Moral Oughts

[DLJ]

The distinction between objectivity and subjectivity isn’t complicated.  It’s not even an issue of debate.
...

It isn't?  I suspect that therein lies the reason why Philosophers haven't sorted this out yet.

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if your intended use is as a reference to facts of the object, that’s the sort of objectivity being referred to in moral theories.

Does this mean that 'objectivity' is one of those terms that means one thing to moral theorists and another thing to lay-persons?  Like "intentionality" which to a Philosopher means 'what-it's-like-to-be-ness' and to the rest of us means 'relating to intentions'.

If so, for future reference, should we read 'objectivity' as related to (dynamic or static) attributes of an entity/thing/act and not as related to bias, partiality and prejudice?

Or is it combination of criteria e.g.:
Static attributes (e.g. serial number)
Dynamic attributes (e.g. location, owner)
Independently measurable / quantifiable / verifiable attributes
... with consensus reached by independent auditors / observers?

Or is it just a way of excluding relative attributes e.g. beauty.

[Acrobat]

Realism doesn’t negate any materialistic account of the world.  It doesn’t even need one.

Materialistic accounts are just immensely useful for describing phenomena.

The whiff comes from listening to religious people butcher realism.  It’s frustrating.  We end up acting as-if we were realists anyway.

I was referring to what Wittgenstien was highlighting, regarding moral absolutes.

I agree moral realism defined by you doesn't negate any materialistic account of the world. 

Since according to your definition, this is just another way of saying, "description of harm done or harm avoided doesn't negate any materialistic account of the world". I agree.

[The Grand Nudger]

Moral realism defined by - no one- negates a materialistic account.

[Acrobat]

Moral realism defined by - no one- negates a materialistic account.

Except those who view oughts as objective facts, or those who subscribe to something like Plato’s conception of the Good.

[The Grand Nudger]

Objective facts don’t negate a materialistic account. Even a platonic account of morality doesn’t negate a materialistic account of the world.

A person can hold both. They’re generally dualists. They think that some things are best explained by x, and others by y. Morality, perhaps, by ideals....the world by material.
- with some defining criteria separating the two.

You’re clearly abusive the term objective by reducing it to refer solely to your own beliefs, which you’ve failed to establish as objective in the first place.

You just believe they are. That’s s fact about you. Not a fact about morality, or even your own morality. Your own beliefs about my morality are a proper fact about you, even...since you won’t unclog your ears when you ask questions.


If you could figure ought how to establish that your beliefs refer to some fact about morality, or even your own morality, then you could learn to identify the objective and subjective components of a given moral theory.

TLDR version. Your silly god doesn’t own facts.

[Acrobat]

Objective facts don’t negate a materialistic account. Even a platonic account of morality doesn’t negate a materialistic account of the world.

A person can hold both. They’re generally dualists. They think that some things are best explained by x, and others by y. Morality, perhaps, by ideals....the world by material.

The good, these sort of absolute moral oughts Wittgenstein highlights, are immaterial truths.

Plato’s conception of the Good isn’t a material fact of the world, it isn’t composed of matter.

Some forms of moral realism postulate immaterial moral truths, whether you disagree with such views or not.

[The Grand Nudger]

Are they? Why can’t they be natural truths, as asserted by natural realists?

Why aren’t all immaterial theories absolutist?

[The Grand Nudger]

Continuing, cognitivism is the notion that moral statements are fact-like. That they represent ( or allegedly represent) objectively true things. Realism and subjectivism ( and the natural and non natural varieties of either) are all equally cognitivist positions.

The difference between subjectivism and realism is not that one possesses objectively true statements and the other doesn’t...but what those objectively true statements refer to.

That I think so and so pizza, for example, is the best kind of pizza is an objectively true fact about my subjective state. Whether it’s a natural or non natural fact depends on how I view the nature of my subjective states.

[Acrobat]

Lol.  Of course oughts follow from moral facts, and at least one evaluative premise.

Unclog your ears.

You can’t go from is to ought without one.  

Stealing is wrong
Therefore you shouldn’t steal

....doesn’t actually follow.

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As for instrumental goods and intrinsic goods, moral statements play heavily with those two concepts.

We often consider our “is”-es to be representative of intrinsic goods.  Our evaluative premises dip heavily into instrumental goods.  Good for confirming to our moral schema.  Good for generating positive consequence.  Good for our mental state.

Moore has a wonderful comment on how we experience morality as a brute fact.

All you have to do to teach a person what “bad” is, is make them stand there watching four adults kick a toddler.

All of their evaluative premises will flow from having seen this and contemplating their relationship to it.  Subjective premises, objective ones, considerations of instrumental and intrinsic goods.

In his view, all were rational but non empirical products.  Insomuch as he considered the experience of that event and the subsequent thought processes beyond empirical verification.

Hence his non natural realism. This sort of realism reverses the distribution above.  More intrinsic goods, fewer instrumental.  Seeing Bad in things, rather than seeing Things that are bad.

I desire to eat a warm pizza.

There's a warm pizza on the table. 

I ought to eat the warm pizza. 


Does the ought stem from the pizza being on the table, or from my desire to eat it? 

You've indicated before that when you saying stealing is wrong, what you mean is descriptive, similar to saying stealing is harmful.

I desire to steal your wallet that you dropped because I want to use the money in it to buy an xbox, i acknowledge that stealing is harmful.

No ought not steal is derived from stealing being harmful. An ought would have to be based on something, such as I ought not do things that are harmful, which isn't derived from that fact that something is harmful, but some overarching goal or aim.

[The Grand Nudger]

It follows from neither. You need some premise along the lines of how it’s best or preferable to do what you desire, and the premise “there is a warm pizza on the table” has no inferential value for the conclusion.

Just as “ought not do things that are harmful” won’t get you a “ you shouldn’t do x” unless it’s paired with some premise about how x -is- harmful.

I ought not do harmful things

Therefore I ought not hit you in the mouth.

What’s missing? Or, more accurately, what’s being silently assumed so that -something- makes the conclusion follow from the premise?