness as irreducible:

“A reductive explanation of consciousness will explain this wholly on the basis of physical principles that do not themselves make any appeal to consciousness. A nonreductive solution is one on which consciousness (or principles involving consciousness) is admitted as a basic part of the explanation […] Conscious experience is not “postulated” to explain other phenomena in turn; rather, it is a phenomenon to be explained in its own right. And if it turns out that it cannot be explained in terms of more basic entities, then it must be taken as irreducible [...] Given that reductive explanation fails, nonreductive explanation is the natural choice.”

The following quote echoes what I said in my curtain analogy. This is how correlates can be assessed despite consciousness not being observable by those on the other side of the curtain:

”The task of a science of consciousness, as I see it, is to systematically integrate two key classes of data into a scientific framework: third-person data, or data about behavior and brain processes, and first-person data, or data about subjective experience. When a conscious system is observed from the third-person point of view, a range of specific behavioral and neural phenomena present themselves. When a conscious system is observed from the first-person point of view, a range of specific subjective phenomena present themselves. Both sorts of phenomena have the status of data for a science of consciousness.”

Reference: Chalmers, D. (2010). The character of consciousness. Oxford University Press: London.

[The Grand Nudger]

It's hard to see the point of copy pasting all that out unless it was meant to show that you do, in fact, have a philosophic objection to science, which proceeds from reductionism.

Chalmers does too...as a dualist who thinks that a new law or force would need to be described in order to explain consciousness. All well and good, but if you take an anti-reductive position, you cannot then assert and thus require the truth of what you would attempt to disprove. In this case, a body of reductive facts. That would be a stolen concept.

Speaking of Chalmers, the p-zombie conjecture is a thought experiment designed explicitly to reject the notion that we can observe the correlates of consciousness, and the hard problem of consciousness is incoherent with the underlying premise of scientific inquiry, as the hard problem of vitalism handily demonstrates. If Chalmers is right about consciousness and hard problems, it's not just cog sci that's wrong, biology is wrong in it's totality. These views place him well outside of the consensus in cog sci (and he knows this, wearing it on his sleeve). As above, there's nothing inherently wrong with taking such a position. However, there are and will always be valid and invalid ways of expressing such a position.

You cannot coherently sate that something is both observable, and un-observable. This isn't a disagreement over facts or which body of asserted facts are the True Facts™. Even assuming Chalmers is right, a stolen concept is still a logical fallacy. This is why Chalmers is careful to assert not that we observe the correlates of consciousness, but that we observe behaviors..correlates of brain activity. Stated this way it only applies to creatures with brains, but we do observe behavior in things without brains at all. For some odd reason you think a furby would be a good example (despite it's obvious human artifice)..but here in mere reality a better rep for that set would be plants. Not a problem, for Chalmers. He might call them proto-conscious or minimally conscious. Consciousness being a fundamental unit or force. Run of the mill panpsychism.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Speaking of Chalmers, the p-zombie conjecture is a thought experiment designed explicitly to reject the notion that we can observe the correlates of consciousness...

These views place him well outside of the consensus in cog sci...

This is why Chalmers is careful to assert not that we observe the correlates of consciousness, but that we observe behaviors..correlates of brain activity.

That’s very interesting; are you aware that Chalmers has been instrumental in defining what neural correlates of consciousness are lol? He's set the foundation that helps many scientists search for them. Its not uncommon to come across cognitive scientists using his definition:
 

• “Chalmers provided a foundational work concerning this notion, in a paper entitled, 'What is a neural correlate of consciousness?' His paper is widely cited, as is his definition of the NCC: ‘An NCC is a minimal neural system N such that there is a mapping from states of N to states of consciousness, where a given state of N is sufficient, under conditions C, for the corresponding state of consciousness’” (Miller, 2014, p. 1).
  

 
Since I understand you may not have access to Chalmers’ paper, here’s a few excerpts to help you get a feel for his thoughts on the neural correlates of consciousness. Notice they tend to echo mine:
 

• “To find an NCC, we need to find a neural system that correlates with certain conscious states. To do this, we first need a way to know when a system is in a given conscious state. This is famously problematic, given the privacy of consciousness and the philosophical problem of other minds. In general, we rely on indirect criteria for the ascription of consciousness. The most straightforward of these criteria is verbal report in humans, but other criteria are often required” (Chalmers, 2000, p. 34).
  

