The Watchmaker: my fav argument

[Angrboda]

Hmm there is no arguments from the heap being made by Quine:

"Quine’s most powerful argument is usually seen to be his claim that there is no way to mark out the distinction between changes within and changes between frameworks in a way that is scientific and does not beg the question" (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p 118).

Reference: Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003). Theory and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

My argument was addressed to you, not to Quine, but what you've posted seems to be a classical example of the fallacy of the beard which says that if no specific demarcation can be made, then the two things are the same. I'm not familiar with Quine's writings to know that he is saying this, and you haven't presented any evidence that he has, but it does seem that this is what you are trying to say, which is fallacious as noted.

[John 6IX Breezy]

I think you are confused about what an argument from the heap is, or are misapplying it to this conversation.

[Angrboda]

I think you are confused about what an argument from the heap is, or are misapplying it to this conversation.

Then straighten me out. Let's hear it.

Let me post what it appears to me that you are arguing:

"Bob the Builder’s most powerful argument is usually seen to be his claim that there is no way to mark out the distinction between changes within a face that is beardless and changes within a face that has a beard, and changes between having a beard and not having a beard in a way that is scientific and does not beg the question. Therefore having a beard and not having a beard are the same."

Fix my error.

[Pat Mustard]

Please inform us of all the "wrong" predictions that cannot be resolved with adjustments [emphasis added] to the theory. 

Adjustment is an important word. According to Quine (a philosopher of science), any belief can be kept in place if you are willing to move enough stuff around it. You can keep any theory alive with revisions, including competing theories.

Science isn't about believe you addle-pated mountebank. If you were truly studying psychology you would know that and you wouldn't be peddling such an idiotic lie.

[Fake Messiah]

Adjustment is an important word. According to Quine (a philosopher of science), any belief can be kept in place if you are willing to move enough stuff around it. You can keep any theory alive with revisions, including competing theories.

So how would you, for example, keep Lamarckism alive with revisions?

[John 6IX Breezy]

Fix my error.

Isn't the awkwardness with which your example is inserted into my paragraph proof that you are misapplying things here?

[Angrboda]

Fix my error.

Isn't the awkwardness with which your example is inserted into my paragraph proof that you are misapplying things here?

No. That is a silly argument. Are you asserting that inter-theoretic change and intra-theoretic change are the same? If so, where does Quine say that they are?

Saying that there is no way to distinguish when a shaven face becomes a bearded face is not the same as saying they are the same. Quine appears to say the former in your quote. He does not say the latter.

I may very well be confused. Your asserting that I am or that my example is strained isn't convincing. However, that you aren't making a convincing argument suggests certain other things.

[John 6IX Breezy]

So how would you, for example, keep Lamarckism alive with revisions?

I'm not sure. I suppose you could shrink or shift it's scope and application. Gould apperantly viewed social learning as a form of Lamarckism. So we could change the theories focus from information that is inherited reproductively, to information that is inherited behaviorally.

Ptolomy's epicycles are a better illustration here. The insertion of epicycles was a revision made to geocentrism that brought it into harmony with observation, while maintaining it's central framework alive. I don't know what the epicycles of Lamarckism could be.

[HappySkeptic]

Isn't the awkwardness with which your example is inserted into my paragraph proof that you are misapplying things here?

You seem to be trying to make the claim that if a theory makes a wrong prediction, the choice whether to throw out the theory completely, or whether to simply change it is arbitrary.  Therefore there is no way to scientifically choose one over the other.

Therefore ID is just as good as modifications to modern evolutionary theory?

[John 6IX Breezy]

You seem to be trying to make the claim that if a theory makes a wrong prediction, the choice whether to throw out the theory completely, or whether to simply change it is arbitrary.  Therefore there is no way to scientifically choose one over the other.

Therefore ID is just as good as modifications to modern evolutionary theory?

I agree that the choice to modify or replace a theory is rather subjective. And ID can certainly be revised as often as it needs. But I've mostly been responding to questions about evolution; I'm not making arguments about ID here.