Is God a logical contradiction?

[John 6IX Breezy]

I once heard someone argue for the existence of souls by claiming that the brain functions as radio receiver, communicating the will of the soul unto the body. Notice that in such a view, the brain is a correlate of the soul, without the soul being reduced to the brain. Why? Because a correlation is not a reduction. Even in Chalmers' view consciousness still correlates with the physical brain:

• "A nonreductive theory of consciousness will consist in a number of psychophysical principles, principles that connect the properties of physical processes to the properties of experience. We can think of these principles as encapsulating the way in which experience arises from the physical" (Chalmers, 2010, p. 20).
  

You confuse measurements with correlation. You confuse reduction with correlation. You confuse the scientific sense observation with the perceptual sense of observation. You have no understanding of the relationship between all these terms, consciousness, and science in general. The things you claim are logically dependant on something have no such relationship. In other words, you don't have the background necessary to identify a stolen concept within this field. Just like someone who doesn't understand the relationship between calculus and mathematics, couldn't possibly identify a stolen concept when someone accepts calculus but rejects mathematics.

Reference: Chalmers, D. (2010). The character of consciousness. Oxford University Press: London

[The Grand Nudger]

Not a problem as stated. No stolen concept. If the brain as receiver nutters can get it right, I'm sure that you can too.

A stolen concept isn't an issue of which position is correct, or whether I'm super dumb. Chalmers describes what will be (at least in his estimation), not what is. Chalmers does not think that we can identify a correlate of consciousness until we can determine..first, that a thing is conscious. He does not think that we can do that until we come up with a non-reductive possibly panpsychic new force. He does not accept -human- consciousness by default, as a purveyor of p-zombie objections.

He has a fun and novel position, none of which has to do with your silly fuckup, now some dozens of pages ago, or your subsequent inability to accept that or rephrase your own statements so that you don't end up sounding like a mouthbreather while saying something you don't believe.

Sooooooo...simple, even a dummy like me can get it. What's your excuse? How about we try another example of a stolen concept? Those fun conversations where a substance dualist asserts a property dualist's views and conclusions as true-for-effect, while rejecting the same. Ultimately, while Chalmers views are largely comprised of a genetic criticism, he still thinks that the answer for human consciousness will be found entirely within the brain, by science. The inclusion of his views and assertions as fact making properties of a worldview where there are two substances, the second substance being supernatural...and that this supernatural substance accounts for consciousness - would be a stolen concept. If Chalmers is right, that can't possibly be true...and if that is true, then Chalmers can't possibly be right.

[The Grand Nudger]

-another fun example of a stolen concept and consciousness.

If/When an eliminativist refers to the "cartesian theater" in a functional description of consciousness. If a guy like Dennett, for example, needed to claim a soul (by any name) in order to express his position, then he would have a stolen concept fallacy on his hands.

Dennett...obviously, famous for his criticism of this sort of thing. In fact, it's a position on this particular issue that place Chalmers and Dennett as far apart on the speculative spectrum as could be imagined. Two wholly disparate views on consciousness. Most people will fall somewhere between the two if they consider the subject. I think that this probably indicates value in both positions. Each side, if you will..has something true and informative to say about consciousness. If that were the case, then it's easy to see why a person who tended more toward Dennet or Chalmers would want to avail themselves of some portion of the others content.

Similarly, Dennett and Chalmers are both unavailable to an even wider set of positions about consciousness, but present a tempting body of (asserted)facts for the same reasons described above.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Chalmers does not think that we can identify a correlate of consciousness until we can determine..first, that a thing is conscious.  He does not think that we can do that until we come up with a non-reductive possibly panpsychic new force.  He does not accept -human- consciousness by default, as a purveyor of p-zombie objections.  

I don't think anyone in the field thinks you can identify the correlates of consciousness without the thing being conscious. Moreover, Chalmers' thinks a nonreductive explanation is needed to understand consciousness, not that a new force is needed to determine when something is conscious. Chalmers clearly accepts that reportability is a sign of consciousness, as do most other researchers:

• "Because we do not measure consciousness directly, we have to make something of a leap of faith […] The first and by far the most prevalent is the principle of verbal report. When someone says, “Yes, I see that table now,” we infer that the subject is conscious of the table. When someone says, “Yes, I see red now,” we infer that the subject is having an experience of red. Of course, one might always say, “How do you know?”— a philosopher might suggest that we may be faced with a fully functioning zombie—but in fact most of us do not believe that the people around us are zombies, and in practice we are quite prepared to rely on this principle. As pre-experimental assumptions go, this one is relatively safe—it does not require a huge leap of faith—and it is very widely used […] The principle here is that when information is verbally reported, it is conscious" (Chalmers, 2010, p. 92).
  

  
So again, the only way you can say there is a stolen concept here, is if you believe correlations are reductions.

Reference: Chalmers, D. (2010). The character of consciousness. Oxford University Press: London

[Rahn127]

If the brain is a receiver, why can I block the signal by closing my eyes ?

[John 6IX Breezy]

Dream states appear in consciousness.

[LastPoet]

Thread is going... everywhere!

[Rhizomorph13]

Is God a logical contradiction? I don't know but apparently animals can't be proven to be conscious unless you trust the data that's been collected by experts in the field...

And something about stolen concepts.

Yep, moving right along! It isn't like this is just Daffy Duck and Bugs Bunny debating about what hunting season it is.

[John 6IX Breezy]

So is this a bad time to say that light bulbs might be conscious?

• "A corollary of IIT that violates common intuitions is that even circuits as simple as a photodiode made up of a sensor and a memory element can have a modicum of experience" (Tononi and Koch, 2015, p. 11).
  

Reference: Tononi G, Koch, C. (2015). Consciousness: Here, there and everywhere? Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society B, 370, p. 1-11.

[The Grand Nudger]

Are you a furby? I only ask because you're copy pasting alot of shit, and I want to know if that's a correlate of consciousness.

As to conscious lightbulbs...not really an issue for me. I understand that you wouldn't be familiar - but I irritate members with constant posts about comp mind. AST is explicitly and intentionally a description of a machine report of consciousness.

Do conscious lightbulbs help you to understand a stolen concept, though? Refer back to my earlier example about how a guy like Dennett could find himself employing one.