 

• “Defining an NCC solely in terms of correlation seems to capture standard usage best, and it also makes the search more clearly defined and the methodology clearer. Correlations are easy for science to study. It also means that the search for an NCC can be to a large extent theoretically neutral rather than theoretically loaded. Once we have found an NCC, one might hope that it will turn out to be a system dedicated to consciousness, or that it will turn out to yield an explanation of consciousness, but these are further questions. In the meantime the search for an NCC as defined poses a tractable empirical question with relatively clear parameters, one that researchers of widely different theoretical persuasions can engage in” (p. 37).
  

 
Refences: -Miller SM (2014) Closing in on the constitution of consciousness. Front Psychol 5:1293
-Chalmers, D. J. (2000). “What is a neural correlate of consciousness?,” in Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions, ed. T. Metzinger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 17–39

[The Grand Nudger]

No discussion of the specifics of Chalmers position has much bearing on whether or why a statement employs the fallacy of a stolen concept.

In any case, Chalmers describes, and you must understand what he describes in the context of his position, what -would be- a correlate. Not that we have them, or can observe them. He doesn't think that we can any more than you do.

[John 6IX Breezy]

In any case, Chalmers describes, and you must understand what he describes in the context of his position, what -would be- a correlate.  Not that we have them, or can observe them.  He doesn't think that we can any more than you do.

He clearly thinks we can observe them, either anatomically or more abstractly:

• "It seems, then, that there is a range of possibilities for the brain-based correlates of conscious states, ranging from special anatomical areas, through more abstract neural systems, to purely "cognitive'' correlates such as Baars's global workspace […]  In any case it seems reasonable to expect that we will find informative brain-based correlates of consciousness at some level of abstraction in cognitive neurobiology" (Chalmers, 2000, p. 36)
  

He even takes time to address individuals who argue that we have no NCC:

• "It has also been argued that there is probably no neural correlate of consciousness, since there is probably no area of the brain that is specifically dedicated to consciousness as opposed to vision, memory, learning, and so on. One may well agree that there is no such area, but it does not follow that there is no neural correlate of consciousness as defined here. An NCC requires only that a system be correlated with consciousness, not that it be dedicated solely or mainly to consciousness" (p. 37).
  

Refences:Chalmers, D. J. (2000). “What is a neural correlate of consciousness?,” in Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions, ed. T. Metzinger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 17–39

[The Grand Nudger]

He thinks that they exist, he just doesn't think that we've found them, for reasons he expounds upon at length. Is any of your copypasta helping you to understand a stolen concept?

[John 6IX Breezy]

The field is still in its infancy, and whether or not something qualifies as a correlate is always open for debate. He certainly viewed many studies on the subject favorably back then, and used them as examples. This is a far cry from you saying he doesn't think we have them or that we can't observe them, both of which are false.

[The Grand Nudger]

If you say so John. Does any of it help you to understand a stolen concept, or not?

[John 6IX Breezy]

"...science, which proceeds from reductionism."

"All well and good, but if you take an anti-reductive position, you cannot then assert and thus require the truth of what you would attempt to disprove. In this case, a body of reductive facts. That would be a stolen concept."

Science has limits; being mindful of where it's tools and methods can't reach, either presently or indefinitely, is part of being a scientist. Pointing out that a hammer isn't good for cleaning widows, isn't a rejection of hammers being good for hammering, despite what you would have us believe. Its not a bundled package; you can view consciousness as irreducible and water as reducible without contradiction.

We saw that cognitive scientist David Chalmers views subjective experience as irreducible. We've seen that neurobiologist Robert Sapolsky views purely reductive explanations of vision as problematic.

I've asked you before for a reference stating that cognitive science is logically dependant on reductionism; or that science proceeds from reductionism. This is the cornerstone of your argument, without it there is no stolen concept, and yet not only have you failed to find such a reference, I've been successful at finding examples of scientists that do view reduction as limited.

[The Grand Nudger]

The idea that we can observe the correlates of consciousness is an explicitly reductionist conjecture. You keep thinking that we're having an argument over some detail of any position..but we're not. There is no "my argument". There is a stolen concept fallacy.

Or do you want to argue logic next, for max irony?

Are you arguing that your statements were not a stolen concept fallacy because you understand what that is, or because you intuit that it would be bad? If it's the former, I'm satisfied, lol.