What if Judas didn't do it?

[Angrboda]

Bel touched on something I've wondered about. Where does the line between objective and subjective exist? Do the patterns in the light entering my eye have objective existence? What about the patterns of electrical activity in my optic nerve? Does it become subjective when my visual cortex abstracts features out of the stream of neural input? Or does that happen when our subconscious orders those abstract features into a set of relations? Or does it necessarily have to enter consciousness itself to become subjective? Or does it only become subjective when our consciousness "does something" with those perceptions, and what exactly does that mean?

I think as Bel observes, Kant concluded that our awareness and the reality it is aware of are inextricably bound. So it may make more sense to say the subjective objective distinction is a false dichotomy, and therefore the question of a primacy of consciousness or existence itself may be a false dilemma.

[The Grand Nudger]

Difficult in practice, perhaps, to identify - but certainly not as a logical proposition. The line with respect to any dispute between the poe and the poc is whether seeming is reality making, or being is reality making. Between fact and opinion as the literal and mechanical producers of reality per se. Between actuality and apprehension. I apprehend Bel as a cat. Does that make Bel a cat? I apprehend Bel as being dull. Does that make Bel dull? I apprehend Bel as a moral failure. Does that make Bel a moral failure?

I think..obviously, no. Insomuch as Bel is either a cat or dull or a moral failure, it could only be on account of facts about Bel, not facts about my apprehension of Bel. Still, two out of three aint bad. If it pisses on the rug and then demands adoration for it's opus, it's a cat. I figure it's 50/50 that I get one of the other two right, as it's hard to tell the difference, in practice, between them.

I find it tedious to have to deal with the insistence that a clear proposition is ambiguous when, in all likelihood, the underlying issue or item of objection - is that the other person thinks it's simply wrong - itself an invocation of purported objectivity. It might be wrong, that's worth exploring, but things are only right or wrong, statements only accurate or inaccurate in fact, in an objective context to begin with..so....? FWIW, I think randian objectivism is loon shit - but that doesn't mean that commitments to objectivity or subjectivity don't have distinct mechanical consequences in coherent systems.

[The Grand Nudger]

-and just to keep trying to tie this into judas. An understanding of the claim that asserts the primacy of subjective apprehension as the reality maker in this matter is a narrative understanding of the character of judas and purpose of the story. It is irrelevant that there was no judas and that this did not happen as told. The salient facts of the story are in the ability of a cultural consciousness to be expressed and that this consciousness is reality making in conflict with and even in spite of any objective fact of judas non existence as a person or jesus non existence as a person or these events non occurrence in mere reality. Both men and the relationship between them are palpably created by thinking about them, and in a particular way, and not by any objective fact of their existence or relationship in reality per se.

[Belacqua]

Bel touched on something I've wondered about.  Where does the line between objective and subjective exist?  Do the patterns in the light entering my eye have objective existence?  What about the patterns of electrical activity in my optic nerve?  Does it become subjective when my visual cortex abstracts features out of the stream of neural input?  Or does that happen when our subconscious orders those abstract features into a set of relations?  Or does it necessarily have to enter consciousness itself to become subjective?  Or does it only become subjective when our consciousness "does something" with those perceptions, and what exactly does that mean?

I think as Bel observes, Kant concluded that our awareness and the reality it is aware of are inextricably bound.  So it may make more sense to say the subjective objective distinction is a false dichotomy, and therefore the question of a primacy of consciousness or existence itself may be a false dilemma.

For whatever reason -- I don't know -- we seem to have a habit of thinking dualistically about the mind. 

Even convinced materialists, who see the mind as only an epiphenomenon from the physical brain, and reject any idea of soul or disembodied mind, will sometimes speak of mind as if it is some kind of spark of pure reason. The old guys who saw mind as a tiny portion of God-stuff apparently set the vocabulary that we still tend to fall into.

For example you'll sometimes hear people say (or imply) that if we could just get rid of certain bad influences (religion or other superstitions) then babies would grow up to be entirely rational. 

But if the brain really is responsible, and the brain evolved just as any other organ, then I don't see the subjective/objective distinction as holding very strongly. And the rational/irrational divide probably isn't quite as distinct as one might hope.

[Angrboda]

Difficult in practice, perhaps, to identify - but certainly not as a logical proposition.  The line with respect to any dispute between the poe and the poc is whether seeming is reality making, or being is reality making.  Between fact and opinion as the literal and mechanical producers of reality per se.  Between actuality and apprehension.  I apprehend Bel as a cat.  Does that make Bel a cat?  I apprehend Bel as being dull.  Does that make Bel dull?  I apprehend Bel as a moral failure.  Does that make Bel a moral failure?

I think..obviously, no.  Insomuch as Bel is either a cat or dull or a moral failure, it could only be on account of facts about Bel, not facts about my apprehension of Bel.  Still, two out of three aint bad.  If it pisses on the rug and then demands adoration for it's opus, it's a cat.  I figure it's 50/50 that I get one of the other two right, as it's hard to tell the difference, in practice, between them.

