Moral Oughts

[EgoDeath]

There are no "objective facts" when it comes to asking whether something is "right" or "wrong."

It's better to look at it in terms of "constructive" or "destructive." I wouldn't want someone to kill me, for example. So why would I take an innocent life? This behavior is destructive not only to the person I would hypothetically kill, it would also be destructive to me (possibly jail time, having to live with killing someone, etc.). So why engage in that behavior?

[The Grand Nudger]

And here’s moral functionalism and motivation.

https://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/paper...vation.pdf

A paper seemingly written for this thread.

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@ego

Is it just your opinion that an act is destructive?

If not, that’s the objectivity being referred to in moral theories.

[EgoDeath]

Looks like an interesting read. I'll bookmark it.

[EgoDeath]

And here’s moral functionalism and motivation.

https://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/paper...vation.pdf

A paper seemingly written for this thread.

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@ego

Is it just your opinion that an act is destructive?

If not, that’s the objectivity being referred to in moral theories.

Even constructive and destructive can be subjective, though probably much less so than 'right' or 'wrong.'

The main point was that I think when discussing morality we can get lost in the weeds of right and wrong, and that constructive and destructive are much better words to use.

That being said, I don't we'll ever get anyone to agree on it all. It's a complex subject, no doubt.

[Abaddon_ire]

If stealing is wrong is a moral fact, then it necessarily follows that one ought not to steal I don't get what's hard about this. Morality is about what you should or shouldn't do, based on whether it's right/good or bad/wrong.

I am of that view, but Gae and Grandizer don’t see the ought as following from the moral facts. For them a moral fact, like stealing is bad, is just another way of saying stealing is harmful.

They don’t view moral statements like stealing as bad as normative, but descriptive. Stealing is bad may be objectively true, but you ought not steal or so bad things is not, at least according to them.

Is stealing a loaf of bread to feed my starving children a moral act, or immoral?

[The Grand Nudger]

The distinction between objectivity and subjectivity isn’t complicated. It’s not even an issue of debate.

Your opinion is a fact about you. A subjectivist’s fact, and sure, it’s your opinion that x is destructive. I have opinions you have opinions we all have opinions. Does the opinion accurately communicate a fact about the act, the object. That would be objectivist.

You could use the term destructive objectively or subjectively, but if your intended use is as a reference to facts of the object, that’s the sort of objectivity being referred to in moral theories.

[Acrobat]

This is an interesting argument. I've never thought of this before. 

Would it be right for me to say here that Wittgenstein isn't talking about morality as being part of metaphysics or something intrinsic in the world. But rather that language reveals how people actually think about morals. And if we know how people really think about morals, then we know what morals people have. 

So he's saying there are two kinds of good: good for a particular goal, and good because it's good. 

And a good which is only aimed at a particular goal may be accepted or discarded if the goal changes. So if your goal is to let the other guy win, then playing "badly" is good. Or if your goal is to delay your passenger from arriving at his destination because you know he's planning a crime, then taking the "wrong" road is the right thing. 

But the other kind -- good because it's good -- is a case where the variability of the goal will be denied. So if you're a bus driver and you're driving your passengers recklessly along the edge of a cliff, it wouldn't be acceptable to say, "well, it was my goal to drive recklessly today." People would, very rightly, say, "it is bad of you to choose this goal. Whether you happen to desire this end or not, it's bad." 

I wonder if this is revealing about a difference between Wittgenstein and modern Americans. I would say that Wittgenstein here is closer to my own moral views, but I have found that many people posting here disagree with me about such things. It may well be that the dominant view of morality in America is a strictly outcome-based, practical view. "If I might get punished it's bad. But if I'll be OK it's OK." With no absolute component to it. Others have thought that America was a land of expediency.

For the most part this is accurate. Wittegenstien here is primarly exploring the meaing of moral language, what we mean by good and bad, as distinct from other domains. Primarily that in moral language we appear to be making statements of absolute value, unlike when we speak in other areas, where we are speaking in relative terms.

He isn't doing so for the sake of deriving what morals people hold. He isn't attempting to develop any moral philosophy. Just investigating the sort of language game that takes place.

I should say, while I made a distinction between the sort of moral language Wittgenstien is speaking of, and the sort Gae and Grandizer appear to be using, Wittgenstien makes no such distinctions. It's the language of theists and unbelievers alike, at least the philosophers, and others he's acquinted with.

And I'm not sure if you're referring exclusively to American atheists, or just Americans in general, because pretty much everyone including fundies, speak about morality in the language described, except perhaps atheists like Gae and Grandizer, and those like them.

I think American atheists, tend to have a hostile attitude towards not just religious views, but views that even have a whiff of religiousness to them, like beliefs in absolute values, views that negate any sort of materialistic account of the world. It's why atheists like Daniel Dennet, Jerry Coyne, come out very harshly against unbelievers like Thomas Nagel, for expressing such sympathies.

[The Grand Nudger]

Realism doesn’t negate any materialistic account of the world. It doesn’t even need one.

Materialistic accounts are just immensely useful for describing phenomena.

The whiff comes from listening to religious people butcher realism. It’s frustrating. We end up acting as-if we were realists anyway.

[Acrobat]

I am of that view, but Gae and Grandizer don’t see the ought as following from the moral facts. For them a moral fact, like stealing is bad, is just another way of saying stealing is harmful.

They don’t view moral statements like stealing as bad as normative, but descriptive. Stealing is bad may be objectively true, but you ought not steal or so bad things is not, at least according to them.

Is stealing a loaf of bread to feed my starving children a moral act, or immoral?

What would you say?

How about if i stole a loaf of bread from another starving family that needed it just as much as I did?

I would say you're doing something bad "stealing a loaf of bread", for the sake of something good "saving your children from starving". 
If someone stole my bread to save their children from starving, by all means steal it.

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Realism doesn’t negate any materialistic account of the world.  It doesn’t even need one.

Materialistic accounts are just immensely useful for describing phenomena.

The whiff comes from listening to religious people butcher realism.  It’s frustrating.  We end up acting as-if we were realists anyway.

I was speaking about the nature of normative moral statements. Not the particular realism view you described, where moral statements are purely descriptive.

[The Grand Nudger]

You bring up something interesting, Acro.

The statement that stealing is bad doesn’t contain any explicit reason for why it would be not bad. Surface level analytics aren’t feasible here.

It doesn’t mean exactly was it says. It’s a generalized absolute. True often enough, but not necessarily true.

(My comments referred to natural and non natural realism.)