I find it tedious to have to deal with the insistence that a clear proposition is ambiguous when, in all likelihood, the underlying issue or item of objection - is that the other person thinks it's simply wrong - itself an invocation of purported objectivity.  It might be wrong, that's worth exploring, but things are only right or wrong, statements only accurate or inaccurate in fact, in an objective context to begin with..so....?  FWIW, I think randian objectivism is loon shit - but that doesn't mean that commitments to objectivity or subjectivity don't have distinct mechanical consequences in coherent systems.

Well, when you find a way to determine objective things without all the subjective in the way, do let me know. You have the wrong end of the telescope, inadvertently and illicitly switching around burdens.

[Belacqua]

-and just to keep trying to tie this into judas.  An understanding of the claim that asserts the primacy of subjective apprehension as the reality maker in this matter is a narrative understanding of the character of judas and purpose of the story.  It is irrelevant that there was no judas and that this did  not happen as told.  The salient facts of the story are in the ability of a cultural consciousness to be expressed and that this consciousness is reality making in conflict with and even in spite of any objective fact of judas non existence as a person or jesus non existence as a person or these events non occurrence in mere reality.  Both men and the relationship between them are palpably created by thinking about them, and in a particular way, and not by any objective fact of their existence or relationship in reality per se.

Yes, I think so too.

The emotional import of a myth -- and therefore its moral power and enduringly provocative nature -- don't depend on it being true at all. 

Fictional characters carry just as much weight in my emotional world as long-dead historical people. 

Whether Judas really did what he did is of interest to a certain kind of historian, but not crucial to religious teaching.

[Belacqua]

Difficult in practice, perhaps, to identify - but certainly not as a logical proposition.  The line with respect to any dispute between the poe and the poc is whether seeming is reality making, or being is reality making.  Between fact and opinion as the literal and mechanical producers of reality per se.  Between actuality and apprehension.  I apprehend Bel as a cat.  Does that make Bel a cat?  I apprehend Bel as being dull.  Does that make Bel dull?  I apprehend Bel as a moral failure.  Does that make Bel a moral failure?

I think..obviously, no.  Insomuch as Bel is either a cat or dull or a moral failure, it could only be on account of facts about Bel, not facts about my apprehension of Bel.  Still, two out of three aint bad.  If it pisses on the rug and then demands adoration for it's opus, it's a cat.  I figure it's 50/50 that I get one of the other two right, as it's hard to tell the difference, in practice, between them.

I find it tedious to have to deal with the insistence that a clear proposition is ambiguous when, in all likelihood, the underlying issue or item of objection - is that the other person thinks it's simply wrong - itself an invocation of purported objectivity.  It might be wrong, that's worth exploring, but things are only right or wrong, statements only accurate or inaccurate in fact, in an objective context to begin with..so....?  FWIW, I think randian objectivism is loon shit - but that doesn't mean that commitments to objectivity or subjectivity don't have distinct mechanical consequences in coherent systems.

Well, when you find a way to determine objective things without all the subjective in the way, do let me know.  You have the wrong end of the telescope, inadvertently and illicitly switching around burdens.

I'll have you know that I almost never piss on the rug any more.

[The Grand Nudger]

You'll have to tell me your secret sometime, I would like to do it less. I'm not sure if it will help - but it's a private goal. I'd really love it if you and I could hijack this discussion about judas for a moment, because it's a hell of a thing when people who disagree so strongly on so much find common ground.

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, when you find a way to determine objective things without all the subjective in the way, do let me know.  You have the wrong end of the telescope, inadvertently and illicitly switching around burdens.

...lol, you know I wouldn't shut up about it or wait for an invitiation if I had one.  I remain ultimately and ideologically ambivalent about such a thing - though I can give all manner of explication for it within a given schema - like..what you can coherently say from the point of view of fundamental objectivism or fundamental subjectivism.  What must be true, if either is true, regardless of which is true. I'm a born butcher. I carve things up. I don't care which cut of what a person wants, and I'm not entirely certain which cut is true, or if a true cut even makes overarching sense...but I do understand the shape of the cuts.

[Angrboda]

There's a Ted talk in which the presenter argues that "realism" or accuracy of perception takes a back seat to how our impulses shaped by perception lead to biological reproduction. I don't know that he outright says that we systematically misperceive reality, but that seems the gist. If that's the case, how would we know that Bel isn't a cat or some other absurdity. There seems some necessary poisoning of the well from which we drink our thoughts about objective reality. We'd like to believe that we can reliably bin things that aren't objectively true, but it's not entirely clear upon what foundation our confidence rests. If Descartes was right in asserting that the only thing we can be certain of is "cogito ergo sum," and I have doubts about that, then it's not clear how confident we can be of objective reality. It's probably true that no theory of knowledge can survive too much skepticism, but the resulting Goldilocks problem abandons us to a philosophical pragmatism that seems more emotionally based than rational.